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In 2009, with the continuation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a global financial crisis, fears of 
$PHULFDQGHFOLQHZHUHFRPSRXQGHGE\WKHµULVHRI&KLQD¶DQGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWKH
Asia-3DFLILFJHRSROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQWWKDWZRXOGGHVWDELOLVHWKHUHJLRQ¶VSRVW-war order and challenge 
U.S. regional hegemony.  In the same year, the Obama administration initiated a recalibration of U.S. 
foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific that became known as the strategic rebalance.  This thesis 
examines the way in which the Obama administration has responded to the Asia-3DFLILF¶V UHJLRQDO
geopolitics through its signature rebalance strategy in order to maintain its hegemonic position.  This 
research contributes to IR by using a constructivist approach and discourse analysis to interpret 
hegemony as both an intrinsic part of U.S. identity, and a social, asymmetrical relationship, derived 
from multiple and overlapping sources of power.  Hegemony is an asymmetric relationship that requires 
consent from the Asia-Pacific nations for its ongoing legitimacy. The rebalance strategy is an effort to 
make the U.S. ontologically secure ± to secure its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific.  In examining 
how the U.S. reproduces its regional hegemony from these angles, this thesis develops the constructivist 
focus on ideas, identity and narrative as being intrinsic to foreign policy output.  This approach allows 
for consideration of the co-constituted relationships between the belief system of American 
H[FHSWLRQDOLVPWKHµULVHRI&KLQD¶QDUUDWLYH86KHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\IRUPDWLRQDQG86IRUHLJQSROLF\ 
practice7KHHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI86KHJHPRQ\DSSOLHV%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\RISRZHUWR
examine the interplay between the different components of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  
This holistic approach to U.S. hegemony and the exertion of power determines that the U.S. does not 
solely rely on coercive military power to achieve foreign policy outcomes.  Instead, this thesis interprets 
the rebalance strategy as part of complex processes of social bargains, identity, narratives and forms of 
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This map shows the principal island chains under dispute. 2 
   
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.  These islands are currently administered by Japan 
but also claimed by China/Taiwan.   
In the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in 
part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and are occupied in part by all these countries except 
Brunei. Scarborough Shoal, occupied by China since 2012, is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines.  The Paracel Islands are claimed by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China. 
                                                          
2 ZŽŶĂůĚK ?ZŽƵƌŬĞ ?Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for 
Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2016, 10. 
 xiv 
 
Figure 3: Map RI&KLQD¶V1LQH-Dashed Line 






















Source: United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. 
 
In its letter to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, LQ 0D\  &KLQD FODLPV µLQGLVSXWDEOH
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign 
rights and jurisdLFWLRQRYHUWKHUHOHYDQWZDWHUVDVZHOODVWKHVHDEHGDQGVXEVRLOWKHUHRI¶3 
                                                          
3 This map wĂƐĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞũŽŝŶƚƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶďǇDĂůĂǇƐŝĂĂŶĚ
Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009. The Permanent Mission of the 
UN, WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ? >ĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ hE ^ĞĐƌetary General, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, May 7, 2009. 








This thesis interprets U.S. identity formation, narratives and security and analyses how these interrelated 
processes contribute to the preservation of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the rebalance 
strategy.  The puzzle at the heart of this project is the ObDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRDQQRXQFHLWV
rebalance policy in November 2011, two years into the strategy, when there was little material evidence 
of U.S. decline, and when the U.S. occupied a dominant and powerful position in the region, particularly 
in military terms.  The thesis argues that we cannot understand the rationale for the rebalance by 
focusing solely on traditional understandings of security.  Instead, the rebalance needs to be understood 
LQ OLJKWRI $PHULFD¶V QHHG IRU RQWRORJLFDO VHFXULW\  In particular, this thesis is concerned with the 
centrality of U.S. hegemonic identity to American self-understanding and sense of security in the 
international arena.  I consider how U.S. security QDUUDWLYHVKDYHLQWHUSUHWHGWKHµULVHRI&KLQD¶DQG
shaped the U.S. exercise of power in the region.  The two main aims of this thesis are first, to explain 
the ideational rationales for the rebalance strategy, and second, to analyse how the U.S. has exercised 




intention to remain the hegemon across the vast expanse that constitutes the Asia-Pacific region.4  In 
recognising the significant role that the Asia-Pacific region would play in global politics in the twenty-
first century, the Asia-3DFLILFUHEDODQFHZDVPHDQWWRGHQRWHWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VµVPDUWDQGV\VWHPDWLF¶
DSSURDFKFRQFHUQLQJZKHUHWKH86ZRXOGLQYHVWµWLPHDQGHQHUJ\¶over the following decade.5  The 
PXVFXODUWRQHRIWKHUHEDODQFHRUµSLYRW¶WR$VLDZDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VFRQFHUQVabout 
regional reports that the U.S. was distracted by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the U.S. had 
been economically weakened by the 2008 global financial crisis.6  7KLV KHLJKWHQHG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
                                                          
4 dŚĞ ‘ƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƐƵď-regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Australasia, and 
increasingly the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) including India. 
5 ,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ ?  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011). 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/  (accessed March 18, 2016). 
6 In her Foreign Policy ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚŽƵƌďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĂůƐŽǁŽŶĚĞƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ WŽƵƌǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĞŶŐĂŐĞĚĂŶĚƚŽůĞĂĚ ?/ŶƐŝĂƚŚĞǇĂƐŬ QǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁĞĐĂŶŵĂŬĞ W 
and keep  W credible economic and strategic commitments. ?ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? 
 2 
 
anxieties that the Asia-Pacific was moving closer to China, attracted by Chinese economic advances.7  
&KLQD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGLQJKDGEHHQVWUHQJWKHQHGon account of its limited exposure to the 2008 
JOREDO ILQDQFLDOFULVLV WKHUHE\ LQFUHDVLQJ%HLMLQJ¶VFRQILGHQFH LQ LWV LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQWHUDFWLRQV8  By 
November 2011, Washington perceived its initial engagement and accommodation strategy as having 
limited success in taming BHLMLQJ¶VDVVHUWLRQRI&KLQHVHLQWHUHVWVLQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW&KLQD6HDVDQG
&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFLQIOXHQFH7KHLPSOLFDWLRQZDVWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVDGHFOLQLQJSRZHUZLWK
little impetus to lead, and China, the rising star in East Asia, was poised to replace the United States as 
the regional hegemon.   
 
Empirical Puzzles 
From the outset of the Obama administration, a plan to reorient U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-
Pacific was already being formulated.9  During 2009 and 2010, the implementation of specific economic 
and diplomatic aspects of the reorientation were underway.  Both President Obama and Secretary of 
State Clinton prioritised the Asia-Pacific for overseas trips, more usually designated to European allies.  
In 2010, Obama renewed U.S. interest in negotiating a regional free trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific 
3DUWQHUVKLS2EDPD¶VGHFLVLRQWRDQQRXQFHWKHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\LQ&DQEHUUDAustralia, in November 
2011, with specific focus on military rebalancing, when the reorientation strategy to the Asia-Pacific 
was already in process, was unexpected.  Why did the United States, the Asia-3DFLILF¶VSreponderant 
military power, need to formally announce its Asia-Pacific strategy, two years into its implementation?  
More importantly, why was the focus on the military rebalance?      
 
In her November 2011 Foreign Policy article, Hillary Clinton promoted the pivot, or rebalance, as 
indication of a broader recalibration of U.S. foreign policy.  This recalibration was a much-needed 
response to concerns that the decade following September 2011 had drawn U.S. attention to Iraq and 
$IJKDQLVWDQ 7KH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFRQFOXGHG WKDW:DVKLQJWRQ¶V IRFXVRQ WKH:DURQ7HUURU
during the G.W. Bush administration had enabled China to step into the leadership void in the Asia-
Pacific.  Following the 2008 global financial crisis, it was reasoned that this combination of conditions 
was transforming Asia-Pacific perceptions on the strength of American regional hegemony.  In her 
                                                          
7 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (New York: 
Penguin, 2012), 247. 
8 dŚŽŵĂƐ : ? ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ?  “KďĂŵĂ ĂŶĚ ƐŝĂ P ŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŶĂ ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ?Foreign Affairs 94, no. 5 
(September/October 2015): 28. 
9 In his Obama administration memoirs, Bader notes that although the G.W. Bush administration policy towards 
the Asia-Pacific had been generally sound, it had been tainted by the focus on terrorism and U.S. attention 
elsewhere. Jeffrey Bader, KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ PŶ/ŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ƐĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐŝĂt^rategy (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 2012), chapter 1. 
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article, Clinton revealed two specific U.S. concerns relating to U.S. regional hegemony: first, the Asia-
3DFLILF¶VUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFDQGVHFXULW\DUFKLWHFWXUHZDVJUDGXDOO\GHYHORSLQJRXWVLGHWKHVSKHUHRI
U.S. influence, and second, regional doubts over Washington¶Vwillingness to engage and lead in the 
region.10   
 
+HUDUWLFOHDOVRPDNHVLPSOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWRWKHSRWHQWLDOO\KDUPIXOLPSDFWRI&KLQD¶VULVLQJLQIOXHQFH
on regional development, as a consequence of its unfair economic practices and currency manipulation, 
LWVKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGDQGRSDTXHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP)XUWKHUWKHXQNQRZQHIIHFWVRI&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\
modernisation, the developments in the South China Sea and matters relating to maritime and 
cybersecurity were set in opposition to the known quantity of U.S. regional hegemony.  Contrasted with 
China, the U.S. has no regional territorial ambitions, it has a long record of providing regional common 
goods, underwriting regional security and has preserved regional stability for decades.  The rebalance 
was expressed in terms of reasoned common sense: µDVWUDWHJLFWXUQWRWKHUHJLRQILWVORJLFDOO\LQWRRXU
JOREDO HIIRUW WR VHFXUH DQG VXVWDLQ $PHULFD¶V JOREDO OHDGHUVKLS.¶11  &OLQWRQ¶V DUWLFOH UHVHPEOHG D
manifesto for American regional hegemony. 
    
The declaration to rebalance coincideGZLWK2EDPD¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWLQ&DQEHUUDWKDWWKHUHZRXOGEH
increased U.S. troop rotation through Darwin, along with other measures designed to strengthen the 
U.S. military presence across the Asia-Pacific.12  Until the announcement, the administration had 
focused its efforts on regional diplomatic and economic re-engagement, and on improving the damaged 
reputation of the U.S. internationally by avoiding any mention of military engagement outside 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Therefore, the specific military edge to the rebalance indicated a 
VKLIWLQWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHJLRQDOHPSKDVLV 
 
The timing of the rebalance announcement also corresponded ZLWK &KLQD¶V apparent increasing 
assertiveness in the South and East China Seas between 2009 and 2011.  In cyclical spats of increased 
tension, incidences in the South China Sea typically involved Chinese Coast Guard harassment of 
fishing vessels from Vietnam and the Philippines entering disputed waters.  The Chinese naval presence 
(PLA-N) in the western Pacific, Chinese island-building activities in the South China Sea and the 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas did not simply emerge between 2009 and 2010.  
                                                          
10 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? 
11 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? 
12 The White House,  “ZĞŵĂƌŬƐďǇWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂƚŽƚŚĞƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂŶďĞƌƌĂ ?Australia, November 
17, 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-
parliament (accessed June 23, 2016). 
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Island-building amongst all claimants in the South China Sea dates back to the 1970s, and in this regard, 
China is late in this development.13  Since the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China 
Sea was agreed between China and ASEAN in 2002, the situation in the South China Sea had remained 
relatively peaceful and stable.    
 
In March 2009, the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed U.S. naval surveillance vessel, was harassed by 
&KLQHVHVKLSVLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDXSRQHQWHULQJ&KLQD¶V([FOXVLYH(FRQRPLF=RQH((=,QD
similar incident nearly a decade earlier, in March 2001, the USNS Bowditch had also been confronted 
E\&KLQHVHYHVVHOVLQWKH<HOORZ6HDIRUDOVRHQWHULQJ&KLQD¶V([FOXVLYH(FRQRPLF=RQHHowever, 
by July 2010, Secretary Clinton had stepped into the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
declaring U.S. support for µDFROODERUDWLYHGLSORPDWLFSURFHVVE\DOOFODLPDQWVIRUUHVROYLQJWKHYDULRXV
WHUULWRULDOGLVSXWHVZLWKRXWFRHUFLRQ¶14  Prior to this, the administration had not indicated that the South 
China Sea was of national interest.  There was no reference to the South China Sea in the 2010 National 
Security Strategy.  While the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) PDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRµSRWHQWLDO
IXWXUHDGYHUVDULHV¶ZKRFRXOG HPSOR\µVRPHGHJUHH¶RIDQWL-DFFHVVFDSDELOLW\µGHVLJQHGWRFRQWHVWRU
GHQ\FRPPDQGRIWKHDLUVHDVSDFHDQGF\EHUVSDFHGRPDLQV¶&KLQDLVQRWVSHFLILFDOO\PHQWLRQHG, 
and the South China Sea warrants no place in U.S. strategic interests.15  Moreover, American military 
preponderance in the Asia-Pacific has increased since the end of the Cold War, with the U.S. continuing 
to function as the regional hegemon in political economy terms.16  Put simply, the U.S. continues to 
underwrite the regional order in both economic and military spheres, even with the rising influence of 
China.17   
 
                                                          
13 For a list of claimants and historical island-building activities in the South China Sea, visit Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm (accessed March 25, 2016). 
14 ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ P ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ Ăƚ WƌĞƐƐ ǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ,ĂŶŽŝ ? sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ? :ƵůǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm (accessed March 25, 2016). 
15 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington DC, February 2010, 9. 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf  (accessed 
March 14, 2016). 
16 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. Others deny US decline in U.S. global economic governance. Doug Stokes, for 
instance, argues that US Dollar hegemony is not under pressure. Doug Stokes,  “ĐŚŝůůĞƐ ?ĞĂů PŽůůĂƌĞĐůŝŶĞĂŶĚ
US Grand Strategy after the CƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?Review of International Political Economy 21, no. 5 (2014): 1071-1094. For 
ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ƐĞĞCarla Norrlof, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ 'ůŽďĂůAdvantage: US 
Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Jan Fichtner, 
 “WĞƌƉĞƚƵĂů ĞĐůŝŶĞ Žƌ WĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? hŶĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ŶŐůŽ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ dƌƵĞ ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ 'ůŽďĂů
&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?Review of International Studies (July 2016): 1-26. Available on CJO 2016 doi: 
10.1017/S0260210516000206. 
17 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 3. 
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The South China Sea territorial disputes appeared to take on added significance for the United States 
between 2010 and 2011.  During this period, however, Beijing had neither directly threatened the United 
6WDWHV¶PLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHQRUDFWLYHO\WKUHDWHQHGWKHSK\VLFDOVHFXULW\RILWVQHLJKERXULQJFRXQWULHV
despite the ongoing territorial and maritime boundary disputes.  Washington had begun to sequence 
specific events in historical procession, building a case for the threat to regional security that &KLQD¶V
activities presented 7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VEHKDYLRXULQLWVQHDUQHLJKERXUKRRGDVDVVHUWLYH
coincided with the perception of American regional hegemony in demise.  By stepping into a regional 
matter as a potential mediator, Washington was demonstrating the efficacy of its role as a Pacific nation 
and resident power.18   At the same time, while official U.S. policy has consistently maintained that the 
U.S. does not take a position on specific sovereignty claims, as a treaty ally to the Philippines, the U.S. 
could not be viewed as a neutral mediator in the disputes ± especially by China.  What, therefore, was 
WKH UDWLRQDOH EHKLQG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH 6RXWK &KLQD 6eas disputes, intensifying its 
involvement in a regional matter, in a move that would also increase the likelihood of Sino-U.S. 
confrontation? 
   
2IILFLDO $PHULFDQ VHFXULW\ QDUUDWLYHV KDYH SURJUHVVLYHO\ SDLQWHG D SLFWXUH RI &KLQD¶V DFWLYLWLHV DV
evidence of a threat to regional security and international norms concerning freedom of navigation, 
EDVHGRQµFUHGLEOH¶H[WHUQDOWKUHDWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\PRGHUQLVDWLRQDQGWKHDVVHUWLRQRI
the PLA-1¶VQDYDOSUHVHQFH LQ WKH(DVWDQG6RXWK&KLQD6HDV  Security narratives are particularly 
HIIHFWLYHLIµWKH\FDSWXUHWKHHVVHQFHRIWKUHDWVDQGRIIHUDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIDVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWLQ
WHUPVWKDWUHODWHWRWKHDXGLHQFH¶VH[LVWLQJLQWHUSUHWLYHHQYLURQPHQW¶19  Official, especially presidential, 
rhetoric is essential for constructing a crisis or problem in the international environment as a social 
reality.  The disputes in the South China Sea presented a golden opportunity to promote U.S. re-
engagement in the region, while reasserting its hegemonic legitimacy and authority through its 
mediation role.  Under what conditions, therefore, was U.S. hegemony under threat and by whom?   
 
The U.S, with its preponderant military capabilities, regional alliances and pervading physical presence 
in the Asia-Pacific, is not physically threatened by China.  The U.S. has, nevertheless, constructed a 
WKUHDW DURXQG WKH µULVH RI &KLQD¶ WR MXVWLI\ FHUWDLQ XVHV RI SRZHU WR IXUWKHU HQWUHQFK LWV regional 
                                                          
18 dŚĞKďĂŵĂĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĂƐĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůůŝŶŬŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĐŽŵŵŽŶƐ ?
connecting the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Europe.  See Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The 
Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 201-202.  
19 ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ,ŽŵŽůĂƌ ? “ZĞďĞůƐtŝƚŚŽƵƚŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ PdŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZŽŐƵĞ^ƚĂƚĞƐEĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŝŶh^^Ğcurity 
WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 4 (2010): 707; Eran Ben-WŽƌĂƚŚ ?  “ZŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ŽĨ
ƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐ PdŚĞWůĂĐĞŽĨ,ŽƌƌŝĨŝĐ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐďƵƐĞƐ ŝŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůWĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶĨĨŽƌƚƐ ? ?Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2007): 182. 
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hegemony.  Leading up to the rebalance announcement in November 2011, the administration 
V\VWHPDWLFDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGDVHFXULW\QDUUDWLYHDURXQG&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW&KLQD
Seas that triggered a shift in U.S. threat scenarios in the Asia-Pacific.  U.S. regional hegemony was 
under threat if the U.S. could nRWGHWHU&KLQD¶VEHKDYLRXULQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDDQG&KLQD¶VDVVHUWLRQ
of its core interests which conflict with those of the United States.  The central argument of this thesis 
is that U.S. response to the conflict situation in the Asia-Pacific is indicative of U.S. ontological 
security-seeking behaviour.  By drawing attention to activities in the South and East China Seas, and 
rhetorically constructing a story about them, a discursive connection between historical events, the 
articulation of national security interests, and the naming of specific security threats was established 
WKDWFRXOGERWKUHLQIRUFH$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\DQGMXVWLI\WKHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\The disputes 
in the South China Sea represent a much broader threat to U.S. hegemony, by creating insecurity in its 
hegemonic identity.  
 
Research Questions 
The empirical puzzle briefly outlined the Obama administration¶VGLVFXUVLYH construction of &KLQD¶V
activities in the South and East China Seas as a broader regional security problem that triggered the 
announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011.  The main research question: How does the 
U.S. reproduce its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the rebalance strategy? is concerned with 
examining how the mutually interdependent processes of identity formation, narratives and security are 
present in the formation of foreign policy to support the reproduction of U.S. hegemony.  Specifically, 
I consider the role of the American belief system, driven by American exceptionalism, and the role of 
WKHµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHLQPDQDJLQJWKUHDWVDQGVHFXULW\LQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRI86SROLF\LQWKH
Asia-Pacific.  Encompassed within $PHULFD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶ is tKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶V
military modernisation and growing naval presence represents to regional security, order and U.S. 
interests.20   
 
There are two parts to this thesis.  The first, theoretical part, (Chapters 2 and 3), examines the normative 
and ideational processes behind the reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  The second, 
empirical part, (Chapters 4-6), assesses how the U.S. reproduces its hegemony through the rebalance 
strategy.  Two sub-questions shape the direction of the thesis. 
 
                                                          
20 U.S. assertions that it is an Asia-Pacific power rest on its continuing capacity to provide regional security public 
goods, such as deterrence, maintaining freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication through the 
Pacific Ocean and offering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR). Goh, Struggle for Order, 72. 
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Sub-question 1: what is under threat and by whom? 
This first question seeks to explore the normative and ideational motivations for the rebalance strategy 
by examining what is under threat, and by whom.  Policies, Hansen notes, are dependent upon 
representations of threats, countries, security problems or crises that they seek to address and in this 
ZD\IRUHLJQSROLFLHVµDUWLFXODWHDQGGUDZXSRQVSHFLILFLGHQWLWLHVRIRWKHUVWDWHV«DVZHOODVRQWKH
LGHQWLW\RI«6HOI.¶21  7KHµWKUHDW¶WRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVW\SLFDOO\QDUUDWHGLQSK\VLFDOVHFXULW\WHUPV
generated by the military escalation in the South China Sea.  However, it is American hegemony ± as a 
practice, through the maintenance of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific, and as part of American 
identity ± that is made insecure.  Focusing on non-material factors, this thesis adopts a 
constructivist/post-structuralist approach to understanding the origins of American ontological security 
and the centrality of its hegemonic identity to American self-understanding.   
 
,QOLQHZLWKWKHµOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶LQVRFLDOWKHRU\ODQJXDJHLVWKHSULPDU\PHGLXPRIVRFLDOFRQWURODQG
power, giving meaning and producing and reproducing particular subjectivities and identities, while 
excluding others.22  The intensification of WKHµ&KLQDULVH¶WKUHDW narrative from 2009 coincided with a 
GHWHULRUDWLRQLQ$PHULFD¶VVHFXULW\RIVHOIWKDWKDVEHHQFUHDWHGE\DJUDGXDOORVVRIFHUWDLQW\DERXWLWV
global leadership role, worsened by a decade of war and the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
86 HFRQRP\ DQG WKH FRQWUDVWLQJ SHUFHSWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V DVFHQW  $uthorised interpretations have 
UHLQIRUFHGH[LVWLQJDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVZKDWµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶PHDQVWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV and facilitated the 
justification of the rebalance strategy in physical and ontological security terms.  The discursive 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶E\$PHULFDQSROLWLFDO officials, as indicated by their common sense and 
frequently myopic LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V Dctivities in the South and East China Seas, imposes a 
certain account of these events and shapes possible responses.  7KHµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHLVLQWHUSUHWHG
within the U.S. understanding of what hegemonic identity means to the United States, and how the U.S. 
relates to others through its hegemonic identity.     
 
In clarifying what is under threat, sub-question 1 also considers what needs to be secured.  The threat 
QDUUDWLYH UHTXLUHV FRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQ ZLWKLQ $PHULFD¶V VHFXULW\-seeking behaviour.  The traditional 
FRQFHSWRIVHFXULW\PDLQWDLQVWKDWDVWDWH¶VVXUYLYDOUHYROYHVDURXQGH[LVWHQWLDOWKUHDWVDQGWKHQHHGIRU
physical security to maintain freedom from threats or danger emanating from an external source.23  
                                                          
21 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006), 6. 
22 Hansen, Security as Practice, 18; Norman Fairclough, Language and Power, second edition (Harlow: Longman, 
2001), 2. 
23 <ĞŶŶĞƚŚtĂůƚǌ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůŝƐĂƉƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĂŶǇŐŽĂůƐƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞƐŵĂǇŚĂǀĞ ? ?
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 129. 
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Security is conventionally conceptualised to preserve the µVXUYLYDO¶PHDQLQJ24  However, the position 
taken by this thesis is that neither the physical security of the United States, nor its military 
preponderance, LVFXUUHQWO\WKUHDWHQHGE\&KLQD¶VULVHRULWVDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW China Seas.  
7KHWKUHDWDVSHUFHLYHGZLWKLQWKHEURDGHUµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHKDVDGHHSHUIXQFWLRQLQUHODWLRQWR
American regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  U.S. hegemony needs to be secured.  Hegemony is 
not treated here as an extension of U.S. primacy, rather, this thesis is concerned with the practice of 
hegemony, WKURXJKWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHUHJLRQDOKLHUDUFKLFDORUGHUDQG$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFUROH
identity.  Consequently, this research engages with the literature in IR that disaggregates security by 
distinguishing between the identity-related aspects of security - ontological security - and the 
conventional treatment of the physical and material dimensions of security.25   
 
Sub-question 2: how does the U.S. use its power to sustain its hegemony? 
7KHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\LVWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHUHSUHVHQWV
WRWKHVHFXULW\RI$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\Sub-question 2 seeks to interpret how the American 
exercise of power (re)produces its regional hegemony as a means to manage the perceived threat.  This 
sub-question draws attention to the rebalance strategy as the foreign policy outcome of identity, 
narrative and security processes.  American political officials are engaged in ontological security-
VHHNLQJ EHKDYLRXU WR DIILUP $PHULFD¶V VHQVH RI VHOI-identity, and this process of reproducing, and 
securing American hegemonic identity informed the decision to announce the rebalance strategy in 
November 2011.  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VSRZHUIUDPHZRUNLVused in this examination of the rebalance 
strategy to give perspective on how the U.S. exercises its power in various forms to preserve its 
hegemonic identity and practices DQG WRGHPRQVWUDWHKRZ$PHULFD¶VH[HUFLVHRISRZHUVXVWDLQV LWV
hegemonic order through a combination of coercion and consent, ideological domination and oversight 
of institutions.   
 
Research Aims 
This research has two aims.  The first is to establish the ideational and normative processes that inform 
U.S. foreign policy-making practice.  The second is to interpret how these processes support U.S. 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the exercise of American power.    
                                                          
24 Brent J. ^ƚĞĞůĞ ? “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝǀŝůtĂƌ ? ?Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 525. 
25 In addition to Steele ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ, see also ĂŚĂƌZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “Identity and Desecuritisation: 
The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical SĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Journal of International Relations and Development 
18, no. 1 (2015): 52-74 ?:ĞŶŶŝĨĞƌDŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ P^ƚĂƚĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
DilemŵĂ ? ?European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341-370. 
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The first step is to expose the belief system which infuses the foreign policy-making process through 
consideration of American exceptionalism on American identity formation.   American exceptionalism 
encompass a range of ideas and values that explain the world and the American position within it.   As 
a collective belief system, exceptionalism shapes American foreign policy activities and its 
understanding of threats and security, exhibited in language and behaviour.  Narratives are an essential 
function in the reproduction of identity, with two processes discussed here.   
 
The first process involves the internal construction of identity through the development of 
autobiographical narratives that exploit µnational histories and experience to provide continuity and 
µVXEVWDQFH¶WRDVWDWH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRILWVVHOI-identity.¶26  AmeriFD¶VSHUFHSWLRQRILWVRZQLGHQWLW\LVFR-
constituted with an autobiographical narrative that endorses ideas of American exceptionalism.  This is 
an opportunity to assess the role that self-identity plays in the foreign policy decision-making process, 
linkLQJ $PHULFDQ OHDGHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI $PHULFDQ KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ ZLWK VHFXULW\ DQG WKUHDW
narratives.   
 
The second process considers the discursive articulation of American identity in relation to the external 
other.  This process involves the production of the QDUUDWLYHDURXQG&KLQD¶VULVH that has interpreted 
China as a threat to the United States and regional order in the Asia-Pacific.  Threat narratives do not 
need to be specific ± they can be broad so as to maintain fluidity and draw in a range of evidence to 
validate the threat.  Narratives have the role of systematically reinforcing American hegemonic identity 
so that the American state feels ontologically secure.  In maintaining these narratives, American leaders 
are constantly aligning processes of identity and narrative formation, as they react to events and policy 
SUDFWLFHV%\IRFXVLQJRQWKHWKUHDWQDUUDWLYHHQFDSVXODWHGZLWKLQWKHµULVHRI&KLQD,¶WKHSHUFHSWLRQ
that China is challenging the security of the United States is constantly reinforced, thus requiring action 
to regain some sense of security.   
 
The rebalance strategy is implicated in the maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemonic identity in 
foreign policy practice.  The second aim, therefore, is to evaluate the practice of American hegemony 
through the American exercise of power.  U.S. hegemony exists at several levels of international social 
interaction ± military, institutional, structural (economic) and ideological (discourse).  A hegemon has 
an unmatched range of power assets at its disposal with which it can coerce or garner consent from 
other states in its order.  The taxonomy of power advanced by Barnett and Duvall takes these levels of 
                                                          
26 Will K. Delehanty and Brent J. Steele ? “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞEĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŝŶKŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?/n)security Theory: Insights from 
Feminist IR ? ?Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009): 523. 
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social interaction between the hegemon and subordinate states into account, building them into 
corresponding forms of power ± compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.27  I aim to 
empirically show how the U.S. reproduces and strengthens its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through 




This research adds to existing literature on the rebalance by drawing scholarly attention to the 
background ideational processes that (re)SURGXFH $PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\.  These under-
represented ideational processes include identity formation, narratives and security.  Existing academic 
literature on the rebalance narrowly focuses on assessing the material implications of the rebalance on 
U.S. power in the region.  $PHULFD¶VSRVLWLRQDVWKHSUHSRQGHUDQWPLOLWDU\and economic power in the 
Asia-Pacific is broadly acknowledged within the literature, and thus the existence of its regional 
hegemony is tacitly accepted in the mainstream.28  This research broadens the discussion by drawing 
attention to the multiple levels of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  This research does not 
explain the rebalance strategy as an outcome of rational political processes, or as a rational and 
LQHYLWDEOH UHDFWLRQ WR &KLQD¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH UHJLRQ  Nor is it my intention to disparage existing 
analyses or theoretical explanations of the rebalance strategy.  Instead, my aim is to add to the existing 
literature, thereby supplementing rationalist accounts, by providing a more complete understanding of 
the ideational processes that motivate states to take certain actions.   
 
Since this research concentrates on interpretation, rather than prediction or verification, it does not 
address the effects of the rebalance strategy on individual states or sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific.  Nor 
does it seek to determine the success of the rebalance strategy as a policy.  These undertakings are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  The future of the rebalance strategy, with consideration of further study, 
LVGLVFXVVHGLQWKHFRQFOXGLQJFKDSWHU$IDLUDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\¶VVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUH
GHSHQGVWRDODUJHH[WHQWRQZKHWKHU2EDPD¶VVXFFHVVRULQ1ovember 2016 continues to develop the 
strategy, which is outside the time scale for this thesis.  That being said, some academic work has 
                                                          
27 DŝĐŚĂĞůĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚZĂǇŵŽŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 59, no. 1 
(2005): 39-75. 
28 For a selection of perspectives on the rebalance, see William T. Tow and Douglas T. Stuart, eds., The New U.S. 
Strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the Regional Pivot (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); David S. McDonough, 
 “KďĂŵĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐWŝǀŽƚŝŶh ?^ ?'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ PĂŶĂĚŝĂŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?Asian Security 9, no. 3 (2013): 165-184; 
^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ ƵƌŐĞƐƐ ?  “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the U.S.-/ŶĚŝĂ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Comparative 
Strategy 34, no. 4 (2015): 367-379; ZŽďĞƌƚ^ ?ZŽƐƐ ?  “h ?^ ?'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƚŚĞZŝƐĞŽĨŚŝŶĂĂŶĚh ?^ ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2 (summer 2013): 20-40; H. Mejier and Hugo 
Meijer, eds., Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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already focused on assessing the success of the rebalance on Southeast Asia ± a region that is a focal 
point for the strategy.29   
 
The point of this research is to draw attention to the ideational processes ± the motivations ± behind 
foreign policy decision-making that justify particular foreign policy behaviour and preferences.  It looks 
beyond the traditional conceptualisation of security that prioritises physical security, to consider how 
$PHULFD¶VQHHGIRURQWRORJLFDOVHFXULW\± in particular, the securing of its hegemonic identity in the 
Asia-Pacific ± RIIHUV D SODXVLEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V GHFLVLRQ to announce the 
rebalance strategy in November 2011.  Consequently, the primary focus is on the processes behind the 
FRQWLQXDOUHSURGXFWLRQRIRQWRORJLFDOVHFXULW\$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\DQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
self and other interact to shape its approach to international politics, influencing how the U.S. deals 
ZLWKWKHULVHRIDFRPSHWLWRUWKDWµWKUHDWHQV¶$PHULFDQµVHFXULW\¶7KLVUHVHDUFKGRHVQRWFODLPWKDW
ideas replace conventional material factors to explain behaviour or outcomes.  The purpose is to make 
sense of how ideas interact with other factors to influence foreign policy outcomes, and to provide a 
SHUVSHFWLYHRQZKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIHDUVLQ&KLQD¶VULVH,WGRHVDVVXPHKRZHYHUWKDWWKH8QLWHG
6WDWHV¶SUHVHQFHLQWKH$VLD-Pacific is an enduring feature of regional geopolitics. Furthermore, through 
the examination of the exercise of American power in the Asia-Pacific, the case studies demonstrate 




This thesis is concerned with the ideational processes that link identity, security and narratives with the 
making of foreign policy by the Obama administration. I now outline the core concepts of this thesis: 
hegemony, ontological security, narrative and power. 
 
(i) Hegemony 
There are several theoretical approaches to hegemony in International Relations theory.  The 
mainstream theories of realism and liberalism give SUHFHGHQFH WR D VWDWH¶V PDWHULDO ± military and 
economic ± FDSDELOLWLHVDVWKHPDLQVRXUFHRIDVWDWH¶VSRZHUZLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP30  Early 
                                                          
29 The role of Southeast Asia in the rebalance is discussed by Satu Limaye,  “Southeast Asia in America's Rebalance 
to the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?Southeast Asian Affairs (2013): 40-50; ƵĂŶ'ƌĂŚĂŵ ? “^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŝŶƚŚĞh^ZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ P
Perceptions from a Divided RĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 35, no. 3 (2013): 305-332. 
30 In his understanding of liberal institutionalism, G. John Ikenberry also views the maintenance of the American 
hegemonic liberal world order as grounded in American material power, as well as its capacity to exert influence 
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theorists of hegemony were principally materialist.31 By conflating hegemony with primacy, they 
argued that D VWDWH¶VSRVLWLRQ LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHU was determined by the preponderance of its 
material resources.  Treating hegemony as synonymous with U.S. primacy in security affairs is, 
KRZHYHU µFRQFHSWXDOO\ HPSLULFDOO\ DQG QRUPDWLYHO\ XQVDWLVI\LQJ¶32  Hegemony is also frequently 
interchanged with imperialism as a way to understand dominance.33  While material sources of power 
DUHDQHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWRIDVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRH[HUWLQIOXHQFHLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPPLOLWDU\RU
economic preponderance do not alone denote the status of hegemon.  In this thesis, hegemonic status 
requires cooperation and consent, based on shared understanding of norms and values underpinning the 
hegemonic order.  Hegemony rests on legitimacy and social power ± WKHSRZHUWKDWµSHUPHDWHVVRFLDO
relationships, institutions, discourses DQG PHGLD¶ LQ DGGLWLRQ WR D KHJHPRQ¶V PDWHULDO resource 
capabilities.34  
 
Hegemony is approached in this thesis in two ways: first, following constructivist understandings, 
hegemony is a treated as a practice of doing.  In this approach, hegemony is conceived as a layered 
hierarchical social RUGHU,QPDLQWDLQLQJDKLHUDUFKLFDORUGHUIRFXVLVJLYHQWRWKHµVRFLDOG\QDPLFVRI
FRPSOLFLW\ DQG UHVLVWDQFH WKURXJKZKLFK WKHKLHUDUFKLFDORUGHU LV FUHDWHG DQG UHSURGXFHG¶35  Asia-
Pacific regional order, therefore, is produced and maintained through continual negotiation among its 
members in accordance with shared understandings relating to the normative and social structures of 
Asia-Pacific society.36  
 
The second approach to hegemony focuses on hegemonic identity, as the practice of being, which 
FRQVLGHUVWKHSURFHVVHVWKDWPDLQWDLQDQGUHSURGXFH$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\XVLQJQDUUDWLYHWR
                                                          
through intĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “>ŝďĞƌĂů/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐŽĨ ůŝďĞƌĂů ǁŽƌůĚŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 71-87; G. John Ikenberry, 
Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011).   
31 The proponents of Hegemonic Stability Theory broadly agree that stability in the international system is 
increased through the existence of a single dominant world power or hegemon with superior military force and 
economic capacity. See Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1986); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981) and Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
32 ǀĂ ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ?  “ ‘,Ğůů /Ɛ ƚŚĞ KƚŚĞƌ ? P ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ and IĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ dŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no.1. (2012): 66. 
33 ZŽďĞƌƚŽǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ PŶƐƐĂǇŝŶDĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 164, 170 ?^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?EŝĂůů&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ? “WŽǁĞƌ ? ?Foreign Policy 134 
(January/February 2003): 18-27. 
34 Peter van Ham, Social Power in International Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 3. 
35 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 210-211. 
36 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 21. 
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integrate events into a common understanding of what it means to be hegemonic.  Conceptualising 
hegemonic identity is developed within IR poststructuralist discourse theory. 
 
The practice of hegemony 
,QIRUPHG E\ 'DYLG /DNH¶V DSSURDFK WR KHJHPRQLF RUGHU KHJHPRQ\ LV XQGHUVWRRG KHUH DV D VRFLDO
activity with hierarchical characteristics, distinct from imperialism.37  Moving beyond the material 
accounts of hegemony, this research uses a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a starting point, 
wherein hegemony is the social foundation of a prevailing order, in which certain modes of behaviour 
and expectations have to be consistent with that social order.38  This broad approach is necessary to 
H[SDQGVWXG\RIµKHJHPRQLHVas genuinely political phenomena¶ WRFKDOOHQJHWKHSHUYDVLYHYLHZLQ
International Relations that hegemony is broadly materialistic and that the ideas of hegemony and power 
are reducible to coercive assets.39  The Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony views hegemonic 
authority as resting on objective military and economic power, a legitimising ideology and a collection 
of institutions that act as mechanisms for globally, or regionally, dispersing that ideology.40  Neo-
*UDPVFLDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\HPSKDVLVHWKHµVWUXFWXUHRIYDOXHVDQG
PHDQLQJVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIRUGHU¶41  Hegemony, at its core, denotes an asymmetrical relationship of 
dominance; it is also the manifestation of an established consensus, expressed in acquiescence to the 
KHJHPRQ¶VLGHDVDQGXQGHUSLQQHGE\PDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV42  Gramscian understanding 
of hegemony as a social order is combined with constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to 
hegemony ± both broadly understanding hegemony as a collective identity that shapes and interprets 
the meaning of self and the other.   
                                                          
37 >ĂŬĞǀŝĞǁƐ ‘ĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?ĂƐƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐĂĨŽƌŵĂů-legal authority over a subordinate state. There have been specific 
times when the US has behaved in the manner of an empirical master. For instance, its administrative oversight 
of Japan after World War Two, or of Iraq, following the invasion in 2003. Generally, the US maintains different 
types of hierarchical relationships internationally, and at any one time. David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International 
Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 57-59. 
38 Žǆ ?  “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ĂŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?  ? ? ? ? Žǆ ĂůƐŽ ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ďĂƐĞĚ ŚŝƐ
conceptualisation of hegemony on the social and economic transnational class superstructure. Hegemony, 
therefore, is not only an order among states, it is an order within the world economy and a dominant mode of 
production that infiltrates states. Consequently, world hegemony is a social, economic and political structure. 
Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ?-2. 
39 dŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŚĞůĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ/ZŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇDĂƌŬ,ĂƵŐĂĂƌĚ ? ‘WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ
^ŽĐŝĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŝŶHegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, eds. Mark Haugaard 
and Howard Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 62. 
40 ^ĞĞZŽďĞƌƚŽǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ PĞǇŽŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-255 and Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison 
Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971). 
41 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “,ĞůůŝƐdŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ?-70. 
42 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “,ĞůůŝƐdŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ?-70. 
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Since hegemonic order provides the overarching structure of international society, all states within that 
structure fall somewhere within the social hierarchy.  A hegemonic state, therefore, relies on more than 
its physical and material capabilities to maintain order ± hegemony is also ideological, since the 
hegemon maintains cohesion and identity through a common culture and processes of socialisation.43  
Conceptual focus on the hegemon highlights the complex social dynamics of justification and consent 
to its strategic choices required by others within the hierarchy.  Hegemony thus rests on a collectively 
agreed amalgam of material power, a collective image of world order and the set of institutions 
established in line with the collective understanding of order.44  Hegemony involves µD FRQWLQXRXV
process of opinion-shDSLQJDQGPRXOGLQJRIQRUPVDQGLGHDV¶that (re)produce shared notions of social 
order.45  &RQVHTXHQWO\WKLVSURFHVVDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHµSRZHULQKHUHQWLQODQJXDJHDQGPHDQLQJ¶ZKLFK
generates behaviour that complies with KHJHPRQLFSUDFWLFHV¶46  
 
Being the hegemon  
$Q LPSRUWDQW GLPHQVLRQ RI KHJHPRQLF SRZHU GHULYHV IURP FRQVWUXFWLYLVP¶V LQWHUVXEMHFWLYH
understandings about what the hegemonic order entails, undergoing continual negotiation through 
discourse and practice.47  Ikenberry observes that a hegemonic order is run on the basis of the hegemonic 
VWDWH¶VYLHZRIZKDWWKHZRUOGRUGHUVKRXOGEHDQG LV LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKHLURZQVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLF
development.48  As a consequence of the global responsibilities undertaken by the hegemonic state, and 
its internal historical biographical narrative underpinning its understanding of itself as the hegemon, a 
hegemonic identity requires continual reproduction, specifically through story-telling, and is contingent 




of negotiation among people and interests groups¶dependent on subjective awareness and objective 
verification.49  Collective identity rests on perception, entailing a decision that relates biographical facts 
                                                          
43 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
44 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 27. 
45 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 27. 
46 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “,ĞůůŝƐdŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
47 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 19. See also DƵƚŚŝĂŚůĂŐĂƉƉĂ ? “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇKƌĚĞƌŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?ŝŶDƵƚŚŝĂŚ
Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 39. 
48 See, for instance, G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American 
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).  
49 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 72. Wendt, too, locates the source of change and stability in state identity in the 
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of the collective past and present.50  HoweverFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\LVQRWµRXWWKHUH¶ WKDWLVµRXW WKHUH¶
LVLGHQWLW\GLVFRXUVHZKLFKLVSURPRWHGE\SROLWLFDOOHDGHUVDQGLQWHOOHFWXDOVZKRµHQJDJHLQWKHSURFHVV
RI FRQVWUXFWLQJ QHJRWLDWLQJ PDQLSXODWLQJ RU DIILUPLQJ D UHVSRQVH WR WKH GHPDQG«IRU D FROOHFWLYH
LPDJH¶51  Giddens asserts that self-identit\ LV QRW JLYHQ EXW LV µURXWLQHO\ FUHDWHG DQG VXVWDLQHG
LQ«UHIOH[LYHDFWLYLWLHV¶ZKLFKDUHXQGHUVWRRGLQUHODWLRQWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIELRJUDSKLFDOKLVWRULHVDQG
narratives.52  Identity formation, from this perspective, is found in the capacity of political officials to 
sustain a particular narrative by continually µintegrating events that occur in the outside world, and 
organising them into an ongoing story about self.¶53  Consistent with a poststructuralist 
conceptualisation of identity within hegemony, this thesis also argues that for hegemonies to emerge, 
WKH FUHDWLRQ RI DQ DQWDJRQLVWLF µRWKHU¶ DQG µD YLVLRQ RI WKH RSSRVHG VHOI¶ DUH QHFHVVDU\54  The 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH µRWKHU¶ DQG WKH YLVLRQ RI WKH µVHOI¶ QHHG WR EH FRQFHLYHG RI DV WKH µSROLWLFDO
FRQVHQVXV DPRQJ WKRVH DJHQWV FRQFHUQHG WR DOORZ IRU WKH DGRSWLRQ RI DFFHSWHG«PHDVXUHV¶55  
Hegemony is interpreted as a means to produce desired behaviour by determining the general conditions 
for a specific way of life, constructing ideational mind-sets and nation-state identities.56    
 
(ii) Ontological Security 
Since this thesis is interested in uncovering the ideational processes behind foreign policy decision-
making, which are driven, in turn, by self-identity needs, ontological security is critical to this work.  
Ontological security is conceptualised here as security-as-being, while physical security is security-as-
survival.57  Ontological security is thus a distinct concern that motivates foreign policy behaviour.  
Security is an ontological necessity for the state - not only because the state has to be protected from 
external threats - but because its identity depends on them.58  Therefore, at a single point in time, states 
seek out several conditions of security.  By disaggregating ontological from the more conventionally 
accepted physical security definition, the pursuit of physical and ontological security can be 
µFKDUDFWHULVHG E\ GLIIHUHQW G\QDPLFV SURFHVVHV DFWV DQG GLVFRXUVHV.¶59  With its concern with the 
stability or security of identity/subjectivity, the interest in conceptualising ontological security opens 
                                                          
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?^ ĞĞůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌtĞŶĚƚ ? “ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ ƚĂƚĞ ? ?American 
Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 385. 
50 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 73-76. 
51 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 77-78. 
52 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1991), 52-53. 
53 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 54. 
54 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “Hell Is the Other ? ?65. 
55 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “,Ğůů/ƐƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ? ?66. 
56 ,ĞƌƐĐŚŝŶŐĞƌ ? “Hell Is the Other ? ?70. 
57 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
58 Hansen, Security as Practice, 60. 
59 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
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up the concept of security, and separates it from rationalist concerns with the material distribution of 
power, by µFKDOOHQJ>LQJ@WKHH[FOXVLYHDVVRFLDWLRQWKDWFRQYHQWLRnal IR theories make between security 
DQG VXUYLYDO SK\VLFDO WKUHDW DQG GHIHQFH¶60  µ6HFXULW\ WKUHDWV DQG LQVHFXULWLHV¶ DUH RQWRORJLFDO
necessities for the reproduction of American hegemonic identity.61  As Campbell asserts, American 
security policy is driven by the desire for a clear and coherent identity.62       
 
The survival motive denotes concerns about the physical survival of citizens, the preservation of the 
functions of the state and territorial integrity. Under usual circumstances, states do not consistently face 
DQLPPLQHQWWKUHDWWKDWMHRSDUGLVHVWKHLUVXUYLYDO&ULWLFDOWKHRULHVRIVHFXULW\WUHDWµVHFXULW\WKUHDW
danger and risk,¶QRWDVµREMHFWLYHFRQGLWLRQVEXWVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWV¶63  In otKHUZRUGVµZHLQKDELWD
VHFXULWLVHGZRUOGRIRXURZQPDNLQJ¶64  Understood in its broadest terms, ontological security requires 
DµUHODWLYHO\FRKHUHQWVHQVHRIVHOIRUVXEMHFWLYLW\¶65  Ontological security does not presuppose a threat 
to identity but does underline an ongoing concern with identity stability.66  The position here is that 
seeking to maximise ontological security can have unintended physical security consequences for a 
state.67  The disaggregation of the two conditions of security thus facilitates a deeper look at how these 
distinct security conditions co-exist, and importantly, how ontological security-seeking activities 
LPSLQJHXSRQSK\VLFDOVHFXULW\LQWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶RIIRUHLJQSROLF\ 
 
                                                          
60 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
61 This position is developed from the post-structuralist work of Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse 
Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006) and David Campbell, Writing Security: United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
62 Campbell, Writing Security, 134. 
63 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
64 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
65 Christopher BrowninŐĂŶĚWĞƌƚƚŝ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ PEŽƌĚĞŶĂƐĂ^ŽƵƌĐĞŽĨKŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?
A paper presented to the International Studies Association 2010 Conference (New Orleans, February 2010), 5. 
http://www.eisa-net.org/be-
bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/SGIR%20Stockholm%20Ontological%20Security%202.pdf (accessed 
September 9, 2016). 
66 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?7. 
67 DŝƚǌĞŶ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ďĞŝŶŐ, ? ĨƌŽŵ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ
understands threats as physical violence and the use of force, understanding that ontological security-seeking 
can have consequences on physical security. DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Rumelili, in 
contrast, determines that physical and ontological security co-exist in distinct but interdependent levels, 
transformed into different conditions of physical (in)security and ontological (in)security by political actors. 
 ‘oncerns about instability and uncertainty can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into concerns 
about survival ? ? ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ?  “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ? ? ? ^ince ontological security is essential to the 
maintenance and affirmation of self-identity, states can be compelled to pursue social actions that, while 
strengthening ontological security, can also have the effect of compromising physical security. Brent J. Steele, 




6LQFHRQWRORJLFDOVHFXULW\ LV µFORVHO\ OLQNHGWRQDUUDWLYH LGHQWLW\SUDFWLFHDQGDFWLRQ¶WKLVUHVHDUFK
claims that states engage in ontological security maximisation through a strategy of being and through 
a strategy of doing.68  This framework builds RQ 6WHHOH¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW LQ being, identities emerge 
HQGRJHQRXVO\µLQWKHGLDOHFWLFEHWZHHQVHOIDQGRWKHU¶DQGDOVRZLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDOGLDOHFWLFWKDWDULVHV
from the ontological security-VHHNLQJSURFHVV¶69  6WHHOH¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKLVGXDOGLDOHFWLFFHQWUHVRQ
the idea that states, just like individuals, are social actors seeking internal security within, as well as 
from, one another.  In assuming that states are motivated by the search for ontological security on two 
levels of being (in relation to internal dialectic of self, and in relation to self and other), a likely 
assumption is that they would also engage in strategies to maintain and reproduce an appropriate 
intensity of ontological security.  The strategy of doing maximises and reinforces ontological security 
E\ µXSKROGLQJ D VWDEOH FRJQLWLYH HQYLURQPHQW WKURXJK URXWLQLVHG SUDFWLFH¶70  In the process of 
maintaining and reproducing ontological security, the state of being and the state of doing are 
interlinked and mutually constitutive.  These conditions cannot be understood in isolation from each 
other, linked by the interconnection between narrative and identity that aims to secure a durable identity 
and biographical continuity.71   
 
(iii) Narrative 
Central to any state of ontological security, therefore, is the ability to tell convincing stories about 
themselves and others and to gain recognition for their self within intersubjectively constructed 
groupings.72  Narrative acts as a central support for identity and subjectivity.73  Sustaining self-
biographies is critical to maintaining a sense of ontological security because they incorporate a story of 
self (who I am and what I want) and past experience (what I have done and why).74  Such biographies 
locate the actor in time and space, and in particular subject positions in respect of events and other 
actors, thereby establishing the expectations of continuity of relations and a sense of order over those 
events.75   
 
                                                          
68 dŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĚƌĂǁƐ ŽŶ &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ĞŝŶŐ ? ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐ ƚŽ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ Ɛocial relations. Trine Flockhart,  “dŚĞ WƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ ŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ
Constructivist Theory: Ontological Security Seeking and Agent Motivation ? ?Review of International Studies 42, 
no. 5 (2016): 799-820, especially 809. The distinction is discussed in Chapter 3. 
69 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 32. 
70 Trine Flockhart,  “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?  ? ? ? ?WĂƵůZŽĞ ?  “dŚĞ  ‘sĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨWŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ
SĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 783. 
71 &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
72 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
73 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
74 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 35-36; 54. 
75 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
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Ontological security-seeking produces two separate, but interconnected, narratives.  The first process 
concerns the internal dialectic of self-integrity, which, in the case of the U.S., is driven by an 
autobiographical narrative inspired by American exceptionalist beliefs.  The second process concerns 
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ VHOI DQG RWKHU ZKLFK LQ WKH FDVH RI WKH 86 SHUFHSWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V ULVH
produces a narrative constructed around the threat that this rise presents to American hegemonic 
LGHQWLW\:DVKLQJWRQLVXQFHUWDLQDERXW&KLQD¶VULVLQJ power identity ± a problem to which Obama 
alluded in Brisbane, Australia, in November 2014 ± and what this means to the United States and the 
existing liberal order.76  These are co-constituted narratives.  The discursive constitution of the threat 
represeQWHGE\µ&KLQD¶VULVH¶LVFRQVWUXFWHGE\$PHULFDQOHDGHUVDQGWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH\VKDSHLWV
meaning, creates a window into American self-identity,77 connecting the autobiographical and threat 
narratives, narratively developing a sense of continuity between the past, present and future.78  The 
inter-relation between ontological security and narratives is explicated further in Chapter 3. 
 
(iv) Power 
In dealing with important themes in IR concerning hegemony, regional order and security, this research 
also connects with the concept of power.  The durability of the U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific 
relies on the ability of its officials to favourably express the multifaceted sources of American power.  
The maintenance of regional, or international, order requires understanding of how the leading state 
expresses and exercises its power.  Hegemony and power are conceptually linked, not only through 
material power differentials, but also through our understanding of legitimised domination, rooted in 
hegemony, constituting µDV\VWHPRIGRPLQDQWLGHDV¶WRZKLFKVXERUGLQDWHVWDWHVDFWLYHO\FRQVHQW79  
Consensus is forged on shared beliefs on the normative underpinnings of the hegemonic order, which 
itself is not simply buttressed by the predominance of coercive, military power.80         
                                                          
76  “And if, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is peaceful and prosperous and stable, that 
ŝƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “Remarks by 
President ObaŵĂ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ YƵĞĞŶƐůĂŶĚ ? ? ƌŝƐďĂŶĞ ? ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland 
(accessed March 14, 2016). 
In what appears to be a change of tack, Obama asserted in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic, 
that ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐƐŝŐŶŝĨǇĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ŚŝŶĂ ? ^ĞĞ :ĞĨĨƌĞǇ 'ŽůĚďĞƌŐ ?  “dŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ? ? Atlantic, April 2016. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/  (accessed March 14, 
2016). 
77 ^ƚĞĞůĞ ? “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity ? ?525. 
78 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations, 20. 
79 DĂƌŬ,ĂƵŐĂĂƌĚ ? “WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?ŝŶThe Sage Handbook of Power, eds. Mark Haugaard and Stewart 
Clegg (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 239. 
80 This neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony differs from that offered by Hegemonic Stability Theory, 
which emphasises the predominance of coercive, military power, and economic power to maintain hegemony. 
ƵĂůŝƐŵĞǆŝƐƚƐŝŶ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ Was a source of domination on the one hand, and as a 
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Power is treated differently by scholars from contrasting theoretical backgrounds because there are 
GLIIHUHQWNLQGVRISRZHU WKDWH[LVW µRXW WKHUH.¶81  Since this thesis is concerned with the exercise of 
power as a means to animate hegemony, power can be expressed in several forms.  It can be exerted 
directly and indirectly, in the conventional form of power over others, but also through the social 
VWUXFWXUHVDQGSURFHVVHVWKDWµJHQHUDWHGLIIHUHQWLDOVRFLDOFDSDFLWLHVIRUDFWRUVWRGefine and pursue their 
LQWHUHVWVDQGLGHDOV¶82  7KHµVRFLDO¶LQVRFLDOSRZHUGHULYHVIURPµWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWSRZHULVIOXLG
and non-OLQHDUDQGWKDWLWPRYHVWKURXJKUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶83  In this way, power works 
WKURXJKµEHKDYLRXUDOUHODWLRQVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQV¶DQGWKURXJKVRFLDOUHODWLRQVWKDWFRQVWLWXWHDFWRUVµZLWK
WKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFDSDFLWLHVDQGLQWHUHVWV¶84  3RZHUFDQEHµVHHQ¶EXWFDQDOVRco-exist in less tangible 
forms.  In other words, power is not solely reflected in concrete decisions, it also exists through the 
creation and reinforcement of hierarchies and structures of international politics.85  Power, therefore, 
can work directly through social relations, and can also be seen working in indirect and socially diffuse 
relations.86   
 
PRZHU µHPEUDFHV FRHUFLRQ LQIOXHQFH DXWKRULW\ IRUFH DQG PDQLSXODWLRQ¶87  It also encompasses 
consent, involving some kind of acceptance, although not necessarily explicit acceptance by other states 
within the hierarchy, of the prevailing hegemonic socio-political order.  American interventions in 
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that, µKDYLQJPLOLWDU\VXSHULRULW\LVQRWWKHVDPHDVKDYLQJ
SRZHU¶88  Moreover, power can be exercised through inaction as much as it is through direct action.  
Indeed, a powerful state need not always act in order to exercise power.89  In recognising that what it 
means to be powerful, or what it means to have power, UHVWVRQPRUHWKDQDVWDWH¶VSK\VLFDOUHVRXUFHV, 
it also concerns how these capabilities are perceived by others.90  To grasp the dynamics of American 
                                                          
more nuanced view of domination, requiring consent from subordinate states, constituting a form of collective 
ǁŝůů ?ŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?^ĞĞDĂƌŬ,ĂƵŐĂĂƌĚ ? “WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶ
thought are discussed in Chapter 2. 
81 ZƵďƌŝĐŬŝĞŐŽŶ ? “ZĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ Ph^WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁ>ĞĨƚŝŶ>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?(unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Kent, 2013), 57. 
82 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
83 Van Ham, Social Power, 3. 
84 DŝĐŚĂĞůĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚZĂǇŵŽŶĚƵǀĂůů ?  “WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ŝŶPower in Global Governance, eds. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9. 
85 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), 8. 
86 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
87 Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, 43-44; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 21. 
88 Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 70. 
89 The non-ratification of international agreements and non-participation in the International Criminal Court are 
also demonstrations of American power. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 77.  
90 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 3. 
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power, therefore, requires more understanding of the United States itself.91  %DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V
taxonomy of power is the framework used to analyse how the Obama administration animates American 
hegemony.  Its multi-dimensional approach to power provides the opportunity for a more thorough 




(i) Social Constructivism 
Conventional security approaches are limited in their explanations of the rebalance strategy because 
they largely ignore ideational factors and identity formation processes in their thinking.  Such accounts 
accept the rebalance DV IRUHLJQ SROLF\ µIDFW¶ IDLOLQJ WR ORRN EH\RQG SROLF\-oriented prescriptions.92  
They also fail to account for the lack of physical threat to the United States as the motivation for the 
rebalance strategy.  With its focus on non-material factors, this thesis adopts a constructivist approach 
for understanding the origins of American ontological (in)security and the centrality of American 
hegemonic identity to its foreign policy.  While constructivism does not claim to be a substantive theory 
of International Relations, it offers a framework for exploring the possibilities of social interaction.93  
Since the focus is on understanding the subjective views of policy-makers, interpreting their actions, 
and reconstructing their motives, rather than on explaining outcomes via causal analysis, this project 
combines critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches to discourse and identity.  The mixed 
approach adopted here is critical in the sense that it sets out to identify and evaluate the social 
circumstances underpinning the decision to rebalance.94     
 
Constructivist approaches view the world as socially constructed rather than supposing the existence of 
DµUHDOZRUOG¶RXWWKHUHH[WHUQDOWRDJHQWVwaiting to be discovered.95  It allows for the identities of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWRUV WR EH µDOZD\V LQ SURFHVV¶ ZKLFK LV µGHSHQGHQW RQ PLQGV DQG SUDFWLFHV¶ of the 
                                                          
91 Bryan Mabee, Understanding American Power: The Changing World of U.S. Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3. 
92 &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ZŽďĞƌƚ  ? ůĂĐŬǁŝůů ĂŶĚ ƐŚůĞǇ : ? dĞůůŝƐ ?  “ZĞǀŝƐŝŶŐ h^ 'ƌĂŶĚ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ dŽǁĂƌĚ ŚŝŶĂ ? ? ^ƉĞĐŝĂů
Report 72, Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations (March 2015). 
93 James &ĞĂƌŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ tĞŶĚƚ ?  “ZĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ǀ ? ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ P  ^ŬĞƉƚŝĐĂů sŝĞǁ ? ? ŝŶHandbook of 
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (California: Sage Publications, 
2002), 56.  
94 ^ĞĞdŝŵƵŶŶĞ ?>ĞŶĞ,ĂŶƐĞŶĂŶĚŽůŝŶtŝŐŚƚ ? “dŚĞŶĚŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?European Journal 
of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 410. 
95 ĂǀŝĚDĂƌƐŚĂŶĚWĂƵů&ƵƌůŽŶŐ ?  “^ŬŝŶ ?ŶŽƚĂ ^ǁĞĂƚĞƌ PKŶƚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚ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Theory and Methods in Political Science 2nd edition, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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actors.96  Constructivists discern that events, practices and concepts only have meaning through shared 
knowledge.  This is achieved through the construction of identities that specify the meaning attached to 
social and material facts, and through the social norms and conventions considered appropriate 
behaviour for the identity in question.  Attention is thus drawn to the importance of normative and 
ideational structures, underpinning the systems of meaning, which define how actors interpret their 
material environment.97  International relations are guided by intersubjectively shared norms, ideas and 
YDOXHVKHOGE\DFWRUVZLWKµPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVRQO\DFTXLr[ing] meaning for human action through the 
VWUXFWXUHRIVKDUHGNQRZOHGJHLQZKLFKWKH\DUHHPEHGGHG¶98   
 
This project does not intend to demonstrate causality; nor does it seek to predict the future for U.S. 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  It seeks to present an interpretation of events through consideration of 
identity, LGHRORJ\DQGIRUHLJQSROLF\RXWFRPHV$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LPEXHGZLWKWKHVHQVH
of righteousness inferred by the exceptionalist ideology, shapes American understanding of national 
security, privileging particular courses of action while impeding the legitimation of others.99  Ideology 
informs a particular world view that also accounts for the construction and types of relations the U.S. 
KDVZLWKRWKHUDFWRUV7KHUHIRUHLWLVQRWDVVLPSOHDVYLHZLQJWKHUHEDODQFHDVDUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶V
aggressive behaviour, rather it is uncovering the complex ideational processes behind which the U.S. 
GHWHUPLQHV&KLQD¶VEHKDYLRXUWREHµDJJUHVVLYH¶RUµDVVHUWLYH¶DQGWKXVWKUHDWHQLQJWKDWIRUPVWKHEDVLV
of this research.100  A constructivist ontology facilitates this approach to the co-constitutive processes 




                                                          
96 tĞŶĚƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŵĂŬĞƐŝƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽ consider international structure as a distribution 
of ideas and to conceptualise structural change as the change in ideas shared by international actors. See Petr 
ƌƵůĂŬ ? “ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?ŝŶConstructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and 
His Critics, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 147. 
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ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůZĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŝŶConstructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt 
and His Critics, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 3. 
98 ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌtĞŶĚƚ ? “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 73. 
99 Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 14.  The significance of the exceptionalist ideology in shaping identity and the national security narrative 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
100 Particularly noteworthy here, is how the other regional rising power, India, is positively discursively 
constructed overall, as an opportunity and strategic partner of the United States. See, for instance, Jarrod Hayes, 





Epistemologically, this research is post-positivist and interpretivist.  The objective of much social 
constructivist research is to inquire how µZHFRQVWUXFWZRUOds we know in a world we do not,¶101 thereby 
FKDOOHQJLQJUHDOLVWDQGHPSLULFLVWDVVHUWLRQVWKDWWKHUHDOZRUOGH[LVWVµRXWWKHUH¶102   The main research 
TXHVWLRQ DGKHUHV WR µKRZ-SRVVLEOH¶ TXHVWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ µZK\¶ TXHstions favoured by mainstream 
realist and liberal approaches.103  This research does not seek to explain the rebalance as an outcome of 
the structure of the international political environment.  It focuses on the internal processes that make 
the rebalance possible and that create these specifically American interpretations and meanings attached 
to social phenomena.104  An holistic understanding of the processes that motivate actors is made 
possible, by µSODF>LQJ@ DQ DFWLRQ ZLWKLQ DQ LQWHUVXbjectively understood context, even if such 
imputations DUHSUREOHPDWLFRUHYHQµZURQJ¶ LQ WHUPVRI WKHLUSUHGLFWLYHFDSDFLW\¶105  The research 
draws on the GRXEOHKHUPHQHXWLFSRVLWLRQLQZKLFKµWKHZRUOGLVLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKHDFWRUVDQGWKHLU
interpretatiRQLVLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKHREVHUYHU¶106  It offers an interpretation of the American view on the 
ZRUOG DQG LWV SODFH ZLWKLQ LW E\ IRFXVLQJ RQ KRZ LGHDV JURXQG $PHULFD¶V LGHQWLW\ DQG VKDSH WKH
national security narrative that justify foreign policy outcomes.  This project also uses a discursive 
analytical approach.  In understanding the motivations behind the decision-making process, attention is 
given to the ontological security process, American identity, and the creation of meanings for actions 
through the autobiographical narrative. 
   
(iii) Discourse Analysis  
'LVFRXUVHDQDO\VLVLVQRWRQHDSSURDFKEXWµDVHULHVRILQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\DSSURDFKHVWKDWFDQEHXVHGWR
H[SORUHPDQ\GLIIHUHQWVRFLDOGRPDLQV¶107  There are differing analytical approaches to discourse that 
mainly draw upon structuralist and poststructuralist language theory, but vary as to the extent to which 
they strictly adhere to poststructuralism in the sense that they view discourse as being the only means 
                                                          
101 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 38. 
102 Onuf, World of Our Making, 39. 
103 Doty observes that conventional foreign policy analysis is concerned with explaining why particular decisions 
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105 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24-25. 
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through which meaning is given to the social world.108   Discourse is a particular way of talking about 
and understanding (an aspect of) the world through the medium of language and social interaction.  
DLVFRXUVH LV µD IRUP RI VRFLDO DFWLRQ WKDW SOD\V D SDUW LQ SURGXFLQJ WKH VRFLDO ZRUOG ± including 
knowledge, identities and social relations ± DQGWKHUHE\LQPDLQWDLQLQJVSHFLILFVRFLDOSDWWHUQV¶109  Our 
understanding of the social world is created and maintained through social interaction in which we 
construct our common knowledge and truths.  This view determines the social world to be socially and 
discursively constructed and that its character is not pre-given or determined by external conditions.   
 
My approach to discourse analysis is situated primarily within critical constructivist and 
poststructuralist theoretical approaches 7KLV FRPELQDWLRQ LV SRVVLEOH VLQFH µGiscourse theorising 
crosses over and mixes divisions between poststructuralists, postmodernists and some feminists and 
VRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVWV¶110  These approaches determine that µIRUHLJQSROLFLHVUHO\XSRQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
RILGHQWLW\¶DQGLQWXUQWKDWLGHQWLWLHVDUHFRQWLQJHQWRQWKHFUHDWLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\111  Therefore, a 
state or collective identity is not detached from the discursive practices used in the presentation and 
practice of foreign policy.112  5DWKHU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLVFRXUVHV µDUWLFXODWH DQG LQWHUWZLQH PDWHULDO
IDFWRUVDQGLGHDV¶UHQGHULQJWKHPLQGLYLVLEOHIURPHDFKRWKHU113  The role of narrative is of particular 
interest in this research, with specific focus on the interrelation between the µULVHRI&KLQD¶QDUUDWLYH
DQG$PHULFD¶VDXWRELRJUDSKLFDOQDUUDWLYH1DUUDWLYHDVDWRRORIGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLVLVWKHfoundation 
IURPZKLFKVFKRODUVµFDQEHJLQWRJUDVSKRZVHOI-identity constrains and enables states to pursue certain 
DFWLRQVRYHURWKHUV¶114  The logic here is that actors create meanings for their actions, consistent with 
their identities.  Narratives are thus DµPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIDµUHDOLW\SURGXFWLRQ.¶¶115   
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ƌŶĞƐƚŽ>ĂĐůĂƵĂŶĚŚĂŶƚĂůDŽƵĨĨĞ ?Ɛdiscourse theory is perhaps the purest adherent to the poststructuralist 
idea that discourse constructs the social world in meaning. In their discourse theoretical approach to the social, 
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Social constructivists broadly agree that state identities are constructed within the social environment 
of international and domestic politics but disagree on the balance of international versus domestic 
environments in shaping state identities.116  This research takes the view that the effects of the domestic 
environment on identity is essential to interest and foreign policy formation.  Identity and ideas are 
mutually reinforcing on the basis that whaW$PHULFDµLV¶LQWKHZRUOGLVGHWHUPLQHGE\QRWLRQVRIZKDW
$PHULFDµWKLQNVLWLV.¶117  If America believes it is exceptional, that it is the guardian of freedom and 
liberty, and that it has a special role to fulfil in the world, then such beliefs inform not only identity, but 
also which interests the U.S. is likely to pursue.118  Therefore, identity is viewed here as an attribute 
DULVLQJIURPµQDWLRQDOLGHRORJLHVRIFROOHFWLYHGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVDQGSXUSRVHWKDWLQWXUQVKDSHVVWDWHV¶
SHUFHSWLRQVRILQWHUHVWDQGWKXVVWDWHSROLF\¶119  The socially constructed nature of interests may not 
alter a stDWH¶VSXUVXLWRIPDWHULDOFDSDELOLWLHVEXW$PHULFDQOHDGHUVUHVSRQGWRWKHVRFLDOUHODWLRQVKLS
between the U.S. and the military resources of others ± through the identification of the other as friend 
or enemy, rather than to the military apparatus itself.120  
 
 
How interests are constituted (and redefined) is critical to our interpretations of international 
phenomena.121  Norms, rules and social structures of meaning are not simply reflections of hegemonic 
state interest; they are part of a reflexive process iQZKLFKDFWRUV¶LQWHUHVWVVHOI-understandings and 
behaviour are constantly reshaped.122  This approach contrasts with rationalist approaches in 
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the state, including identity formation, since his analytical focus is the state system. Pursuing a neorealist 
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118 >ĞĞDĂƌƐĚĞŶ ? “Religion, Identity and American Power in the AŐĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ? ?International Politics 48, no. 2/3 
(2011): 327. 
119 MarƚŚĂ&ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ<ĂƚŚƌǇŶ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐ^ƚŽĐŬ PdŚĞŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚWƌŽŐƌĂŵŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
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states. Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
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Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 565-97. 
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International Relations that under-theorise interest formation, treating preferences as exogenously-
determined givens in existence prior to social interaction.  Mainstream International Relations and 
conventional Security Studies present WKH H[LVWHQFH RI FHUWDLQ HQWLWLHV VXFK DV µWKH VWDWH¶ LQ DQ
environment within which they experience threats.  Such assumptions µnaturalise actors and their 
insecurities,¶ while µrendering contingent and problematic their actions and strategies for coping with 
the insecurities.¶123  Rather than assuming that WKHVWDWH¶V insecurities are natural, this research seeks to 
denaturalise these insecurities.  Insecurities and actors¶ LGHQWLWLHV are both culturally produced and 
mutually constituted, rather than ontologically separate entities.  Insecurity, therefore, is not necessarily 
µexternal to the object to which it presents a threat, it is both implicated in, and an effect of, the process 
of (re)HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHREMHFW¶VLGHQWLW\¶124  Insecurity is also created by non-material factors brought 





about imminent harm, threats and danger, and also regards itself as inadequately protected.126  The 
decision to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, while discursively constructed as a counter-measure to the 
WKUHDWIURP&KLQD¶VJURZLQJLQIOXHQFHDURXQGWKHUHJLRQLVQRWXQGHUSLQQHGE\DQLPPLQHQWWKUHDWWR
WKHVXUYLYDORIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,QDVWDWHRIRQWRORJLFDOLQVHFXULW\WKHµVHOI¶H[SHULHQFHV instability 
and uncertainty of being,127 therefore ontological insecurity may arise from deep uncertainty and/or 
IURPWKHIDLOXUHWRKDYHLWVVHQVHRIµVHOI¶DIILUPHGE\RWKHUV128  µ&KLQD¶VULVH¶KDVEHHQGLVFXUVLYHO\
constructed as threat to American hegemonic identity.  7KHPHDQLQJRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶ has been shaped 
in discourse which creates a window into American self-identity.129  6HFXULW\VHHNLQJLVWKXVDµVRFLDO
practice that implicates identity.¶130  Ontological security is thus achieved by routinised relationships 
with significant others, to which actors become attached.131 
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126 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
127 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
128 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?341-370; ǇƐĞĂƌĂŬŽů ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů (In)security and State 
ĞŶŝĂůŽĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌŝŵĞƐ PdƵƌŬĞǇĂŶĚ:ĂƉĂŶ ? ?International Relations 24, no. 1 (2010): 3-23.  
129 ^ƚĞĞůĞ ? “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-IĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
130 Mitzen, for instance, considers the identity effects of persistent conflict between states and the logic of the 
security dilemma. Where conflict exists and comes to fulfil identity needs, breaking free can create ontological 
insecurity. DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
131 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůSecurity in World Politics ? ?363. 
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The focus of constructivism on the intersubjective social context enables investigation of the process in 
which particular contested understandings become shared and settled in global politics.  This occurs 
mainly through public and linguistic processes.132  How states identify and assess threats in the 
international environment is critical to conduct of international relations, since the processes that give 
rise to social meaning are deeply political and power-laden.133  Powerful groups play a privileged role 
in the process of social construction.  Consequently, this research also engages with critical forms of 
constructivism, which assert WKDWµFRQVWUXFWLRQVRIUHDOLW\UHIOHFWHQDFt and reify relations of power.¶134    
In particular, the postmodernist strand of critical constructivism concentrates on the socio-historical 
FRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKODQJXDJHPHDQLQJDQGVRFLDOSRZHULQWHUDFWµLQSDUWLFXODUWKHhow question 
concerning the sociolinguistic conditions of the construction of dominant knowledge forms and their 
disciplining and representation in contemporary life.¶135  The task of the critical scholar is to unmask 
these ideational structures of domination, where ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of 
material power, in part by revealing their connection to existing power relations.136   
 
(i) %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\RISower 
Hegemony and power are conceptually linked in this thesis through the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony, typically viewed as domination rooted in economic and military resources, as a means of 
coercion, and a more nuanced understanding of domination, constituting a system of dominant ideas to 
which subordinate states actively consent, thereby bestowing legitimacy on the hegemonic order.  The 
FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI SRZHU PDQLIHVWHG DV SRZHU µRYHU¶ DQG SRZHU µWR¶, presupposes some form of 
consent by subordinate states to the hegemonic order.137  Moreover, since power is expressed in a variety 
of overt and covert ways as a means to maintain hegemonic order, engagement with different analytical 
understandings of power is vital.  %DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\ RI SRZHU characterises four 
intersecting and interconnecting forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.  
In the U.S. case, compulsory power concerns $PHULFD¶V GLUHFWFRPPDQG FDSDELOLWLHV LWV FRHUFLYH
                                                          
132 See Martha &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞ ĂŶĚ <ĂƚŚƌǇŶ ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ?  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů EŽƌŵ ǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917; See also Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making.  
133 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 16. 
134 &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐ^ƚŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
135 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Riener, 1994), 156.  Other works using a discursive analytical approach include Constructing National 
Interests in which Jutta Weldes argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a social construction forged by U.S. 
officials in the process of re-asserting its identity as leader of the free world.  Jutta Weldes, Constructing National 
Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, 1999); 
Doty demonstrates how ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ “EŽƌƚŚ ?constructs discourses around ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ “^ŽƵƚŚ ?to justify 
violent counterinsurgency policies and economic exploitation. See Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The 
Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996). 
136 See Weldes et al, Cultures of Insecurity; Price and Reus-^ŵŝƚ ?  “ĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ>ŝĂŝƐŽŶƐ ? ?  ? ? ? ?&ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ
^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐ^ƚŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
137 ,ĂƵŐĂĂƌĚ ? “WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 27 
 
especially military capacity; institutional power is demonstrated by $PHULFD¶VDELOLW\WRFRQVWUuct and 
operate through formalised instruments of indirect control, for example through shaping regional 
institutions; structural power is demonstrated by $PHULFD¶VDELOLW\WRUHVKDSHH[LVWLQJVWUXFWXUHVRI
economic production, for example through its regional trade policies; and productive power, is 
demonstrated by $PHULFD¶VDELOLW\WRPRXOGLGHRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJVERWKGLVFXUVLYHO\DQGWKURXJK
practices of representation.   
 
6LQFH%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\GLVDJJUHJDWHVSRZHULQWRIRXUIRUPVWKHUHLVLQHYLWDEOHDIILQLW\
with different schools of thought in International Relations, although Barnett and Duvall acknowledge 
WKDW WKH WD[RQRP\ µGRHV QRW PDS SUHFLVHO\ RQWR GLIIHUHQW WKHRULHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶138  
1RQHWKHOHVVWKH\GRDGPLWWKDWHDFKWKHRUHWLFDOWUDGLWLRQZRXOGµIDYRXUDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISRZHUWKDW
FRUUHVSRQGVWRRQHRUDQRWKHURIWKHIRUPV¶139  While their taxonomy is used in this thesis to address 
the means by which the U.S. takes steps to preserve and strengthen its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, 
%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VIUDPHZRUNallows for a comprehensive exploration of the U.S. exercise of power 
that incorporates the critical dimensions of power relations.  Developing WKHWD[RQRP\DURXQGSRZHU¶V
µFULWLFDO GLPHQVLRQV¶ generates µGLIIHUHQW FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV RI SRZHU¶ that also supports a 
constructivist approach in addressing how identity, ideas, narratives and social relations are critical to 
any understanding of power.140  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\DQG WKHFRQFHSWRISRZHUZLOOEH
further explicated in Chapter 2. 
 
(ii) The Strategic Rebalance: A case study of American hegemony 
7KHFRQWULEXWRUVWR%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VVHPLQDOHGLWHGYROXPHPower in Global Governance, focus 
on combining various forms of power to show how states/global institutions simultaneously use various 
power resources to influence outcomes.  In their own examination of U.S. hegemony, Barnett and 
Duvall question the analytical overreliance on compulsory power, which emphasises the use of 
American resources to coerce and intimidate, as the primary source of American hegemony.  Instead, 
they seek to refocus attention on the means and the manner in which international consent for American 
hegemony has been generated since 1945, broadening the debate to include the general international 
                                                          
138 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
139 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
140 The first dimension asks whether power works through processes of social interaction or social constitution. 
The second dimension separates the social relations of any given expression of power into whether the 
relationship is direct and tangible, or indirect and diffuse. ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?8. 
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consensus that developed on the purpose of American power, and also on the way in which the emerging 
multilateral institutions conferred legitimacy and constrained American power.141        
 
This research adapts their taxonomy of power to show how the U.S. consistently uses various aspects 
of its power ± not only its physical resources ± to influence and shape regional politics through the 
rebalance strategy.  The empirical chapters forming the case study element of this thesis emphasise the 
multi-GLPHQVLRQDO QDWXUH RI $PHULFD¶V SRZHU FDSDELOLWLHV.  The themes of power resonate with 
*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\ZLWKLWVGXDOLVPRIGRPLQDWLRQE\FRHUFLYHPHDQVRQWKHRQHKDQG
and the garnering of consent from subordinate states on the other, through whom legitimacy for U.S. 
hegemony is bestowed, or revoked.  For each element of the rebalance strategy outlined below, the U.S. 
exercises power in various ways, as it attempts to consolidate its hegemony.  Some forms of power are 
demonstrated more discretely, operating in the background, while others are more overtly expressed.  
The flexLELOLW\RI%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\RISRZHULQDQLPDWLQJ$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\DOORZV
for a comprehensive study of hegemony as both identity and social practice.  This research does not 
offer a case study in the traditional sense, in that it is not making an intensive study of a single case, 
where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases.142  Rather, the case studies 
offer insight into the American exercise of power as it seeks to preserve its hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific. 
 
In her November 2011 Foreign Policy article outlining the core principles of the rebalance strategy, 
Secretary Clinton characterised six lines of actions to be taken: 
- Strengthen alliances; 
- Increase U.S. military presence; 
- Improve relations with emerging powers; 
- Deepen economic relations; 
- Engage with multilateral institutions; 
- Support for universal values, including democracy and human rights.143   
Since there is considerable overlap between these six strands, for the purposes of this research, these 
features of the rebalance are condensed into three areas of study: the military rebalance, the economic 
rebalance, and relations with the two main regional rising powers, China and India.  In the examination 
                                                          
141 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?-63. 
142 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
20. 
143 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?   
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of each, reference is made to the role that American values pertaining to human rights and democracy 
and respect for international rules and norms and the rule of law, that are intrinsic to American 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.    
 
Military Rebalance 
A key priority of the rebalance is to strengthen the alliances that provide the foundation of U.S. 
engagement in the region and upon which regional stability continues to rest.  The San Francisco 
alliance system, otherwise known as the hub-and-spokes system, remains at the core of U.S. Asia-
Pacific strategy and thus is elemental to American compulsory power.  The goal of the military 
rebalance is to strengthen these existing alliances and to develop them into burden-sharing arrangements 
DQGWRFUHDWHµZHEV¶EHWZHHQWKHVSRNHV± in other words, to push existing allies to work cooperatively 
in military matters, and with more interoperability, with American oversight.  In addition, the U.S. seeks 
to increase its military presence throughout Southeast Asia, Australasia and into the Indian Ocean ± in 
other words, to rebalance its military presence within the Asia-Pacific as well as to the Asia-Pacific.    
 
Economic Rebalance 
The economic rebalance addresses a domestic priority of the Obama administration ± to improve the 
state of the domestic economy by increasing American trade opportunities in the economically dynamic 
Asia-Pacific.  This aspect of the rebalance emphasises American institutional and structural power, 
drawing attention to American engagement with the myriad regional institutions, including Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
Attention is also given to the American-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  Regional deliberation 
over the future of regional economic order offers a different vision to that of the United States.  The 
ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes China and India 
and not the United States is one such vision.  The Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative offers another 
alternative.  Whose vision will eventually form the basis of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP) is as yet undecided.  
 
Relations with Regional Rising Powers: China and India 
China presents the greatest challenge to American regional hegemony.  This issue-dependent 
relationship ebbs and flows between accommodation, engagement and containment, even while there 
are common areas of interest between the two.  India, in contrast, is often portrayed as an opportunity, 
rather than a threat to American interests and hegemony.  A principal element of the discussion focuses 
 30 
 
on the contrasting American narratives concerning these two rising powers; how China is perceived as 
the authoritarian other, and India as a like-minded democratic state, despite the challenges in 
strengthening and formalising the Indo-U.S. relationship on grounds acceptable to both.  While other 
rising powers, notably Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, and other middle powers with whom the U.S. 
has good relations, including Singapore and Australia, are discussed, more attention is given to India 
and China.  Washington has tended to give strategic and economic priority to these two rising powers.  
In improving strategic ties with India, Washington hopes that in the medium to long term, India will be 
a friendly partner with the capacity to balance China in the region.      
 
Research Data 
This research engages with qualitative methods, which are aligned with an interpretative epistemology 
WKDWµVWUHVVHVWKHG\QDPLFFRQVWUXFWHGDQGHYROYLQJQDWXUHRIVRFLDOUHDOLW\¶DOWKRXJKWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ
between the choice of methods and epistemological positions should not be exaggerated.144  The choice 
RI PHWKRGV KDV EHHQ PDGH RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKHLU VXLWDELOLW\ LQ DQVZHULQJ µKRZ-SRVVLEOH¶ UHVHDUFK
questions, rather than truth-VHHNLQJµZK\¶TXHVWLRQV145  In line with the constructivist approach of this 
research, qualitative methods draw attention to contextual issues and are therefore good at capturing the 
µPHDQLQJ SURFHVV DQG FRQWH[W¶ RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SUDFWLFH ZLWKLQ D ZLGHU VRFLDO VHWWLQJ146  The 
combination of methods emphasises the interpretive nature of this research, recognising that any method 
is not free from bias.  Instead, the aim is to provide aQµRXWVLGH-LQ¶ perspective on the practice of U.S. 
foreign policy by interpreting the behaviours and beliefs that underpin it.  I claim neither scientific 
validity, nor the production of observable knowledge.  Through a framework of methods and data, this 
research offers an interpretation of the processes of identity, interest and narrative formation that use 
data in a way that is as explicit as possible in the development of its argument.  
 
(i) Primary source material  
As aQµRXWVLGH-LQ¶H[DPLQDWLRQ of U.S. foreign policy using discourse analysis, for the purpose of this 
research, U.S. foreign policy materials include official documents relating to military/security policy, 
economic and trade policy, the use of diplomacy, and multilateral institutions.  I have relied on official 
publications as primary sources ± speeches and statements ± released by White House, the Department 
of Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and the State Department.  National Security 
                                                          
144 &ŝŽŶĂĞǀŝŶĞ ? “YƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞDĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ?ŝŶTheory and Methods in Political Science, 1st edition, eds. David Marsh 
and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 201. 
145 ŽƚǇ ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
146 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (London: Routledge, 1988), 62. 
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Strategies and the Quadrennial Defense Review have been invaluable sources of material for military 
and security strategies emanating from previous and current administrations.  For information on the 
TPP, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has provided some source material.  From the 
legislative branch, I have made extensive use of the reports (both original and updated versions) 
published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Congressional hearings and testimony, 
particularly from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to a lesser extent, the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs.  Memoirs, published by key insiders in the Obama administration, have 
provided a useful source of insider knowledge; above all memoirs offer insight into discussions that 
occur during critical decision-making processes, albeit subjective recollections.147  
 
(ii) Secondary source material 
For up-to-date knowledge of the wider academic debates on U.S. foreign policy, with specific focus on 
the Asia-Pacific, I have referred to reports, blogs and other publications from a number of U.S. foreign 
SROLF\WKLQNWDQNVUHIOHFWLQJWKHYDULHGSRVLWLRQVRQWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\148  I 
have mainly consulted think tank output from the Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution 
and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  In the U.K, I have had the opportunity to 
attend several conferences and other events at Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International 
Affairs), that have provided broad discussion on U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, with input from experts from 
the U.S., the U.K., Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and the Philippines, offering a 
broader perspective on the rebalance strategy.   
 
Given the contemporary nature of this research, and its focus on the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific, 
newspapers in the U.S. and U.K. and in the Asia-Pacific have been an essential secondary source of 
information as events occur ± viewed with a critical eye.  To this end, opinion pieces and editorials from 
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post have provided up-to-date information; 
in the U.K, The Financial Times and The Economist have provided an international perspective and for 
Chinese responses to American policy, I have engaged with the Chinese state media outlets, Xinhua 
(English version) and China Daily (English version); for regional discussions, I have examined a range 
                                                          
147 Memoirs offer subjective insight into the inner workings of the Obama administration. See Jeffrey A. Bader, 
KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ P Ŷ /ŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ƐĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐŝĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐy (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2012); Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (London: Penguin, 2014); Hillary Clinton, 
Hard Choices (London: Simon Schuster, 2014). Derek Chollet, The Long Game: How Obama defied Washington 
and ƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐZŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ (New York: Public Affairs, 2016). 
148 Due to the nature of the political/academic/think tank circuit, most American think tanks employ political 
insiders from previous administrations who, given their knowledge of the Beltway, are able to offer an insider 
view of the goings on there. 
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of publications, including The Straits Times (Singapore), The Australian (Australia) and the Japanese 
broadsheet, Asahi Shimbun (English version).    
 
Methods of Analysis  
 
(i) Discourse analysis 
I have adopted a discourse analytical approach for this research.  As vDQ'LMNREVHUYHVµGLVFRXUVH¶LV
an abstract structure that to gain coherence requires concrete construction via texts and conversations.149  
This methodology is concerned with the analysis of language, offering a qualitative method of 
µXQFRYHULQJVRPHRIWKHZD\VLQZKLFK«DFWRUVRUDJHQWV«VHHNWRUHSUHVHQWWKHLUDFWLRQVLQWH[WVDQG
ODQJXDJH¶150  The aim of discourse analysis is to work with texts, exploring patterns in and across 
statements, and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality.151  
$ GLVFRXUVH DQDO\VLV 0LOOLNHQ QRWHV µVKRXOG EH EDVHG XSRQ D VHW RI WH[WV E\ GLIIHUHQW
SHRSOH«SUHVXPHGWREHDXWKRULVHGVSHDNHUVZULWHUVRIDGRPLQDQWGLVFRXUVH¶152  The function of the 
VRXUFHPDWHULDOLVWRPDNHPHDQLQJWRµWHOOWKHVWRU\¶DQGWRUHFUHDWHDKLVWRULFDOVHTXHQFLQJRIHYHQWV
rather than offering a systematic study via quantitative content analysis that looks for word patterns and 
overall word usage, and seeks to make generalisations.153   
 
Texts such as speeches and statements, as well as media coverage of events are interpreted within an 
analysis of broader social, political and cultural processes.  Consequently, the analysis offered here does 
not focus on the texts, or other data alone, rather, it presents a richer analysis by interpreting how 
speeches and other documents are emblematic of broader social, political and cultural frameworks.154  
,WµSURElematise[s] the politics of the interpretive process, asking from whose perspective, and for whose 
EHQHILW WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ KDV EHHQ FRQGXFWHG¶155  Supporting the study of narrative, other critical 
discourse analysis techniques, including intertextuality and predicate analysis, are applied to the source 
material.   
                                                          
149 dĞƵŶ  ? ǀĂŶ ŝũŬ ?  “dŚĞ ^ƚƵĚǇ ŽĨ ŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ? ŝŶ Discourses as Structure and Process, ed. Teun A. van Dijk 
(London: Sage, 1997), 13.  
150 <ĞŝƚŚ:ĂĐŽďƐ ? “ŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?ŝŶSocial Research Methods: An Australian Perspective, ed. Maggie Walter 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 141.    
151 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 21. 
152 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
153 Ariadne sƌŽŵĞŶ ?  “ĞďĂƚŝŶŐ DĞƚŚŽĚƐ P ZĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ YƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? ? ŝŶTheory and Methods in 
Political Science, 3rd edition, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 262. 
154 sƌŽŵĞŶ ? “ĞďĂƚŝŶŐDĞƚŚŽĚƐ PZĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐYƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
155 Douglas Ezzy, Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2002), 107. 
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)DLUFORXJK¶Vintertextuality method, that is, how an individual text draws on elements and discourses 
of other texts, is used to investigate how language users draw on earlier discursive structures to build 
on already established meanings.156  The specific goal of this method is to investigate the constructions 
of identity within official discourse.157  Intertextuality refers to the influence of history on a text and to 
DWH[W¶VLQIOXHQFHRQKLVWRU\, in that the text draws on earlier texts and thereby contributes to historical 
development and change.158  The meaning of a text is partly created in processes of interpretation, thus 
texts have several meaning potentials that may contradict one another and are open to several 
interpretations.159  Additionally broadening the scope of analysis beyond official discourse to include 
the vibrant discourse of the political opposition (both Republican and occasionally Democrat) and the 
debates in online/print media provide invaluable source material for exploring the development and 
clout of alternative narratives to that of the official discourse.160   
 
7KLV WKHVLV GUDZV SULPDULO\ RQ 0LOOLNHQ¶V WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN RI GLVFRXUVH  &RQFHSWXDOO\ VKH
discerns discourse as a system of signification - the way in which we integrate words, deeds, interactions, 
WKRXJKWVIHHOLQJVSODFHVDQGWLPHµWRHQDFWDQGUHFRJQLVHVRFLDOO\-situated identities.¶161  Discourses 
GRQRWH[LVWµRXWWKHUH¶LQWKHZRUOGUDWKHUWKH\DUHµVWUXFWXUes that are actualised in their regular use by 
SHRSOHRIGLVFXUVLYHO\RUGHUHGUHODWLRQVKLSVLQµUHDG\DWKDQG¶ODQJXDJHSUDFWLFHVRURWKHUPRGHVRI
VLJQLILFDWLRQ¶162  Predicate analysis is a suitable method for studying systems of signification that 
involveVDQDO\VLVRIµWKHYHUEVDGYHUEVDQGDGMHFWLYHVWKDWDWWDFKWRQRXQV¶XVLQJWH[WVIURPGLIIHUHQW
authors with narrative authority.163  This type of analysis draws attention to the construction of an object 
WKDWLVJLYHQµSDUWLFXODUIHDWXUHVDQGFDSDFLWLHV¶164  Through implicit or explicit parallels and contrasts, 
RWKHU VXEMHFWVDUH µODEHOOHGDQGJLYHQPHDQLQJIXODWWULEXWHVE\ WKHLUSUHGLFDWHV¶EHLQJGLIIHUHQWLDWHG
from or related to, one another.165   
 
                                                          
156 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 7.   
157 Hansen, Security as Practice, 60. 
158 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 102.  
159 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 75. 
160 Hansen, Security as Practice, 61. 
161 James Paul Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method, 4th edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014), 61. 
162 DŝĐŚĂĞů^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ? “dĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ'ůŽďĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ŝŶInternational/Intertextual Relations, eds. James Der Derian 
and Michael Shapiro (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1989), 11. 
163 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
164 :ĂƉĂŶ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚďƵƚƐďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŝƐŬĞǇƚŽh^ƉŽůŝĐǇďƵƚŽŶĞ
ƚŚĂƚŝƐĂĐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶ ? ?DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
165 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽŽƚǇ ?Imperial Encounters, 378. 
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The second theoretical commitment involves discourses as being productive or reproductive RIµWKLQJV
defined by the discourse.¶166  'LVFRXUVHGHILQHµVXEMHFWVDXWKRULVHGWRVSHDNDQGWRDFW,¶DVZHOODVµWKH
relations within which they see and are seen by each other,¶E\DOVRGHILQLQJNQRZOHGJHDEOHSUDFWLFHV
by these subjects towards the objects which the discourse defines.167  The theoretical commitment of 
discourse productivity also points to the third theoretical commitment, the play of practice, which 
focusHV RQ WKH VWXG\ RI GRPLQDWLQJ GLVFRXUVHV DQG µWKHLU VWUXFWXULQJ RI PHDQLQJ DV FRQQHFWHG WR
LPSOHPHQWLQJ¶LQWHOOLJLEOHDQGOHJLWLPDWHSUDFWLFHV)XQGDPHQWDOWRWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIGLVFRXUVHLV
that the ways in which we understand and represent the world DUHµKLVWRULFDOO\DQGFXOWXUDOO\VSHFLILF
and contingent.¶168  In this way, discourses are, Doty observes, inherently unstable,169 rather than 
µJURXQGHG RQ D VROLG PHWD-WKHRUHWLFDO EDVH WKDW WUDQVFHQGV FRQWLQJHQW KXPDQ DFWLRQV¶170  Being 
unstable, all discourses require work to articulate and rearticulate their knowledges and identities, to 
µIL[WKHUHJLPHRIWUXWK.¶171  The analytical focus of discourse productivity requires consideration of 
how officials GLVFXUVLYHO\ SURGXFH WKHLU µUHJLPH RI WUXWK¶ DV FRPPRQ sense, excluding others, by 
GHILQLQJµNQRZOHGJHDEOHSUDFWLFHV¶172  $JHQWVHIIHFWLYHO\XVHGLVFRXUVHDVDµUHVRXUFH¶WRGLUHFWWKHLU
practices, making possible certain courses of action while precluding others.  In this way, they attempt 
to shape new/existing social meanings in discourse through the practice of narrative or storytelling.   
 
(ii) The discursive practice of narrative 
The act of story-telling, as a discursive practice, represents events in a meaningful temporal and causal 
ZD\ WKDW µVXJJHVW VSHFLILF interpretations, shape possible responses and limit potential other 
representations.¶173  7KHµH[HUFLVHRIQDUUDWLRQ¶%RGHH[SOLFDWHVµLQYROYHVOLQNLQJUHDOZRUOGHYHQWV
through a number of characteristic narrative devices such as the inclusion of characters and the 
GHYHORSPHQWRISORWV¶174  Throughout history, story-telling has been fundamental to making sense of, 
and shaping, social reality.175  Individual story-telling practices are performed within a social context 
and thus connect visions about how specific events should be interpreted.  Consequently, the actor or 
agent telling the story is an integral part of the analytical picture.176  7KHVWRU\¶VGLVFXUVLYHVXFFHVVLV
                                                          
166 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
167 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
168 Emphasis in original. Doty, Imperial Encounters, 16.  
169 Doty, Imperial Encounters, 16. 
170 Phillips and Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 5. 
171 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
172 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
173 Ingvild Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: the People of the United Nations  
(London: Routledge, 2015), 46-47. 
174 Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations, 47. 
175 ,ŝĚĞŵŝ ^ƵŐĂŶĂŵŝ ?  “ŐĞŶƚƐ ? ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? EĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 
(1999): 381. 
176 Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations, 47. 
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as much a product of the way its narrator is telling it, and who the narrator is, as it is a product of its 
discursive and intersubjective construction.177   
 
The essence of narrative, especially in the political context, lies in the capacity of the story-teller to 
simplify complex situations into chains of events, to shape the present, relative to the past, and create a 
political reality from a particular perspective.178  For the actor, narratives perform several functions:  
they give meaning to particular events, decode the rules of behaviour, and set out the context.179  The 
role of narratives is to integrate events and make sense of them within the overall story line.180  They 
LQWULQVLFDOO\DQGµVLPXOWDQHRXVO\stabilise the meaningfulness and social predictability of interaction, 
and offer a vehicle for the transformation of knowledge, meaning and practice.¶181  Narratives can be 
WUHDWHGµintersubjective enterprises¶through which meaning is constructed, linking the project of action 
(the plot) with the context of action.  Bode details three basic elements to a narrational representation 
of events: (i) a plot, understood as a structured and chronological sequence of events; (ii) the characters; 
and (iii) an interpretive theme in the form of regulative ideas that, in defining standards of behaviour, 
also try to order or constrain behaviour.182  In sum, the complex process of exchange between the 
FKDUDFWHUVHYHQWVDQGWKHSORWVWUXFWXUHXQWLOWKH\LQWHUFRQQHFWJLYHVSXUSRVHDQGVHQVHWRµWKHPHDQLQJ
rules and context of interaction,¶ and continually adjusted to meet the intentions, whims and 
expectations of actors.183   
 
For the U.S., the evolution of its regional hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific context is framed 
within an overall logic involved with it being the hegemon, and it practising hegemony through the 
hierarchical regional order.  From a narrativist and constructivist point of view, in maintaining 
ontological (and physical) security, it is the security narrative of the American state and political elite 
that provide the rules and meaning for political actions and strategic movements for other actors.184  
                                                          
177 Bode, Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations, 47. 
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245. 
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predicament requiring a call for action; and the conclusion. The revelation phase is crucial since the events and 
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What the U.S. is, and what it does, are the result of a continuous process of narrative reinterpretation, 
grounded in the past and the present, and with the capacity to shape the future.185  The sequencing of 
how we understand the U.S. and what it does becomes a narrative by µa common thread, the plot,¶ and 
WKHSHUYDVLYHORJLFRIµVHFXULW\¶ZKLFKµgives coherence to this chain of events¶ and authenticates the 
µappropriate criteria of action.¶186  The narrative of the events in the South and East China Seas has been 
gradually reconfigured into a security contextFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DµEURDG¶DQGVHFWRUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
security,187 DQGRI86WDVNVDVWKHKHJHPRQDQGVXSSRUWHGE\WKHGLVFXUVLYHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIµ&KLQD¶V
ULVH¶DVWKUHDWHQLQJZLWKLQDEURDder American security narrative.  
 
Chapter Overview 
This research connects the rebalance strategy ± as a discrete IHDWXUHRI WKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
foreign policy ± with the processes that produce it.  I aim to reveal a complex picture of U.S. foreign 
policy production, combining processes comprising narrative, identity and security, with foreign policy 
outcomes.  Language is critical to these processes because it has a clear political purpose: it normalises 
and legitimises particular foreign policy practices within an authorised version of historical context, and 
validates a specific and narrow conception of American national identity and security.   
 
Since the U.S. remains, arguably for the foreseeable future, the critical actor in the international sphere, 
the continuing legitimacy and consent for the post-1945 international order hinges on the U.S., as 
hegemon, to lead and reproduce this order.  *UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\± emphasising 
coercion, consent and legitimacy ± exposes the need for a broader representation of the social processes 
behind the reproduction of American domination of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific, in light of 
WKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVLJQDWXUHUHEDODQFHSROLF\.  ,XVH%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VSRZHUIUDPework 
to analyse the range of power assets that the U.S. has at its disposal, and to highlight the asymmetric 
social relations of power that facilitate and complicate the maintenance and reproduction of hegemony.  
I supplement %DUQHWW DQG'XYDOO¶V framework with discourse analysis through which I explore the 
nature, themes and consequences of the overarching narratives that weave through the American 
exercise of power that supports the maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  
This inquiry proceeds through six additional chapters.   
 
                                                          
185 dŚĞ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƵƚĉƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŚƵƚƚůĞ ? ?dŚŝƐƚĞƌŵǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
in chapter 3. Ciutĉ,  “dŚĞŶĚ ?Ɛ )ŽĨEdK ? ?38. 
186 Ciutĉ,  “dŚĞŶĚ ?Ɛ )ŽĨEdK ? ?45. 
187 Ciutĉ,  “dŚĞŶĚ ?Ɛ )ŽĨEdK ? ?51. 
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Chapter 2 establishes the first part of the theoretical framework of this thesis by opening up the concepts 
of hegemony, order and power.   My approach to hegemony moves beyond rational considerations, 
giving priority to neo-Gramscian and constructivist understandings of hegemony.188  The focus is on 
exposing the social relationships that underpin American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and the 
processes of negotiating regional order that rely on garnering legitimacy and consent in addition to 
enforcement through coercion.  Moreover, the hegemon also makes concessions to the subordinate 
states as a means to maintain their acquiescence and which ultimately preserve the asymmetry and status 
quo in the existing order.189  Attention is also given to the domination of ideas, allowing for examination 
of the principal mechanisms of socialisation that underpin U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, and attempt to 
reproduce consent for the hegemonic order.190  As a means to situate the condition of U.S. hegemony 
that was passed onto the incoming Obama administration in 2009, I consider the shifts in the character 
of order in the Asia-Pacific, and the effects on hegemonic legitimacy, as a consequence of the G.W. 
%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V*OREDO:DURQ7HUURU  Finally, I present %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶Vfour-fold typology 
of power as a means to connect the concepts of hegemony and order to the exercise of power by way 
of the strategic rebalance.  Since American hegemony relies on a range of power assets for its 
UHSURGXFWLRQ%DUQHWW DQG'XYDOO¶V typology facilitates a comprehensive examination of power that 
emphasises its social, as well as its physical foundations, thereby supporting a systematic examination 
of the coercive, consensual and legitimising aspects of U.S, hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
Forming the second part of the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 concentrates on processes of narrative, 
identity and security formation in the development of U.S. foreign policy.  This chapter uses a 
constructivist approach, emphasising the role that ideas play in the social production and reproduction 
RI$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\and how this relates to its ongoing search for ontological security.  It 
considers how identity is formulated through autobiographical (i.e. self) and self-versus-other 
processes.  This chapter attends to the continuing influence of the exceptionalist ideology and belief in 
manifest destiny on American hegemonic identity (re)production.  Attention is given to identity 
formation processes and their influence on national security narratives and the construction of threats 
to identity, often through a prism of a real or perceived physical threat.  By examining hegemony as an 
American identity role, the process of maintaining security does not only occur on the physical level; 
rather, the (re)production of security is also needed at the level of self, to ontologLFDOO\VHFXUH$PHULFD¶V
                                                          
188 The English School also puts forward a conceptualisation of hegemony in international society that, once 
disaggregated from primacy, views hegemony as an institutionalised practice within international society, along 
with balance of power, the role of great powers, international law, diplomacy and war. Ian Clark, Hegemony in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34. 
189 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
190 Gramsci also considers hegemonic legitimacy which is explored in his notiŽŶŽĨĂŶ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůďůŽĐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.  
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hegemonic identity.  Language is critical to all these processes, with the µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ narrative 
evidently situated within the context of a consolidated U.S. regional hegemony.  Discussion, therefore, 
focuses on the way in which WKHµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHKDVEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGDUHVXOWRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
XQFHUWDLQW\RYHUKRZWRPDQDJH&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\LWVIDLOXUHWRXQGHUVWDQGDQGHYHQVKDSH
&KLQD¶VFKDQJLQJFKDUDFWHUDQGUROHDQGKRZWKH86LQWHUSUHWVLWVRZQKHJHPonic identity.  Linking 
back to hegemonic practices in the production of order, language and meaning are infused with power, 
demonstrated by the ability, or inability, of U.S. administration officials to favourably express American 
power, and by $PHULFD¶Vcapacity, not only to generate consent for its power, but to also continually 
cultivate behaviour that complies with its hegemonic order.  
 
The empirical core of the thesis is located in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  Each chapter focuses on a specific 
element of the rebalance, demonstrating how the U.S. exercises a broad range of power assets at its 
disposal to assert its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific.  I aim to show how the U.S. simultaneously 
exerts different types of power, using %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VFODssification of compulsory, institutional, 
structural and productive power to produce regional hegemonic order and to secure its hegemonic 
identity.  Since the U.S. has the capacity to exercise power interactively and constitutively in each case, 
the scope of its power assets, with which it can broadly garner consent for its hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific, even when it resorts to coercion, characterises American hegemonic order as legitimate by the 
majority of subordinate states in this region.  Although hegemony is a form of dominance, the empirical 
chapters draw attention to the processes of consent and bargaining that occur between the U.S. and the 
subordinate states, who actively maintain asymmetrical social relations with the hegemon.   
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the military element of the rebalance strategy, paying particular attention to the 
maintenance and development of the alliance system that has dominated the order of regional security 
since 1945.  The economic element of the rebalance is examined in Chapter 5.  This discussion centres 
on the 2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VHIIRUWVWRVKDSHWKHUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFRUGHUWKURXJKWKH7UDQV-Pacific 
Partnership, and U.S. capacity to shape regional developments through regional multilateral institutions.  
Chapter 6 considers $PHULFD¶VHYROYLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHUHJLRQ¶VWZRPDLQULVLQJSRZHUV&KLQD
and India, varying distinctly in its respective approaches to each rise.  A more detailed overview of the 
relationship of hegemony and power as manifested in the rebalance strategy, and examined in the 
empirical chapters, is provided at the end of Chapter 2. 
 
Each empirical chapter also assesses how the U.S. uses various aspects of its power to dominate the 
structure of values and meanings about the nature of regional order, including threats to that order, to 
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influence the perceptions, domestic narratives and policies of the subordinate states. To further 
emphasise U.S. hegemonic practices, %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶Vframework is supplemented by analysis of 
the Obama admLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vdiscursive practices, focusing on identity and security narratives that seek 
WR PDNH VHQVH RI µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH VWUDWHJLF UHEDODQFH  (DFK FKDSWHU makes 
reference to aspects of U.S. ontological security-seeking behaviour, outlining autobiographical and self-
versus-other processes, which connect attempts to secure American hegemonic identityZLWKWKHµUHDO
ZRUOG¶RIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLFLHVWKURXJKZKLFKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIILFLDOVLGHQWLI\DQGDFWRQreal or 
perceived threats to its hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific.  Determining the boundaries of the 
relationship with China in particular seems to challenge U.S. hegemony at the level of both regional 
order and in the way in which the U.S. views its hegemonic identity.   
 
Chapter 7 brings this thesis to its timely conclusion.  This chapter reviews my contribution to the study 
RI$PHULFDQIRUHLJQSROLF\VLWXDWLQJWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\ZLWKLQWKHEURDGHU
DFDGHPLFGHEDWHRQZKHWKHU WKHUH LVDQµ2EDPD'RFWULQH¶ WKDWgives GLUHFWLRQ WR2EDPD¶V IRUHLJQ
policy.  As Obama has looked to secure his foreign policy legacy during the final months of his 
presidency, I conclude with some final observations on whether the rebalance strategy will continue 
into the next presidency.  Finally, I explore the limitations of my research, also suggesting opportunities 






Hegemony, Power and Legitimacy: A Framework for Analysis 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for this thesis, in which hegemony provides the 
conceptual lynchpin.  Hegemony in the international sphere is conceived here as an asymmetry in 
relationships defined and shaped by varying expressions of power over a sustained period.  To be 
hegemonic requires the convergence of political, economic and cultural conditions that allow for the 
creation and reproduction of order.  Using a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a social 
relationship, the presence of hegemony is derived from consent, rather than coercion, which requires 
constant negotiation with the subordinate states.   
 
The first section examines American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific through the hierarchical structure 
of regional order.  Thereafter, attention turns to the concept of hegemony in the international system, 
drawing on neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony in IR, and focusing on *UDPVFL¶VLGHDVRQFRHUFLRQ
and consent to hegemony.191  A neo-Gramscian approach allows for an analytical focus on the 
pervasiveness of American hegemony through its domination of ideas and practices permeating a core 
of global political and civil society, domination of economic and social forces, and supported by 
multilateral institutions that facilitate the expansion of these forces whilst also providing legitimacy and 
absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas.192  Since hegemony is treated here as a social relation which relies 
RQPRUHWKDQ$PHULFD¶VSUHSRQGHUDQWPDWHULDOSRZHUWKLVDSSURDFKDOORZVIRUdeliberation of the non-
physical aspects of U.S. regional domination in the Asia-Pacific, through the inclusion of ideational and 
ideological phenomena.   
 
With neo-Gramscian and social constructivist approaches in IR focusing on hegemony as a social 
relationship requiring social control, attention turns to an explicit exploration of legitimacy ± the subject 
of much debate in normative approaches to IR.  This chapter draws on constructivist traditions to 
                                                          
191 Key related neo-'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶ ǁŽƌŬƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ZŽďĞƌƚ Žǆ ?  “^ŽĐŝĂů &ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ tŽƌůĚ KƌĚĞƌƐ P ĞǇŽŶĚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155; Robert 
Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ PŶƐƐĂǇŝŶDĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 12, no 2 (1983): 162-175; Joseph Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ P,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Revolutionary Process  ?KǆĨŽƌĚ P ůĂƌĞŶĚŽŶ WƌĞƐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ZĂŶĚĂůů  ? 'ĞƌŵĂŝŶ ĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů <ĞŶŶǇ ?  “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ P /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?Review of International Studies 24, no. 1 
(1998): 3-21; Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel eds., Gramsci and Global Politics: 
Hegemony and Resistance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).  
192 Cox,  “Social Forces, States and World KƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?172. 
 41 
 
.consider how mechanisms of socialisation are used to underpin U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, and which 
facilitate exploration of the social reproduction of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.193   
 
The post-9/11 world has drawn attention to the challenge of maintaining American hegemony, and the 
often difficult task of balancing coercion and consent across the political and socio-economic aspects 
of American hegemony.  As such, this situation has precipitated normative focus on the issue of 
hegemonic legitimacy.  Since 9/11, the focus on the consensual and social aspects of U.S. hegemony 
has become especially significant.  The second section of this chapter deliberates on the crisis in U.S. 
hegemonic legitimacy emanating from the Global War on Terror, and whether this has led to a change 
LQ$PHULFD¶VZRUOGYLHZXQGHU2EDPD194      
 
The durability of U.S. hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific relies on the ability of government officials 
to articulate and exercise U.S. power effectively through its rebalance strategy.  Power, so understood, 
LVQRWOLPLWHGWR$PHULFD¶VDELOLW\WRXVHLWVSUHSRQGHUDQWPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVWRGLUHFWO\VKDSHWKHDFWLRQV
of the subordinate states.  Nor is its µSRZHU¶VROHO\PDQLIHVWHGLQFRHUFLYHPHDQVThe final part of this 
chapter sets out the analytical framework for animating American hegemony in the strategic rebalance, 
XVLQJ %DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\ RI SRZHU ZKLFK FDWHJRULVHV µSRZHU¶ LQWR IRXU GLVFUHWH
dimensions, compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.195  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\
offers a broad framework through which the American exercise of power, as the Obama administration 
implements the rebalance strategy, can be more comprehensively analysed.  This approach to power, 
therefore, goes beyond typiFDOFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVWKDWOLPLWIRFXVWRWKHFRQGLWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VPLOLWDU\
and economic capabilities to maintain regional order.  Furthermore, the incorporation of the social 
                                                          
193 Works utilising a broadly constructivist approach to hegemony include Lavina Rajendram Lee, U.S. Hegemony 
and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars on Iraq (New York: Routledge, 2010); 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů EŽƌŵ ǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů hange, ? International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887- ? ? ? ?ŚĂƌůĞƐ ?<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŝŶŐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽWĂǆŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂ ? ?Security Studies 23, no. 2 (2014): 219-257; G. John Ikenberry and 
ŚĂƌůĞƐ ?<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?International Organization 40, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 
283-315 and ůĂƐƚĂŝƌ/ĂŝŶ:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?International 
Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 487-515. In addition to constructivist work, in this study of hegemonic 
legitimacy and processes of socialisation, I also draw on notable works from the English School. The English 
School views hegemony as an institution of international society. Like constructivists, they provide analysis of 
the normative foundations of hegemonic legitimacy. See /ĂŶ,ƵƌĚ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 397-408; Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Christian Reus-^ŵŝƚ ?  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌŝƐĞƐ ŽĨ >ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?
International Politics 44, no. 2/3 (2007): 157-174.  
194 The notion of a crisis in US legitimacy under the G.W. Bush administration is discussed at length in the English 
School. See Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit ?ĞĚƐ ? ? “Resolving International Crises of Legitimacy ? ?special issue, 
International Politics 44, nos. 2/3 (2007): 153-339. 
195 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?-75. 
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dimensions of power, as well as its material dimensions, allows for an interpretation of the mechanisms 
of socialisation that are present within U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations.   
 
American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: Constructing regional order  
,QWKHGHFDGHIROORZLQJ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VJHQHUDOFRPPLWPHQWWRDQGFDSDFLW\WRXQGHUZULWHWKH
existing post-Cold War hegemonic order came under pressure, with suggestion that U.S. foreign policy 
is in crisis.196  In the Asia-Pacific, U.S. hegemony was undermined by questions over its capacity to be 
the principal guarantor of regional order, its perceived weakness in underwriting global economic 
governance, and its singular focus on the global war on terrorism.197  The G.W. Bush administration¶V
attitude towards U.S. primacy following 9/11 reignited debate on the coercive nature of U.S hegemony, 
and the means by which consent from subordinate states was induced.198  To some, therefore, the 
adoption of such coercive hegemonic practices bordered on µHPSLUH-building.¶199  7RRWKHUV$PHULFD¶V
hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific has been undergoing transformation since the end of the Cold War, 
GHQRWLQJWKDWWKHKHJHPRQLFRUGHULVµSURGXFHGDQGPDLQWDLQHG¶E\DFRQWLQXDOSURFHVVRIQHJRWLDWLRQ
between thHKHJHPRQDQGRWKHUVWDWHVUHVWLQJRQVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIUHJLRQDOµRUGHU¶200       
 
Unlike rationalist conceptualisations of order that commence with the premise that the state with 
material preponderant power is most likely to dominate the international system,201 this study starts with 
                                                          
196 Goh notes that in academia in particular, the post-mortem on the G.W. Bush era indicated that American 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ. ? Goh, The Struggle for Order, 3. See also G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-
Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).   
197 For discussion of the effects of the global financial crisis on US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, see Mark Beeson, 
 “ƌŝƐŝƐǇŶĂŵŝĐƐĂŶĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ PĂƐƚƐŝĂŝŶŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?The Pacific Review 24, no. 3 (2014): 
 ? ? ? ?&ŽƌŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĞĞDĞůǀǇŶW ?>ĞĨĨůĞƌ ? “ ? ? ? ?ŝŶZĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (2011): 357-374. 
198 The G.W. Bush DoctƌŝŶĞƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞŐƵŝƐĞŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?Mustapha 
<ĂŵĂů WĂƐŚĂ ?  “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? WĞƌŝůŽƵƐ ŵƉŝƌĞ ĂŶĚ ,ƵŵĂŶ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ŝŶAsia Pacific Geopolitics: Hegemony vs. 
Human Security, eds. Joseph A. Camilleri, Larry Marshall, Michalis S. Michael and Michael Seigel (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), 25. Many scholars have argued that American foreign policy practice has 
reflected a consistent pattern of imperialist behaviour. See, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and 
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).  
199 dŚĞ ŚŝĚĚĞŶ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĞŵƉŝƌĞ ? ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ Ă ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ƌŽůĞ ĂŶĚ
purpose of American power. While the U.S. has pursued imperial-like policies at certain times and in places, it is 
not clear that empire-building has followed from a deliberate policy of imperial aggrandisement, or that an 
expansive global empire generally describes American conduct or purpose. AnĚƌĞǁĂŬĞƌ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŵƉŝƌĞ W 
A Dangerous DŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶ ? ?Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 10.   
200 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6. 
201 As a means to understand the existence of one leading actor in specifying the terms for the maintenance of 
order in the international system, Hegemonic Stability Theory determines that this actor has a predominance of 




+HGOH\%XOO¶VGHILQLWLRQRIRUGHUDVµUXOHV-based interactions, underpinned by intersubjective consensus 
FRQFHUQLQJ WKH EDVLF JRDOV RI DQG SURFHVVHV LQYROYHG LQ WKH FRQGXFW RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DIIDLUV¶202  
Spanning a spectrum ranging from total disorder to a rules-based order, the construction of order is 
dynamic, adjusting to the underlying forces of international politics, the distribution of power, and the 
organising principles of the order.203  Order in the Asia-Pacific depends on historically produced and 
constantly evolving shared understandings.  µ,QWHUQDOFRKHVLRQ¶RIDQRUGHUUHTXLUHVWKHGHYHORSPHQW
of a shared identity expressed in part in collectively held norms and values and in part in common 
cultural links and similar domestic governance arrangements.204  Furthermore, shared ideas, manifested 
LQµKLVWRULFDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGQRUPDWLYHVWUXFWXUHV± in international legal rules and practices, international 
political norms, and in the dominant ideologies and practices thDWDQLPDWHWKHP¶205 are reached through 
µVWUXJJOH FRQIOLFW DFFRPPRGDWLRQ DQG FRRSHUDWLRQ¶ RFFXUULQJ EHWZHHQ WKH KHJHPRQ DQG WKH
subordinate states.206  Order, therefore, is not static, but in a constant process of negotiation and 
evolution, with order existing on a continuum that ranges between rules-based order and disorder.  
 
U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific was initially established on the back of U.S. military preponderance, 
unchallenged in its role of public goods provider since the Second World War.207  Of equal importance, 
however, the power exerted by the United States has social foundations, denoting that the exercise of 
American power permeates through social frameworks, to which other states in the system broadly 
acquiesce.208  As Cox observes, examination of orders must be broadened to encompass the basic 
SURFHVVHVEHKLQGWKHµGHYHORSPHQWRIVRFLDOIRUFHVDQGIRUPVRIVWDWHDQGLQWKHVWUXFWXUHRIJOREDO
SROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶209  With the focus on the social nature of power, rather than a myopic focus on 
material resources, how others perceive and interact with this unequal power distribution draws 
attention to matters of legitimacy, consent, and the process of negotiation that occurs in the 
(re)production of Asia-Pacific regional order.   
                                                          
202 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), 8, 16; Goh, The Struggle for Order, 7 
203 DƵƚŚŝĂŚůĂŐĂƉƉĂ ?  “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌ PŶŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ? ŝŶAsian Security Order: 
Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 39. 
Alagappa also presents a comprehensive typology of international order, focusing on the key elements of an 
instrumental order, a normative-contractual order and a solidarist order. ůĂŐĂƉƉĂ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶational 
KƌĚĞƌ PŶŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ? 42-43 
204 dƌŝŶĞ&ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞŽŵŝŶŐDƵůƚŝ-KƌĚĞƌtŽƌůĚ ? ?Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 1 (2016): 14-15. 
205 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 17. 
206 ůĂŐĂƉƉĂ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌ PŶŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ?39. 
207 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ?  “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐKƌĚĞƌ ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ ƚŚĞƵƐŚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 178. 
208 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4 
209 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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A study of the international sphere, including the resilience of the U.S. hegemonic order, therefore, 
require more than examination of material shifts of power.  There is also the matter of norms of order, 
UHVWLQJRQWKHµVRFLDODQGLGHRORJLFDOSURFOLYLWLHV¶RISRZHUIXO states within the system.210  As with any 
hegemonic order in history, the normative dimensions of U.S. hegemonic order influence its character, 
stability and durability, and govern social relations within the order.211  Social structures provide the 
µLQIUDVWUucture of hegemonic order...give hierarchy and hegemony social character and enable the 
KHJHPRQWRDVVHUWLWVQRUPDWLYHSUHIHUHQFHV¶212  Furthermore, hegemonic preferences not only pervade 
the international system but also infuse the practices, meanings, values and beliefs of political officials 
LQ VXERUGLQDWH VWDWHV  1RUPV WKHUHIRUH µVKDS>H@ WKH VRFLDO UHODWLRQV WKDW DUH WKH VLQHZV RI
KHJHPRQ\¶213  Hegemons advance their ideological and material interests in four broad dimensions of 
order: geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural and commercial.214  Consequently, the U.S. plays a critical 
role in constituting and shaping regional order and stability in the Asia-Pacific, and the current regional 
order continues to be formatively shaped by American liberal hegemony in economic and military 
terms, and in political and ideational terms.  The core values and interests of Asia-Pacific regional 
society are broadly characterised by liberal U.S. principles, including the rule of law and an open 
economic system.  U.S. regional alliances are defined by American principles and commitment, and are 
supported by loose regional multilateral cooperation.215   
 
Regional order in the Asia-Pacific is classified here as hierarchical, rather than anarchic.216  
Relationships are classed as anarchic if states possess no authority over one another,217 while at the 
other end of the continuum exist international hierarchical relationships, including empires, 
protectorates, spheres of influence and dependencies.218  The characterisation of a continuum negates 
                                                          
210 <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ EŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ &ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ DĂƌƚŚĂ &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞ ?  “Legitimacy, 
Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity ? ?World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 58-85. 
211 <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
212 <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
213 <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
214 <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ?-223. 
215 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 9. 
216 The role of anarchy is developed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959). In Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 
chapter 5, Waltz represents anarchy and hierarchy as dichotomous characterisations based on the presence or 
absence of overarching authority. Keohane argues that anarchy is equally central to liberal institutionalism. 
Institutions constrain state behaviour and facilitate cooperation despite the absence of international political 
authority. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Alexander Wendt is the main proponent of systemic anarchy, see 
ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌtĞŶĚƚ ? “ŶĂƌĐŚǇŝƐǁŚĂƚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŵĂŬĞŽĨŝƚ PdŚĞ^ŽĐŝĂůŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨWŽǁĞƌWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). Not all constructivists accept the importance of systemic anarchy. See also 
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security. 
217 ĂǀŝĚ ?>ĂŬĞ ?  “ƐĐĂƉĞ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŽĨEĂƚƵƌĞ PƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?International 
Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 50.   
218 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 11. 
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WKH µWUXLVP¶ WKDW DOO UHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKLQ WKH V\VWHPDUH DQDUFKLF219  In its simplest form, hierarchy 
denotes the ranking and interaction of states within the order, based on the unequal distribution of 
power, underpinned by an agreement by the subordinate states to cede authority.  Hierarchy is, in this 
sense, relational, imbued with features of consent and legitimacy.220  The relationship that has developed 
between the U.S. and many states in the Asia-Pacific over the past seventy years remains predominantly 
hierarchical, especially in security matters.221  Furthermore, many states in the Asia-Pacific continue to 
subordinate themselves in whole, or in part, to the authority of the U.S., acknowledging American 
authority to regulate their interactions, particularly in military matters, and/or in economic affairs.222   
 
Incorporated within this hierarchical conception of regional order, grounded in geopolitical, socio-
economic, cultural and commercial logics, the U.S. is hegemonic.223  Hegemony is a crucial concept in 
understanding how a dominant state shapes and controls order.224  However, there is a marked difference 
in IR as to how hegemony is conceptualised and studied.  Rather than adhering to problem-solving 
theories, which treat the prevailing social and power relationships as given, the emphasis here is on 
uncovering the configuration of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, hinging on multi-layered 
processes involving its material power, the (re)production and maintenance of a collective image of the 
American conception of order, including its normative foundations, and the institutions which 
µDGPLQLVWHUWKHRUGHUZLWKDFHUWDLQ VHPEODQFHRIXQLYHUVDOLW\¶225  *UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWRIKHJHPRQ\LV
                                                          
219 ĂǀŝĚ ?>ĂŬĞ ? “ƐĐĂƉĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŽĨEĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĂǀŝĚ ?>ĂŬĞ ?Hierarchy in International Relations.   
220 /ĂŶůĂƌŬ ? “,Žǁ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĞ ? ?International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 468. 
221 The security hierarchy in the Asia-Pacific has been maintained through the hub-and-spokes system of U.S.-
ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐ ?<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
222 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 3. Lake observes that economic and security relationships vary 
from the anarchic to the hierarchical, depending on the level of sovereignty ceded to the dominant state.  
Security relationships can vary from diplomacy at the anarchic end, to protectorates at the hierarchical end.  
Economic relationships between states range from market exchange at the anarchic end, to dependency at the 
hierarchical end. He also argues that hierarchies represent the outcome of consensual contracts, in which one 
state agrees to cede some sovereignty in return for various kinds of security, political, and economic benefits. 
This is not a one-way relationship, therefore, with negotiation occurring on both sides. Lake, Hierarchy in 
International Relations, 52-57.  
223 Kang, like Goh, treats hierarchy and hegemony as distinct: hegemony is overarching, more intrusive, and 
focuses on the largest power, while hierarchy is more concerned with the interaction of states up and down the 
ranked hierarchical order. ĂǀŝĚ<ĂŶŐ ? “,ŝĞƌĂƌchy and Stability in Asian /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶInternational 
Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 164-166.  
224 ŽǆĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐǁŽƌůĚŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂƐ ‘ĂƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ Q ?ĂŶĚ ?
ŵƵƐƚďĞĂůůƚŚƌĞĞ ? ?Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂ ŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?-2. 
225 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ PĞǇŽŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌ ĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽǆĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ
that ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨ ‘ƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚŝŶŐ ?ŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶ ?
tend to reflect and perpetuate the prevailing power relations. Later on, institutions may take on a life of their 
own, or stimulate the creation of rival institutions. Žǆ ?  “^ŽĐŝĂů &ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ tŽƌůĚ KƌĚĞƌƐ P ĞǇŽŶĚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?  
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employed as an alternative to the state-centric power theories that dominate IR.226  This 
conceptualisation is then coupled with a constructivist approach to the reproduction of legitimacy 
through normative mechanisms of socialisation.  However, before exploring the interactive social 
processes that work to maintain and embed U.S. hegemony, the next section outlines rationalist 
approaches that place little or no value on the normative aspects of hegemony.      
 
Conceptualising hegemony 
(i) Rationalist approaches in IR 
Common to mainstream rationalist approaches of IR, hegemony is typically characterised by the 
GRPLQDQWVWDWH¶VSUHSRQGHUDQWPDWHULDOFDSDELOLWLHVDQGRUGHUSURYLVLRQFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUactors in the 
international system.  It is often used interchangeably with primacy and unipolarity, as a means to 
explain the presence of American power in Asia-Pacific regional order.227  There are differences in 
rationalist approaches in relation to their emphasis, or lack of emphasis, on the non-material elements 
of hegemony ± the norms and ideas that also activate hegemonic orders.228  These differences stem from 
underlying theoretical assumptions about the nature of international structures, and the forms of power 
used by a hegemon to maintain order.229  While it is relatively uncontroversial to describe the United 
States as hegemonic, the nature of its domination in the Asia-Pacific remains open to theoretical 
interpretation.230  Nevertheless, regional preponderance represents an important element to any claim 
to major power status, since a state may promote itself, or may be seen by others, as the representative 
of a particular region.231 
 
Conventional realist and liberal IR scholarship on hegemony broadly focus RQRQHVWDWH¶VGRPLQDQFH
over others, GHWHUPLQHGE\DFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLFDQGPLOLWDU\UHVRXUFHEDVHDQGWKHXVHRIFRHUFLRQ
                                                          
226 For a recent discussion ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨZŽďĞƌƚŽǆĂŶĚ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ'ŝůů ?ƐĞĞKǁĞŶtŽƌƚŚ ? “ZĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝŝŶ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 373-392. 
227 In realist terminology, primacy and preponderance both concern an abundance of a single ĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
power over others. Unipolarity refers to the distribution of material capabilities, which overwhelmingly favour 
ŽŶĞƐƚĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?^ĞĞtŝůůŝĂŵtŽŚůĨŽƌƚŚ ? “dŚĞ^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂhŶŝƉŽůĂƌtŽƌůĚ ? ?International 
Security 21, no. 1 (1999): 5-41. 
228 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 5-6. 
229 In broad terms, realist theories generally prioritise power, while liberalist approaches consider international 
institutions and preference formation. Uncovering processes of norms and ideas are widely explored in 
constructivist work.  The difference approaches to ideas and norms are discussed in more depth in the following 
sections of this chapter. 
230 DĂƌŬĞĞƐŽŶ ? “h^,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2004): 446. 
231 Hurrell observes that a state may be seen as a major power if it takes on an assertive role in regional crisis 
management, or fulfils an order-ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐƌŽůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ŶĚƌĞǁ,ƵƌƌĞůů ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?>ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ
Global Order: What Space for Would-Ğ'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 8. 
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and inducement to alter the preferences of leaders in subordinate states.232  Realist conceptions define 
hegemony as a relationship of dominance, in which the hegemon maintains international order by using 
its predominant material resources to reward and coerce subordinate states.233  There is often no 
distinction made between hegemony and primacy.234  John Mearsheimer asserted thatµDKHgemon is a 
state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system¶235  Power, in materialist 
conceptions, equates to the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims; the most 
important of which are to protect and promote national material interests at home and abroad.236  
American power is derived from the relative superiority of its economic and military capabilities in the 
world.237  Its productive capacity, defined by indicators such as wealth, technology, and population size, 
is a pre-requisite for building and modernising U.S. military forces.  The rise and fall of a powerful 
nation is driven primarily by relative economic strength, as determined by its productive capacity, which 
is, in turn, heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other power assets 
measured over a sustained period.238  Economic strength and military power are interdependent.   
 
Liberal approaches DOVRHPSKDVLVHWKHKHJHPRQ¶VPDWHULDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOSRZHULQVXSSRUWLQJWKH
need for a hegemon to protect its preponderant material power and hegemonic order.239  Many liberals 
emphasise the formal institutional arrangements that protect the KHJHPRQ¶V OHDGHUVKLS SRVLWLRQ IRU
mutually beneficial international cooperation but also which constrain hegemonic power.240  Some also 
                                                          
232 Eminent IR academics in the field of liberal institutionalism treat hegemony as primarily reliant on material 
resources. Keohane, for instance, ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ŝƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ Ă  ‘Ɖƌeponderance of material resources ? ? 
Keohane, After Hegemony, 32. 
233 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 2-3.  ‘ŵƉŝƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ĂƌĞfrequently interchanged 
to define aspects of U.S. foreign policy behaviour that rely heavily on the use of military power as a means to 
assert U.S. national interests. See Ăƌů ŽŐŐƐ ?  “h ?^ ?'ƌĂŶĚ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ CŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ŝŶThe Politics of 
Empire: War, Terror and Hegemony, ed. Joseph G. Peschek (London: Routledge, 2006).   
234 The U.S. ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞŶŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝƐŝŶƚĞĚ ĚďĞǇŽŶĚŝƚƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƉƌŝŵĂĐǇ ?/ĂŶůĂƌŬ ?Ɛ
discussion of hegemony, from the English School perspective, separates hegemony from primacy.  Hegemony is 
an institutionalised practice which is legitimated within international society. Conversely, primacy depicts 
nothing more than a distribution of power, in which one state enjoys predominance.  See Ian Clark, Hegemony 
in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4, 23.  
235 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York: Norton 2001), 40. 
236 ZŽďĞƌƚ ?WĂƉĞ ? “ŵƉŝƌĞ&ĂůůƐ ? ?The National Interest 99, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 22.  
237 WĂƉĞ ? “ŵƉŝƌĞ&ĂůůƐ ? ? ? ?-22.  
238 WĂƉĞ ? “ŵƉŝƌĞ&ĂůůƐ ? ? ? ? ?
239 Moravcsik identities three variants: ideational liberalism, focusing on state behaviour, collective social values 
and public goods provision; commercial liberalism, focusing on state behaviour, and gains and losses from 
transnational economic interchange; and republican liberalism, focusing on domestic representation and 
incentives for social groups to engage in rent-ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ? ŶĚƌĞǁ DŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ?  “dĂŬŝŶŐ WƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ P 
Liberal Theory of InƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 515. For other liberal 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƐĞĞ ZŽďĞƌƚ K ? <ĞŽŚĂŶĞ ?  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů >ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ZĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ? ? ŝŶThe Economic Limits to Modern 
Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially 176-185. 
240 G. John Ikenberry, also defining power in material terms, suggests hegemonic management occurs through 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ůŽĐŬ-ŝŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐƐĞůĨ-restraint on the part of the hegemon, and which leads to the creation of 
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contend that through increased economic interdependence, the existing provision for global economic 
governance can continue to flourish without a hegemon.241  Other liberal theorists observe that 
American power is also exercised through its influence on legal and normative structures.242  The 
emergence of international norms has come about through U.S. influence on regimes and institutions, 
and through U.S. capacity to influence choices between modes of governance.243  In the main, liberals 
observe that liberal economic integration gives rising powers greater influence in global economic 
governance, which binds them into the existing system.  The formation of state preferences matters 
more to liberals than the configuration of capabilities.244  States balance economic welfare and 
development with considerations of power and autonomy.245  In this way, states expend resources, or 
make concessions, primarily as a function of preferences, and not capabilities.246   
 
Rationalist approaches limit their understanding of hegemony to material considerations.  Domination 
typically rests on material predominance, measured by the aggregate resources possessed by a single 
actor across a wide range of capabilities, and by the degree of concentration of these resources in terms 
of their international distribution.247  Dominance, so understood, is not purely bilateral or relational, but 
can also be expressed through systemic rules, since hegemonic power is defined as one which is 
µSRZHUIXOHQRXJKWRPDLQWDLQWKHHVVHQWLDOUXOHVJRYHUQLQJLQWHUVWDWHUHODWLRQVDQGZLOOLQJWRGRVR.¶248  
The behaviour of states is thus conditioned by the distribution of material capabilities in the system at 




                                                          
durable constitutional orders.  See G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation 
of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 39-77.   
241 In After Hegemony, Keohane examines the prospect for stability and cooperation in the absence of American 
hegemony. Future cooperation could be attained through institutional mechanisms via the logic of 
interdependence.   
242 Moravcsik notes that ideational liberalism views  ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƐŽĐŝĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ
ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ůŝďĞƌĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽ  ‘ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů
identities or their social construction, nor on whether they reflect material or non-maƚĞƌŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?DŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ?
 “dĂŬŝŶŐWƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
243 ŶĚƌĞǁ,ƵƌƌĞůů ? “WĂǆŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŽƌƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞŽĨ/ŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, 
no. 2 (2005): 160.  
244 ŶĚƌĞǁDŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐWƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
245 HuƌƌĞůů ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?>ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ'ůŽďĂůKƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
246 DŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐWƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
247 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 18.  
248 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 
(Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1989), 234. 
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(ii) Ideational approaches to hegemony in IR 
In IR, constructivist and neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony offer alternative conceptualisations 
that shift exclusive focus away from the hegemon and its accumulated material power, towards the 
needs and expectations of other actors in the order, and towards normative cohesion.  Hegemony is not 
MXVWVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKHKHJHPRQµGRHV¶RUµKDV¶ EXWVRPHWKLQJWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\µVHHV¶249  This 
implies that hegemony requires something more, beyond the capability and willingness of the hegemon 
to coerce subordinate states.250  In these terms, material preponderance is understood as a necessary 
condition of hegemony, but on its own, offers an incomplete concept of hegemony.251  While it is agreed 
that a dominant actor, by definition, typically possesses a preponderance of material resources relative 
WRRWKHUVWDWHVPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVDORQHGRQRWµFRQIHUWKHHQWLWOHPHQWRUULJKWWROHDGDQGFDQQRWHQVXre 
WKDWDVWDEOHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHSROLWLFDORUGHULVFUHDWHGRUPDLQWDLQHG¶252   
 
Gramsci conceptualised hegemony as a mode of social control pervading society by an actor or a 
dominant group, using ideology with which to dominate subordinate actors or groups by shaping 
personal beliefs.253  He initially situated hegemony, meaning direction, in the sphere of civil society, 
ZKLOHFRHUFLRQPHDQLQJGRPLQDWLRQZDVORFDWHGLQWKHUHDOPRIµWKHVWDWH¶*UDPVFLSXWIRUZDUGWZR
GHILQLWLRQVRIµWKHVWDWH¶,QKLVOLPLWHGGHILQLWLRQRIµWKHVWDWH¶SROLWLFDOVRFLHW\HQJHQGHULQJµWKHVWDWH¶
is the coercive apparatus that ensures popular conformity to the mode of production and economy.  In 
contrast, the hegemony of a social group over society as a whole is exercised through civil society ± the 
µSULYDWH¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVHJWKHFKXUFKWUDGHXQLRQVDQGVFKRROV7KHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\
µRSHUDWHWRVKDSHGLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\ WKHFRJQLWLYHDQGDIIHFWLYHVWUXFWXUHV¶WKURXJKZKLFKDFWRUV
µSHUFHLYHDQGHYDOXDWHSUREOHPDWLFVRFLDOUHDOLW\¶254  Together, civil and political society form the two 
OHYHOVRIµVXSHUVWUXFWXUH¶LQ*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ255   
                                                          
249 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 19. 
250 Hurrell asserts that unlike empire, hegemony rests on  ‘negotiation, legitimacy and followership ?ĂŶĚŽĨĨĞƌƐ a 
 ‘less intrusive mode of control. ?/ŶĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ globalised world, the promotion of US economic and security 
interests requires deeper intrusion in to the domestic arrangements of other nations. ,ƵƌƌĞůů ? “WĂǆŵĞƌŝĐĂŶa 
ŽƌƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞŽĨ/ŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?153, and also 158-165. 
251 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 19. ZĞĐĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐŽŶĐƵƌ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ǀŝĞǁĞĚ ƚŚĞŵ ĂƐ  ‘ŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ
determinant of human thought or behaviour. See Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 120-121; Richard Bellamy, 
Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio and the Italian Political Tradition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2013), 179-180. 
252 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 11. 
253 Žǆ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŬĞĞƉƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨŽĐƵƐŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ďĂƐŝƐĞŶƚŝƚǇŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ŝƚƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů ďĂƐŝƐ ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ŝƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŽĐŝĂů
relationships connecting the social classes of different countries. Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?  
254 Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 24. 
255 WĞƌƌǇŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ?New Left Review I/100 (Nov/Dec 1976): 21. Here, by 
dividing superstructure into two realms, and by distinguishing between hegemony and domination, Gramsci 
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Gramsci was not entirely consistent with his views on coercion and consent, which has led to much 
speculation on the extent to which hegemony involves leadership and domination.256  Civil society and 
SROLWLFDOVRFLHW\DUHFRPELQHGZLWKLQ*UDPVFL¶VHQODUJHGFRQFHSWLRQRIµWKHVWDWH¶*UDPVFLLGHQWLILHV
KHJHPRQ\QRWDVDµSROHRIFRQVHQW¶WKDWFDQEHFRQWUDVWHGZLWKµDQRWKHUSROHRIFRHUFLRQ¶EXWDVD
µV\QWKHVLVRIFRQVHQWDQGFRHUFLRQ¶257  As a result, the distinction between political and civil society 
disappears and consent and coercion become co-GHWHUPLQRXVLQKLVHQODUJHGGHILQLWLRQRIµWKHVWDWH¶258  
Gramsci is conscious of the problem of delineating the differences or boundaries between political and 
civil society.259  2SSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQFLYLODQGSROLWLFDOVRFLHW\LVGHYHORSHGLQWRµKHJHPRQ\DUPRXUHG
ZLWKFRHUFLRQ¶260  Consequently, the binary oppositions of state and civil society and coercion and 
FRQVHQWLQ*UDPVFL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPRGHUQVWDWHDUHOHVVZHOO-defined in practical application.261  
7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVWDWHDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\VHUYHVD µFRQFHSWXDODQDO\WLFDO¶ IXQFWLRQVLQFHWKHVH
spheres are reciprocally penetrated rather than distinct spheres of activity.262      
 
For a group to become hegemonic, it must possess the economic, political and cultural conditions that 
facilitate its emergence as the leading force.263  ,Q*UDPVFL¶VZULWLQJµLGHRORJLFal superiority must have 
VROLGHFRQRPLFURRWV¶264 Therefore politico-ethical hegemony must also be economic ± the dominant 
JURXSLV µWKHGHFLVLYHQXFOHXVRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶265  *UDPVFLXVHVµhistorical bloc¶ to define the 
relationship of the structure (economic base) to the superstructure.  The superstructure includes 
organisations and institutions of ideology and politics, including civil society, which are viewed as 
universal in form.266  Gramsci identified civil society with the ideological superstructure.267  Structures 
RU WKH EDVH UHODWH WR µWKH VRFLDO UHODWLRQV RI DQG SK\VLFDO PHDQV RI SURGXFWLRQ¶268  In the 
                                                          
attempts to construct a theory of superstructure which was previously missing from Marxist thought. Femia, 
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 26.  
256 See, for ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ?tŽƌƚŚŝƐůĞƐƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?^ĞĞKǁĞŶtŽƌƚŚ ?
 “ZĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 373-392.  
257 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 
258 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 
259 Anne Showstack Sassoon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ, second edition (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 113. Marxists can 
be divided between  ‘those who see the state as the mere expression of the particular interests in civil society 
and those who see the state as an autonomous force expressing some kind of general interest ? ?^ĂƐƐŽŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
260 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 263.  
261 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 
262 ZŽďĞƌƚŽǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ PĞǇŽŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 127. 
263 Jonathan Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003) 
49. 
264 Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝcal Thought, 24 
265 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ?
266 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ?-169. 
267 dŚŝƐŝƐĂĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵDĂƌǆ ?ƐĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůďĂƐĞ ?^ĞĞ&ĞŵŝĂ ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ
Political Thought, 26. 
268 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ?-169. 
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superstructure, hegemony is exercised by the dominant group throughout society, and domination is 
exercised predominantly, although not always exclusively, by the political society through the state and 
judicial system.269   
 
Although the historical bloc incorporates relations between different social agents, this must be seen 
within the context of the relationship between the economic structure (base) and the politico-ethical 
superstructure ± a relation which is realised through the activity of different social groups.  Hegemonic 
outcomes are not defined solely by specific superstructures but by the larger relationship between the 
dominant and subordinate classes, which is, in turn, shaped by production.270  The historical bloc 
rHSUHVHQWV WKH µFRPSOH[ LQWHUDFWLRQ RI YDULRXV VRFLDO DQG KLVWRULFDO IRUFHV LGHDV DQG UHODWLRQV¶271  
Gramsci contrasted historical materialism, which accepts the value of ethical and cultural sources of 
political action (always related to the economic spherH ZLWK ZKDW KH GHVFULEHG DV µKLVWRULFDO
HFRQRPLVP¶ZKHUHE\HYHU\WKLQJFDQEHUHGXFHGWRWHFKQRORJLFDODQGPDWHULDOFRQFHUQV272   
 
There are conceptual challenges with a strict separation of superstructure and base relations.  The 
superstructure is related to its economic base and the reproduction of these conditions must be sustained 
by the political and ideological superstructure.273  However, as Gramsci appreciated, the correspondence 
between class interests and political activity occurred over a long period of time.  At any point in time, 
the ideas, beliefs, cultural practices and political events represented in the superstructure may not 
necessarily be a direct articulation of economic interests.  Economic conditions create boundaries for 
activities in the superstructure, rather than directly regulating them.274  For Gramsci, the political and 
the economic are not so easily separated.275  It has been argued, for instance, that the legal structure 
belongs to the superstructure of political, ideological or ethical relations but which equally could form 
part of the economic base since capitalism is founded upon property rights and relations.276  
Consequently, Joseph raises questions about the distinction between base and superstructure and about 
the distinction between forces of production and relations of production.277  He argues that productive 
forces do not develop autonomously but within the context of particular social relations of the 
                                                          
269 Anne Showstack Sassoon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ, second edition (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 113. 
270 tŽƌƚŚ ? “ZĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
271 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 49. 
272 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 158-168. 
273 Anne Showstack Sassoon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ, second edition (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 114. 
274 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 263. 
275 :ĂŵĞƐDĂƌƚŝŶ ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚdŚĞƌŝƐŝƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝŶ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ?History of the Human Sciences 10, no. 1 
(1997): 53. 
276 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 37. 
277 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 38. 
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superstructures and economic base.278  By relating the historical bloc to the question of hegemony, 
Gramsci is attempting to give the base-superstructure relation a more dynamic character.  Social 
hegemony is not given but must be constantly reproduced and developed.   
 
Some neo-Gramscians argue that hegemony at international level cannot be envisaged in the same 
PDQQHURIRFFXUUHQFHLQWKHQDWLRQVWDWHDVWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPODFNVµDFRQFUHWHKLHUDUFKLFDOIRUP
LQZKLFKKHJHPRQ\FRXOGEHFRQVWUXFWHG¶279  This would need a shift back to the economic base in 
determining the productive area for class struggle.280  From this perspective, hegemony in the 
international sphere is determined as originating in FDSLWDOLVWUHODWLRQVRISURGXFWLRQ¶281  Consequently, 
the Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony has often prevailed in IPE but been less prominent in IR, 
GHVSLWH *UDPVFL¶V ODFN RI FUHGHQWLDOV DV D SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLVW282  Gramsci rejected economic 
determinism but was keen to maintain the range of structural situations from the economic to the cultural 
and the political.283  A looser interpretation of the relationship between capital and production, and the 
µhighly complex issues of culture, identity and class¶ that are simultaneously occurring at different 
levels in international society.284 
      
Historical materialism maintains the connections between µpower in production, power in the state and 
power in international relations.¶285  Prevailing historical structures are essential for understanding a 
particular configuration of forces.  As an ideological and consensual form of control, the historical bloc 
requires a hegemonic social class to maintain social cohesion and identity within the bloc, which is also 
pertinent in international relations.286 Individuals and groups, like states, may be affected by, or resist, 
or oppose the pressures of the hegemonic group, but they cannot disregard them.  Successful resistance 
requires an alternative, emerging configuration of forces ± the formation of a rival historical bloc of 
states.287  The awareness of a reciprocal relationship between structure (economic relations) and 
                                                          
278 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 38. 
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eds. Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 87.  Structural Marxism is  ‘designed as a 
framework for analysis of the capitalist state and society, which turns its back on historical knowledge in favour 
of a more static and abstract conceptualisation of the mode of production. ? Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚ
KƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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superstructure (politico-HWKLFDO LQ *UDPVFL¶V WKLQNLQJ FRQWDLQV WKH SRWHQWLDO IRU FRQVLGHULQJ
µVWDWHVRFLHW\ FRPSOH[HV DV WKH FRQVWLWXHQW HQWLWLHV RI D ZRUOG RUGHU¶288  However, the different 
configurations of state/society complexes remain largely underexplored in IR.289  More attention should 
EH JLYHQ WR KRZ UHODWLRQVKLSV RI FRQVHQW DUH µFRQVWUXFWHG DQG GHFRQVWUXFWHG DW HYHU\ OHYHO RI
LQWHUDFWLRQ¶290 
 
In the international sphere, hegemony intersects with material power, ideology and institutions.291  Cox 
notes that the world can be seen as: 
µDSDWWHUQRILQWHUDFWLQJVRFLDOIRUFHVLQZKLFKVWDWHVSOD\DQLQWHUPHGLDWHWKRXJK
autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local 
configurations of social forces within particuODUFRXQWULHV¶292   
Power is treated as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated 
material capabilities that are derived from these social processes.293  Material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions reciprocally interact in an historical bloc.294  Hegemony on a global scale is a social, 
economic and political structure, and must be all three.  It is expressed in universal norms, institutions 
and mechanisms for rules of behaviour for states and civil society acting across national boundaries, 
and supporting the dominant mode of production.295  Hegemony at the international level is not merely 
µDQRUGHUDPRQJVWDWHVLWLVDQRUGHUZLWKLQWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\ZLWK DGRPLQDQWPRGHRISURGXFWLRQ¶
that penetrates all countries and connects social classes of different countries.296  
 
Social structures serve as the infrastructure of hegemonic order; they give hegemony its social character 
and enable the hegemon to assert its normative preferences.297  Normative preferences and social and 
cultural orientations also affect the character of hegemony and the nature of rule.298  Moreover, these 
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294 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
295 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
296 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
297 Charles <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “hŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?ŝŶPower, Order and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John Ikenberry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25.  
298 Liberal approaches diverge from normative ones over the matter of self-interest, since liberal theory explores 
the conditions under which self-interested actors do, or do not, cooperate, whereas constructivist approaches 
do not assume self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?DŝĐŚĂĞůŽǇůĞ ? “>ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚtŽƌůĚ
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?American Political Science Review 80 no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169 ? DŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ?  “dĂŬŝŶŐ WƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
Seriously ? ?517. 
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norms are usually derived from the domestic order of the dominant state, and that order consequently 
UHIOHFWVWKHKHJHPRQ¶VRZQYDOXHVDQGQRUPVDVZHOODVLWVSUHSRQGHUDQWSRZHU299  Given the reciprocal 
nature of the relationship between leaders and followers, hegemony involves the use of power but 
cannot be reduced to an exercise of power, for it crucially relies on the ability of the hegemon to 
persuade others on the attractiveness of its leadership.300  Gramscian approaches to hegemony focus on 
the supremacy of a social group, manifesting both coercive and consensual practices.301  Social control, 
therefore, takes two forms: the dominant group can externally influence behaviour and preferences 
through a system of reward and punishment, and it can internally manipulate behaviour by shaping 
values, norms and interests.302  This is not a directly exploitative relationship, but one which most states 
µFRXOGILQGFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHLULQWHUHVWV.¶303   
 
In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci distinguished between domLQDWLRQ DQG µLQWHOOHFWXDO PRUDO
OHDGHUVKLS¶DVVHUWLQJWKDW, 
µD VRFLDO JURXS FDQ LQGHHG PXVW DOUHDG\ H[HUFLVH µOHDGHUVKLS EHIRUH ZLQQLQJ
JRYHUQPHQWDOSRZHU«LWVXEVHTXHQWO\EHFRPHVGRPLQDQWZKHQLWH[HUFLVHVSRZHU
EXWHYHQLILWKROGVLWILUPO\LQLWVJUDVSLWPXVWFRQWLQXHWRµOHDG¶DVZHOO¶304 
By making the distinction between leadership and domination in his conceptualisation of hegemony, 
Gramsci treats ideological leadership as the counter position of domination.305  Through the exercise of 
leadership rather than domination, hHJHPRQ\LVDµVWDWXV¶EHVWRZHGE\RWKHUVDQGUHVWVRQUHFRJQLWLRQ
by WKHPLQUHWXUQIRUWKHEHDULQJRIVSHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV,QVKRUWKHJHPRQ\LVµan institutionalised 
practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state with the resources to lead¶306  
American hegemony depends on reciprocity and cooperation, in addition to coercion and material 
capabilities.307  Hegemony can, therefore, conceptually combine domination and leadership.  As the 
                                                          
299 Finnemore and Sikkink,  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůEŽƌŵǇŶĂŵŝĐƐĂŶĚWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůhange, ?893. 
300 John Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 28. 
301 Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 24. 
302 Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 24. 
303 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
304 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 57-58. 
305 Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 25. 
306 &ƌŽŵĂŶŶŐůŝƐŚ^ĐŚŽŽůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇƐĞĞŬƐƚŽ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĂŶĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨ
power relations and shared ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐ ? ? ůĂƌŬ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ĂƐ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
hegemony. These practices include international law, diplomacy, war, the balance of power and the collective 
special role and status of the Great Powers in international society, which institutionalise power disparities and 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐ ŽĨ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ? /ĂŶ ůĂƌŬ ?  “ƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂĐŬ /Ŷ P dŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů KƌĚĞƌ ? ?
International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009): 24.    
307 dĂŬĂƐŚŝ /ŶŽŐƵĐŚŝ ĂŶĚ WĂƵů ĂĐŽŶ ?  “ŵƉŝƌĞ ? ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ? ĂŶĚHegemony: American Grand Strategy and the 
Construction of Order in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 123. 
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main forms of neo-Gramscian discussion assert, consent facilitates relations of domination, 
consequently, domination is also present in an asymmetric relationship with a hegemon.308  Given the 
nature of asymmetric power relations, and since order largely reflects the material interests of the 
dominant state, a state with a preponderance of power can also be expected to dominate, sometimes 
coercively.  ,WLVWKHXQGHUO\LQJµWKUHDW¶RIWKHGRPLQDQWVWDWH¶VSUHSRQGHUDQWPLOLWDU\SRZHUUHVRXUFHV
and its willingness to use them, that supports the maintenance of hegemonic order.309 
 
Why nations adhere to a hegemonic order is handled differently by rationalist and normative approaches 
in IR.  There is a tendency in rationalist approaches of IR to focus on two mechanisms of compliance 
(or social control), namely coercion and self-interest.310  The use of inducements cultivates voluntary 
compliance, but consent is derived from self-interest and self-gain.  Acting in self-interest follows the 
same logic as coercion, in the sense that actors will assess the costs of punishment for non-compliance 
and the benefits of compliance.311  An overwhelmingly coercive order is, however, more likely to 
generate resistance and resentment, and, therefore, cannot be deployed in the longer term.  Nor does 
self-interest guarantee long term compliance within the order, since interests change.312  Nonetheless, 
coercion underlies the consensual aspect of power.313  6XERUGLQDWH VWDWHV µREH\¶ WKH UXOHV RI RUGHU
because they fear the sanction of the hegemon, and, more importantly, because they gauge that 
obedience is within their materially-defined self-interest.314  Acquiescence on the part of subordinate 
states is a consequence of coercion on the part of the dominant state, with inducements and sanctions 
ensuring cooperation rather than non-cooperation.315  +HJHPRQ\ WKHUHIRUH µLV HQRXJK WR HQVXUH
conformity of behaviour in almost all but the most marginal and deviant cases.¶316   
 
Basing social control on coercion, and acquiescence centred on self-interest fails to account for other 
mechanisms by which consent is derived.  A sustainable hegemonic order requires consensus on the 
                                                          
308 Mark Haugaard,  “WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ^ŽĐŝĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŝŶHegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion 
in Contemporary Politics, eds. Mark Haugaard and Howard Lentner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 50. 
309 However, the consensual aspect of power denotes hegemony. Coercion is latent and only to be applied in 
 ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ ƚĞƌ ĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
310 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ>ĂǇŶĞ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƉŽůĂƌ/ůůƵƐŝŽŶZĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ PdŚĞŽŵŝŶŐŶĚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? hŶŝƉŽůĂƌDŽŵĞŶƚ ? ?
International Security, 31, no. 2 (2006): 17.   
311 /ĂŶ,ƵƌĚ ?  “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 
385. 
312 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 15-16.  
313 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
314 &ĞŵŝĂŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚŝƐĂ ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĞŝƚŚĞƌĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝŽ-political 
order, in whole or in part. Voluntary agreement varies in intensity from, on one hand, a sense of obligation and 
internalisation of the dominant values, to partial assimilation based on uneasy acceptance on the status quo as 
the only viable option, on the other. Femia, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 37-40. 
315 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?283. 
316 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
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GHVLUDELOLW\RIWKHGRPLQDQWVWDWH¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQGRQWKHVRFLDOSXUSRVHV of the order that it promotes.317 
Neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony in IR also provide a valuable counterpoint to rationalist 
conceptions of hegemony, by expressing a firmer role for ideology, institutions and normative belief 
systems in explaining the complexities between the state and civil society,318 and the stability and 
longevity of political order operating at the global level.  +HJHPRQ\LVµDUHODWLRQQRWRIGRPLQDWLRQ
E\PHDQVRIIRUFHEXWRIFRQVHQWE\PHDQVRISROLWLFDODQGLGHRORJLFDOOHDGHUVKLS¶319  However, consent 
LVJDUQHUHGQRWRQO\E\LQFOXGLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRIVRPHVXERUGLQDWHJURXSVEXWDOVRLQWKHµFRQFHSWLRQV
and VRFLDOSUDFWLFHVRIWKHGRPLQDQWJURXSDVWKHQDWXUDORUGHU¶320    
 
,GHRORJLFDOVXERUGLQDWLRQHQDEOHVµUXOHE\FRQVHQW¶DQGWKLVVXERUGLQDWLRQLVSUHVHQWLQERWKFLYLODQG
political society existing at national and international levels.321   Ideology relates to the social activities 
embodied in the community that can bind diverse social elements together, for example, through control 
of communication that is derived from control of the means of production.322  From this perspective, 
U.S. leaders have come to see themselves in ideological terms as the necessary guarantors of the world 
order.323  The dominant class within society, or the dominant state in the international order, maintains 
µFRKHVLRQDQG LGHQWLW\«WKURXJK WKHSURSDJDWLRQRI D FRPPRQFXOWXUH¶324  In the shift towards the 
hegemonic level of consciousness,325 the interests of the dominant class are synchronised with those of 
WKHVXERUGLQDWHFODVVHVLQWRµDQLGHRORJ\H[SUHVVHGLQXQLYHUVDOWHUPV¶326  The relationship between the 
                                                          
317 Kupchan notes that the normative foundations of order are dependent on the ideas and experiences of the 
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞ ?dŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂƌĞƚŚƵƐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƚǇƉĞŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐŽƌĚĞƌ ? 
Kupchan,  “TŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?    
318 Gill, for example, draws attention to what he considers the simplistic way in which conventional IR theorises 
the state and inter-state system by focusing on the uniqueness of the era of Pax Americana, and avoiding 
examination of social forces and social structures, and transnational class formation, simultaneously undergoing 
transformation. See ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ 'ŝůů ?  “ƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇ ? KŶƚŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ /ƚĂůŝĂŶ ^ĐŚŽŽů ? ? ŝŶGramsci, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30-31.     
319 Roger Simon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ PŶ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 21. 
320 ĂŶŝ&ŝůĐ ? “WŽƉƵůŝƐŵĂƐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ PdŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝĂƐĞ ? ? in Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and 
Resistance, eds. Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 121. 
321 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ?-27. 
322 Simon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů dŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 25, 60. In Prison Notebooks, Gramsci observes that the forging of a 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞǁŝůů ŝƐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƉŽŶĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚĂŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇŽĨ
ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚǁŝůůƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐĂŝŵƐ ?ĂƌĞǁĞůĚĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂƐŝŶŐůĞĂŝŵ ? ?Gramsci, Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks, 349.     
323 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
324 Žǆ ĞŶůĂƌŐĞƐ 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƚŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ^ĞĞ Žǆ ?  “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ĂŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
325 Gramsci distinguishes three levels of consciousness: (i) the economic-corporative; aware of the specific 
interests of a particular group; (ii) class consciousness; extending to a social class but only at an economic level; 
and (iii) hegemonic. The movement towards the hegemonic level requires passing from the specific interests of 
ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŐƌŽƵƉƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆƐƵƉĞƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ include institutions and ideologies that 
are universal in form. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 180-195.  
326 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?
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dominant ideology and subordinate states at this level is thus grounded in common sense ± µin the 
unconscious and uncritical way in which an individual (or a state) perceives the world.¶327   
 
Reflected in the international arena, international institutions and rules, and the co-option of global civil 
society, generally initiated by the dominant state, can help establish hegemony.328  A global civil society 
µFRQVLVWVRIWKHIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOQHWZRUNVLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFHVZKLFKPHGLDWHEHWZHHQ
WKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWKHVWDWH¶ and which also intersect transnationally329  The forces of global civil society 
facilitate hegemony by spreading the dominant ideology to the officials in RWKHUVWDWHVµUXOLQJZLWKDQG
RYHUUDWKHUWKDQDJDLQVW¶VXERUGLQDWHVWDWHVWKHUHE\DEVRUELQJcounter-hegemonic ideas.330  Global 
civil society therefore plays a critical role in producing and spreading consensus for hegemony, whilst 
maintaining the conditions of production,331 acting as the main agent of conformity to global hegemony 
and sustaining cultural domination for the hegemonic group.332    
 
Institutions are a means to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order; they reflect the power relations 
prevailing at their point of origin and foster collective images in accordance with these power 
relations.333  International institutions support hegemony via rules, the production of ideological 
legitimacy, by co-opting officials from subordinate states and ultimately, by absorbing counter 
hegemonic ideas.334  Institutions are a way to secure the acquiescence of the subordinate states, 
especially if this leadership can be conveyed in terms of universal or general interests.  Institutions may 
become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations 
of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy,335 while reflecting dominant social and 
economic forces.336  International institutions, for example, embody rules that facilitate expansion of 
                                                          
327 Common sense is the way in which the masses make sense of their experiences and upon which the dominant 
ideology is constructed. Simon, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ Political Thought, 63 & 72. 
328 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ?2. 
329 'ĞƌŵĂŝŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶǇ ? “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Prison Notebooks, 12. 
330 'ĞƌŵĂŝŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶǇ ? “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 
331 'ĞƌŵĂŝŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶǇ ? “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ?  
332 In his article on the network of American foundations  W ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŐ dŚƌĞĞ ? ? ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞ ? &ŽƌĚ ĂŶĚ
Rockefeller  W and the practice of American hegemony, Parmar analyses how elite networks penetrate domestic 
society and international affairs to (re)produce consensus for American ideas across national boundaries. 
/ŶĚĞƌũĞĞƚWĂƌŵĂƌ ? “&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?European Journal of American Studies 7, 
no. 1 (2012): 1-25. Cox, in contrast, considers international finance as the agent of conformity to global 
hegemony. See Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the making of History (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 267. 
333 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
334 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
335 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
336 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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dominant economic and social forces but at the same time permit adjustments to be made by 
subordinates ± especially in monetary and trade relations.337   
 
However, hegemony cannot be reduced to an institutional dimension ± institutions are an expression of 
hegemony but are not identical to hegemony.338  They can develop their own identity; they are particular 
amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the development of new ideas and 
capabilities that can potentially stimulate the creation of rival institutions reflecting different 
tendencies.339  Rival hegemony through institutions is difficult to achieve, however, because of the 
DEVRUSWLRQDQGLQWHUQDOLVDWLRQSURFHVVHVWKDWRFFXULQVWLWXWLRQDOO\7KURXJKµWUDVIRUPLVPR¶OHDGHUVDQG
talented individuals of subordinate groups are typically co-opted into these institutions, which have the 
capacity to assimilate and tame potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the 
dominant coalition.  Through the process of trasformismo, the formation of opposition to established 
social and political power340 is effectively thwarted by the merging of these subordinate state officials 
working within the existing hegemonic structures, thereby rendering complete counter-hegemony 
unlikely.341  7KHUHDODLPRIWKLVµSDVVLYHUHYROXWLRQ¶WKDWDEVRUEVRSSRVLWLRQLVWRPaintain the status 
quo.342  Through the practices of international institutions, which promulgate and reinforce the dominant 
ideology, the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant state achieve the status of common 
sense in the international arena.343  These international institutions can also help define policy guidelines 
for states and legitimise certain institutions and practices at the national level.344  Moreover, in adopting 
a comparable ideological discourse, national state structures are able to increase their regulatory and 
policy coordination in accordance with these international institutions.345  
 
Hegemonic practices also occur within the broader structural confines of discourse.346  Actors establish 
legitimacy for their actions through the rhetorical construction of self-images, seeking out public 
                                                          
337 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
338 Coǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
339 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
340 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ?-167. 
341 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
342 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 50. 
343 Hopf offers a neo-Gramscian-ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇƚŚĂƚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?Ɛ  ‘ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ ?ĨĞĞůĂŶĚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
conscious ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĐŽƐƚƐ Žƌ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ Žƌ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? dĞĚ ,ŽƉĨ ?
 “ŽŵŵŽŶ-^ĞŶƐĞŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 67, no. 2 (2013): 
317-318.   
344 Žǆ ? “'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?172. 
345 'ĞƌŵĂŝŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶǇ ? “ŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ?16. 
346 ŝƌŬEĂďĞƌƐ ? “WŽǁĞƌ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ PdŚĞĂƐĞŽĨĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 932. 
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justification for their priorities and practices, with other actors endorsing or contesting these 
representations through similar rhetorical processes.  Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is a 
routinely discursive phenomenon, requiring skills in persuasion and attraction.347  Mirroring hegemonic 
groups in society, a regional or global hegemon also disseminates its beliefs, values and ideology, 
gaining support from others, through the use of language.  In this way, discursive hegemony also 
emphasises consent through the manipulation of language, ideas and beliefs, rather than requiring 
physical force or explicit coercive forms of power on the part of the hegemon.   
 
Discursive hegemony is moulded out of a series of discourses with legitimate norms that relies on social 
hierarchy, and other socially-naturalised conventions.348  The discursive practices of the hegemon are 
an important medium through which to maintain power and control, as well as providing a medium for 
counter-hegemony.  The notion of discursive hegemony rests on the assumption that any discourse can 
be dominant.  The ability of regional powers to transform their material capabilities into leadership 
depends on their ability to present their particular worldview as compatible with collective aims.349  As 
a dominant interpretation evolves, identification becomes more routinised, with new kinds of political 
action adhering to the dominant interpretative framework.  Echoing Gramscian thought, as a method of 
social control, constructing and maintaining dominant discourses is an essential activity for the 
hegemon.350 
 
Hegemony, manifesting in ERWK SRZHU DQG VRFLDO UHODWLRQV UHVWV RQ D µGHOLFDWH EDODQFH EHWZHHQ
FRHUFLRQDQGFRQVHQVXV¶; on the hegePRQ¶VDELOLW\WREDODQFHWKHH[HUFLVHRIGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWSRZHU
while accounting for its own autonomy of action and respect for the interests of subordinate states.351  
Through a complex process of negotiation, consent to hegemony is an active process of subordination, 
and not a passive submission.  However, Gramsci did not specify what kind of consensus defines a 
situation of hegemony.  Consent can vary in intensity from, for example, wholesale internalisation of 
dominant values, to pragmatic acceptance.352  *UDPVFL¶VFRQFHUQVDERXWKHJHPRQ\ZHUHQRWIRFXVHG
on how established political institutions were legitimised by consent but how consent was integral to 
the process by which such institutions were initially established.353  The pursuit of political power ± 
                                                          
347 Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
348 EĂďĞƌƐ ? “WŽǁĞƌ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
349 EĂďĞƌƐ ? “WŽǁĞƌ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
350 Narratives are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
351 Some liberals also believe that hegemony requires constant negotiation between the strong and the weak, 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƚŚĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ƵƌƌĞůů ? “WĂǆŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŽƌƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞŽĨ
/ŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? 161.  
352 Femia, GƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůdŚŽƵŐŚƚ, 38. 
353 DĂƌƚŝŶ ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚdŚĞƌŝƐŝƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝŶ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 
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when power is understood as a social relationship ± can also be understood as the search for 
legitimacy.354  +HJHPRQ\ WKHUHIRUH µLQYROYHV WKH OHJLWLPDWH H[HUFLVH RISRZHU¶355 with legitimacy 
intersubjectively agreed upon by all states within the hegemonic order.356  Legitimacy is assumed within 
*UDPVFL¶VIUDPHZRUNRIKHJHPRQ\WKURXJKFRQVHQW6LQFHFRQVHQWFDQYDU\LQLQWHQVLW\legitimacy is 
not implicit within consent and requires consideration in its own right.357   
 
Legitimacy as a form of social control 
There is broad consensus across IR theory that American power is enhanced when it is seen by other 
states as legitimate.358  'LVFXVVLRQVRQWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHKHJHPRQ¶VDFWLRQVW\SLFDOO\HPSKDVLVH
their conformity to internationally-recognised rules and norms, the validity of the rules, and 
acquiescence to the power relations expressed in the hegemonic order.359  Yet differences in emphasis 
on the extent to which legitimacy matters stem from theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
international structures, power and the forms of power utilised by a hegemon to maintain order.360  The 
conflation of primacy and hegemony by realists in particular precludes other dimensions of power 
relations, including the relationship between hegemony and legitimacy.361  Since the focus here is on 
U.S. hegemony, attention is primarily given to how the U.S. derives legitimacy for its hegemony.  
Hegemony is treated as a social relationship, so consideration is also given to who grants legitimacy to 
86KHJHPRQ\DQGKRZµOHJLWLPDF\¶LVQRWDIL[HGEXWDFRQVWDQWO\HYROYLQJSULQFLSOH 
 
In normative approaches to hegemony, subordinate states do not only comply with U.S. hegemony out 
of fear of retribution, or by a rational calculation of self-interest, they act out of an internal sense of 
                                                          
354 /ŶŽŐƵĐŚŝĂŶĚĂĐŽŶ ? “ŵƉŝƌĞ ?,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?ĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
355 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐKƌĚĞƌ ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?ĂŶĚdŚĞŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƐŚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005): 179.   
356 While Lake emphasises the need for the dominant state to gain political authority and legitimacy, he 
downplays the significance of intersubjective understandings in defining and shaping international authority. 
>ĂŬĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐǁĞĚĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƌĞƐƚƐŽŶŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ
and legitimacy. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, xi-xii. 
357 Clark observes that political theorists have long held the view that legitimacy resides in any political 
relationship, merely in the presence of consent. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 162-3. 
358 /ĂŶ,ƵƌĚ ? “ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐEŽƌŵƐ PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶZĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐŵĂŶĚƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?International Politics 
44, No. 2/3 (2007): 194. 
359 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 16. 
360 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 4. 
361 Gilpin ǀŝĞǁƐĂŚĞŐĞŵŽŶ ?ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌƵůĞ ?ĂƐƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚƌĞĞĨĂĐƚŽƌs: its demonstrated ability to 
enforce its will on other states through victory in hegemonic war, its provision of public goods such as 
international security and economic order, and the on the ideological, religious or other values common to a set 
of states. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?'ŝůƉŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂƐ ‘ƵƐƵĂůůǇǁĞĂŬŽƌŶŽŶ-ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚ ? ?WƌĞƐƚŝŐĞƌĞƐƚƐŽŶĂ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƵƐĞŝƚƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŽĨŽƌĚĞƌ ?
Gilpin, War and Change, 31, 34. 
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moral obligation, in the EHOLHIWKDWGRLQJVRLVµULJKWIXOSURSHUDQGDSSURSULDWH¶362  In other words, they 
consent to hegemony for normative and ideational reasons, rather than for exclusively coercive or self-
interest considerations.  Since hegemony requires the consent of followers, legitimacy is the hallmark 
of hegemony as a social practice.363  While legitimacy is implicit in the process of gaining consent,364 
it should also be explored in its own right.365  Legitimacy, as a device of social control, has longer term 
advantages over coercion, or motivations of self-interest, because habitual compliance is gained through 
a process of internalisation of WKH KHJHPRQ¶V LGHDV E\ VXERUGLQDWH VWDWHV366 Since hegemony is 
XQGHUVWRRGWRHPSKDVLVHµFRQVHQW LQFRQWUDVWWRUHOLDQFHRQWKHXVHRIIRUFH¶legitimacy requires some 
clarification.367   
 
Suchman defines legitimacy DVµDJHQHUDOLVHGSHUFHSWLRQRUDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHDFWLRQVRIDQHQWLW\DUH
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
GHILQLWLRQV¶368  Legitimacy is intrinsically bound up with the observance of established rules and norms.  
Rules are deemed appropriate, either because they emanate from a recognised source of authority, with 
formal-OHJDOLW\ DWWDFKHG WR WKHP LH SURFHGXUDO RU EHFDXVH RI WKHLU µFRQJUXHQFH ZLWK H[WUD-legal 
YDOXHV¶369 In the latter understanding, authority rests on a social bargain between the dominant and 
subordinate states, premised on the GRPLQDQWVWDWH¶Vprovision of a desirable social order.  Authority, 
then, is a contingent relationship of compliance, with obligation flowing from the consent of the ruled, 
not the ruler.370  As a dynamic relationship, hegemonic authority requires constant maintenance and 
strengthening, and the capacity to adapt to changing conditions.371 
                                                          
362 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 16. 
363 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 8-9. 
364 This position is particularly relevant to the neo-Gramscian approach to international legitimacy, which is 
typically seen in terms of consent in its application to hegemony. See Cox, Production, Power and World Order. 
365 These three mechanisms of social control, coercion, self-interest and legitimacy recur in combination across 
all social systems, where rules exist to influence behaviour. Where rules or norms exist, compliance with them 
may be achieved by one or a combination of these devices. ,ƵƌĚ ?  “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Politics ? ?379-380. 
366 ,ƵƌĚ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?   ?-388. 
367 Jonathan Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (London: Routledge, 2002), 1. 
368 DĂƌŬ^ƵĐŚŵĂŶ ?  “DĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ P^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? ?Academy of Management 
Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 574. Clark also notes that the practice of legitimacy draws heavily, but not entirely, on 
the norms of legality, morality and constitutionality. See Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 4. Because of 
its inherently social nature, legitimacy should not be conflated with these other social values  W it draws on these 
values but is not bound to them. Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
369 DĂƌƚŝŶ^ƉĞŶĐĞƌ ? “tĞďĞƌŽŶ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞEŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?British Journal of Sociology 21, no. 2 (1970): 
133. Franck, a procedural legitimacy theorist, also explicitly adopts some key elements of Weber. See Thomas 
M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
370 >ĂŬĞ ? “ƐĐĂƉĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŽĨEĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ?-55. 
371 There is convergence here with neo-Gramscian thought concerning the need to take into account the 
interests of some subordinate groups as a means to gain legitimacy. Žǆ ?  “^ŽĐŝĂů &ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ tŽƌůĚ
KƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Legitimacy is socially sanctioned and thus inextricably dependent upon social perception and 
recognition,372 resting RQ µLQGLYLGXDO QRUPDWLYH MXGJHPHQW¶ drawn from µshared understandings of 
DSSURSULDWH EHKDYLRXU ZLWKLQ D SDUWLFXODU SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\¶373  As a subjective and relational 
quality, legitimacy is defined by an DFWRU¶VSHUFHSWLRQs of the hegemonic order, and determined by the 
extent to which an actor internalises the legitimacy that order, and is prepared to abide by its rules.374  
The ability to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular order ± that is, 
the ability to forge a consensus among national officials on the normative underpinnings of order ± is 
an important dimension of hegemonic power.375  Legitimacy is neither an alternative to power, nor 
distinct from it; it is an essential component of power.376  The social character of hegemony implies that 
the hegemon derives legitimacy from other states in the international system.  Being seen to act 
legitimately enables a hegemon to maintain order without relying heavily on coercion and bribery, as 
followership by subordinate states is driven by internal acceptance of the legitimacy of the order.377 
 
Conceptualised as D µQRUP-GHILQHG VRFLDOO\ VDQFWLRQHG VWDWXV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ an attribute of material 
power,378 hegemonic leadership is devoid of meaning unless others agree.  Simply put, hegemony is not 
owned by the hegemon.379  As Buzan asserts, the hegemon has to be able to recruit followers.380  Power 
UHVRXUFHV DQG SROLWLFDO LQIOXHQFH GR QRW H[LVW LQ D UHODWLRQVKLS RI VLPSOH FDXVDOLW\ ZLWK µPDWHULDO
preponderance unproblematically spawning political influence¶381  Effective influence depends on 
more than coercion, bribery or the threat of non-SDUWLFLSDWLRQLWGHSHQGVRQWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKDVWDWH¶V
policies, and behaviour, are deemed legitimate by other states and by international public opinion.382  A 
powerful actor must also have the capacity to persuade others of the worthiness of its objectives, to 
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40, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 289. 
376 Martin A. Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 29. Reus-Smit also notes 
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377 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 2. 
378 Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 44. 
379 Hegemony is a state or condition of the system itself, and not simply a property belonging to the hegemon. 
Cerny suggests that hegemony represents a structural space that is only significant in so far as it gives rise to, 
stabilises, manages, shapes, expands and/or controls the wider system in which it is embedded. Philip G. Cerny, 
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Politics 45, no. 5 (2008): 554 W70. 
381 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 5.  
382 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order ?  ? ? ĂǀŝĚ W ? ZĂƉŬŝŶ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ƌĂĂƚĞŶ ?  “ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ
,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 128-133. 
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realise its own objectives and to translate its resources into intended outcomes.383  Therefore, power, so 
understood, can comprise multiple material and non-material resources, including ideas, beliefs, norms 
and rules, as ZHOODVµWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGFRPPXQLFDWLYHSURFHVVHVWKDWHPEHGDQGPRELOLVH
WKHP¶384  :KLOHPDWHULDOSRZHUIDFWRUVPD\GHILQHµRXWHUOLPLWVRIIHDVLELOLW\¶ their social meaning, 
and hence their political importance, are determined by the intersubjective ideas, beliefs, norms and 
rule that actors attribute to them.385  
 
Both Weber and Habermas advocate that the legitimacy of power has its foundation in a set of shared 
beliefs in a normative order.386    A hegemon enjoys legitimacy for its order and for the way it exercises 
power when the values it espouses correspond with the values of the subordinates:  
µ,IELQGLQJGHFLVLRQVDUHOHJLWLPDWHWKDWLVLIWKH\FDQEHPDGHLQGHSHQGHQWO\RI
the concrete exercise of force and of the manifest threat of sanctions, and can be 
regularly implemented even against the interests of those affected, they must be 
considered as the fulfilment of recognised norms.¶387    
It is the common acceptance of a consensual normative order that binds dominant and subordinate states 
and legitimises power.388  Unlike compliance based on coercion or self-interest, legitimacy requires 
normative compliance.  Consequently, political power is intimately connected to, and dependent upon, 
the spread and observance of norms.389  In a consensual relationship, DKHJHPRQ¶VSRZHUFDQEHGHHPHG
legitimate to the extent that it (i) conforms to established rules; (ii) these rules can be justified through 
shared beliefs by the dominant and subordinate actors; and (iii) there is demonstrable expression of 
consent by the subordinate states to the existence of the power relationship.390  Hegemonic legitimacy 
GHULYHVLQODUJHSDUWIURPWKHKHJHPRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWREHFRQVWUDLQHGE\QRUPVDQGUXOHVZKLFKDUH
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385 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 111.  
386 Weber ?Ɛconcerns with the exercise of power within the nation-state is also relevant to the exercise of inter-
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drawn from the negotiation of a social contract, rather than from top-down imposition.391  Legitimacy 
requires continual maintenance and reproduction.     
 
The hegemon also has to behave in ways commensurate with its own acknowledged principles, which 
is equally as important as the adherence of subordinate states to international norms and rules.392  Such 
principles impose constraints on otherwise unrestrained behaviour, since the most powerful states are 
not externally bound.  Hence, self-restraint is crucial:  
µ,QWHUQDOUHVWUDLQWDQGH[WHUQDOinfluence are thus closely related. Self-restraint that 
SURPSWV EHKDYLRXU LQ DFFRUG ZLWK WKH DFNQRZOHGJHGSULQFLSOHV«ERWK HDUQV DQG
VXVWDLQVWKHKHJHPRQLDWKDWPDNHVHIILFLHQWLQIOXHQFHSRVVLEOH¶393  
The hegemon sets the rules, and is also obliged to abide by them.  When it fails to do so, it moves closer 
to a perception of domination by coercion, ZKLFKPD\QRWFRQYHUJHZLWKWKHKHJHPRQ¶VVHOI-image of 
the normative foundations of its order.  Adherence to norms, therefore, is in the interest of both 
dominant and subordinate states.394  Activities perceived to be purely driven by self-interest and private 
gain erode the social basis for leadership, just as much as any reduction of material preponderance, 
VLQFHµOHJLWLPDWLRQLVWKHOLQNEHWZHHQVWDWHVDQGWKHQRUPDWLYHVWUXFWXUHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\¶395  
Dominant states seek legitimacy and limit the potential advantages of resorting to coercive abilities, 
since to acquire authority requires the tempering of actions promoting self-interest in favour of general 
interest.396  Not only is DKHJHPRQ¶VSRZHULVHQKDQFHGZKHQLWVDFWLRQVDUHVHHQE\RWKHUVWDWHVDV
legitimate, and subordinate states are then more inclined to support those actions,397 but also the 
KHJHPRQ¶VRZQSHUFHSWLRQRILWVKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LVUHLQIorced or enhanced.398   
 
                                                          
391 A point also made ďǇŽǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
392 Lebow considers whether ethics and interests have to be oppositional.  While classical realism is more 
accommodating of the role of international rules and norms and the idea of legitimate power, it is still a theory 
of power in which moral action may require the subordination of normative beliefs where the survival of the 
state is at stake. Richard Ned Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), xii. 
393 Richard Ned Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, 283- ? ?/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂůƐŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ůŝŵŝƚ ?
their power. See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 25. 
394 Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, 284. 
395 Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital,  ? ? ?,ƵƌĚ ? “ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐEŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
396 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 177.   
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While normative assertions hold that legitimacy restrains power relations, clarifying the critical 
relationships between legitimacy and other international norms, and between legitimacy and the 
exercise of power is, however, challenging.399  Beetham, for instance, situates the problem as one of the 
lack of recognition of any causal influence between power and the process of its legitimisation.400  First, 
the practice of legitimacy is not a passive one; there is a degree of negotiation occurring between actors 
prior to normative adjustment.  Legitimacy, therefore, is not an absolute standard.401  Second, a precise 
conceptualisation of the relationship between power and legitimacy is difficult.402  The generation of 
legitimacy may be autonomous from the power relations it legitimises, or, at the opposite end of the 
scale, legitimacy may be reduced to the preferences of those hegemonic forces that are thought to 
manufacture it in the first place.403  Third, it is difficult to separate the operation of coercion, self-
interest, and legitimacy.  Consequently it is difficult to determine whether some particular rule is being 
followed by actors out of a sense of its legitimacy, fear of repercussion, or coincidental alignment 
EHWZHHQWKHUXOHDQGWKHDFWRU¶VVHOI-interest.404  These problems do not, however, justify abandoning a 
study of legitimacy, or that legitimacy does not exist.405  The principles of legitimacy arHµQHFHVVDULO\
rather vague and uncertain in their applicability.¶406  However, of greater importance is the process by 
which their applicability is decided, and the means by which legitimacy is bestowed.407  Legitimacy, 
moreover, is multi-dimensional; it is contextual and intersubjective and a judgement of degree.408 
 
To this point, the discussion has centred on how the hegemon derives consent for its order by securing 
consent from other states within the order.  Legitimacy, rather than coercion or self-interest, is the 
preferred form of social control.  Gaining legitimacy has longer term advantages over coercion and self-
LQWHUHVWVLQFHFRPSOLDQFHLVJDLQHGWKURXJKWKHLQWHUQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHKHJHPRQ¶VQRUPVDQGLGHDVE\
the political officials, and hopefully, mass publics, of subordinate states.  Social recognition of a 
hegemonic order is drawn from international legitimacy, the means to dominate communication, and 
the material capacities to maintain and reconstitute order.409  $V+XUGGLVFHUQVWKHµagency that comes 
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with power often leads to disproportionate influence over the development of rules and norms.¶410  
Constructivist emphasis on the constitutive role of norms in international social life, and on how these 
norms impact upon the relationship between a hegemon and subordinate states, however, suggests that 
norm diffusion in a hegemonic order is a two-way, rather than top-down process.411  This requires 
consideration of the mechanisms used by the U.S. to permeate the normative foundations of the U.S. 
hegemonic order through the socio-economic and political strata of subordinate states.  
 
(Re)Producing U.S. hegemony 
Given its dominant position in the international realm, the United States typically presents American 
national interests as global interests and by extension, states with political regimes deemed 
objectionable by Washington are treated as being of legitimate global concern.412  If there is no viable 
alternative, subordinate states are used to accepting WashLQJWRQ¶Vassertions, even if they disapprove 
of U.S. motivations and self-interest.413  Furthermore, in some instances, states often appear to accept 
as unavoidable, or even natural, 86LQWHUHVWLQRWKHUV¶UHJLRQDOFRQIOLFWV, without U.S. membership of 
the relevant international organisation.414  Equally, as the dominant state, U.S. involvement in 
international conferences is often valued because of the clout such presence brings to a particular issue.  
The U.S. is granted special privileges because of the general understanding that its power permits 
unequal rights, and also because the U.S. underwrites public goods provision.  The extent to which 
VWDWHV EHOLHYH DQG DFW XSRQ WKH EHOLHI WKDW VXEPLVVLRQ WR WKH 86 LV D µUHDOLVWLF¶ UHTXLUHPHQW RI
international life, continually reproduces the social relation of subordination to Washington.415   
Hegemony is both maintained and strengthened by processes of socialisation, primarily through 
ideological convergence of the political officials in subordinate states, also extending to the mass 
public.416  This can amount to a cultural transformation in the subordinate states.417  Beyond coercion 
and inducements, socialisation is a normative process of internalisation used by the hegemon, seeking 
to µMXVWLI\[its] identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs,¶ from which its hegemonic order 
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derives legitimacy.418  6RFLDOLVDWLRQLVµDSURFHVVRIOHDUQLQJLQZKLFKQRUPVDQGLGHDOVDUHWUDQVPLWWHG
IURP RQH SDUW\ WR DQRWKHU¶419 The socialisation of subordinate states is typically initiated by the 
GRPLQDQWVWDWHWKURXJKWKHQDWLRQDOOHDGHUVRIVXERUGLQDWHVWDWHVZKRLQWHUQDOLVHWKHKHJHPRQ¶VQRUP
and value orientation, leading to acquiescence among states participating in the system.420  These 
proFHVVHVRI VRFLDOLVDWLRQKHOSFRQVROLGDWH WKHKHJHPRQ¶VSRVLWLRQ421  Crucial to hegemony are the 
PHFKDQLVPVWKURXJKZKLFKVHFRQGDU\VWDWHVDFTXLHVFHWRWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHGRPLQDQWVWDWH¶VSRZHU
ZRUNLQJ µDW WKH OHYHO RI substantive beliefs, rather than mateULDO SD\RIIV¶422  Acquiescence, or 
compliance, is the result of the socialisation of officials in subordinate nations who buy into, and 
internalise, norms that are communicated by the hegemon, and consequently undertake policies 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHKHJHPRQ¶s idea of international order, under certain conditions.423   
 
7KHFDSDFLW\WRVRFLDOLVHLVFUXFLDOWRWKHH[HUFLVHRIDKHJHPRQ¶VSRZHUZRUNLQJDORQJVLGHUDWKHUWKDQ
diminishing material capabilities as a source of hegemonic power.424  For the hegemon, activating 
mechanisms of socialisation are generally less costly to its hegemony, since it can expend fewer 
economic and military resources to secure acquiescence, which confers longevity on its hegemony.  
Socialisation mechanisms offer insight into a more productive means of diffusing and reshaping the 
                                                          
418 Reus-^ŵŝƚ ?  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?  ? ? ? ?  ‘^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐŶŽƚentirely ignored by rationalist IR 
theories. Neorealism uses socialisation to describe the homogenisation of self-help balancing behaviour among 
security-seeking states interacting under conditions of anarchy. Institutions elicit norm-conforming behaviour 
to maintain their reputation, but mainly to reduce uncertainty about the commitment of others and thus help 
ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐto converge around cooperative results. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127-8. 
Moravcsik, seems open to the possibility that social interaction changes interests and preferences through 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞĂůƐŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŵĂǇǀĂƌǇŝŶ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽĐŝĂů
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ďƵƚhe appears ambivalent as to whether social preferences or social identities inside states are socially 
constructed at the state or inter-ƐƚĂƚĞůĞǀĞů ?DŽƌĂǀĐƐŝŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐWƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ?522-53. 
419 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
420 /ŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƚĂŬĞŽŶ  ‘ƚĂŬĞŶ-for-ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞ
hard to change. The benefits of behaviour are calculated in abstract social terms rather than concrete 
consequential terms.  Johnston notes that there can be degrees of internalisation, given that not all actors are 
exposed to exactly the same configuration of social pressures, nor do they enter into a social interaction with 
ĞǆĂĐƚůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?
494-495. 
421 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?-90. 
422 ŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ? /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ?  “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌ ƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐ WŽǁĞƌ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ƚ ƚŚĞ
international level, socialisation frequently occurs indirectly through multilateral institutions, directly through 
ĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶ ?Ɛ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů ďƵƚ ƵŶĞƋƵĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ
through productive (discursive) means. 
423 The conditions conducive to the socialisation process may be brought about by external or domestic factors, 
including war, or periods marked by international turmoil, or domestic political instability. Norm diffusion may 
additionally be initiated in the populace towards the political officials, or socialisation could be triggered by 
material inducement (e.g. threats of punishment, promise of rewards) by the hegemon that generate policy 
change consistent with the hegemonic order. /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ?  “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?
289-90. 
424 Reliance on material inducement and/or coercion, however, ŝƐŶĞǀĞƌƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ‘ŝŶĂŶĚŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?ƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŽƌ
sustain legitimacy. Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ? ? ? ?.  
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interests and activities of subordinate states over the longer term.  Coercion and inducement, conversely, 
WHQG WR SURGXFH PRUH IUDJLOH KHJHPRQ\ EHLQJ H[FOXVLYHO\ EDVHG RQ WKH KHJHPRQ¶V FRQWURO RI
preponderant material resources.425  Different traditions of IR acknowledge that socialisation, as an 
element of hegemonic power, is not reducible to coercive capabilities.426  Material considerations and 
norms are mutually reinforcing, with neither being singularly determinative.427  Consequently, their 
RFFXUUHQFHVDUHµIUHTXHQWO\GLIILFXOWWRGLVHQWDQJOH¶428  They are, however, analytically distinct ways 
of exercising power, rel\LQJRQGLIIHUHQWPHFKDQLVPVDQGZKLFKDGYDQFHµTXLWHGLIIHUHQWQRWLRQVRI
WKH XQGHUO\LQJ IDEULF DQG GXUDELOLW\ RI KHJHPRQLF SRZHU¶429  However, empirically isolating the 
importance, in addition to the presence, of socialisation mechanisms can be problematic, since the 
hegemon may simultaneously use mechanisms of coercion/inducement and socialisation to persuade 
subordinate states.430   
 
)RU ,NHQEHUU\DQG.XSFKDQ WKHGHJUHHRIVRFLDOLVDWLRQ LVGHSHQGHQWXSRQ WKHKHJHPRQ¶VDELOLW\ WR
disseminate its conception of order, and upRQWKHVXERUGLQDWH VWDWHV¶ VXVFHSWLELOLW\ WR UHVWUXFWXUH431  
They see change occurring principally through external inducement432 or internal reconstruction433 
rather than normative persuasion,434 which they view as insufficient on its own to drive the socialisation 
process.435  Officials in subordinate states only internalise the norms and ideals articulated by the 
                                                          
425 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?315. 
426 In War and Change, Gilpin notes that while hegemonic power is ultimately established by military and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƉŽǁĞƌŵĂǇďĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ
ǀĂůƵĞƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽĂƐĞƚŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?'ŝůƉŝn, War and Change, 34. Cox, working in the neo-Gramscian tradition, 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂƌĞ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇ  ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ůĂǇ
ĚŽǁŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ĨŽƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ? ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 
intertwining of socio-economic, political and ideological structures, all of which are rooted in a particular mode 
of production. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 172.   
427 Charles A. <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ?  “hŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐ ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ŝŶ Power, Order and Change in World Politics, ed. G. John 
Ikenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25. 
428 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
429 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
430 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
431 Ikenberry and <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?291. 
432 External inducement relies on economic and military incentives to induce subordinate states to comply. G. 
Ikenberry and <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?. 
433 Through internal reconstruction, the hegemon directly intervenes into the affairs of the subordinate state 
with the aim of transforming its domestic political institutions.  The hegemon exports normative principles about 
domestic and international political order and officials in the subordinate state are meant to become 
accustomed to these institutions, gradually accepting them as their own. Such extensive intervention only occurs 
in certain conditions, namely in the aftermath of war, or as a result of colonial empire-building. Ikenberry and 
<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ?291. 
434 As conceptualised by Ikenberry and Kupchan, normative persuasion ƌĞůŝĞƐ ŽŶ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ QĚŝƉůŽmatic channels, 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƐƚƵĚǇ ? ?KĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽĨƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞƚŚĞŚĞŐĞŵŽŶ ?ƐŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚĂĚŽƉƚ
ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
435 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?-5. 
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hegemon after the provision of material incentives, or through the imposition of these norms via direct 
intervention.436  The dissemination of American norms, such as democracy and economic liberalisation, 
is heavily dependent on U.S. military and economic dominance, and frequently only internalised after 
material inducement.437   
 
Socialisation, however, is not as a one-way, top-down process that is initiated and controlled by the 
hegemon in its entirety.438  In Social States, Johnston advances two micro-processes in socialisation 
theory, persuasion and social influence,439 which can affect any actor in the system, and which are often 
ignored in constructivism.440  The determining feature of these processes concerns the nature of 
acceptance.  Social influence confers compliance derived from social pressure to conform, while 
persuasion HQWDLOV µSXEOLF FRQIRUPLW\ with SULYDWH DFFHSWDQFH¶441  Rewards and punishments are 
socially determined because only the groups that can provide them, and only those groups, whose 
approval an actor values, have this influence.  Social influence resWVRQWKHµLQIOXHQFHG¶DFWRUKDYLQJ
prior identification with the relevant reference group.442  Identification with a group can generate a range 
of cognitive and social pressure to conform, and the more identity-conforming behaviour is repeated, 
the more commitment to the group is reinforced.443 
 
PersuasionWKHILUVWRI-RKQVRQ¶VPLFUR-processes, relies on ideological persuasion and transnational 
learning through various forms of direct contact with political officialsZKRLQWHUQDOLVHWKHKHJHPRQ¶V
norms and move to adopt new state policies which are compatible with those of the hegemon and which 
                                                          
436 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
437 For instance, by opening up the American domestic market to friendly countries. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 
 “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?
438 Ikenberry and Kupchan recognise that interaction can affect the normative orientation of officials in dominant 
and subordinate states. If the initial efforts at socialisation by dominant state officials are ineffective, they may 
rework their terms. Dominant and subordinate state officials may also compromise, working together to reshape 
ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŽƌĚĞƌ ?/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚ<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?
439 In Social States, Johnston outlines a third micro-process of mimicking; the borrowing of language, habits and 
ways of acting as a safe, first reaction to a new environment, used by novice states as they interact in the 
international environment for the first time. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 
1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxv.  
440 Johnston observes that the goal of diplomacy, for instance, is often the socialisation of others into accepting 
ŶĞǁƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨǁŽƌůĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ?  “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?
 ? ? ? ?ŚĞĐŬĞůĂŐƌĞĞƐǁŝƚŚ:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐŝǀŝƐŵŚĂƐŶŽƚďĞĞŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŝŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐŵŝĐƌŽ-
processes about how precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process and then act upon the normative 
arguments that predominate in particular social environments such as international institutions. Jeffrey T. 
ŚĞĐŬĞů ? “dŚĞŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdƵƌŶŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?World Politics 50, no. 2 (1988): 343. 
441 ŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ?:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
442 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
443 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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produce more cooperative outcomes.444  Typically a focus of constructivist work into processes of 
socialisation, persuasion LQYROYHVµFKDQJLQJPLQGVRSLQLRQVDQGDWWLWudes about causality and affect 
LGHQWLW\ LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI RYHUWO\ PDWHULDO RU PHQWDO FRHUFLRQ«OHDG>LQJ@ WR FRPPRQ
NQRZOHGJHRU«D KRPRJHQLVDWLRQ RI LQWHUHVWV¶445  Persuasion, then, relies upon two-way 
communication between the dominant and subordinate states.       
 
The act of persuasion combines three processes, as the persuadee responds to information from the 
SHUVXDGHU,QWKHILUVWWKHSHUVXDGHHHQJDJHVLQDµKLJKLQWHQVLW\SURFHVVRIFRJQLWLRQUHIOHFWLRQDQG
argument about the content of new information¶446  The persuadee employs a systematic process of 
weighing evidence, assessing counter-attitudinal arguments and as a result, may draw different 
conclusions from their starting point.  This is not necessarily a spontaneous process, and is more likely 
to occur under favourable environmental conditions which allow for the persuadee to consider the 
QHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRµWKLQNKDUGHU¶DERXWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHLU
initial attitudes on outcomes that might affect their interests.447  In the second process, the persuadee is 
VZD\HGE\ WKHLU µNQRZOHGJH¶RI WKHLUH[LVWLQJ UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKHSHUVXDGHU +HUH WKHSHUVXDGHH
looks for signals about the nature of the relationship to judge the legitimacy of counter-attitudinal 
arguments presented.  Consequently, information from sources that are liked, trusted, or considered 
knowledgeable has more likelihood of being viewed as credible, than information from untrusted 
sources, or from sources outside the group.448  In the third process, a persuadee, entering into social 
interaction with the persuader, possesses characteristics that, when interacting with a particular social 
HQYLURQPHQWDQGRWKHUDFWRUVOHDGVWRµYDULDWLRQLQWKHGHJUHHRIDWWLWXGLQDOFKDQJH¶449    
 
                                                          
444 hŶůŝŬĞ /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ĂŶĚ <ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŶŽƌmative persuasion does not place it as a 
mechanism of secondary importance to coercion and inducement. 
445 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?  
446 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
447 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
448 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
449 dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĂĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĞ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐƚŽĂŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ-
processing abilities, the strength of existing attitudes, a desire not to be seen as inconsistent, and the degree of 
autonomy from the persuader ?:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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The second micro-process, social influenceUHIHUVWRDµFODVVRIPLFUR-processes that elicit pro-norm450 
behaviour through the distribution of social rewards451 and punishments¶452  Drawing on social identity 
theory,453 VRFLDO LQIOXHQFHSURFHVVHVRIIHULQVLJKWLQWRDQDFWRU¶VGHVLUH WRµPD[LPLVHVWDWXVKRQRXU
SUHVWLJHDQGWKHGHVLUHWRDYRLGDORVVRIVWDWXVVKDPLQJRUKXPLOLDWLRQDQGRWKHUVRFLDOVDQFWLRQV¶454  
Social actors are motivated to maximise their status for UHDVRQVRIµSRZHUZHDOWKDQGGHIHUHQFHDQG
YLFHYHUVD¶455  ,QWKLVZD\VWDWHVDFTXLUHµSV\FKRORJLFDOVDWLVIDFWLRQ¶IURPDµVHQWLPHQWRIVXSHULRULW\¶
in relation to other actors in the system.456  However, the reward can also be psychological well-being.457  
Since individual and collective identities are co-constitutive, drawing on group-conforming behaviour, 
status requires social recognition.458  A good image may encourage other actors to cooperate with you 
in other arenas and on other issues, which can help build trust, leading to reciprocity.  Rather than an 
H[SORLWDWLYH SULVRQHUV¶ GLOHPPD FRQWHVW LW LV LQ DQ DFWRU¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV WR URXWLQLVH DQG VRFLDOLVH
cooperation to make the reputation credible.459  There are seldom concrete benefits or leverage that can 
be attributed to a good image, rather membership in the club in itself bestows status with socially 
                                                          
450 The term pro-norm indicates action/behaviour that is consistent with the norm in question, whether done 
because the norm has been internalised or because some kind of consequentialist calculation makes it useful to 
ĨŽůůŽǁ ?ŶĂĐƚŽƌŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ĨŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵďƵƚĂďŝĚĞƐďǇŝƚ ?:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
451 Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being 
derived from conformity with role expectations. 
452 Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or conflict derived from actions 
inconsistent with role and identity. 
453 Social Identity Theory (SIT) considers ƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĨŽƌŵĂŶ ‘ŝŶ-ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ to maximise 
self-esteem. ^ĞĞ:ŽŚŶdƵƌŶĞƌ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů/ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů'ƌŽƵƉ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ,ĞŶƌŝdĂũĨĞů ?ĞĚ ?The 
Social Dimension: European Developments in Social Psychology, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), especially 526-7. For a discussion on how SIT is integrated into International Relations theory, see Jacques 
,ǇŵĂŶƐ ?  “ƉƉůǇŝŶŐ^ŽĐŝĂů /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇdŚĞŽƌǇƚŽƚŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ P ĂƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶŐĞŶĚĂ ? ?A 
paper presented to the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 2002. http://www-
bcf.usc.edu/~hymans/hymansSITpaper.pdf  (accessed April 1, 2016).   
454 :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
455 Gilpin ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶstates at the top of the status hierarchy emphasises their economic and military power, with 
status being highly coercive. His approach places no significance in group-conforming behaviour from which 
status is also derived. Gilpin, War and Change, 30-33. 
456 dƵĚŽƌ  ? KŶĞĂ ?  “ĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĞĐůŝŶĞ P ^ƚĂƚƵƐ ŶǆŝĞƚǇ ĂŶĚ 'ƌĞĂƚ WŽǁĞƌ ZŝǀĂůƌǇ ? ?Review of 
International Studies 40, no. 1 (2014): 130. 
457 Well-being is derived from group-ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚĂůƐŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?dŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ
ontological security is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3. 
458 KŶĞĂ ? “ĞƚǁĞĞŶŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?-130. 
459 Drawing on Gramscian and English School theory, Cronin and Reus-Smit separately argue that subordinate 
states follow a hegemonic leader if the basis of its international order is not purely exploitative but is universal 
in conception, in the sense of being compatible with their interests. While the hegemon is recognised as having 
greater interests and prerogatives, in return, subordinate states expect the hegemon to accept certain limits in 
ƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?ƌƵĐĞƌŽŶŝŶ ?  “dŚĞWĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ PŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚthe 
hŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 108; Reus-Smit, American Power 
and World Order, 58. 
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recognised advantages.  Therefore, the appeal of gaining from the status of in-group membership is the 
ultimate motivator of conforming behaviour.460   
 
Conversely, fear of being shamed or criticised by the group, can be derived from violating status-related 
QRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHV6LQFHQRUPVDUHLQWHUVXEMHFWLYHO\XQGHUVWRRGDQ\VWDWH¶VIDLOXUHWRFRPSO\ZLWK
generally accepted rules and norms, or failure to discharge normative obligations, in the existing order, 
can be viewed as threatening or unacceptable.  Such actions, especially if undertaken by the hegemon, 
may, ultimately, undermine the legitimacy of a generally accepted rule, thereby weakening the fabric 
of the system.461  The mechanisms of socialisation, therefore, make no distinction between a hegemon 
and a subordinate state in requiring status validation.  However, the hegemon has more to lose in terms 
of the legitimacy for its order, on which its authority rests, if its status is weakened.  This confirms that 
KHJHPRQLFOHJLWLPDF\LVLPEXHGWKURXJKPHFKDQLVPVRIVRFLDOLVDWLRQWKURXJKWKHKHJHPRQ¶VFDSDFLW\
to persuade and to exert social influence, rather than resting on WKHKHJHPRQ¶VPDWHULDOFDSDEilities, or 
on their ability to coerce or induce. 
 
The next section considers WKHHIIHFWVRIWKH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vglobal war on terror (GWOT) 
strategy on U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific to determine the extent to which U.S. hegemonic 
legitimacy ZDVGDPDJHGE\WKH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSRVW-9/11 foreign policy.  The first aim is 
to show that U.S. hegemonic legitimacy is multi-dimensional, and gained from multiple sources.  U.S. 
hegemonic legitimacy derives from its ability to conform to established rules and norms, to universalise 
the beliefs about these rules and norms, and to retain the consent of subordinate states to the asymmetric 
power relationship that exists in the order.462  The second aim is to demonstrate that the U.S. hegemonic 
order during this period shifted towards coercion and deriving acquiescence through inducement, and 
compliance through social pressure.  7KLV VKLIW QHJDWLYHO\ DIIHFWHG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR
persuade subordinate states to accept and internalise changes to the normative foundations of U.S. 
hegemony.  Nevertheless, while aspects of U.S. legitimacy were damaged by the G.W. Bush 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGWKH*:27OHJLWLPDF\LVQRWDQµDOORUQRWKLQJDIIDLU¶463  It follows with a brief 
                                                          
460 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 38.  There has to be an intersubjectively agreed notion of 
socially valuable behaviour. There must also be a forum or institution that makes acting a particular way public 
and observable.  From this perspective, agency and structure are mutually constituted  W derived from shared 
understandings of how an actor should act, and an institutional structure that provides information about the 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞďĞŚĂǀŝŶŐ ŝŶǁĂǇƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƐŚĂƌĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ?  “dƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
461 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 150. 
462 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 15-16. 
463 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 19-20. 
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discussion on the Obama administration¶VDWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKHlegitimacy deficit in U.S. hegemony 
in the Asia-Pacific by shifting back to U.S. support for multilateralism and shared values.  
 
The effects of the G.W. Bush era on U.S. hegemonic legitimacy 
In considering the effects of the GWOT on U.S. hegemonic legitimacy, three aspects of the G.W. Bush 
Doctrine are highlighted: the global implications of U.S. attempts to re-interpret international norms on 
pre-emptive strike and the use of force; its shift towards coercion and inducement in the Asia-Pacific to 
gain consent; and the effects of its swing towards unilateralism, with its disregard for multilateral 
institutions in the region that inevitably changed the social bargain underpinning U.S. hegemonic order 
in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
(i) International rules and norms on pre-emptive strike and the use of force  
$PHULFDQSROLF\XQGHU*:%XVKVKLIWHGLQDSSURDFKWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPRIµXVHRIIRUFH¶DQG
the definition of pre-emptive strike.  The framing of U.S. foreign policy in moral, binary terms (e.g. 
µJRRGYHUVXVHYLO¶FKDUDFWHULVHGE\a polarising µZLWKXVRUDJDLQVWXV¶PLQG-set, sought to mobilise 
support around what Washington deemed to be a common enemy.464  Despite initial support from the 
international community, there was growing concern by the end of 2002 that the U.S. was attempting 
to unilaterally re-interpret the terms of international rules and norms concerning pre-emption and the 
use of force for its own gain.465 
 
First, tKURXJKWKHGRFWULQHRISUHYHQWLYHZDUDQGWKHµVtrategy of pre-emption,¶ the U.S. attempted to 
shift the generally agreed interpretation of this international norm from striking against an µLPPLQHQW
WKUHDW¶WRRQHRISUHYHQWLRQWKHUHE\EHLQJDEOHWRVWULNHDQHQHP\ILUVWZLWKRXWVSHFLILFHYLGHQFH of an 
imminent attack.466  In this way, the G.W. Bush administration sought to approximate its strategy to one 
                                                          
464 DĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “Hegemonic Order, September 11, and the Consequences of the Bush Revolution ? ? ? ? ? ?During 
its second term, the G.W. Bush administration attempted to back-track on its unilateral foreign policy by 
pursuing more multilateralist and conciliatory strategies. Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job,  “U.S. Policy in 
Southeast Asia: Limited Re-Engagement after Years of Benign Neglect ? ?Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (2007): 630. 
465 KŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞhE^ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ ‘ĂůůŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƐƚĞƉƐ ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ?hE^
Resolution 1368). UN Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), September 12, 2001. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 23, 2016). The 
same day, NATO invoked Article 5  W coming to the defence of a member - for the first time in history. NATO, 
 “^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚďǇ ƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm 
accessed August 23, 2016.   
466 DĂƌƚŝŶ'ƌŝĨĨŝƚŚƐ ? “ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƵƐŚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌ ? ?Australasian Journal of 
American Studies 23, no. 1 (2004): 67-68. 
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RI µVHOI-defence,¶ PHDQLQJ WKDW LI WKH WKUHDW ZDV LPPLQHQW LW FRXOG DW OHDVW PDNH some claim to 
legitimacy.467  American emphasis shifted from the punishment of the instigators of the 9/11 attacks, to 
the elimination of any regime, which the U.S. considered hostile, and who might also potentially be the 
source of any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by pre-emptive strike.468   
 
Second, the coQWURYHUV\RYHU$PHULFD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO816&5HVROXWLRQ
1441, passed unanimously in November 2002, giving Iraq its final opportunity to comply with UN 
disarmament obligations, also had negative consequences on this essential condition of American 
hegemonic order ± the legitimacy of internationally agreed rules and norms.  The U.S (and Britain) 
treated Resolution 1441 regarding the inspections of the Iraqi weapons programme (combined with 
existing UNSC Resolutions relating to the first Gulf War), as grounds for the authorised invasion of 
Iraq in March 2003.  The UN Charter, however, sets out that the legal right to determine how to enforce 
its own resolutions lies with the Security Council and not with individual nations.469  Although Kofi 
Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN (1997-2006) declared the war illegal from the point of 
view of the UN Charter, and while the UNSC could, in principle, rule on the legality of the war, the 
British and American vetoes in the Security Council would have made the possibility of a ruling against 
the legality of the war highly improbable.470  When viewed alongside the authorisation by Congress 
through the µJoint Resolution to Authorise the Use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq,¶ it was clear that 
U.S. domestic authorisation superseded agreed international rules and norms in this instance. 
 
In seeking to reinterpret international law and long-standing norms, the G.W. Bush administration failed 
to understand that judgements of legitimacy are not just derived from law, but from what others perceive 
to be acceptable behaviour in accordance with existing norms.471  Furthermore, once it was clear there 
ZHUHQR:0'LQ,UDTWKH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVRXJKWWRUHEUDQGWKHZDULQWHUPVRIWKHµ)UHHGRP
                                                          
467 ZŽďĞƌƚ dƵĐŬĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĂǀŝĚ ,ĞŶĚƌŝĐŬƐŽŶ ?  “dŚĞ ^ŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ >ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 
(Nov/Dec 2004): 18-32. 
468 ĐŚŽŝŶŐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚZĞĂŐĂŶ ?ƐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ?State of the Union Address, G.W. Bush declared 
ƚŚĂƚ /ƌĂŶ ? /ƌĂƋĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶ  ‘ĂǆŝůŽĨĞǀŝů ? ?These countries were cited as pursuing chemical, 
biological, and nƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĐĂŵƉƐ ?dŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚǁĂƌŶĞĚ ? “^ƚĂƚĞƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞƐĞ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚĂůůŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂŶĂǆŝƐŽĨĞǀŝů ?ĂƌŵŝŶŐƚŽƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?George W. Bush, 
 “State of the Union Address, ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed January 
14, 2015). 
469 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39, 24 October 1945. 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html (accessed August 23, 2016). 
470 BBC,  “/ƌĂƋ tĂƌ /ůůĞŐĂů ? ƐĂǇƐ ŶŶĂŶ ? ? ^eptember 16, 2004. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm (accessed August 23, 2016). 
471 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, 155. ^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ ĞĞƚŚĂŵ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ  W
shared beliefs.  Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 15-16. 
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AgeQGD¶ZLWKDYLHZ WRSURPRWLQJGHPRFUDF\DQGHQGLQJ W\UDQQ\DFURVV WKH0LGGOH(DVW472  This 
strategy soon ran into problems since democracy promotion contradicted U.S. counter-terrorism 
strategy and the use of torture and rendition in the GWOT.  Also running counter to the freedom agenda, 
the G.W. Bush administration embraced regimes with poor human rights records to support the 
GWOT.473 
   
In World Out Of Balance, Brooks and Wohlforth emphasise the power of the U.S. within the 
international system, which, they claim, does not constrain the agency of the U.S. derived from its 
material resources,QVWHDGWKH\DVVHUWWKDW86IRUHLJQSROLF\LVDµUHDOPRIFKRLFH¶474  They disagree 
with institutionalist logic which accentuates the constraints on the hegemon through the need to 
PDLQWDLQDµIDYRXUDEOHPXOWLODWHUDOUHSXWDWLRQ¶475  Brooks and Wohlforth assert that the hegemon can 
FKRRVH WR LJQRUH WKH µLQWHUQDO DQG LQKHUHQW LQFHQWLYH WR FRPSO\ ZLWK WKH H[LVWLQJ VWUXFWXUH RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPV¶E\HLWKHUDEVRUELng the costs, or rewriting the norms.476  According to this logic, 
the U.S. holds several reputations across international institutions, and since subordinate states have 
various international interests, they do not value all institutions equally.477  While they concede to 
constructivist argument that U.S. hegemony is harder to maintain if other states cease their support for 
the institutional status quo, they disagree with the idea that unilateral norm-breaking in specific 
circumstances can generally erode the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony.478  Consequently, in their view, a 
complete crisis in hegemonic legitimacy is unlikely.479 
 
                                                          
472 :ĂŵĞƐD ?>ŝŶĚƐĂǇ ? “'ĞŽƌŐĞt ?ƵƐŚ ?ĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨh^'ůŽďĂů>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?International 
Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 769-770.  
473 For instance, the administration improved its relationship with the former Uzbek leader, Karimov, to gain 
access to the airbase in Khanabad. It also supported the Musharraf military government in Pakistan because of 
WĂŬŝƐƚĂŶ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ'tKd ?Wyn ZĞĞƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚƐŝĂŶZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh^->ĞĚ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? ?
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2007): 225. 
474 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of 
American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 16. 
475 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance, 149. 
476 Brooks and Wohlforth offer a two-way interaction between power resources and legitimacy. Legitimacy 
constrains the use of material power, and power also shapes legitimacy. Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out Of 
Balance, 149, 179. 
477 ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵŶĞĂƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ' ?t ?ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƵƐŚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞŶŽƌŵŽŶƉƌĞ-
emptive strikes, subordinate states continued to work with the U.S. in other institutions and bilaterally. Brooks 
and Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance, 160. 
478 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance, 176. 
479 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out Of Balance, 18. ,ƵƌĚĂůƐŽĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽǀĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?In contrast to Reus-
^ŵŝƚ ?,ƵƌĚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ?ŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ?,ƵƌĚ ? “ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐEŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Unilateral norm-breaking, especially by the dominant state, does undermine the social base on which 
its hegemony is founded.480  While the U.S. has the capacity to influence the development of 
international norms, it is also situated within them.  The U.S. cannot stand outside the international 
community by relying upon its preponderant material resources, or its capacity to influence international 
norms.481  A dominant state also needs to justify its reasons for delegitimising existing norms, and 
legitimising new ones.482  When a dominant state fails to convince its audience that it is committed to 
upholding existing norms in international society, it operates in the realm that Reus-Smit describes as 
µUXOHZLWKRXWULJKW¶483  $WWKLVSRLQWVRFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQIRUDKHJHPRQ¶VLGHQWLW\LQWHUHVWVSUDFWLFHV
norms, or procedures declines, and the hegemonic actor, or institution, either adapts by reconstituting 
the social bases of its legitimacy, or by investing more heavily in material practices of coercion or 
bribery.484   The basis of U.S. appeared to move away from legitimacy and towards coercion and 
acquiescence through self-interest, which is highlighted by the responses to the GWOT in the Asia-
Pacific. 
 
(ii) Coercion and consent in regional geopolitics 
%X]DQQRWHVWKDWWKH*:27ZDVDµUDWKHUVXFFHVVIXOPDFUR-VHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶UHLQIRUFLQJWKHYLHZRXWside 
the Islamic world at least that Al Qaeda presented a common threat.485  Acting in their own self-interests, 
&KLQD,QGLDDQGVHYHUDOFRXQWULHVLQ6RXWKHDVW$VLDOLQNHGWKHLURZQORFDOLVHGSUREOHPVZLWKµWHUURULVW¶
groups to the GWOT.486  In addition, the association of the GWOT with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) assisted the U.S. in establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003.  As 
RXWOLQHGE\WKH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWKH36,ZDVWREHDµPXVFXODUHQKDQFHPHQWRI>RXU@DELOLW\
collectively to halt trafficking in WMD cRPSRQHQWV¶DQGµWRSUHYHQWWKHPRYHPHQWRI:0'PDWHULDOV
WRKRVWLOHVWDWHVDQGWHUURULVWRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶487  7KHDLPVZDVWRIRUPDµZHERISDUWQHUVKLSV¶RYHUODQG
by air and by sea that could stop shipments of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons bound for 
terrorists or countries deemed to support terrorism.488  Despite international reservations about rising 
                                                          
480 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, chapter 2. 
481 ,ƵƌĚ ? “ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐEŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
482 ,ƵƌĚ ? “ƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚDĂŬŝŶŐEŽƌŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
483 Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?163. 
484 Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝƐĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?158. 
485 ĂƌƌǇƵǌĂŶ ? “tŝůůƚŚĞ ‘'ůŽďĂůtĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ?ďĞƚŚĞEĞǁŽůĚtĂƌ ? ?International Affairs 82, no. 6 (2006): 
1103. 
486 For a consideration of China ?Ɛtreatment of the Uighur population in the autonomous region of Xinjiang as 
terrorists, see DĂƌŝĞdƌĠĚĂŶŝĞůĂŶĚWĂŬ ?< ?>ĞĞ ? “ǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞ&ƌĂŵŝŶŐŽĨ ‘dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚ ?sŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝŶyŝŶũŝĂŶŐ P
Insights from ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ƵŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
487 :ŽŚŶ Z ? ŽůƚŽŶ ?  “dŚĞ ƵƐŚ ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ &ŽƌǁĂƌĚ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĨŽƌ EŽŶƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Chicago Journal of 
International Law 5, no. 2 (2005): 400. 
488  ?sŝŶŽĚ<ƵŵĂƌ ? “/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞWƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ P/ƐƐƵĞƐŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?Strategic 
Analysis 33, no. 5 (2009): 687. 
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U.S. unilateralism, opposition to the invasion of Iraq, and concerns about the legality of intercepting 
trade, over 40 countries willingly participated in the PSI.489  This is despite the knowledge that, as a 
U.S.-led initiative, the U.S. was most likely to target states that were of concern to the U.S., in 
accordance with U.S. definitions.490  In the five years after September 2001, the GWOT was established 
as a macro-securitisation, attaining broad acceptance within international society.491   
 
The G.W. Bush administration used coercion and inducement to garner Asia-Pacific support for the 
GWOT, through the use of military and economic coercive power and incentives, with subordinate 
states, and regional institutions, being financially rewarded and/or with funds withheld, dependent on 
their support for the GWOT.  In their response to the GWOT, Asia-Pacific states fell into two broad 
categories.  States with strong strategic ties with the U.S., including Japan, South Korea and Australia, 
moved closer to the United States, motivated, not only by the threat perception from Islamic terrorism, 
but also by their own self-interest.492  In a move that provided legitimacy for the U.S. intervention, the 
Australian government under Prime Minister John Howard sent troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
despite eliciting criticism from its Asian neighbours.493  While the South Korean government also 
broadly supported the GWOT, 6HRXOFDPHWRYLHZWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKHµD[LVRIHYLO¶WRLQFOXGH1RUWK
.RUHD DV SURYRFDWLYH DQG XQFRQVWUXFWLYH DQG LQ GLUHFW RSSRVLWLRQ WR 6RXWK .RUHD¶V VWUDWHJ\ RI
cooperation and reconciliation with Pyongyang.494  Major regional allies acted in accordance with 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFRQFHUQVRYHU3\RQJ\DQJ¶VSRWHQWLDOWRKDUERXUWHUURULVWVDQGWRSUHYHQWWKH.LPUHJLPH
from selling military goods and technology to anyone deemed actually, or potentially, hostile to U.S. 
interests.495  South Korea disagreed with U.S. policy but did not withdraw its consent to the GWOT.  
However, to counter-balance the U.S., Seoul shifted towards Beijing with regard to North Korea.496    
                                                          
489 Mark Valencia, The Proliferation Security Initiative, Adelphi Paper 376 (London: International Institute for 
Security Studies, 2005).  Prominent dissenters to the PSI include China, India, Malaysia and Indonesia. For China, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, there was concern that through the initiative, the U.S. sought to exert greater influence 
over the Malacca Strait. 
490 <ƵŵĂƌ ? “/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞWƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ P/ƐƐƵĞƐŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
491 Buzan,  “tŝůůƚŚĞ ‘'ůŽďĂůtĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ?ďĞƚŚĞEĞǁŽůĚtĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
492 ZĞĞƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚƐŝĂŶZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh^->ĞĚ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
493 Dick Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and US Policy 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2006), 30. 
494 The South Korean-h ?^ ?ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ' ?t ?ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐEŽƌƚŚ< ƌĞĂƉŽůŝĐǇĐĂŵĞĂƚĂƚŝŵĞ
when South Korea was becoming mŽƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝŶŝƚƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?sŝĐƚŽƌ ?ŚĂ ? “^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ
ŝŶ ? ? ? ? PWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ&ůƵǆ ? ?Asian Survey 25, no. 1 (2005): 33-40. 
495 ZŽďĞƌƚ ?,ƵŶƚĞƌ ? “ĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? Ph ?^ ?WŽůŝĐǇŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Asia Pacific Review 10, no. 1 (2003): 7. 
496 The loss of confidence in Washington may have created the conditions that supported the intensification of 
ROK-ŚŝŶĂ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ^ĐŽƚƚ ^ŶǇĚĞƌ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ-KoƌĞ  ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ P ^ǁĞĞƚ ĂŶĚ ^ŽƵƌ ĨƚĞƌƚĂƐƚĞ ? ?Comparative 
Connections, January 2009. 
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SnyderByunSweetSourTasteCSISJan09.pdf (accessed April 7, 2015). 
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The counter-terrorism imperative also brought significant changes to the U.S-Japan alliance, with Japan 
µORFN>LQJ@LWVHOILQWR¶WKH86DOOLDQFHHYHQPRUHILUPO\DIWHU497  The Japanese government under 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi treated the strategic environment as MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU D EURDGHU
UHGH¿QLWLRQRI-DSDQ¶VJOREDO role, breaking the post-war restrictions on the role of the Japanese Self-
Defence Forces (SDF), by committing it to a noncombat, reconstruction role in Iraq.498  7RN\R¶VQHHG
to security-bind the U.S. was also grounded in serving Japanese national interests, at a time of escalating 
tensions in Northeast Asia, permeating from North Korea, and compounded by longer-term concerns 
DERXW&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHU499  As a result, Washington was able to push for an enhanced Japanese role 
in the GWOT, consisting of political support, the provision of some technical competences in dealing 
ZLWKWHUURULVPDVVLVWDQFHLQORFDWLQJDQGREVWUXFWLQJWHUURULVWV¶ILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVDQGWRDOLPLWHG
extent, intelligence.500   
 
The second category included several Southeast Asian states considered by the U.S. to be a source of 
regional instability.  These states were subjected to intense pressure to accept U.S.-imposed counter-
terrorism assistance.501  Inducements were garnered through existing bilateral alliances in Southeast 
Asia, with both the Philippines and Thailand, being upgraded to µPDMRUQRQ-1$72DOO\VWDWXV¶502  The 
U.S. also agreed to deploy combat troops to train and support the Filipino military in its fight against 
radical Islamist Abu Sayyaf insurgents in 2002.  Military-to-military relations were restored with 
Indonesia in 2005, and a new Strategic Framework Agreement with Singapore expanded bilateral 
cooperation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of WMD, joint military exercises and training 
in the same year.  Despite Washington¶V GLVWULEXWLRQRI DVVLVWDQFH DQG VPRRWKLQJRI UHODWLRQVZLWK
6RXWKHDVW$VLDQOHDGHUVWKHLPSDFWRIWKH,UDTZDUDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQW*:27µDOLHQDWHGFRQIXVHG
DQGIUXVWUDWHG¶GRPHVWLFDXGLHQFHVLQSDUWLFXODU503  The Bush Doctrine, and an impression of a military 
campaign against Islam, created anti-American sentiment in the predominantly Muslim countries of 
                                                          
497 sŝĐƚŽƌ ?ŚĂ ?  “tŝŶŶŝŶŐƐŝĂ PtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐhŶƚŽůĚ^ƚŽƌǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs 86, no 6 (2007): 98-113. In the 
revised 2005 U.S-Japan defence agreement, the U.S. agreed to relocate the problematic air base on Okinawa 
and both agreed to expand bilateral cooperation in training and intelligence-sharing. Emma Chanlett-Avery, 
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 5, 2006), 9.    
498 ReĞƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚƐŝĂŶZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh^->ĞĚ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? ? 223. 
499 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 59. 
500 Hunter,  “After 9/11: U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia, ? ? ? 
501 ZĞĞƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚƐŝĂŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh-^ůĞĚ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶ ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? ? 224. 
502 Thailand and the Philippines became eligible for priority delivery of defence material and the purchase of 
certain controlled items such as depleted uranium tank rounds. They are able to stockpile U.S. military hardware 
and benefit from a U.S. government loan-guarantee programme for arms exports. Goh, Struggle for Order, 58. 
503 Entering into a subsidiary relationship with a hegemon can create domestic political problems for the client 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?  dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐůŝĞŶƚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ may prefer to base their participation in the hegemonic 
system on normative claims, with the view to reducing the political costs concerning the loss of independence 
and autonomy suffered as a result of involvement in the hegemonic system. Ikenberry and Kupchan, 
 “^ŽĐŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Indonesia and Malaysia in Southeast Asia, provoking a backlash against Western targets.504  Such an 
attack occurred in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, when members of the Islamist terrorist group, 
Jemaah Islamiyah, attacked a nightclub, killing 202 people, including 88 Australians.505  As one 
Southeast Asia analyst, Simon Tay, QRWHG µWhe U.S. post- DJHQGD«FRPSOLFDWHG H[LVWLQJ
international conflicts and insurgencies in Southeast Asia.¶506   
 
(iii) Undermining regional institutions 
Washington wielded its agenda-setting powers within regional institutions, with APEC issuing its first 
ever political statement on counter-terrorism.507  ASEAN also adopted various supportive declarations, 
offering enhanced regional cooperation in intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism.508 The ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) espoused an agenda for implementing UN anti-terrorist measures, including 
measures to block terrorist financing.509  Outside U.S. limited interests pertaining to the GWOT, other 
regional issues and political challenges drew less attention in Washington, with diplomatic, cultural, 
and economic approaches being underemployed, which reduced U.S. channels for normative persuasion 
DQGLQIOXHQFH)XUWKHUPRUH:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKWHUURULVPSULRULWLVHGVHFXULW\LVVXHVDQG
neglected multilateral relationships in favour of bilateral ones.  Opportunities to retain its standing in 
Southeast Asia, for example, were reduced when key administration officials, including the president, 
fUHTXHQWO\ PLVVHG $6($1 PHHWLQJV  6LJQLILFDQWO\ *: %XVK IDLOHG WR DWWHQG $6($1¶V 40th 
                                                          
504 ĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘/ƐůĂŵŝĐ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚŝŶh ?^ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƌŝƐŝŶŐůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĂŶƚŝ-American 
sentiment in the region, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, both predominantly Muslim countries. Such 
sentiment was not confined to dissidents and separatists, but also found expression in pro-democracy 
movements and the general population. This was largely attributable to American complicity (or at least the 
perception of American complicity) in human rights abuses and the harsh suppression of political dissidents by 
local authorities. T.J. Pempel,  “How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference and Unilateralism 
Have Weakened the United States across Asia ? ?The Pacific Review 21, no. 5 (2008): 547 W81 and T.J. Pempel,  “
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ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƵƐŚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐWŽƐƚ-9/11 Foreign Policy: (Critical) Security Implications for Southeast 
ƐŝĂ ? ?The Pacific Review 24, no. 4 (2011): 498. 
505 Members of the Jemaah Islamiyah group were convicted of the Bali bombings in March 2005. 
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World Affairs 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 121. The U.S. agenda also damaged the U.S. promotion of human rights. 
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508 ƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƉƵƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞh^ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŽƵŶƚĞƌƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵĞŶƚƌĞŝŶ<ƵĂůĂ
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South-East Asia under UniůĂƚĞƌĂůWƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ? ?International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 527. 
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anniversary celebrations,510 which incorporated the inaugural U.S.-ASEAN summit, in Singapore in 
September 2007.511  During this period, the U.S. isolated itself from the institutions that were designed 
DQGVHWXSRIWHQDWLWVLQLWLDWLYH'HVSLWH$PHULFD¶VXQPDWFKHGPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVDQGWKHVWUHQJWKRI
its power, the effect of its willingness to discard the existing social contract on which its hegemony 
rested, undermined its legitimacy.512        
 
(iv) Consequences 
The GWOT had two mutually reciprocal effects in the Asia-Pacific. First, it helped level the negotiating 
field between the U.S. and subordinate states by creating reciprocal strategic relations; and second, 
although U.S. strategic dominance in the region was reinforced, regional security decreased as a result 
RIJHQHUDOXQFHUWDLQW\RYHU$PHULFD¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRH[HUWLWVH[WHQsive military power capabilities.513  
Regional officials saw an opportunity to seek a more reciprocal hegemonic bargain with Washington, 
JLYHQWKHODWWHU¶VXUJHQWVHFXULW\LPSHUDWLYHVLQWKH*:276XERUGLQDWHVWDWHofficials exchanged their 
support for U.S. counter-terrorism, for economic access and political support for institutionalising great 
power constraints, in addition to security commitments from Washington.514  The G.W. Bush 
administration securitised regional economic and trade policy, subsuming them within the wider 
contextual discourse of its regional security agenda, to drum up support for the GWOT.515  For their 
SDUW 6RXWKHDVW $VLDQ VWDWHV LQ SDUWLFXODU ZHUH µUHFLSURFDOO\ RSSRUWXQLVWLF¶ LQ WKHLU UHVSRQVH WR
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSRVW-9/11 security agenda.516  In the Asia-Pacific, therefore, there was little danger of 
states abandoning U.S. hegemony, where subordinate national officials were already inclined to 
collaborate with the U.S. counter-terrorism agenda.517  However, :DVKLQJWRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRSHUVXDGH
subordinate states to normatively internalise the changes to the social bargain was significantly reduced.  
Neither Japan, nor the ROK, entirely supported the U.S. security agenda, unconvinced by tKHµD[LVRI
HYLO¶ORJLFEXWprimarily driven by their fears of abandonment by the U.S. in the security sphere, which 
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ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ Ă  “ƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚŽƵƐ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŵŽŶŐ ŵĂŶǇ ƉƵďůŝĐƐ throughout the world, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?^ĞĞůŝǌĂďĞƚŚĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ P/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (August 2005): 411. 
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prompted them to act on their own regional security concerns.518  Despite the general support for the 
GWOT, there was also reticence throughout the Asia-Pacific ± from strategic and non-strategic allies 
across Northeast and Southeast Asia ± regarding U.S. objectives and the imposition of the GWOT 
agenda at the regional level.519  There was growing recognition that U.S. power in the region had to be 
PRUHµDFWLYHO\FXUEHGQRWMXVWFKDQQHOOHG¶520   
 
The increasing over-reliance on coercion and the use of the U.S. military, and on inducement through 
incentives to underpin U.S. hegemony reached its peak in the G.W. Bush era.  The G.W. Bush Doctrine 
assumed a simple causal relationship between power resources and political influence.  It was also a 
radical project of hegemony that sought to reassert American dominance ± rather than leadership ± and 
sought to transform world order in the process.521  However, the administration attempted to do so in 
an international environment that was notably different from the post-1945 environment.  The limits to 
the presuppositions that American practices are legitimate because American interests are generally 
expressed as being universal, and that the U.S. can resort to unilateral action, were exposed in the 
aftermath of 9/11.522  American willingness to resort so quickly to the use of its military force, and with 
its readiness to disregard international law, has not only complicated its ability to garner international 
support for the legitimate use of force, but has also reduced its leverage to persuade others not to use 
force.523  International support for the legitimacy of U.S. leadership waned, not only as a result of 
disagreements over the invasion of Iraq, and the use of torture, and in the way the G.W. Bush 
administration defined or practised the GWOT, but also as a consequence of its unilateralist turn, which 
mutually reinforced U.S. unpopularity and intensified disagreements over the deteriorating situation in 
Iraq.524   
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519 Jörn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 71-111. 
520 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 60. Lake also notes that dominant states must credibly commit to limit their 
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There was also growing disjuncture between American self-perception and global perceptions of its 
hegemony, which created a deficit of hegemonic legitimacy in the absence of collectively shared beliefs, 
as U.S. hegemony was increasingly lacking a normative basis.525  In effect, the G.W. Bush 
administration relied on coercion and inducement to gain support for its agenda, through the unilateral 
(re)interpretation of international norms, and the threat of its departure from existing multilateral 
institutions.526  While the G.W. Bush administration continued to command a degree of legitimacy 
among a small number of allies, U.S. policies and its approach to its hegemonic order, when combined, 
did not damage U.S. hegemony in its entirety, but has had longer terms effects on the perception of U.S. 
legitimacy across the international community, particularly affecting public perception.527  The GWOT, 
and the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, in addition to the global financial crisis, 
created a domestically-driven perception of failure, decline, and a loss of legitimacy, as well as within 
the international system as a whole.528  
 
The Obama Administration: restoring American legitimacy 
The incoming Obama administration in January 2009 was confronted with international concerns over 
$PHULFD¶V FDSDFLW\ DQG UHDGLQHVV IRU OHDGHUVKLS DQG ZKHWKHU WKDW OHDGHUVKLS FRXOG EH MXGLFLRXVO\
exercised.529  While many states continued to support the GWOT, U.S. international standing had been 
damaged by the growing range of policy disagreements concerning the narrow U.S. focus on Iraq and 
Afghanistan, WMD, its negative attitude towards international institutions, and human rights abuses in 
the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.530  With shared 
interests being critical to the maintenance of hegemony, the Obama administration, it was hoped, 
offered a return to hegemonic restraint, support for multilateralism and international norms, and a 
recalibration of U.S. foreign policy priorities away from the narrow focus on terrorism.  From the 
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528 The result of the GWOT strategy is arguably a decline in the perception of U.S. physical security, compounded 
by a loss of American ontological security.  Identity security is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.   
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perspective of its legitimacy, and the practicalities of the financial burden of sustaining its military 
KHJHPRQ\ 2EDPD DVVHUWHG WKDW WKH 86 FRXOG QR ORQJHU DIIRUG WR EXOO\ µRWKHU FRXQWULHV WR UDWLI\
chanJHV >WKH 86@ KDWFK>HV@ LQ LVRODWLRQ¶ DQG ZRXOG QHHG WR UHDOLJQ LWV LQWHUHVWV ZLWK WKRVH RI WKH
international community.531  
 
U.S. hegemonic legitimacy is established and maintained when self-representations and institutional 
interpretations resound with the normative expectations of others.532  The deficit in hegemonic 
legitimacy can be resolved through the recalibration of mechanisms of socialisation, placing persuasion 
and voluntary compliance before material inducement and coercion.533  This process of recalibration 
LQYROYHV WKH FRPPXQLFDWLYH UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ RI WKH DFWRU¶V VRFLDO LGHQWLW\ LQWHUHVWV RU SUDFWLFHV in 
accordance with the normative expectations of other actors.  In 2007, Obama outlined his approach to 
American leadership as requiring a new humiliW\µRITXLHWFRQILGHQFHDVSLULWRIFDUHDQGUHQHZHG
FRPSHWHQFH¶534  Rhetorically, at least, his core foreign policy themes included interdependence, 
humility, leadership, shared goals, and engagement with others.  The intention was to rebalance the 
substance and practice of foreign policy, away from hard, coercive military-focused power, and towards 
the (re)integration of the soft power tools of attraction, including diplomacy and trade.  Behind the 
UKHWRULFWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZDVµDFXWHO\DZDUHRIDQGsympathetic to, the major criticisms directed at 
LWV SUHGHFHVVRU¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH ZRUOG¶535  There was an underlying understanding in the new 
administration that moral authority and legitimacy are essential tools of leadership and that the global 
environmeQW ZDV µOHVV DPHQDEOH¶ WR $PHULFDQ LQVWUXPHQWV RI KDUG SRZHU ZKHQ PDQLIHVWHG LQ D
unilateral and aggressive manner.536  7KHVPDUWSRZHUVWUDWHJ\ZDVDW WKHKHDUWRI2EDPD¶VIRUHLJQ
policy vision to recalibrate American hegemonic leadership. 
 
(i) $µVPDUWSRZHU¶strategy 
$FDGHPLF LQWHUHVW LQ WKH VWXG\RIKDUGDQGVRIWSRZHUVXEVWDQWLDWHV WKH LQIOXHQFHRI1\H¶VRULJLQDO
premise that states need to balance command (inducements/coercion) and co-optive (attraction) power 
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tŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁƐ ? ?ŚĂƚŚĂŵ,ŽƵƐĞ ?January 2015, 15.  
536 'ŝƵůŝŽD ?'ĂůůĂƌŽƚƚŝ ? “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ PĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?Journal of Strategic Studies 
38, no. 3 (2015): 251, 254. 
 84 
 
to achieve successful foreign policy outcomes.537  The efficacy of soft power as a means of conducting 
foreign policy has been widely debated, both theoretically and within the foreign policy community.538  
Conceptual and foreign policy analysis problems notwithstanding, Nye asserts that soft power tools 
include diplomacy, economic assistance and communication, but any resource can contribute to soft 
power, including the military, since soft power relates to behaviour, rather than the kind of resource.539  
6RIWSRZHULVDERXWFUHDWLQJDµKDUPRQ\RILQWHUHVWV¶ rather than a conflict of interests.540  American 
soft power rests on its culture (attractiveness), political values (living up to them at home and abroad) 
and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimacy and having moral authority).541  The power 
to attract others to what America wants depends on international perceptions of its culture, its domestic 
values and external policies.542   
 
A successful combination of hard and soft power, implemented in a specific context, is the key to a 
smart power strategy which combines hard power ZLWKWKHµSRZHURIDWWUDFWLRQ¶VRIWSRZHU543  Smart 
SRZHU1\HFRQWHVWVLVDERXWµSRZHUFRQYHUVLRQ¶± converting the full range of power resources at a 
VWDWH¶VGLVSRVDOLQWRVWUDWHJLHVWKDWSURGXFHWKHRXWFRPHVWKH\VHHN544  :KLOHWKHLGHDRIDµVPDUWSRZHU¶
                                                          
537 For a range of literature on soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004); David A. Baldwin,  “Power and International Relations, ?in Handbook of 
International Relations, 2nd edition, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage 
Publications, 2013), 273 W97; Felix Berenskoetter,  “dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďŽƵƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ? in Power in World Politics, eds. Felix 
Berenskoetter and Michael Williams (London: Routledge, 2007), 1 W22; Niall Ferguson,  “WŽǁĞƌ ? ?Foreign Policy 
(2003): 18 W27; Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire (New York: St 
Martin ?s Press, 2003). 
538 Mattern criticises Nye for his treatment of soft power as occurring through both a process of social 
construction and naturally ?:ĂŶŝĐĞŝĂůůǇDĂƚƚĞƌŶ ? “tŚǇ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌ/ƐŶ ?ƚ^Ž^ŽĨƚ PZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚ the 
Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World PŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 
3 (2005): 583-612. Kearn considers the problematic role of attraction, the inadequately developed linkage 
between hard and soft power and the implicit centrality of hegemony to the soft power model. David W. Kearn, 
 “dŚĞ ,ĂƌĚ dƌƵƚŚƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ^ŽĨƚ WŽǁĞƌ ? ?Journal of Political Power 4, no. 1 (2011): 65-85. See also, Natasha 
Hamilton-Hart, Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2012). 
539 Nye contends that military power can also be attractive when it is used for co-optive purposes: protecting 
and assisting rather than threatening and fighting (e.g. hearts and minds, humanitarian assistance, military-to-
military communication).  Similarly, economic power can also be used for command purposes (e.g. sanctions). 
Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 20-21.     
540 'ĂůůĂƌŽƚƚŝ ? “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ PĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?250. 
541 :ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞ ? “WƵďůŝĐŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇĂŶĚ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ?AAPSS, 616 (March 2008): 97. 
542 EǇĞ ? “WƵďůŝĐŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇĂŶĚ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?EǇĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚĂĨƚĞƌ
the invasion of Iraq, as a result of government policies, rather than a decline in support for American culture and 
ǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ^ĞĞ :ŽƐĞƉŚ EǇĞ ?  “ZĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 1 
(2008): 59. 
543 Nye, The Future of Power, 10.  Nye first developed the smart power strategy in 2004, to counter the 
ŵŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĂůŽŶĞĐĂŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?^ŵĂƌƚƉŽǁĞƌŝƐŶŽƚ ‘^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft resources into an effective strategy. The Future of Power, 
23. 
544 Nye, The Future of Power, 23. 
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strategy may appear fairly obvious, combining hard and soft power effectively is no simple task.545  
Even states like the U.S., endowed with greater power resources, can be ineffective in converting their 
full range of power resources successfully because smart power relies upon good understanding of the 
strategic environment (i.e. contextual intelligence) and the ability to adjust tactics to a situation, by 
choosing between hard and soft power tools to reinforce, rather than destabilise, one another.546  Smart 
power underscores the significance of socialisation by attraction, rather than coercion or inducement, 
to the practice of hegemony.  Garnering social influence is linked to concerns about international image 
and status, and therefore, by reducing reliance on the American military as the main channel of coercion, 
the U.S. could attract approval and limit disapproval.  The smart power framework means to reclaim 
86LQIOXHQFHE\EHLQJµVPDUW¶ WKURXJKWKHUHDOLVDWLRQWKDW86LQWHUHVWVDUHIXUWKHUHGby enlisting 
others to support U.S. goals, through alliances, international institutions, judicious diplomacy and the 
power of ideas.547   
 
,QWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRIWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQWKHµVPDUWSRZHU¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVDFRQVFLRXVDWWHPSWDW
communicating a more balanced approach to U.S. foreign policy, with the aim of restoring American 
DXWKRULW\ DQG KHJHPRQLF OHJLWLPDF\  7KH µVPDUW SRZHU¶ VWUDWHJ\ WRQHG GRZQ WKH XQLODWHUDO DQG
aggressive use of military force in favour of an integrated strategy combining both hard military, and 
soft attractive, power.548  +LOODU\ &OLQWRQ GHILQHG µVPDUW SRZHU¶ DV DQ µLQWHOOLJHQW LQWHJUDWLRQ DQG
networking of diplomacy, defense and development and other tools of so-called hard and soft power.¶549  
In her confirmation hearing staWHPHQW DV 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH VKH H[SODLQHG WKDW µVPDUW SRZHU¶
incorporated the use of:  
µWKHIXOOUDQJHRIWRROVDWRXUGLVSRVDO± diplomatic, economic, military, political, 
legal, and cultural ± picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each 
situation.  With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign 
SROLF\«:HZLOOOHDGZLWKGLSORPDF\EHFDXVHLW¶VWKHVPDUWDSSURDFK%XWZHDOVR
                                                          
545 Nye, The Future of Power, 23. dŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚĂƌĚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌŝƐ ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?ĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?'ĂůůĂƌŽƚƚŝ ? “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ PĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
546 Nye, The Future of Power, 225. 
547 ^ƵǌĂŶŶĞEŽƐƐĞůů ? “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ PZĞĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ>ŝďĞƌĂů/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004): 131-
143. Smart power can involve the use of hard power, so long as its use is consistent with internationally-
determined principles such as protection, peace-keeping or liberation. Gallarotti,  “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ PĞĨinitions, 
/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?254. 
548 Nye notes that the Cold War was won by a smart combination of hard coercive power and the soft attractive 
power of ideas. JosepŚ^ ?EǇĞ ? “^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘War on Terror ? ? ?Asia-Pacific Review 15, no. 1 (2008): 4. 
549 Hillary Clinton, cited in ŶĚƌĞǁ^ ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ? “WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů-DŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨĨĂŝƌƐ P^ ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ^ ƚĂƌƚƐ,ĞƌĞ ? ?<ĞǇŶŽƚĞĚĚƌĞƐƐ
to ComDef 2009, Washington, DC, September 9, 2009. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/128752.htm  





While smart power does not rule out the use of force, in her autobiography, Hard Choices, Hillary 
Clinton described it DV µFKRRVLQJ WKH ULJKW FRPELQDWLRQ RI WRROV ± diplomatic, economic, military, 
SROLWLFDOOHJDODQGFXOWXUDO¶IRUHDFKVLWXDWLRQZLWKDQH[SDQded focus on technology, public-private 
SDUWQHUVKLSVDQGDUHDVEH\RQGWKH6WDWH'HSDUWPHQW¶VVWDQGDUGSRUWIROLRDVFRPSOHPHQWDU\UHVRXUFHV
to more traditional diplomatic tools and priorities.551   
 
Legitimacy is an inherent quality of U.S. hegemonic attractiveness.552  Rebuilding the relationship 
between American legitimacy and its hegemonic power are essential to the allure of U.S. hegemony.553  
$QLPSRUWDQWµDWWUDFWLRQ¶WRRORIWKHVPDUWSRZHUVWUDWHJ\KDVEHHQSXEOLFGLSORPDF\DQLQVWUXPHQW
used by governments to mobilise soft power resources regarding U.S. values, culture, and in 
demonstrating the way the U.S. handles relations with others.  Appeal rests on the ability of the U.S. to 
communicate well, and to attract others ± not just government, but also the public ± through 
broadcasting, subsiding cultural exports, symbolic events, and people-to-people exchanges.554  Public 
diplomacy initiatives, especially in Southeast Asia, have augmented the attractiveness of U.S. policy 
through a focus on public audiences, rather than the conventional focus on political officials.555 
  
7KH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V VPDUW SRZHU VWUDWHJ\ PHDQW D UHWXUQ WR GLSORPDF\ FRRSHUDWLYH HQJDJHPHQW
economic assistance and communication.  Emphasising the art of persuasion, smart power implied 
                                                          
550 ,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ ?  “dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ,earing, ? New York Times, 13 January 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/us/politics/13text-clinton.html?_r=0  (accessed April 9, 2015). 
551 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (London: Simon Schuster, 2014), 33. Non-governmental commissions in 2008 
ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ĨŽƵŶĚ Ă  ‘ďŝƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŽŶ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐ ŚĂƌĚ and soft power to elevate and 
strengthen civilian capacities (development and diplomacy) as essential tools for advancing US interests along 
ǁŝƚŚƐƚƌŽŶŐĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĂŶŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů  
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƚŽŽůƐǁĂƐ ůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ?ĞŶƚĞƌ ĨŽƌh^'ůŽďĂůŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?  “WƵƚƚŝŶŐ
 ‘^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ ?dŽtŽƌŬ PŶĐƚŝŽŶŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌƚŚĞKďĂŵĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ?th ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ? ? ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?
DC: Center for US Global Engagement, 2010), 15.  
552 Lee, U.S. Hegemony and International Legitimacy, 157. 
553  ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ
today is not happǇǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂƌĞĂƚ
all-ƚŝŵĞ ůŽǁƐ ? ?ǀĞŶƐŽ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁĂƐƌŝƉĞĨŽƌĂ  ‘ďŝŐ ŝĚĞĂ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚƌĞƐƚŽƌĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇƚŽ
American leadership and  ‘ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ƉƌĞ-emŝŶĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂŐĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ŐŽŽĚ ? ? ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ > ? ƌŵŝƚĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ
:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞ ? “^/^ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ P^ŵĂƌƚĞƌ ?DŽƌĞ^ĞĐƵƌĞŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ
International Studies (2007), 3-6, 17. https://www.csis.org/analysis/smarter-more-secure-america (accessed 
September 9, 2016). 
554 :ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞ ? “WƵďůŝĐŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇĂŶĚ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ? 97-102. 
555 In Hard Choices, Hillary Clinton refers to the need to build strong relationships with foreign publics as well as 
governments to build more durable partnerships and also build support for American goals and values when the 
government was not with the U.S. but the people were. Clinton, Hard Choices, 49. 
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hegemonic constraint and the need to gain acceptance from others to endorse its authority and 
legitimacy.  In other words, to reconstruct the image of benign American hegemonic leadership, U.S. 
foreign policy must be perceived as active rather than assertive, EDFNHGE\DQµHQJDJHG¶QRWDJJUHVVLYH
military. The aim has been to persuade others that American power is benign; that the American military 
LVIULHQGUDWKHUWKDQIRHDQGWKDWµJOREDOOHDGHUVKLSGRHVQRWUHTXLUHJOREDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLVP¶556  In her 
Senate confirmation hearings as Secretary of State, Hillar\&OLQWRQVWUHVVHG WKHQHHG WR µstrengthen 
$PHULFD¶VSRVLWLRQRIJOREDOOHDGHUVKLS¶WRHQVXUH$PHULFDUHPDLQVµa positive force in the world.¶557  
7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VILUVWNational Security Strategy in 2010 was a product of the desire to signal a 
more restrained and nuanced approach to the world, moving away from framing the U.S. as a proactive 
agent of µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO GLSORPDF\¶ abroad.558  This strategy also placed renewed emphasis on 
preserving the norms and institutions of the established liberal order.  Importantly, the document also 
UHIHUHQFHG86µOHDGHUVKLS¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHQHHGWRµUHQHZ¶LWUDWKHUWKDQDVVXPLQJLWVXQWDUQLVKHG
existence.559  A smart power strategy was intended to kick-start the process of (re)legitimating and 
recalibrating American foreign policy and hegemony through attraction and persuasion by redirecting 
U.S. attention to recalibrating its social influence through its adherence to existing norms.560  
 
(ii) Renegotiating U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: A two-way process? 
7KHVWUDWHJLFUHEDODQFHLVDOHQVLQWRWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVPDUWSRZHUVWUDWHJ\$VSDUWRIWKH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V REMHFWLYH WR UHQHZ WLHV LQ WKH Asia-Pacific, reports back from the region had 
VWUHQJWKHQHGWKHLQFRPLQJDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VYLHZWKDWthe GWOT had damaged regional perceptions of 
American hegemony.561  Rather than securing hegemony, the region felt less sure of American power.  
                                                          
556 Nye, The Future of Power, 230.   
557 HillĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ ?  “TraŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐ ? ?President Obama also advocated a smart power 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ůŝŶƚŽŶŚĂƐŵŽƌĞŽǀĞƌƚůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƌŽůĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞKďĂŵĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵŽƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ?
placing more emphasis on engagement. Hillary Clinton ƚŚŝŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
dŚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
policy. See Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House, especially chapter 17.  
558 dŚĞ  ? ? ? ? E^^ ǁĂƐ ŵĞĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƐŚŝĨƚ h ?^ ? ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ŽŶĚŽůĞĞǌĂ ZŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ďƵŝůĚĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĚĞŵŽŶĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚ
well-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? h ?^ ? ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ŽŶĚŽůĞĞǌĂ ZŝĐĞ P dƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ ? ?
Washington, DC, January 18, 2006. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm (accessed 
January 14, 2015). 
559 ĚĂŵYƵŝŶŶ ? “KďĂŵĂ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ? ?-16. 
560 OĨĨŝĐŝĂůh ?^ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞ
ŝŵĂŐĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞƉƵƐŚƚŽŐĂŝŶƚŚĞďĂĐŬŝŶŐŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌs in the event of military 
action for legitimacy purposes. See for example, Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
(Washington, DC: February 2010). In testimony before Congress, Stephen Hadley, one of the co-chairs of the 
bipartisan QDR ƉĂŶĞů ? ĞĐŚŽĞĚ ZŽďĞƌƚ 'ĂƚĞƐ ? ĐĂůůƐ ĨŽƌ ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
American militĂƌǇ ?ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? “QDR Panel Calls for More Force Structure Changes ? ?August 4, 2010. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60303  (accessed January 14, 2015).  
561 Bader, KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ, 2. 
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Calls for Washington to pay more attention to the economic and non-military strategic needs of the 
region required positive action.562  While it was premature to conclude that the Asia-Pacific regional 
system was becoming Sino-centric, or less American-centric,563 the incoming administration was 
concerned about increasing Chinese influence across the region.  As Hillary Clinton espoused, smart 
SRZHU WUDQVODWHV LQWR D FRQFUHWH SROLF\ IUDPHZRUN WKURXJK µFRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK SDUWQHUV SULQFLSOHG
engagement with those who disagree with U.S. policy, the integration of civilian and military action, 
DQG WKH OHYHUDJLQJRIPXOWLSOH VRXUFHVRI$PHULFDQSRZHU¶564  Given the significance of the Asia-
Pacific to U.S. interests, the aim was to create an image of a proactive American foreign policy in the 
Asia-Pacific that would be properly communicated, and stream-lined, involving multiple civilian and 
security government agencies.565 
 
The rebalance strategy is thus a conscious attempt to recalibrate American foreign policy in the Asia-
Pacific, with a view to reasserting U.S. hegemony and proclaiming the durability of its regional presence 
in a balanced way.  The main source of U.S. regional influence remains the bilateral security 
relationships, as the most prominent feature of U.S. engagement.  Many of these alliances have been 
renegotiated and strengthened over the course of the Obama administration, with the view to increasing 
their usefulness in non-threat-centric contexts, such as integrating U.S. and regional military efforts in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).566  :DVKLQJWRQ¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKH/RZHU0HNRQJ
Initiative, which aims to µaddress complex, transnational development and policy challenges in the 
Lower Mekong sub-region,¶ is another example of the move away from coercive power.567  The military 
option has therefore not been disregarded, but is moderated by values of understanding and deepened 
commitment to regional multilateral engagement.  In Southeast Asia, for instance, there has been a 
concerted effort to constrain American power by engaging with the regional institutions, with Obama 
personally attending ASEAN and other regional meetings and maintaining direct and regular contact 
                                                          
562 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “dŚĞƵƐŚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŶZĞŐŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶGeorge W. Bush 
and Asia: A First Term Assessment, eds. Robert Hathaway and Wilson Lee (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 
2005), 30. 
563 ĂǀŝĚ ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ŶŐĂŐĞƐ ƐŝĂ P ZĞƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů KƌĚĞƌ ? ?International Security 29, no. 3 
(2004/5): 66. 
564 h ?^ ?^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “,ŝůůĂƌǇZŽĚŚĂŵůŝŶƚŽŶ P&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇĚĚƌĞƐƐĂƚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
15 July 2009 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm  (accessed January 14, 2015). For 
NǇĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶKďĂŵĂ ?ƐƐŵĂƌƚƉŽǁĞƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƐĞĞ:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ? EǇĞ ?:ƌ ? ? “KďĂŵĂĂŶĚ^ŵĂƌƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ?ŝŶUS Foreign 
Policy, 2nd edition, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 97-107.   
565 The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ŝƐĂƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐůǇ ƚŝƚůĞĚ  “>ĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ŝǀŝůŝĂŶWŽǁĞƌ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶƐĞƚƐŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽďƵŝůĚƵƉŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ
power, with the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) taking a leading 
ƌŽůĞ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŵĂƌƚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƚŚĞĂŝŵŝƐƚŽ  ‘ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶǁĂůůƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?  ?ƚŽ ?
eliminate overlap, set priorities, and fund only the work that supports those priorities ? ? 
566 William TŽǁĂŶĚĞǀĞƌůǇ>ŽŬĞ ? “ZƵůĞƐŽĨngaŐĞŵĞŶƚ PŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐŝĂ-Pacific Security Policy under an Obama 
AĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 4 (2009): 452.  
567 Lower Mekong Initiative, http://www.lowermekong.org/ accessed August 23, 2016. 
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with leaders across the Asia-Pacific.568  His personal knowledge of Indonesia, for instance, has tempered 
the approach of his White House predecessor.569  7KH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V HQWKXVLDVP IRU WKH 733
underscores its commitment, not only to regional free trade, but also to binding the U.S. to develop a 
regional economic framework for the twenty-first century. 
   
Implementing a smart power strategy in the Asia-Pacific ± D UHJLRQ ZLWK µDQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ FRPSOH[
PRVDLFRIDFWRUVDQGIDFWRUV¶ZLWKRYHUODSSLQJVSKHUHVRILQIOXHQFHDQGKLHUDUFK\± has not been an 
easy task.570  Across the region, subordinate states are managing strategic changes associated with 
&KLQD¶V ULVH and American hegemony, while struggling to maintain autonomy and avoid over-
dependence on the U.S. and/or China.571  Across Southeast and Northeast Asia, with notable exceptions, 
there is broad acceptance of the need for a regional order, hinging on a preferred hierarchical power 
distribution that retains U.S. predominance and assimilates China into the regional great power tier 
below that of the United States.572  Despite deepening economic integration with China, there is an 
underlying fear of being absorbed into a Sino-centric regional economic and political system, especially 
in Southeast Asia.573  The longer term goal for the Southeast Asian states in particular is to bind both 
China and the U.S. into regional economic and security institutions.  The broader strategic aims of both 
Southeast and Northeast Asia are to avoid U.S. withdrawal and to prevent a Chinese challenge to U.S. 
hegemony.  Through ASEAN-supported projects, Southeast Asian states have attempted to socialise 
China and the United States into accepting WKH µ$6($1 :D\¶ of regional order-building through 
consensus.574 $6($1¶V JRDOV DUH to avoid mutual coercion, to deter a potential Chinese push for 
                                                          
568 Obama has made ten trips to the Asia-Pacific during his eight-year presidency. dŚŝƐ ŝƐ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ ůĂƐƚ
opportunity to showcase his rebalance and climate change policies.  His September 2016 visit to Laos is for the 
U.S.-ASEAN summit and the EAS. Laos has been viewed as being of limited strategic interest to Washington  W 
even with the rebalance. However, one analyst observes that the new government is shifting towards closer 
relations with Vietnam, and away from China. This could potentially lead to the cultivation of links with 
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ^ĞĞ :ŽƐŚƵĂ <ƵƌůĂŶƚǌŝĐŬ ? KďĂŵĂ DĂŬĞƐ dŚĞ &ŝƌƐƚ h^ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů sŝƐŝƚ ƚŽ >ĂŽƐ P WĂƌƚ  ? ? ? ůŽŐ ĨŽƌ
Council on Foreign Relations, August 30, 2016. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/08/30/obama-makes-the-first-u-
s-presidential-visit-to-laos-part-1/  ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?DĂƌŬ>ĂŶĚůĞƌ ? “KďĂŵĂ,ĞĂĚƐƚŽƐŝĂ^ĞĞŬŝŶŐ
ƌĞĂŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŽŶ dƌĂĚĞ ĂŶĚ ůŝŵĂƚĞ ? ? New York Times, September 1, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/us/politics/obama-heads-to-asia-seeking-breakthrough-on-trade-and-
climate-change.html?_r=0 (accessed September 3, 2016). 
569 ƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ?ƐƚŽŶĞĚĚŽǁŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?KďĂŵĂƵƐĞƐƚĞƌŵƐůŝŬĞ ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
 ‘/ƐůĂŵŝƐƚ ? ƚŽ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĂƌĞůǇ ŝĨ ĞǀĞƌ ? ŚĂƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ǁĂƌ ŽŶ ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? DƵƐƚĂƉŚĂ ?  “dŚƌĞĂƚ
Construction in the Bush ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-9/11 Foreign Policy ? ? ? ? ? ? 
570 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůKƌĚĞƌŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ PŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐZĞŐŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ?
International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/8): 129. 
571 The desire to avoid excessive dependence on external powers is related to the traditional nonalignment or 
neutrality strategies pursued by many small- and medium-sized countries across the Asia-Indo-Pacific. Amitav 
Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 13.   
572 'ŽŚ ? “'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůKƌĚĞƌŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
573 'ŽŚ ? “'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůKƌĚĞƌŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
574 The ASEAN Way is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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hegemony by preserving U.S. forces in the region, thereby retaining the gap between the U.S. and 
China; and to draw in other major regional players, such as India, Japan and Australia, to diversify 
sources of influence in the region.575 
 
The privileged position of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific is substantiated and sustained by reciprocal social 
bargains agreed between the U.S., the other regional middle powers and institutions (e.g. China, Japan, 
India, South Korea and ASEAN), and the smaller states.  U.S. hegemony, as it has developed in the 
post-Cold War Asia-Pacific context, exists, therefore, not simply because of American preponderant 
power, but because of the complicity of key regional states and institutions, who help sustain the 
hierarchy of U.S. regional hegemony.  American hegemony is broadly seen as legitimate, with 
resistance to U.S. hegemony being limited by consensual compliance.  Important strategic changes have 
not reflected balance of power challenges to U.S. primacy, but have instead indicated a complex process 
of renegotiating the consensus on values, rights and duties that underpin U.S. hegemony in its relations 
with other states.576  The conditions of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific are constantly 
undergoing a process of renegotiation.  Nevertheless, U.S. hegemony remains a prominent condition of 
regional geopolitics. 
 
Consent to American regional hegemony is negotiated and obtained for both material and ideational 
reasons, with instrumental logic underpinned by normative beliefs in this compliance.577  The decision 
to rely on the U.S. as regional security guarantor is based not only on calculations of U.S. force 
projection capabilities in the region, but also on the belief that the U.S. is a benign external power with 
no territorial ambitions in the region.  Moreover, the U.S. generally agrees with regional allies on 
interpretations of critical crises, and intervenes in them to uphold values shared with regional states.578  
In response to regional concerns, the Obama administration has reciprocated in the new bargain, 
employing trade agreements, including the TPP, and economic cooperation to signal its strategic 
commitment to the region.  Crucially, there is a new institutional bargain that seeks to deepen U.S. 
participation in regional institutions, which has been incorporated into the admLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVWUDWHJLF
                                                          
575 The twin strategies are omni-ĞŶŵĞƐŚŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ ? 'ŽŚ ?  “'ƌĞĂƚ WŽǁĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ,ŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů
KƌĚĞƌŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?
576 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4. 
577 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6. 
578 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 6.  This ties in with data from the Asia Barometer Survey taken between 2005-7 
which indicated weak anti-American sentiment across the region, with the predictable exception of China, and 
the Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. The assertion is made on the basis of shared interests and 
ƐŚĂƌĞĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?^ĞĞDĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƌůƐŽŶĂŶĚdƌĂǀŝƐEĞůƐŽŶ ?  “Anti-Americanism in Asia? 
Factors shaping International Perceptions of American IŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, 
no. 3 (2008): 303-324. 
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rebalance policy.579  By being relatively open to renegotiating the terms of its hegemony, and shifting 
back towards multilateralism and garnering consent, the U.S. is able to contain, some, not all, resistance, 
while regaining some of its lost legitimacy.580   
 
States across the Asia-Pacific continued to work with the U.S. despite their reticence in supporting the 
GWOT and the invasion of Iraq.  In many cases, states used the GWOT to advance their own interests.  
As a result, the basis of U.S. hegemonic order shifted from consent through legitimacy to an order based 
on coercion and acquiescence through inducement.  Legitimacy, it is noted, has longer term advantages 
over coercion or acquiescence because the production of hegemony requires more than a material base.  
In the long term, the financial cost of relying on military power as the sole means for its hegemony is 
unsustainable.     The final section of this chapter sets out the analytical framework for exploring how 
the exercise of American power underpinning its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is multi-
dimensional.  
 
The power in American regional hegemony 
The discussion of hegemony to this point has focused on the characteristics of American hegemony, 
order-building activities, the use of coercion, the garnering of consent, and the socialisation processes 
of persuasion and social influence by which the hegemonic order accumulates social legitimacy.  The 
maintenance and reproduction of U.S. hegemony relies on the capacity of the U.S. to exercise power in 
a manner broadly agreeable to the subordinate states.  Power activates hegemony as it relates to the 
practice of U.S. foreign policy.   
 
Power, van Ham notes, comprises a dual ontology: one as an essential condition and resource, but also, 
one based on social interaction.581  Power cannot be reduced entirely to something possessed by actors 
and wielded over others.  It takes different shapes; it has different forms, and the type of power exerted 
is context-dependent.  Barnett and Duvall contend that no single conception of power can capture all 
forms of power in international politics.  They call for a multi-dimensional approach to power with the 
capacity to unravel the various forms of social power that model the oscillation in hegemonic 
relationships over time.  A dominant state uses various methods, over the short and longer term, 
including coercion and inducement, and by constructing consent and voluntary compliance through 
socialisation mechanisms in direct and indirect ways.  The dominant state can also shape and reshape 
                                                          
579 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 61. 
580 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 5. 
581 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 3. 
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structures and discourses that are co-constitutive of subordinate national officials and their foreign 
policies.  Social power thus includes discursive power, with emphasis on the framing of norms, agenda-
setting, methods of communication, and public diplomacy.582  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VW\SRORJ\RISRZHU
is used in this thesis to demonstrate how, in maintaining and reproducing hegemony, the U.S. 
simultaneously uses a variety of power assets at its disposal that is currently unsurpassed by any other 
state in the regional order.    
 
In mainstream approaches, power is often presented almost exclusively in Dahlian instrumental terms, 
as the ability of an actor to achieve a goal or realise a desired outcome.583  This project uses Barnett and 
'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\RISRZHUDVWKHEDVLVIRUIUDPLQJGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRISRZHUVLQFHZKLOHWKHDELOLW\
of the hegemon to compel others to change their foreign policies is an important manifestation of power, 
it is not the only way the U.S. exercises power to underpin its hegemony.  As Barnett and Duvall clarify, 
WKHUHDUHRWKHUµHQGXULQJVWUXFWXUHVDQGSURFHVVHVRIJOREDOOLIHWKDWHQDEOHDQGFRQVWUDLQWKHDELOLW\RI
DFWRUVWRVKDSHWKHLUIDWHVDQGWKHLUIXWXUHV¶584  Analyses of power must also include consideration of 
the normative structures and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors as they 
define and pursue their interests and ideals.585   
 
Power, expressed in various forms, produces effects that shape tKHFDSDFLWLHVRIDFWRUVµLQDQGWKURXJK
VRFLDOUHODWLRQV¶586  The over-UHOLDQFHRQUHDOLVWFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVDVWKHµLQGXVWU\VWDQGDUG¶KDVLQ
their view, limited understanding on how global outcomes are produced, and skewed understanding of 
how actors aUHµGLIIHUHQWLDOO\HQDEOHGDQGFRQVWUDLQHGWRGHWHUPLQHWKHLUIDWHV¶587  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶V 
taxonomy identifies four forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive, that, 
while distinct, also interact with one another.588  These four forms of power do have some affinity with 
different schools within IR, with different theoretical traditions favouring an understanding of power 
                                                          
582 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 8. 
583  “ŚĂƐƉŽǁĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŚĞĐĂŶŐĞƚƚŽĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞĚŽ ? ?&Žƌ
ĂŚů ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĞĞZŽďĞƌƚ ?ĂŚů ? “dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨWŽǁĞƌ ? ?Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 
(1957): 202-3. 
584 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ŝŶ Power in Global Governance, eds. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.  
585 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?3. 
586 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?3. 
587 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?8. 
588 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?3- ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?-75. 
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specified in their taxonomy.589  %\WKHLURZQDGPLVVLRQWKHLUWD[RQRP\µGRHVQRWPDSSUHFLVHO\RQWR
different theRULHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV¶590   
 
%DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI SRZHU LGHQWLILHV WZR DQDO\WLFDO GLPHQVLRQV SURGXFLQJ IRXU
conceptually distinct but intersecting forms of power.  The first dimension concerns whether power 
works through social interaction, or in social constitution.  Interaction presupposes fully-constituted 
social actors with control over their behaviour in relation to others.  Power, so conceptualised, is nearly 
always an attribute possessed by a dominant state, and used as a resource to shape the actions and/or 
conditions of others.  Social constitution, in contrast, focuses on social relations which precede the 
µVRFLDORU VXEMHFWSRVLWLRQVRI DFWRUVDQG WKDW FRQVWLWXWH WKHPDV VRFLDOEHLQJVZLWK WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH
FDSDFLWLHV DQG LQWHUHVWV¶591  In other words, social constitution relates to the elements which create 
social actors, with their self-understandings, interests and capacities, prior to their behaviour and 
interactions with others.  The conceptual distinction between power working through social relations 
of interaction, and in social relations of constitution, corresponds WRWKHµSRZHURYHU¶DQGµSRZHUWR¶
distinction found in traditional understandings of power.  Power over corresponds to concepts of power 
rooted in action and control over others, whereas power to correlates to concepts of power concerned 
with how social relations define actors, their capacities and practices.592   
 
The second dimension of their framework concerns the specificity of the social relations through which 
the effects of power are produced; in other words, whether the social relations between the subject and 
object are direct, immediate and tangible, or whether the mechanisms of relations are diffuse, spatially, 
socially and/or temporally distant and mediated.593  Together, the two dimensions ± the kinds of social 
relations through which power works and the specificity of the social relations through which the effects 





                                                          
589 In simplistic terms, realists might focus on compulsory power, liberals on institutional power, and critical 
theorists on structural and productive power.  Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?4, 11-12. 
590 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?4. 
591 Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? 9. 
592 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?10. 
593 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?11-12. 
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Table 1: Types of Power 
 Relational Specificity 
Direct Diffuse 
 
Power works  
Through interactions 
of specific actors 
Compulsory Institutional 
In social relations of 
constitution 
Structural  Productive 
  
Source: Barnett and Duvall.594 
Compulsory Power 
Compulsory power refers to the most commonly used definition of power.  It is, in Dahlian terms, the 
most direct IRUPRIFRQWURORIDQRWKHUGHILQHGDVµWKHDELOLW\RI$WRJHW%WRGRZKDW%RWKHUZLVH
ZRXOG QRW GR¶595  The salient features of compulsory power include the extent to which B feels 
compelled E\ $¶V PDWHULDO UHVRXUFHV WR DOWHU LWV EHKDYLRXU  6LPSO\ SXW µ$ DQG % ZDQW GLIIHUHQW
RXWFRPHVDQG%ORVHV¶EHFDXVH$KDVPRUHUHVRXUFHVWKDQ%596  'DKO¶VFRQFHSWDOVRVXJJHVWVWKDW$
acts with intentionality to compel B to act against its will.  For Barnett and Duvall, however, compulsory 
SRZHULVQRWGHSHQGHQWRQLQWHQWLRQDOLW\&RPSXOVRU\SRZHULVSUHVHQWZKHQHYHU$¶VDFWLRQVFRQWURO
%¶VDFWLRQVRUFLUFXPVWDQFHVHYHQZKHQ$LVQRWFRQVFLRXVRIKRZWKHLUDFWLRQVSURGXFHXQLQWHQGHG
effects.597  A dominant state uses its decisive material advantages to compel others to align with its 
interests.  In most cases, this implies the use of physical coercion through military means, but also 
includes financial inducements, or the withholding of financial inducements, to directly control the 
conditions of behaviour of a subordinate state.   
 
The way in which this thesis examines how the Obama administration animates U.S. hegemony through 
the exercise of compulsory power primarily, although not exclusively, relates to the military rebalance.  
&R[ REVHUYHV WKDW µPDWHULDO FDSDELOLWLHV DUH ERWK SURGXFWLYH DQG GHVWUXFWLYH¶598  The U.S. military 
presence, is, by its nature, coercive, yet there is also a degree of consent to this presence across the Asia-
Pacific because many subordinate states across the Asia-Pacific have come to view this presence as 
stabilising.  The collective understanding of the U.S. military presence perpetuates both the security 
                                                          
594 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?12. 
595 ĂŚů ? “dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?-03.  
596 Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? 13. 
597 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?13-14. 
598 Žǆ ? “^ŽĐŝĂů&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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narrative and maintains social order.  The way in which the U.S. exercises compulsory power is 
examined in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
In Chapter 4, I argue that the U.S. directly influences the regional security environment through its 
network of bilateral alliances and other strategic partnerships.  Through the alliance system, the U.S. 
also directly exerts influence over its allies.  These alliances reflect the prevailing power relations in the 
Asia-Pacific and also stabilise and perpetuate the U.S. vision of order.  Since hegemony presupposes 
that the dominant states makes allowances for the interests and proclivities of subordinate states, a 
certain calculation of compromise is made by the hegemon.599  The U.S. clarification of its position on 
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Abe government¶V decision to re-interpret Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution in July 2014, in order to allow Japanese Self-Defence Forces to have a greater 
role outside Japan, has occurred within the scope of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.  The U.S.-ROK 
security alliance provides the context within which the U.S. is working towards installing the Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, through which the U.S. 
primarily aims to deter North Korean threats.   
 
Demonstrating the coercive side of U.S. hegemony, in Chapter 6, I discuss U.S. attempts to challenge 
the behaviour of the rising regional power, China, in the South China Sea through deterrence, namely 
through its exercise of military power, including its naval presence and the execution of regular freedom 
of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the western Pacific.  This distinctly coercive hegemonic 
behaviour on the part of the United States is an attempt to constrain China into accepting the security 
arrangements of the prevailing hierarchical security order.  However, coercion does not dictate Sino-
U.S. relations overall.  While coercion may dominate the military relationship, other aspects of the 
UHODWLRQVKLS IRU H[DPSOH LQ WKH HFRQRPLF VSKHUH DUH PRUH FRQVHQVXDO JLYHQ &KLQD¶V extensive 
adherence to the rules of international economic governance.  This is not to say Sino-U.S. economic 
relations are not also without tension but there is more willingness on the part of the Chinese to observe 
the general rules of international trade.  Successful resistance rHTXLUHV µDQ DOWHUQDWLYH HPHUJLQJ
FRQILJXUDWLRQRIIRUFHV¶IURPHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDODQGFXOWXUDOVSKHUHV600   While China resists certain 
aspects of U.S. hegemony, it does not, at present, have the amalgam of tools needed to establish a rival 
order.   
 
                                                          
599 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ? ? 




With the other regional rising power, India, the focus is on :DVKLQJWRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRSHUVXDGH1HZ
Delhi to join the U.S. hegemonic order centres on similarities in U.S.-Indian norms and domestic 
governance arrangements.  Washington has endeavoured to bring India into the regional security order 
through the improvement and upgrading of the strategic partnership.  The promise of security is coupled 
with the effective threat narrative concerning the increase of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean as 
a means to attract India to collaborate with other U.S. security partners in the region.   
 
The U.S. has also resorted to coercion to impose its ideas and rules in the economic sphere.  In Chapter 
5, attention is given to the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis, when the U.S. directly intervened, 
ostensibly through the IMF, to impose strict IMF bail-out conditions on the affected countries, to coerce 
them into following U.S.-sanctioned neoliberal restructuring of their economies.601  The Asian Financial 
Crisis, however, had far-reaching and unintended consequences for this aspect of U.S. regional 
hegemony.  Second-tier powers in the region did not agree with the terms of U.S. hegemony in the 
economic sphere and worked to establish regional mechanisms to reduce direct reliance on the U.S. and 
indirect reliance on the IMF, which was seen as an American-controlled institution.    
 
Institutional Power 
Through institutional power, a hegemon exercises indirect control over subordinate states.  Formal and 
informal institutionVPHGLDWHEHWZHHQ$DQG%ZLWK$ZRUNLQJWKURXJKWKHµUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUHVWKDW
GHILQHWKRVHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶WRJXLGHVWHHUDQGFRQVWUDLQWKHDFWLRQVRUQRQ-actions) of B.602  The important 
distinction between compulsory power and institutional power is that compulsory power rests on the 
resources possessed by A to exercise direct FRQWURORYHU%ZKHUHDV$GRHVQRWµSRVVHVV¶WKHLQVWLWXWLRQ
that constrains and shapes B.  By recognising and abiding by institutional arrangements, A and B are 
socially removed from, and only indirectly related to, one another, spatially and/or temporally.  
Spatially, A can only affect the behaviour and conditions of B through institutional arrangements.603  
:KLOH$GRHVQRWSRVVHVVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQEHFDXVHµLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHVLWHVRISRZHU¶$WKURXJKLWVUROHLQ
constructing and operating the relevant institutional arrangements, can exercise power over B.604  
0RUHRYHU LQVWLWXWLRQVHVWDEOLVKHGDWRQHSRLQWLQWLPHH[KLELWµRQJRLQJDQGXQLQWHQGHGHIIHFWV¶DWD
later point.605  Long-estaEOLVKHGLQVWLWXWLRQVµUHSUHVHQWIUR]HQFRQILJXUDWLRQVRISULYLOHJHDQGELDVWKDW
                                                          
601 If A exercises total control over an institution, then that institution is possessed by A and is therefore an 
instrument of compulsory power. Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?15-16.   
602 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?15-16. 
603 dŚĞƐĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůůĂƐ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚůŝŶĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?
divisions of labour, and ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?16. 
604 ,ƵƌƌĞůů ? “,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?>ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚ'ůŽďĂůKƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? 
605 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?16. 
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FDQFRQWLQXHWRVKDSHWKHIXWXUHFKRLFHVRIDFWRUV¶606  In other words, the hierarchical status quo is 
efficiently institutionalised to prevent meaningful transformation in favour of newer, rising powers.  
 
U.S. hegemonic order through the exercise of institutional power is discussed here through the 
construction of regional institutions that confer legitimacy on American hegemony by binding the U.S. 
to the region.  The regional multilateral mechanisms have a predominantly economic focus ± although 
this is slowly changing ± and through these regional institutions, the U.S. attempts to generate consent 
for its neoliberal ideology and to shape the direction of regional order.  The U.S. attempts to indirectly 
influence regional affairs through the range of regional multilateral fora, with, or without membership, 
including ASEAN, ARF, APEC and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which is the primary focus of 
Chapter 5 ± the economic rebalance.   
 
The economic aspect of U.S. hegemony requires more negotiation and compromise with the subordinate 
states.  Furthermore, U.S. foreign economic policy suffers from the conflicting views on free trade 
agreements that emanate from the domestic political sphere, which has implications for its support of 
regional multilateral institutions.  In Chapter 5 I track the oscillation of U.S. policy towards regional 
multilateral institutions and the consequences of its foreign economic policy in the Asia-Pacific.  
Following the Asian Financial Crisis and the manner in which the U.S. was able to use the IMF to create 
an outcome that served U.S. interests, there is often suspicion amongst subordinate states in the Asia-
3DFLILFFRQFHUQLQJWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKH86µRZQV¶ institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  Consequently, after the Asian Financial Crisis, there has been a shift 
towards establishing Asian regional institutions to steer economic governance as a means to protect the 
region from outside influence.  The U.S. commitment to Asia-Pacific multilateralism, particularly in 
the economic sphere, has been less consistent that in the security sphere.  The fluctuation between 
Republican and Democrat presidents in their engagement with regional institutions also creates 
competition between the middle tier subordinates and the regional institutions as they vie to influence 
the direction of regional trade with or without U.S. leadership.               
 
The Obama administration has shifted U.S. policy back towards multilateralism in order to influence 
the direction of regional trade.  Ideological conditioning and control of the narrative enable rule by 
consent.607  At the same time, a commitment to supporting regional institution-building present U.S. 
hegemony as benign and demonstrates U.S. willingness to concede to regional attempts at limited order-
                                                          
606 Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? 16. 
607 Anderson,  “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨŶƚŽŶŝŽ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ?26. 
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building.  As part of the strategic rebalance, the U.S. has strengthened formal ties with ASEAN, 
including the establishment of a permanent U.S. mission to ASEAN in June 2010, followed by the 
appointment of the first permanent U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in March 2011 and membership of the 
EAS in 2011.  The aim is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional multilateralism and also with 
the hope to influence regional trade and security agendas but also to restore autonomy to regional 
institutions, particularly to APEC, that had been reduced during the G.W. Bush administration.   
 
Chapter 6 examines a different aspect of the U.S. exercise of institutional power by focusing on the 
steady deepening of formal and informal ties with China and India.   U.S. hegemony is demonstrated 
through the way in which both rising powers are actively encouraged to participate in regional 
institutions as a means to facilitate socialisation of both rising powers into the U.S.-led regional order.  
Active participation and inclusion prevents resistance by co-opting the leaders of subordinate states and 
by adjusting their ideas into the dominant coalition of states, thereby absorbing opposition, and 




capacities of subjects and the interests that elicit action.609  It is these social structures that assign agents 
the capacity to act in the social world.  The direct, co-constitutive element of structural power derives 
from its ability to constrain or enable actors through the internal relations of pre-existing structures.  
The internal mechanisms of structures directly create agents with differential capacities, differential 
advantages and competing interests based on their position.  These structural relations, by definition, 
DUHKLHUDUFKLFDO0RUHRYHU%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOOH[SODLQµVWUXFWXUDOSRVLWLRQ$H[LVWVRQO\E\YLUWXHRI
LWV UHODWLRQ WR VWUXFWXUDO SRVLWLRQ %¶ KHQFH WKH FDSDFLWLHV VXEMHFWLYLWLHV DQG LQWHUHVWV RI DFWRUV DUH
µGLUHFWO\VKDSHGE\WKHVRFLDOSRVLWLRQVWKH\RFFXS\¶610  Social structure not only constitutes actors and 
their capacities, but LWDOVRµVKDSHVWKHLUVHOI-XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGVXEMHFWLYHLQWHUHVWV¶ZLWKLGHRORJLHV
emerging from the interests and imperatives of structural relations.611   
 
                                                          
608 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 50.  See also Cox,  “Social Forces, States and World 
KƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?166-167.  
609 Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? 17. 
610 Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? 18. 
611 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?18. 
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Analyses of structural power in IR are typically, although not exclusively, associated with Marxian (and 
Gramscian) approaches.612  Critical approaches privilege the structure of global capitalism in 
determining the capacities and resources of actors, and, importantly, in shaping their ideologies.613  
Structures give rise to economic imperatives that alter financial markets and patterns of economic 
production, which then reproduce structure through agents.  States are embedded in the structural milieu 
of the global economy but have limited capacity to shape those structures, although a hegemon has 
greater capacity than other actors to reshape existing structures.  Actors tend to view their social position 
as natural, even though they may be in a subordinate and unequal position within the hierarchy and their 
µEX\-LQ¶UHLQIRUFHVH[LVWLQJVWUXFWXUDOKLHUDUFKLHV $FWRUV¶VHOI-understanding reproduce, rather than 
resist, asymmetric capacities and privileges.  Structural power operates covertly to the extent that it 
generates the social powers, values and interpretations of reality that structure internal control.  It is 
overt to the extent that the dominant state can manipulate strategic constraints for the purposes of 
controlling the actions of subordinate states.614  While structural power privileges structure, it is the 
practices of agents, who intentionally and unintentionally produce and reproduce social structures.615   
 
U.S. structural power is manifest in the regional economic architecture aspect of U.S. regional 
hegemonic order.  In line with Gramscian thought, Chapter 5 emphasises how the U.S. directly 
influences the structure of the regional economy and the hierarchy of states within it.  Regional 
economic governance is more hotly contested by regional actors ± both allies and less-friendly states.  
The chapter considers the competition between the U.S. and China to exert control over regional 
economic governance by examination of the TPP, which seeks to steer the future the regional economic 
order, whilst preserving American influence and control through the dominant neoliberal ideology.   
 
                                                          
612 ^ƵƐĂŶ^ƚƌĂŶŐĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂ ‘ŶŽŶ-DĂƌǆŝĂŶ ?ĨĂĐĞŽĨƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĐƌĞĚŝƚĂŶĚ
knowledge.  See Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1988), especially 43-134. Barnett and Duvall note that many constructivists draw from 
structurally-oriented theories of sociology (institutionalism) in their exploration of structural power. Barnett and 
ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?. In Social Theory, Wendt conceptualises structure in social terms.  
^ŽĐŝĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŝĚĞĂƐŽƌƐƚŽĐŬƐŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ
and roles of self and others. Wendt, Social Theory, 249. dŚĞƐĞ ‘ƌŽůĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ, not actor beliefs. 
For actors to enact and reproduce subject positions, they must be incorporated into their identities and 
interests. Wendt, Social Theory, 259. 
613 ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů ĚĞĨŝŶĞ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƵŶĚerstand their 
interests and desires but which serves the interests of the dominant capitalists at the direct expense of the 
subordinate productive classes.  Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?19. 
614 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?19. 
615 ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ tĞŶĚƚ ĂŶĚ ZĂǇŵŽŶĚ ƵǀĂůů ?  “/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů KƌĚĞƌ ? ? ŝŶGlobal Changes and 




Chapter 6 examines whether the establishment of the China-led regional financial institution, the Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), in April 2015 is an attempt by China to resist, oppose or 
modify 86KHJHPRQ\%HLMLQJ¶VPRYHWRHVWDEOLVKWKLVSRWHQWLDOO\FRPSHWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQWRVXSSRUW
regional trade ± even if this institution fulfils a regional need ± caused a degree of panic in Washington.  
Furthermore, American attempts to coerce allies into rejecting membership of the AIIB demonstrated 
its limited capacity to exert control over its allies.616  Despite U.S. opposition to the AIIB, the structure 
of the global economic remains tilted to American advantage.  Many U.S. allies across Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific ± who ultimately adhere to the rules of global economic governance ± joined the AIIB as 
founding members, with the view that they could influence the direction of the AIIB from the inside.       
 
Productive Power 
Productive and structural power are both attentive to constitutive social processes that are beyond the 
control of specific actors.  Both are concerned with the processes by which the social capacities of actors 
are socially produced, and how these processes VKDSH DFWRUV¶ VHOI-understandings and perceived 
LQWHUHVWV3URGXFWLYHSRZHUKRZHYHURSHUDWHVLQDGLIIXVHOHVVWDQJLEOHPDQQHUWKURXJKµV\VWHPVRI
NQRZOHGJH DQG GLVFXUVLYH SUDFWLFHV¶617  Productive power highlights systems of signification and 
meaning (i.e. discourse), moving away from structures per se, looking beyond, or post, structures.618  
'LVFRXUVHGHILQHGKHUHDVV\VWHPVRIVLJQLILFDWLRQµVLWXDWHRUGLQDU\SUDFWLFHVRIOLIHDQGGHILQHVRFLDO
ILHOGVRIDFWLRQ¶619  Discursive processes and practices also produce social identities and capacities, 
giving meaning to them.    
 
([LVWLQJDQDO\VHVRISURGXFWLYHSRZHUUHIHUWRWKHµGLVFXUVLYHSURGXFWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWVWKHIL[LQJRI
PHDQLQJVDQGWKHWHUPVRIDFWLRQRIZRUOGSROLWLFV¶620  This can relate to the classification of subjects 
which generate asymmetries of social capacities through binary representations of, for instance, 
µFLYLOLVHG¶ YHUVXV µXQFLYLOLVHG¶ µURJXH¶ YHUVXV µFRPSOLDQW¶ RU µGHPRFUDWLF¶ YHUVXV µDXWRFUDWLF¶ LQ
determining the relationshLSEHWZHHQµVHOI¶DQGµRWKHU.¶ Language is neither objective, nor neutral. It 
creates social subjectivity and is imbued in power.621  Discourse in this sense is more than language, it 
                                                          
616 Japan remains the only major US ally that has stayed outside the AIIB.  The only other major ally that 
initially rejected AIIB membership, Canada, applied to join the AIIB in August 2016. 
617 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?20. 
618 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?20. 
619 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?20 
620 Barnett and Duvall ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?21. 
621 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 10. 
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encompasses all cultural practices, including images, symbols, meanings, and representations that 
produce social knowledge.   
 
([WHQGLQJ *UDPVFL¶V FRQFHSWRI KHJHPRQ\ WR PDNH H[SOLFLW WKH UROH RI GLVFXUVLYH KHJHPRQ\ U.S. 
productive power, through the use of targeted language about self and other pervades the three empirical 
chapters of this thesis.  Whether friend or foe, through narratives, the U.S. indirectly influences systems 
of knowledge and reproduces identities for both self and other.  Chapter 4 focuses on the security 
narrative as a means to strengthen regional order under the U.S. security umbrella.  To produce ongoing 
consent for the U.S. military regional presence, U.S. narratives are connected with the domestic 
QDUUDWLYHVRIPDQ\RIWKHUHJLRQDODOOLHVWRFUHDWHDFRQVLVWHQWVHWRILGHDVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIµ&KLQD¶V 
ULVH¶ &KDSWHUDOVRH[DPLQHV WKH µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶QDUUDWLYH WKURXJK WKH OHQVRI86-China bilateral 
relations ± PDQLIHVWHGWKURXJKQDUUDWLYDOSURFHVVHVRIµRWKHULQJ¶ ±, to shape the identity of the other and 
to define the relationship between the incumbent hegemony and potentially competing rising power.  In 
contrast, Chapter 5 investigates the way in which the U.S. seeks to discursively support the reproduction 
of the existing structure of the regional economy indirectly through its neoliberal narratives.  Drawing 
on the Asian Financial Crisis, this chapter examines how a similar, yet moderated storyline on state-
owned enterprises has been reproduced to draw regional states into negotiating the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership trade deal.      
   
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out the framework for understanding hegemony as an 
asymmetrical relationship between the dominant and subordinate states within a recognised hierarchy 
RIRUGHUDPRQJVWDWHV8VLQJ*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\DV a social relationship, attention has 
been given to outlining the consensual, rather than exclusively coercive, nature of hegemony.  A 
Gramscian approach to hegemony permits consideration of the way in which the ideas, practices and 
institutions of the leading state permeate subordinate states.  In a two-way process, hegemony absorbs 
resistance but also draws legitimacy from the subordinates.  I have argued that the durability of the U.S. 
hegemonic order relies on the ability of U.S. officials to articulate and exercise power in a way that 





A prevailing theme of this chapter has been the acknowledgment that social power relies on legitimate 
authority for recognition,622 with legitimacy conferred within existing relations of power.623 The 
legitimacy of the hegemon is conferred on it by subordinate states ± they are not simply passive 
recipients.624  Legitimacy thus rests on normative judgement which requires constant reproduction.  
Furthermore, legitimacy is not merely an activity of the hegemon, rather, social power infers the ability 
WR LQIOXHQFH WKH EHOLHIV RI VXERUGLQDWH VWDWHV WKURXJK WKH KHJHPRQ¶V SULYLOHJHG DFFHVV WR FXOWXUDO
development and the dissemination of ideas.  How legitimacy is conferred, requires consideration of 
WKH PHFKDQLVPV RI VRFLDOLVDWLRQ ZKLFK IDFLOLWDWH LQWHUQDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH KHJHPRQ¶V LGHDV WKURXJK
processes such as persuasion and social influence.  While this project focuses on American power, 
authority and legitimacy, it recognises that hegemonic relationships are, by their nature, asymmetric, 
but they are not entirely driven by top-down processes of coercion and socialisation.  As in the case of 
pre-emptive strike, the U.S. can act unilaterally when it is unable to reinterpret international rules and 
norms in its favour, but the social basis for its hegemony changes towards coercion and acquiescence 
through inducement as a result, and this type of hegemonic order is unsustainable in the long-term.  
+RZHYHUDVWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRUHFDOLEUDWHWKHKHJHPRQLFRUGHUKDYHVKRZQWKH
principles of legitimacy are not fixed.   
 
The focus on hegemonic legitimacy connects to the exercise of U.S. power, with power, too, consisting 
of material and social dimensions.  This chapter has considered how hegemony, as a mode of social 
control, is produced and reproduced over a sustained period of time by diverse expressions of power 
WKDW HPHUJH IURP WKHVH VRFLDO SURFHVVHV  %DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V WD[RQomy of power provides the 
analytical framework for drawing together the production of hegemony and the exercise of power.  
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKLVFKDSWHUKDVRXWOLQHGWKHUDQJHRISRZHUDVVHWVDWWKHKHJHPRQ¶VGLVSRVDOZLWKZKLFK
it maintains social cohesion, group identity, the dominant mode of production, and absorbs resistance.  
6LQFHWKHH[HUFLVHRISRZHUFDQQRWVLPSOLVWLFDOO\EHUHGXFHGRQO\WRWKHKHJHPRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRGRPLQDWH
coercively through its military and economic power, their framework permits the study of the exercise 
RISRZHUWKURXJKLGHRORJLFDODQGFRQVHQVXDOIRUPVRIFRQWURO%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VIUDPHZRUNZLOOEH
put to use in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).    
 
Seeking to reproduce the consensual basis for its hegemony, this chapter considered the recalibration 
of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration and a shift to a smart power strategy that seeks 
to combine various elements of U.S. power ± moving away from the use of its coercive, hard power 
                                                          
622 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 4. 
623 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 104.  
624 Van Ham, Social Power in International Politics, 33; Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, 104-6. 
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capabilities that had become associated with the G.W. Bush administration, towards a more balanced 
approach, encompassing the power of attraction and persuasion, thereby reinforcing mechanisms of 
socialisation associated with consensual hegemony.   
 
This chapter briefly touched upon the manner in which the practice of hegemony is drawn from the 
domestic arena, which determines the character and nature of the hegemonic order.  Hegemonic order 
is simultaneously shaped by, and produces, the hegemon¶V identity.  Order and identity are thus bound 
together with social processes including the construction of narrative and security. Forming the second 
part of the theoretical framework, the next chapter elucidates on the processes which produce and 
reproduce U.S. hegemonic identity as the U.S. seeks ontological, as well as, physical security. It focuses 
RQWKHUROHRIQDUUDWLYHVDQGWKHµULVHRI&KLQD¶QDUUDWLYHLQSDUWLFXODUWRFUHDWHand maintain ontological 
security in its hegemonic identity. 











This second part of the theoretical framework examines the discursive articulation of American 
hegemonic identity.  It focuses on narratives, ideas and belief systems that blend history, past experience 
DQGFXUUHQWHYHQWVIXVLQJZLWKDVWDWH¶VSDUWLFXODUVHOI-identity and its interactions with other states.  
The aim is to show that narratives and identity continually interact with each other until they align, in 
this case, around security.  I argue that this process concerns securing American hegemonic identity ± 
American ontological security ± which is typically manifested in physical security needs.  This chapter 
exposes the narratives, grounded in the past, present and with capacity to shape the future, which fit 
together with identities, and which also seek to make sense of events within a broader narrative. 
 
Mainstream American political officials WUHDW µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ DV WKH VLQJOH JUHDWHVW WKUHDW WR 86
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  This chapter identifies the processes that create the conditions for this 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGVSHFLILFDOO\ZKDWDVSHFWVRI&KLQD¶VULVHµWKUHDWHQ¶WKH8QLWed States and how.  The 
DUJXPHQWSXWIRUZDUGKHUHLVWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHUHSUHVHQWVDWKUHDWWR$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LQ
the Asia-Pacific.  Constructivism contends that ideas play an essential role in shaping state identity, 
which affects perceptions of global status and national interests, and influences the formulation of 
foreign policy.625  American exceptionalism shapes American understanding of the nature and range of 
American foreign policy activities through language and behaviour. A constructivist approach allows 
for examination of the way in which the national security narrative identifies and constructs threats, 
SURGXFHGE\$PHULFD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILWVHOIDVWKHH[FHSWLRQDOnation, and global/regional hegemon, 
and its interpretation of others, as either potential rivals or friends.  These processes, constituted by 
identity and ideas, cannot help but shape foreign policy choices.  Therefore, this study presents 
$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LWVLQWHUHVWVDQGSUDFWLFHVDVFRQVWLWXWLYHRIHDFKRWher; illustrating that 
American foreign policy behaviours are the outcome of its socially constructed identities.  
 
                                                          
625 Constructivist approaches explain ƐƚĂƚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ  ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞůĨĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ. ? State 
identities determine whether countries see each other as friends or foes, and thus whether relative power 
differences between countries are threatening or not. AleǆĂŶĚĞƌtĞŶĚƚ ? “ŶĂƌĐŚǇŝƐǁŚĂƚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŵĂŬĞŽĨŝƚ Pdhe 
Social Construction of Power PŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 397. Rosemary Foot, 
 “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P ŚŝŶĂ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƚŚĞ ŝǀŝĚĞ ? ? ŝŶChina across the Divide: The Domestic and Global in Politics and 
Society, ed. Rosemary Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2. 
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This chapter advances in three stages.  The first stage explores the main tenets of exceptionalism, 
uncovering how this belief system propels U.S. political leaders to make choices, to maintain American 
security, and to repel potential threats.  Exceptionalism also informs the value system that feeds into 
the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony.  
 
The second stage considers how exceptionalist beliefs, constitutive of American identity, are weaved 
into the national security narrative, which facilitates the construction of threats.  The primary focus of 
this section is on the intersection of identity formation processes, and ontological security-seeking 
behaviours which determine what constitutes a threat to American hegemonic identity and how these 
threats are acted upon.  Once a threat has been identified by political officials, the necessity for them to 
take action to contain or vanquish the µWKUHDW¶LVJHQHUDWHG$WWHQWLRQLVJLYHQWRWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
QDUUDWLYHWKDWLVRODWHVDQGQRUPDOLVHVSDUWLFXODUµWKUHDWV¶± potential and/or real ± to the general security 
RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV  7KH DLP KHUH LV WR H[SRVH $PHULFD¶V IHDU RI µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ EH\RQG UDWLRQDO
explanations that focus on the increasing economic and military competition between a rising and 
incumbent hegemon.  This section examines how certain threats to American identity are repositioned 
as physical ones.   
 
7KHWKLUGVWDJHRIWKLVFKDSWHUFRQFHQWUDWHVRQ$PHULFDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI&KLQD¶V
national identity formation, and its own brand of Chinese exceptionalism, that inform Chinese responses 
to the rebalance strategy.  It argues that the decision to rebalance has been driven by a perceived 
confrontation looming between American and Chinese versions of exceptionalism, and two competing 
visions of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, guided by American conceptions of national (in)security. 
 
Exceptionalism in U.S. foreign policy 
The much cited American historian, Richard Hofstadter, asserted that Americans do not embrace 
ideologies because America is an ideology.626  Ideology implies a set of ideas characterising the 
American way of life and its values, and informing policy decisions.  Crucially, it is relative to these 
ideas that the world from the American perspective is explained.627  Ideas constituting American 
exceptionalism, for instance, constitutionalism, individualism, liberalism, democracy and 
                                                          
626 Richard Hofstadter, cited ŝŶDŝĐŚĂĞů<ĂǌĂŶ ?  “dŚĞZŝŐŚƚ ?ƐhŶƐƵŶŐWƌŽƉŚĞƚƐ ? ?The Nation 248 (February 28, 
1989): 242. 
627 Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the 








The first term of the Obama presidency in particular, coincided with a period of anxiety over American 
purpose and global role, reviving interest into the continued relevance of American exceptionalism in 
the twenty-first century.631  In spite of this anxiety, American elite belief in exceptionalism offers a 
GHJUHHRIFRQWLQXLW\LQWKLQNLQJDERXW$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LQWKH$VLD-Pacific ± a position of 
responsibility and leadership ± WUHDWHGDVDQDWXUDORXWFRPHRI$PHULFD¶VXQLTXHSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHDQG
self-awareness.632  Exceptionalism offers a distinctive blend of ideas about the United States and its 
approach to human rights, democracy and freedom around which the national identity revolves, 
generating national interests, security narratives and policy priorities.  However, exceptionalism is 
controversial.  There is no fixed or uncontested conceptualisation of a single American identity.633  
Consequently, disagreement over what America does abroad is generally rooted in domestic tensions 
over American identity.634     
 
                                                          
628 This chapter does not discuss the merits of domestic interpretations of exceptionalism, focusing instead on 
the projection of elements of exceptionalism within foreign policy, as they relate specifically to the rebalance. 
For Huntington, the political ideas of the American Creed provide the basis of American national identity. Samuel 
Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 14-
15, 23. There are other characteristics of American exceptionalism that warrant discussion, including the 
relationship between the state and citizens, socio-economic mobility, the Constitution and institutions of 
governance.  Seymour Martin Lipset ?Ɛ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ŝŶƚŽ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ focuses on liberty, egalitarianism, 
individualism, populism and laissez-faire in economic matters. Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: 
A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1997). 
629 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 15. 
630 McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5, 23. Huntington also refers to these ideas 
as constituting Ă  ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚĂŵŽƌƉŚŽƵƐĂŵĂůŐĂŵŽĨŐŽĂůƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?Huntington, American Politics: The 
Promise of Disharmony, 15. 
631 Stephen Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama (New York: Routledge, 2013), preface. 
632 ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝƐ ‘ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĚĞƐƚŝŶǇ ? ?dŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
the nation westwards, which was inscribed in the public imagination from the 1840s. Thomas A. Hietala, 
Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 2. 
633 dŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ĂƌĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ? tĂůƚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂƐ Ă
 ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞpower rather than 
 ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ. ?^ƚĞƉŚĞŶD ?tĂůƚ ? “dŚĞDǇƚŚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Foreign Policy 189 (November 
2011): 72-75. Holsti asserts that U.S. foreign policy is not exceptional, offering post-revolutionary France and the 
Soviet Union as comparable cases that have also claimed exemption from the rules of international order. Kalevi 
J ? ,ŽůƐƚŝ ?  “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it EǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?European Journal of International 
Relations 17, no. 3 (2011): 381. 
634 Samuel Huntington, Who are We? ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ'ƌĞĂƚĞďĂƚĞ (London: Free Press, 2005), 9-10. 
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While exceptionalism does not solely determine the direction of American foreign policy, the tenets of 
H[FHSWLRQDOLVPDUH IXQGDPHQWDOO\ IXVHG LQWR$PHULFD¶VZRUOGYLHZZKLFKGRHVSURYLGHDEDVLV IRU
foreign policy ideas.635  Two themes unite in exceptionalist thinking.  The first, idealism, understands 
$PHULFDWREHWKHµORFDODJHQWRIWKHJOREDOFRPPRQJRRG¶DQGWKHJOREDOµLQGLVSHQVDEOHQDWLRQ¶636  
The second, realism UHODWHV WR WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ ULVH WR JUHDW SRZHU VWDWXVRYHU WKH FRXUVH RI WKH 
twentieth century that, due to American material preponderance, has required American oversight of 
global institutions and greater involvement in global affairs.637  The faith in exceptionalism facilitates 
the presentation of the United States as the necessary force for good in the world, and as a benign, 
liberal hegemon, and allows for the demonisation of those opposed to the American mission.  Even as 
administrations respond in their own way to particular events, U.S. foreign policy behaviour is broadly 
guLGHGE\WKHFRQYLFWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VH[FHSWLRQDOLVWLGHRORJ\638 
 
The roots of exceptionalist thinking are a combination of historical fact and storytelling, centred on a 
part-mythical and part-KLVWRULFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VELUWK639  David Campbell observes that 
WKHWHQGHQF\WRYLHZWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDVDµEHDFRQRIOLJKW¶FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWRWKH3XULWDQH[SHULHQFH
SUHGDWLQJWKHIRUPDWLRQRIµWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶640  The term exceptionalism was conceived by French 
aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic work Democracy in America.  De Tocqueville observed 
WKDW µWKH SRVLWLRQ RI WKH $PHULFDQV LV WKHUHIRUH TXLWH H[FHSWLRQDO DQG LW PD\ EH EHOLHG WKDW QR
                                                          
635 Zhang asserts that it is hard to claim a direct causal link between exceptionalist principles and actual foreign 
policy behaviour. Exceptionalism offers one possible influence on policy, while actual behaviour is also 
determined by other factors, including competing policy ideas and policy positions, and material-contextual 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵǇƚŚƐĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂǀĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?&ĞŶŐŚĂŶŐ ? “dŚĞZŝƐĞ
ŽĨ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 2 
(2011): 321. For discussion of the problematic character of American national identity based in creed and/or 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ƐĞĞ ĂƌůƐŽŶ ,ŽůůŽǁĂǇ ?  “tŚŽ ƌe We? Samuel Huntington and the Problem of American Identity ? ?
Perspectives on Political Science 40, no. 2 (2011): 106 W114.   
636 Caroline Kennedy,  “dŚĞDĂŶŝĐŚĞĂŶdĞŵƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ PDŽƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐZŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǀŝůŝŶh ?^ ?&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
PŽůŝĐǇ ? ?International Politics 50, no. 5 (2013): 627.  
637 The realist strand in American politics emphasises power, spheres of interest and the maintenance of 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŐůŽďĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ^ĞĞMichael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 125.  
638 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 125.  
639 See Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972) for an overview of political myths as historical 
phenomena, which inspire their members with confidence in their destiny and glorify achievements with 
practical importance in the contemporary setting.  
640 Campbell, Writing Security, 133. In American Exceptionalism and Civic Religion, Wilsey observes that there 
are five theological themes contained in exceptionalism, imported from protestant Christianity and then applied 
ƚŽŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞ P ‘ĐŚŽƐĞŶŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚŝǀŝŶĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĂĐƌĞĚůĂŶĚĂŶĚŐůŽƌǇ ? ?:ŽŚŶ ?tŝůƐĞǇ ?
American Exceptionalism and Civic Religion: Reassessing the History of an Idea (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 2015), 18. McKenna adds that Puritan thought provided a coherent framework around which American 
self-identity was constructed. George McKenna, The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 51. 
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GHPRFUDWLF SHRSOH ZLOO HYHU EH SODFHG LQ D VLPLODU RQH¶641  Offering an insightful analysis of the 
XQLTXHQHVVRI$PHULFDQGRPHVWLFGHPRFUDF\DQGSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHGH7RFTXHYLOOH¶VZRUNYDOLGDWHGWKH
American form of republican liberal democracy that directly influenced the development of 
exceptionalist thinking.642  Huntington adds that the United SWDWHVZDVµFRQFHLYHGLQWHUPVRISROLWLFDO
LGHDOVDQGLQVSLUHGE\WKHSURPLVHRUGUHDPRIOLEHUW\DQGHTXDOLW\¶DQGWKXVWKHFRQVWDQWSXUVXLWRI
libertarian and democratic ideals is central to the American political experience.643   
 
Entering mainstream use during the twentieth century, exceptionalism was extended beyond its 
GRPHVWLF UHPLW WR DFFRXQW IRU $PHULFD¶V SXUSRVH DV D JOREDO SRZHU,644 with foreign policy 
characteristically reflecting American domestic economic and security interests, in addition to the 
political values and principles shaping American domestic identity.645  The exceptionalism of American 
history and its political institutions has been argued in diverse ways.646  Broadly speaking, U.S. identity 
has been shaped by the ebbs and flows of its self-perception as the exemplary beacon among nations.  
The U.S. also identifies itself as the exempt nation, free from the laws of history, and as the first self-
conscious nation, with the ability to control its own fate and future.647  Exceptionalism emphasises 
$PHULFD¶VGHSDUWXUHµIURPWKHHVWDEOLVKHGZD\RIGRLQJWKLQJV¶ZLWKWKHELUWKDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHVPDUNLQJLWRXWDVWKHµH[FHSWLRQWRWKHJOREDOUXOH¶648  Consequently, the United States 
LQKHULWHGDµVSHFLDOVSLULWXDODQGSROLWLFDOGHVWLQ\¶WKDWLVH[SRUWDEOHWRWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG7KHVHVHOI-
beliefs remain dominant components of U.S. national identity, also actively promoted through foreign 
policy.649   
                                                          
641 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II, trans. Henry Reeve (Hollywood: Simon and Brown, 2013), 
555. 
642 Tony Smith, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐDŝƐƐŝŽŶ PdŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞtŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ^ƚƌƵŐŐůĞĨŽƌĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ(Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 16 W17. 
643 Huntington, The Promise of Disharmony, 10. 
644 ZŽďĞƌƚ Z ? dŽŵĞƐ ?  “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-&ŝƌƐƚ ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy 56, no. 1 (2014): 29. 
645 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 241.   
646 ĂŶŝĞůĞůů ? “dŚĞ ‘,ĞŐĞůŝĂŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚ ? Pŝǀŝů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŝŶIs American Different? A 
New Look at American Exceptionalism, ed., Byron E. Schaffer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 51. 
647 Emphasis in the original. DanieůĞůů ? “dŚĞ ‘,ĞŐĞůŝĂŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚ ? ?51.
648 WĞƚĞƌ ĞŝŶĂƌƚ ?  “dŚĞ ŶĚ ŽĨ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?National Journal, February 3, 2014. 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-end-of-american-exceptionalism-20140203 
(accessed November 15, 2015). 
649 The well-developed link between national values (e.g. democracy, constitution, individualism) and their 
promotion in external affairs is commonly associated with the formation of American society held together by 
shared ideas rather than by ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶŽƌďůŽŽĚ ?^ĞĞ:ŽƐĞƉŚ>ĞƉŐŽůĚĂŶĚdŝŵŽƚŚǇDĐ<ĞŽǁŶ ? “/ƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
WŽůŝĐǇǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ? ŶŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 3 (1995): 382-83; Huntington, 
American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 237; and DĂƌŐĂƌĞƚ' ?,ĞƌŵĂŶŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ŝŶThe Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy, eds. Steven W. Hook and Christopher M. Jones 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 4. 
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Exceptionalism is undergirded by a religious claim that APHULFDQµSULPDF\LVERWKLQHYLWDEOHDQGWKH
RXWZRUNLQJRIGLYLQHEOHVVLQJ¶650  This spiritual dimension, combining a missionary role and special 
destiny, influences ideas about global responsibilities that link into two manifestations of 
exceptionalism.651  The first characteristic asserts that the U.S. leads by example.  American actions 
GHPRQVWUDWHWRRWKHUVµKRZDUHSXEOLFIRXQGHGRQDQGJRYHUQHGE\OLEHUW\HTXDOLW\DQGMXVWLFHOHDGVWR
VWDELOLW\SURVSHULW\DQGLQGLYLGXDODFKLHYHPHQW¶652  The second expression of exceptionalism involves 
$PHULFD¶VPLVVLRQRUGXW\WRH[SRUWLWVXQLTXHTXDOLWLHV([FHSWLRQDOLVWWKLQNLQJHPERGLHVDVSHFWUXP
of historically-developed beliefs, establishing a range of cultural norms, values and foreign policy 
traditions that have merged with strategic priorities and American national interests.653  Not only is the 
belief in American uniqueness perpetuated by the religious dimension, it has also propagated the notion 
of American superiority to other nations.  The battle between good and evil, right and wrong, civilisation 
and barbarism, highlights the essential goodness of American actions and objectives and the good nature 
and character of Americans vis-à-YLVWKHµHYLO2WKHU¶UHVROYHGWRGHVWUR\WKH$PHULFDQZD\RIOLIH654   
 
ThesH ELQDU\ RSSRVLWLRQV KDYH D OHJLWLPLVLQJ HIIHFW UDOO\LQJ SXEOLF VXSSRUW IRU µMXVW¶ FDXVHV655  
American vulnerability to assaults on its way of life was reinforced by the events of September 2001.656  
The direct attack on American soil changed how Americans sDZµWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶DVJHRJUDSKLFDOO\
LVRODWHGDQGWKXVSURWHFWHGIURPWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG7KLVH[SHULHQFHZDVLQWHUQDOLVHGLQWHUPVRIµD
religious judgment on the providential mission of America and on the idea of the Americans as a chosen 
people ZLWKLPPXQLW\IURPGDQJHUV¶W\SLFDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKRWKHUOHVVH[FHSWLRQDOQDWLRQVUHVLGLQJ
µRYHUWKHUH¶657  In his reflections on 9/11, Ian Jack observed that,  
                                                          
650 >ĞĞDĂƌƐĚĞŶ ? “Religion, Identity and American Power in the AŐĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ? ?International Politics 48, no. 2/3 
(2011), 329. 
651 Campbell, Writing Security, 133; Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 45. 
652 Tomes,  “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-&ŝƌƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?  ? ? ? The first theme manifests in different 
forms, from a virulent strain of nationalism to a more reserved sense of being a role model that others can 
choose to emulate. Huntington refers to American efforts to propagate its cultural values as universal, as a likely 
source of conflict with other civilisations. SĞĞ^ĂŵƵĞů,ƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? “dŚĞůĂƐŚŽĨŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Foreign Affairs 
72, no. 3 (Summer 1993):22-49. 
653 dŽŵĞƐ ? “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-&ŝƌƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? ? ?-45. 
654 :ŽĂŶŶĞƐĐŚ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ “tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? PWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůDǇƚŚŝŶ Official->ĞǀĞůZŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ? ?Political Psychology 
31, no. 3 (2010): 369. 
655 Esch observes that 'ĞŽƌŐĞ, ?t ?ƵƐŚ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƉŽůůƐĂŶĚĨŽĐƵƐŐƌŽƵƉƐƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚthe public found 
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ  ‘ĂǆŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘evil ? deeds of Saddam Hussein to be more 
compelling in justifying the Gulf War than rhetoric emphasising economic reasons, such as jobs and oil. Esch, 
 “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  “tĂƌ ŽŶ Terror ? ?371; BranĚŽŶ ZŽƚƚŝŶŐŚĂƵƐ ?  “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŽŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ?
Opinion PolliŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨ ‘ƌĂĨƚĞĚdalk ? ? ?Political Communication 25, no 2 (2008): 138 W157. 
656 ŽƌŝƐ>ĞƐƐŝŶŐ ? “tŚĂƚǁĞƚŚŝŶŬŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?Granta 77 (Spring 2002): 53-54. 




just because America is a remarkably Christian state led by a man who peppers his 
UKHWRULF ZLWK WKH ZRUGV µJRRG¶ DQG µHYLO¶ EXW EHFDXVH WKH VKHHU IDFW RI EHLQJ
American is for many Americans to be part of an evangelical, patriotic faith ± to be 
one of the elect, tREHRQHRIWKHVDYHG¶658  
$PHULFDQVSODFHLQWKHLUQDWLRQDQGLWVFUHHGµPDQ\RIWKHDWWULEXWHVDQGIXQFWLRQVRIWKHFKXUFK¶D
µFLYLF UHOLJLRQ¶ WKDW SURYLGHV D VHFXODU-religious dimension for the fabric of American society.659  
Consequentially, American staWHFUDIWLPEXHVDQµHYDQJHOLVPRIIHDU¶WKDWLQWLPHVRIFULVLVDVVXPHV
DSRFDO\SWLF SURSRUWLRQV DQG LQ ZKLFK µD GLVFRXUVH RI IHDU IXQFWLRQV DV SURYLGHQFH DQG IRUHWHOOV D
WKUHDW¶660   
 
(i) Shifting meanings and applications of exceptionalism 
As a political idea, American exceptionalism can be adapted to apply to changing circumstances, and 
provide significance for various narratives.661  Specific exceptionalist themes and characteristics are 
evoked for diverse purposes, with an administration responding to a need for a sense of purpose and 
strategy at a particular time.662  &RQVLVWHQWO\ µLGHRORJ\ LV FHQWUDO QRW LQFLGHQWDO WRSROLF\-PDNLQJ¶
FUHDWLQJDSROLWLFDOQDUUDWLYHDURXQGZKLFKVXSSRUWIRURURSSRVLWLRQWRFHUWDLQµSROLFLHVYDOXHVDQG
visions of AmericDQ VRFLHW\¶ FDQEHXQLILHG663  The exceptionalist ideology provides a crucial link 
between the American sense of nationhood, and acting with distinction in the foreign policy sphere, 
whilst offsetting domestic insecurities or problems.664  American exceptionalism is extended and 
FRQVWDQWO\ UHYLVHGEXW UHPDLQV DQFKRUHG LQ WKHXQHUULQJEHOLHI WKDW WKH86 LV µXQLTXHDQGPRUDOO\
superior to other nations,¶WRZKLFKWKHFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHRI$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\DWWHVWV665   
 
                                                          
658 /ĂŶ:ĂĐŬ ? “KǀĞƌdŚĞƌĞ P,ŽǁŵĞƌŝĐĂƐĞĞƐƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ ? ?Granta 83 (Winter 2003): 7. 
659 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, 158-9. 
660 Campbell, Writing Security, 133. 
661 ƐĐŚ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ “tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ, ? 369. 
662 Administrations typically outline their foreign policy priorities, stating their main commitments to spreading 
democracy and economic liberalisation, and their modus operandi, for instance, supporting the use, or limited 
use, of military force, their approach to multilateralism or a preference for unilateralism. Crucially, therefore, 
diverging interpretations of exceptionalism attest to competing ideas on American primacy and cooperative 
engagement. Georg LƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind  W ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂ ?ƐWŽƐƚ-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶsŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?Geopolitics 20, no. 2 (2015): 308. 
663 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153; Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 132. 
664 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
665 Richard J. Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985), 13. 
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Interpretations of exceptionalist thinking intersect with geopolitical realities, linking two fundamental 
REMHFWLYHVRI86IRUHLJQSROLF\ZLWK$PHULFD¶VXQZDYHULQJREOLJDWLRQ WRGHIHQG LWVFRQFHSWLRQRI
freedom around the world.666  7RSURWHFW$PHULFD¶VLQWHUHVWVWKHILUVWREMHFWLYHLVWRH[SDQd democracy 
globally.  Since America broadly understands threats to democracy as being located in alternative 
political systems, the U.S. has often opposed any ideological system that presents an alternative 
approach to liberal, American-style democracy.667  The second objective is to prevent the creation of 
competing economic systems that might create barriers to American trade.  While the promotion and 
stability of free trade is often prioritised over the exceptionalist mission to expand democracy, the two 
objectives remain at the core of American understanding of the existing international order.668  Yet, 
American exceptionalism functions beyond a solely strategic purpose.  Similarities between 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV¶ UKHWRULFRQPDQ\IRUHLJQSROLF\ LVVXHV LOOXVWUDWHV WKHµH[LVWHQFHRIDQ LQVWLWXWLRQRI
UKHWRULF ZLWK GHHS URRWV¶669  There may be divergence in concerns, styles and values, but the 
maintenance of exceptionalism indicates the existence of enduring norms, influencing the general 
character of U.S. foreign policy.670  
 
With the geopolitical uncertainties of the twenty-first century, the theme of American exceptionalism 
remains the obvious strategic choice for encouraging domestic political consensus about its 
international role and responsibilities.671  The President of the United States plays a unique role in 
articulating the geopolitical vision of American global leadership, tied to multi-functional 
interpretations of American exceptionalism.  The President has the ability to frame the national 
narrative, and potentially recalibrate the articulation of geopolitical identity.672  It is the representations 
and practices employed by the President of the United States in defining the geopolitical identity of the 
United States, and in orienting U.S. foreign and security policy, which are crucial in understanding the 
co-constitutive processes of identity and politics in American geopolitical discourse.673  American 
exceptionalism offers a useful interpretive lens for the course, continuity, and change of dominant 
                                                          
666 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
667 For a recent consideration of the rise of the New Latin Left as contestation of the Washington Consensus, see 
ZƵďƌŝĐŬŝĞŐŽŶ ? “ZĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ Ph^WŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁ>ĂƚŝŶ>ĞĨƚŝŶ>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ? ?ƵŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 2013).  
668 dŽŵĞƐ ? “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-&ŝƌƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
669 McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5. 
670 dŚĞƐĞŶŽƌŵƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ in a dynamic two-way 
process. McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5. 
671 McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 146. 
672 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), especially chapter 6. 
673 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ?312. 
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conceptualisations of geopolitical imagination, in addition to producing and reproducing American 
global leadership.674  
 
7KHUHIRUH NH\H[FHSWLRQDOLVW WKHPHV VXFKDV OHDGLQJE\H[DPSOH DQG$PHULFD¶VJOREDOPLVVLRQ WR
export its values outside the United States, are constant characteristics of U.S. foreign policy.  In 1991, 
at a critical and uncertain time in global affairs, 3UHVLGHQW*HRUJH+:%XVKGHILQHG$PHULFD¶VUROHLQ
bringing about the end of the Cold War in exceptionalist and missionary terms:  
µWe in this Union enter the last decade of the 20th century thankful for our 
blessings, steadfast in our purpose, aware of our difficulties, and responsive to our 
duties at home and around the world. For two centuries, America has served the 
world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America 
has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a 
rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know 
that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of 
humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the 
hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works.¶675 
His successor, President Bill Clinton, similarly asserted that American leadership was essential for 
navigating the new order, calling on the United States to assume the burden of leadership.676  &OLQWRQ¶V
second term Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, contended that America was the µLQGLVSHQVDEOH
QDWLRQ¶FRQMXULQJXSDQLPDJHRI$PHULFD¶VJOREDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGPLVVLRQWRMXVWLI\WKHSRWHQWLDO
use of force against Saddam HXVVHLQEHFDXVHWKH86FRXOGµsee further than other countries into the 
future, and we see the GDQJHUKHUH WRDOORIXV¶677  Falling back on exceptionalist themes, Albright 
asserted that the U.S. held overall responsibility for identifying and eliminating the world of evil, 
EHFDXVH LQ LWV VXSHULRULW\ RQO\ WKH 86 KDG LQVLJKW LQWR WKH ZRUOG¶V SUREOHPV DQG PDLQWDLQHG WKH
undisputed capacity to solve them.  
 
American exceptionalism was appropriated to make sense of the 9/11 narrative and the threat from this 
form of terrorism.678  The War on Terror highlighted the power and value of exceptionalism as a 
                                                          
674 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ? 
675 ŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĂĚĚĞĚ ?'ĞŽƌŐĞ, ?t ?ƵƐŚ ?  “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
hŶŝŽŶ ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253 (accessed September 26, 2015). 
676 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement ? ? ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ
1995): i. http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1995.pdf  (accessed November 18, 2015). 
677 NBC,  “dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ P ůďƌŝŐŚƚ /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽŶ E-ds ? ? &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html (accessed September 26, 2015). 
678 ƐĐŚ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ “tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?-6.
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rhetorical legitimisation strategy.679  For President G.W. Bush, the burden of leading the world into the 
post-9/11 era would be shouldered by the U.S. alone, on tKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWµif the U.S. acted firmly 
and decisively, other nations would follow¶680  7KH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI
exceptionalism, heavily influenced by neo-conservatism, invoked an extreme sense of American 
morality and superiority that justified American unilateralism.681  7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VRYHU-stated link 
between exceptionalism and faith, when applied in the extreme in this case, portrayed the United States 
DV D µFUXVDGHU QDWLRQ¶ GHWHUPLQHG WR LPSRVH LWV YHUVLRQ RI ULJKW and wrong, good and evil, on the 
world.682  Moreover, the sense of exceptionalism imbued in this particular administration, viewed 
$PHULFD¶VXQPDWFKHGJOREDOSRVLWLRQDVQRWRQO\EHVWRZLQJXSRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVXQLTXHREOLJDWLRQV
to eliminate evil, but additionally conferred unique privileges, such as the capacity to ignore 
international opinion.683  In his 2004 State of the Union address, G.W. Bush declared that America did 
QRWQHHGDµpermission slip¶IURPRWKHUQDWLRQVWRSURWHFWLWVHOIDQGIXOILOLWVmission in the world.684  
7KLV SDUWLFXODU LQYRFDWLRQ RI $PHULFDQ H[FHSWLRQDOLVP VKDSHG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR
American identity and its global leadership role and enabled a rallying effect for its war discourse.  The 
IXVLRQRIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vstrategic goals with a sense of moral purpose also created enough strategic 
ambiguity that widened the scope of foreign policy options, providing moral justification for military 
violence, including torture.685   
 
The exceptionalist ideology broadly allows fRUFRQWLQXLW\LQ$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\DQGSURYLGHV
DEDVLVIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKUHDWV+RZHYHUWKH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VH[WUHPHLQYRFDWLRQ
of exceptionalism uncovers underlying tensions that exist within this belief system in relation to 
                                                          
679 Esch and Jackson respectively offer thorough analyseƐŽĨƚŚĞtĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĐŚ ? “Legitimizing the 
 “tĂƌ ŽŶ dĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?  ? ? ?-391. See also Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and 
Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), especially chapter 2. 
680 Daalder and Lindsay note that the G.W. Bush approach created a narrow view of international relations which 
overlooked the long term consequences. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush 
Revolution in Foreign Policy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 2, 13.   
681 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 4. 
682 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 74. Lipset also observes that Americans are 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀŝů ? ?The US has been unique in its emphasis 
on the non-recognition ŽĨ ‘Ğǀŝů ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƌĞŐŝŵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŐŽĞƐďĞǇŽŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĂƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĐŽƵĐŚĞĚĂƐĂďĂƚƚůĞŽĨŐŽŽĚŽǀĞƌĞǀŝů ?^ĞǇŵŽƵƌDĂƌƚŝŶ>ŝƉƐĞƚ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ
ZĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ ? ? ŝŶIs America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism, ed. Byron E. Shafer (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 23-5. 
683 For an overview of neo-conservative thinking and the moral use of force to shape the international 
environment, see Alexandra Homolar-ZŝĞĐŚŵĂŶŶ ?  “dŚĞDŽƌĂůWƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨh^WŽǁer: Neoconservatism in the 
AŐĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ? ?Contemporary Politics 15, no. 2 (2009): 179-196. 
684 CNN,  “dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ ŽĨ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hŶŝŽŶ ĚĚƌĞƐƐ ? ' ?t ? ƵƐŚ ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/20/sotu.transcript.3/ (accessed November 15, 2015; See also 
ĞŝŶĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞŶĚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? 
685 ŶĚƌĞǁ ZŽũĞĐŬŝ ?  “ZŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂů ůĐŚĞŵǇ P ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ tĂƌ ŽŶ dĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?Political 
Communication 25, no. 1 (2008): 72.  
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American identity and the utility of American power.  These tensions have become particularly 
discernible during the Obama administration and are explored in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Obama, exceptionalism and U.S. hegemony 
2EDPD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLon of exceptionalism has created tension with traditional views that typically fuse 
$PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ ZLWK WKH PDWHULDO EDVH RI SULPDF\  2EDPD¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
exceptionalism rests on leading by example, and has attempted to uncouple American leadership from 
its over-dependence on the American military.  His understanding of exceptionalism has led to claims 
that he lacks strategic vision.686  On the other hand, Obama remains true to the traditional understanding 
of national security and the utility of constructing threat narratives to steer U.S. foreign policy. 
    
(i) Obama and American exceptionalism 
President Obama articulates an interpretation of exceptionalism as a construct of geopolitical identity, 
GUDZLQJIURPWKHPDWHULDOEDVHRI$PHULFD¶VVuperior power, and ideationally from his belief in the 
superiority of American values of freedom and liberty.687  +RZHYHUKLVJHRSROLWLFDOYLVLRQRI$PHULFD¶V
leadership identity does not endorse an interpretation of exceptionalism exclusively drawn from 
primacy and a unipolar world order.  Here, he diverges from the interpretations of exceptionalism 
preferred by many of his predecessors.  The fusion of hegemonic identity and superior power in 
2EDPD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIH[FHSWLRQDOLVPGRHVQRWFRQYH\WKH86 as a crusading leviathan.  Instead it 
is an exceptionalism that attempts to recalibrate American identity of unique superiority and global 
responsibility through a grand strategy of engagement and burden-sharing.688  President Obama has re-
appropriated the belief in the superiority of American values and the pre-eminence of American power 
and leadership by emphasising domestic renewal.689  There are practical and ideological reasons for this 
shift. 
                                                          
686 KďĂŵĂ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚďǇƐĞǀĞƌĂůĨŽƌŵĞƌŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞKĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?^ĞĞ
also ďŝŐŶŝĞǁƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝ ? “&ƌŽŵ,ope to Audacity: Appraising Obama's Foreign PŽůŝĐǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 
(2010): 16-30. &ƌĞĚ<ĂƉůĂŶ ? “KďĂŵĂ ?ƐtĂǇ PdŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Foreign Affairs 95, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2016); 
DŝĐŚĂĞů 'ĞƌƐŽŶ ?  “On Foreign Policy, KďĂŵĂ ǁĂƐ  ‘ĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƵƌǀĞ ? ? ?Washington Post, January 11, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-inner-circle-has-few-kind-words-for-the-former-
boss/2016/01/11/ddd67742-b892-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html?utm_term=.21db7e2a1e07 (accessed 
April 26, 2016). 
687 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ? 
688 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “>eading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ? 
689 Andrew Bacevich, for instance, argues that for the US to reassert control over its own destiny, it should 
abandon its imperial delusions and resist reliance on the military to accomplish freedom. The US should 
exemplify through self-mastery and not compellence of others. See Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The 
End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2009), 13. 
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Obama senses transformation in the global geopolitical environment; consequently, his 
DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIWKHµULVHRIWKHUHVW¶LVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHZD\KHGHILQHVH[FHSWLRQDOLVPDQGXVHVLW
to orient U.S. foreign policy.  This is exceptionalism for an increasingly complex and interdependent 
world, in which global hegemony is not exerted through coercion relying on the use of force.  This 
worldview accepts that globalisation creates transnational challenges, including terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation and climate change that American material power cannot meet alone.690  2EDPD¶V
approach to leadership involves working with others on these issues by forging consensus.691  The issue 
for Obama is not whether the United States should continue to play the role of world hegemon, but 
rather, how the U.S. should approach its leadership role.  In his 2007 Foreign Affairs article, Obama 
defined his vision by emphasising a need for balance between the economic, political and moral 
elements of American global leadership.  At the core of the message was the presentation of 
exceptionalism as the capacity to lead by example to rejuvenate the perception of American hegemony 
at home and abroad:  
µ7KHZRUOGKDV ORVW WUXVW LQRXUSXUSRVHV DQGRXUSULQFLSOHV«:HPXVW OHDG WKH
ZRUOGE\GHHGDQGE\H[DPSOH«7KLVLVRXUPRPHQWWRUHQHZWKHWUXVWDQG faith of 
our people - and all people - in an America that battles immediate evils, promotes 
DQXOWLPDWHJRRGDQGOHDGVWKHZRUOGRQFHPRUH¶692   
2EDPD¶VEHOLHILQµOHDGLQJE\H[DPSOH¶KDGWZLQDLPVWRUHVWRUHJOREDOIDLWKLQERWKWKH86FDSDFLW\
and moUDOFHUWLWXGHWROHDGZKLOVWDOVRVWUHVVLQJWKHQHHGWRXVHµDOOHOHPHQWVRI$PHULFDQSRZHUWR
NHHS>WKH86@VDIHDQGSURVSHURXVDQGIUHH¶693   
 
As he asserted in his Foreign Affairs article, there is a clear commitment to domestic economic renewal 
as a PHDQVWRUHMXYHQDWHJOREDOOHDGHUVKLSZKLFKµVHUYHVDVWKHZHOOVSULQJRI$PHULFDQSRZHU¶694  The 
focus on domestic economic issues, at the time of the global financial crisis, would reinvigorate 
$PHULFD¶V HFRQRPLF UHVLOLHQFH DQG UHVWRUH WKH FRQILGHQFH RI the American nation.  Obama also 
appealed to the civil religion tradition of his predecessors, rather than the moral and missionary 
ODQJXDJHRISUHVLGHQWVVXFKDV*:%XVKRU5RQDOG5HDJDQLQFKDUDFWHULVLQJ$PHULFD¶VJOREDOUROH
                                                          
690 :ĂŵĞƐD ?>ŝŶĚƐĂǇ ? “'ĞŽƌŐĞt ?ƵƐŚ ?ĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨh^'ůŽďĂů>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?International 
Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 766. 
691 Löfflmann ? “>eading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ? 
692 ĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ? “ZĞŶĞǁŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Foreign Affairs 86, no.4 (2007): 16. 
693 Barack Obama ? “EĞǁ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌĂEĞǁtŽƌůĚ ? ?transcript, Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2008.  
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/barack-obamas-remarks-iraq-national-security/p16791  (accessed April 26, 2016). 
694 The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May 2010, 2. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf  (accessed 
November 15, 2015). 
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and responsibilities.695  This tradition invokes foundational myths that continue to inspire and animate 
the American people; a common unifying force used to justify and stimulate support for U.S. foreign 
policy actions that seek to maintain and advance national interests and U.S. power.696  While George 
W. Bush was closely identified with conservative evangelicals,697 Obama has sought to build a broader 
civic-religious base on which to globally restore the reputation of the United States.698  2EDPD¶V
inaugural address reminded Americans thDWWKH\µKDYHUHPDLQHGIDLWKIXOWRWKHLGHDOVRIRXUIRUHEHDUV
DQGWUXHWRRXUIRXQGLQJGRFXPHQWV¶699  He conjured up the memory of the Founding Fathers to remind 
$PHULFDQVWKDWWKH\KDGµGUDIWHGDFKDUWHUWRDVVXUHWKHUXOHRIODZDQGWKHULJKWVRIPDQThose ideals 
still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience¶V VDNH¶ $PHULFDZRXOG UHPDLQ
H[FHSWLRQDOE\FRQWLQXLQJWREHµWKHPRVWSURVSHURXVSRZHUIXOQDWLRQRQ(DUWK¶DVWKHJOREDOGHIHQGHU
of American values.700  
 
 
2EDPD¶V FRQFHSWXDlisation of exceptionalism, determining how the U.S. should lead and shape the 
international environment, has produced an approach that seeks to facilitate the pursuit of American 
interests in a more cooperative and less military power-centric global environment.  His 
conceptualisation reflects the most likely future scenario in which the U.S. is likely to remain the most 
powerful nation, but not the single dominating actor in the international arena.701  Obama connects his 
exceptionalist beliefs with an appreciation for the scope, but also the limitations, of American power.702  
His first Quadrennial Defense Review 4'5LQDVVHUWHGWKDWµWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZLOOUHPDLQWKH
most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability 
DQGSHDFH¶703  The QDR acknowledged that the geopolitical dynamics of the rising rest would have 
                                                          
695 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 4. 
696 DĂƌƐĚĞŶ ? “Religion, Identity and American Power in the AŐĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
697 For discussion of ƚŚĞ' ?t ?ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŚĞtĂƌŽŶderror, see Dirk Nabers, 
 “Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy aĨƚĞƌ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Foreign 
Policy Analysis 5, no. 2 (2009): 191-214. 
698 DĂƌƐĚĞŶ ? “ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?In his 2007 article, Obama offers 
a route to spread democracy to ƚŚĞ/ƐůĂŵŝĐǁŽƌůĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂŵƵƐƚŵĂŬĞ
every effort to export opportunity  W access to education and health care, trade and investment  W and provide 
the kind of steady support for political reformers and civil society that enabled our victory in the Cold War. ?
ĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ? “ZĞŶĞǁŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 11. 
699 The White House,  “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ /ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂů ddress ? ? :ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President_Barack_Obamas_Inaugural_Address  (accessed 
September 25, 2015). 
700 The White House,  “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ/naugural Address ? ?    
701 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ?
702 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ?  “Leading from Behind ? ?  ? ? ? ? KďĂŵĂ ŚĂƐ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “not every global problem has an 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ĞĞ/ǀŽ, ?ĂĂůĚĞƌ ? “KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?The Washington Post, November 18, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/effect-on-global-politics.html (accessed 
January 16, 2017). 
703 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
February 2010): iii. 
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implications for the United States.  Instead of focusing exclusively on the status of the United States as 
the indispensable nationZLWKVXSHULRULW\RISRZHUDQGXQLYHUVDOO\DSSOLFDEOHYDOXHV2EDPD¶VYHUVLRQ
of exceptionalism underscores the unique potential the U.S. in leading by example, and through 
cooperation to achieve global outcomes.704  Incorporated within this interpretation is the understanding 
that U.S. hegemony in the twenty-first century is strengthened when the U.S. leads through example.705   
2EDPD¶VJHRSROLWLFDOYLVLRQKDVQHLWKHUDEDQGRQHG$PHULFD¶VFODLPWROHDGHUVKLSQRULQGLFDWHGWKDWLW
will refrain from deploying the tools of primacy.706  Furthermore, his vision continues to support the 
fundamental exceptionalist belief that the continuation of U.S. hegemony across the globe is both 
feasible and broadly supported.  Yet, Obama is a realist, selectively sanctioning the use of force, whilst 
rejecting reliance on hard hegemony.707  +HKDVDOVRFRQVLVWHQWO\GRZQSOD\HG$PHULFD¶VUROHDVWhe 
JOREDOµIL[HU¶QRWDEO\in relation to the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict.708  His image of American 
H[FHSWLRQDOLVPDQG$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\KDVVRXJKW WRXQFRXSOH$PHULFDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVP
from its reflexive linkage with American (especially military) primacy.  Instead he has advanced 
policies designed to lessen the burden of American leadership.  In this way, he has inverted the 
conventional linkage of exceptionalist rhetoric and hegemonic practices that have so often been 
detrimentally expressed through foreign interventions and the use of military force.709  Obama remains 
convinced that only the U.S. has the capacity to lead globally, working with others, but his primary 
                                                          
704 James Fallows,  “Obama on Exceptionalism ? ? Atlantic, April 4, 2009. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/04/obama-on-exceptionalism/9874 (accessed 
November 15, 2015). 
705 KďĂŵĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶcontravened the Jacksonian unilateralism that has dominated foreign policy views in 
large parts of the Republican Party ƐŝŶĐĞZĞĂŐĂŶ ?ƐĞƌĂƚŚĂƚƉůĂĐĞƐstrong emphasis on U.S. military power. See, 
for instance, Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence (New York: Routledge 2009), 218 W263. 
706 At West PoinƚŝŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?KďĂŵĂĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ? ‘In fact, by most measures, America has rarely been stronger 
relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise  ? suggesting that America is in decline or has seen 
its global leadership slip away - ŵŝƐƌĞĂĚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?KƵƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŚĂƐŶŽƉĞĞƌ Q/ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐm 
ǁŝƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨŝďĞƌŽĨŵǇďĞŝŶŐ ? ? dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy 
CommenĐĞŵĞŶƚĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-
academy-commencement-ceremony  (accessed September 1, 2015). Obama also challenged the economic 
decline argument in his 2016 State of the Union address. dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “Remarks of President Barack 
Obama: State of the Union Address aƐĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address 
(accessed April 24, 2016). 
707 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚKďĂŵĂƌĞũĞĐƚƐ ‘ďŽŽƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ĚƌŽŶĞǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŶĚ ‘ƐƵƌŐŝĐĂůƐƚƌŝŬĞƐ ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŽŽůŬŝƚ ?See ĂǀŝĚ ƵŶŶ ?  “ƌŽŶĞƐ P ŝƐĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ĞƌŝĂů tarfare and the 
Unarticulated TŚƌĞĂƚ ? ?International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013): 1237- ? ? ? ? ? DŝĐŚĂĞů ŽǇůĞ ?  “dŚĞ ŽƐƚ ĂŶĚ
Consequences of Drone WĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ?International Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 1-29; ^ƚĞǀĞŽůů ? “dŚĞhŶďůŝŶŬŝŶŐ^ ƚĂƌĞ ? ?
New Yorker, November 24, 2014. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare  
(accessed November 17, 2015). 
708 In his April 2016 interview in The Atlantic, Obama defends his position on Libya and Syria, despite the criticism 
he received for his hands-ŽĨĨ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? :ĞĨĨƌĞǇ 'ŽůĚďĞƌŐ ?  “dŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ? ?Atlantic (April 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed April 25, 
2016).   
709 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ?
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focus has been on how the U.S. demonstrates its preponderance, which he deems more important to 
sustaining American hegemony over the longer term.710 
 
3ROLWLFDOO\$PHULFDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPLVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWK$PHULFD¶VJOREDOPLVVLRQOLQNLQJKHJHPRQ\
and primacy through the use of the U.S. military.  2EDPD¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI exceptionalism has 
supported a seemingly reserved U.S foreign policy with regard to military intervention.  His judicious 
approach to using the U.S. military as a tool of foreign policy, an approach widely used by his 
predecessors, has received criticism fURP5HSXEOLFDQVDQG'HPRFUDWVDVSURRIWKDWWKH86LVµOHDGLQJ
IURPEHKLQG¶711  As a consequence of tensions in American global identity and how it should lead, 
Obama is the only President asked to confirm his belief in American exceptionalism.712  In the lead up 
to the 2010 mid-WHUP&RQJUHVVLRQDOHOHFWLRQVWKH3UHVLGHQWZDVFKDUDFWHULVHGDVEHLQJµXQ-$PHULFDQ¶
DQG µLQWHOOHFWXDOO\KRVWLOH¶ WR WKHQRWLRQRI$PHULFDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVP713  Exceptionalism once more 
became an issue of national importance and a matter of dispute, especially for Republicans during the 
2012 presidential election campaign.714  In foreign policy terms, the presidential election was a contest 
between competing geopolitical visions of American leadership between President Obama and the 
Republican candidate, Mitt Romney.715  The discussion concerned which geopolitical vision of 
                                                          
710 Emphasis has shifted towards issues such as finalising the nuclear deal with Iran, a climate change deal with 
China and India, and normalising relations with Cuba, in addition to an emphasis on TPP and TTIP. McEvoy-Levy, 
American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 144. 
711 Republican and Democrat ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ/^/^ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇďĞĐĂŵĞŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ after the terrorist 
attack on Paris in November 2015. DŝĐŚĂĞů ?^ŚĞĂƌĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌĂŬĞƌ ?  “KďĂŵĂƐĂǇƐ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚ /^/^ǁŝůů
SƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ?New York Times, November 16, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/obama-
says-paris-attacks-have-stiffened-resolve-to-crush-isis.html?_r=0 , (accessed November 17, 2015); Sergio Bustos 
ĂŶĚƌĞŶĚĂŶ&ĂƌƌŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? “'KWandidates criticise Obama, Clinton after Paris AƚƚĂĐŬƐ ? ?Agence France-Presse, 
November 14, 2015. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8bba39f6e7fa4e99b81d5d6aa48d8728/gop-candidates-
criticize-obama-clinton-after-paris-attacks (accessed November 18, 2015); Jordan Fabian,  “Obama comes Under 
Criticism from Dems over Paris Rhetoric ? ? The Hill, November 17, 2015. 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/260479-obama-comes-under-criticism-from-dems-over-paris-
rhetoric (accessed November 18, 2015). 
712 The question was posed by Financial Times journalist Edward Luce at the NATO summit in Prague on April 4, 
 ? ? ? ? ?KďĂŵĂ ?ƐĂŶƐǁĞƌǁĂƐ ? “/ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐ/ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞƌŝƚƐďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ
exceptionalism and the GreekƐ ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ŝŶ 'ƌĞĞŬ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “News Conference by 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ ? Ɖƌŝů  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-
obama-4042009  (accessed November 17, 2015).  
713  ?^ŽƵǌĂĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐKďĂŵĂĂƐ ‘ĂŵĂŶĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞĂŶƚŝ-colonial ideology of his father and the first American 
president to actually "seek" tŽƌĞĚƵĐĞŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ? ^ ĞĞŝŶĞƐŚ ?^ŽƵǌĂ ?
dŚĞZŽŽƚƐŽĨKďĂŵĂ ?ƐZĂŐĞ (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2010). The debate on exceptionalism and the form 
of American global leadership promoted by Obama led to accusations that his American credentials were 
disputable. <ĂƚŚůĞĞŶ WĂƌŬĞƌ ?  “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ? dŚŝŶŐ ? ?Washington Post, January 30, 
2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012805190.html 
(accessed September 7, 2015). 
714 This was the first time that Ă WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ďĞĐĂŵĞĂ Ɖrominent and 
overarching theme of the mid-term elections. Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, preface, 
14, 128. 
715 &ŽƌKďĂŵĂ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂŶŝƚĞŵŽĨĨĂŝƚŚƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐƌĞĂƚŶĞƐƐ
and provides the ideational foundation of AmerŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ŐůŽďĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ŐƌĂŶĚ
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OHDGHUVKLS VKRXOG JXLGH WKH QDWLRQ LQWR WKH IXWXUH 3UHVLGHQW 2EDPD¶V DSSURDFK RI FRRSHUDWLYH





RQWKHJURXQG¶KDYHEHFRPHSURblematic when dealing with situations in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where a strong U.S. position is needed.717  Obama has been criticised for his lack of grand strategic 
vision, and slow response to unfolding international events, that has allowed power vacuums to form in 
numerous regions, for instance in North Africa (Libya and Egypt), the Middle East (ISIS, Iraq and 
Syria), Central Asia (Afghanistan) and Europe (Russia, Ukraine).718  0DQWUDVOLNHµGRQ¶WGRVWXSLGVWXII¶
DQGµOHDGLQJIURPEHKLQG¶DUHDOLHQWR$PHULFD¶VYLHZRILWVHOIDVWKHFLW\RQWKHKLOOZLWKDPDQLIHVW
destiny to lead.719  For others, the administration has failed to articulate a clear grand strategy and failed 
to convince Americans of a sound grand strategy that makes appropriate use of American power.720  
µ/HDGLQJ IURP EHKLQG¶ DQG FRRSHUDWLYH HQJDJHPHQW OHDYH XQUHVROYHG TXHVWLRQV DERXW $PHULFDQ
uniqueness and superiority, when not combined with primacy, whilst also stressing the limits of 
American power.  The paradox of this less visible hegemonic role has implications at home, for U.S. 
DOOLHVDQGDOVRIRUFRPSHWLWRUVLQFOXGLQJ&KLQDDQG5XVVLD2SSRVLWHWRKLVEHOLHIV2EDPD¶VSRVLWLRQ
implies that the U.S. is less superior and unique ± less exceptional ± and more dependent on its regional 
                                                          
strategy. During the 2012 presidential election campaign, exceptionalism became an expression of who believed 
ŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŵŽƌĞ ? ‘/ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ? ? declared Romney in 2011 ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘we are an exceptional country with a unique destiny 
ĂŶĚƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ QƚŚĂƚŽĨĂŐƌĞĂƚĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ? “dĞǆƚŽĨDŝƚƚZŽŵŶĞǇ ?Ɛ
Speech on Foreign Policy at The Citadel, ? Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2011. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/text-of-mitt-romneys-speech-on-foreign-policy-at-the-citadel/  
(accessed November 17, 2015). 
716 RepƵďůŝĐĂŶĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨŝŶĂŶĞǁ ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
rejection of any notion of even relative decline. >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ?
717 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 130.  
718 >ĞƐůŝĞ 'Ğůď ?  “dŚĞ ůƵƐŝǀĞ KďĂŵĂ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ? ?The National Interest 121 (September/October 2012): 20. 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-elusive-obama-doctrine-7340 (accessed November 13, 2015). 
719 DŽůůŝĞZĞŝůůĞǇ ?  “,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶŝƐŵŝƐƐĞƐKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ  ?ŽŶ ?ƚŽ^ƚƵƉŝĚ^Ś ?ƚ ?&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?Huffington Post, 
August 10, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/10/hillary-clinton-obama_n_5665901.html 
(accessed November 13, 2015) ?  ‘>ĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ? ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ĂƐ ƐŚŽƌƚŚĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ KďĂŵĂ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
approach in late 2014. In her interview with The Atlantic in August 2014, Hillary ClŝŶƚŽŶ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? :ĞĨĨƌĞǇ'ŽůĚďĞƌŐ ? “Hillary 
ůŝŶƚŽŶ P  ?&ĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ƚŽ ,ĞůƉ ^ǇƌŝĂŶ ZĞďĞůƐ >ĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZŝƐĞ ŽĨ /^/^ ? ?Atlantic, August 10, 2014. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/hillary-clinton-failure-to-help-syrian-rebels-led-to-
the-rise-of-isis/375832/  (accessed April 25, 2016). 
720 tŝůůŝĂŵ  ? DĂƌƚĞů ?  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ 'ƌĂŶĚ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ? ?The National Interest, June 9, 2014. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-grand-strategy-disaster-10627 (accessed November 17, 2015). For 
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞKďĂŵĂ ?ƐŐƌĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƐĞĞĂŶŝĞůƌĞǌŶĞƌ ? “ŽĞƐKďĂŵĂŚĂǀĞĂ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?Foreign 
Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 57-68; Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  Dueck and Drezner both argue that Obama deploys a mixture of grand strategies, 
including retrenchment, accommodation and containment. His preference is to retrench the US military 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŐŽĂůƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? 
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allies to sustain its global hegemony.  Despite these tensions, exceptionalist beliefs pervade American 
hegemonic identity and connect to the interpretation of threats to that identity through the national 
security narrative.      
 
(ii) $PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLdentity: Ontological security-seeking behaviour 
Exceptionalism is a critical component of national identity construction that helps maintain the 
FRQWLQXLW\DQGHQGXUDQFHRI$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\721  Uniqueness of American identity and 
the superiority of American power are merged in the American geopolitical imagination that 
consistently associates American exceptionalism and American leadership with American primacy.  
This association became more prominent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the United States 
became the single most powerful state in international system.722  The uniqueness and superiority of 
American capabilities, especially military, and its ability to control the global commons (sea, air and 
cyber) is seen as the ultimate embodiment of American primacy.723  $PHULFD¶VDELOLWLHV to project power 
globally and to reorganise geopolitical space through military force, underline how exceptionalism and 
hegemony are a defining feature of American geopolitical understanding, which constantly work to 
reproduce one another.  The U.S. distinguishes its regional hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific as 
built on its preponderant power and on the universality of its values, its virtue and the belief in its global 
social purpose as characteristics of its exceptionalism.   
 
Identity refers not only to the characteristics of individuals and national types; it also incorporates the 
form of domestic order, the social relations of production and the various subjectivities to which they 
give rise.724  $PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LVDrole identity that acquires meaning from role positions 
in the social order.725  Role is a normative concept.726  Role identities are internalised roles; aspects of 
                                                          
721 Löfflmann ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ? ?&ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚŵĂŬĞƐĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽƌĚĞƌ ?
in contemporary international relations. In a situation where liberal order is no longer global and may need to 
co-exist with other orders, questions relating to which values, norms and institutions belong in the international 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŽƌƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌĚĞƌ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ?&ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dhe Coming Multi-KƌĚĞƌtŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ? 
722 >ƂĨĨůŵĂŶŶ ? “Leading from Behind ? ? ? ? ?-5. 
723 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 82; See also ĂƌƌǇWŽƐĞŶ ? “ŽŵŵĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ P
dŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh^,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?International Security 28, no. 1 (2003): 5-46.  
724 ĂǀŝĚĂŵƉďĞůů ? “'ůŽďĂů/ŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ P,Žǁ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Alternatives 15, no. 
3 (1990): 272.  Wendt, for instance, distinguishes role identities from type identities. Type identities are social 
categories of states that share some characteristics (e.g. regime type). tĞŶĚƚ ? “ŶĂƌĐŚǇŝƐǁŚĂƚt^ates make of 
It ? ?391-425. 
725 For an analysis of identity and collective action, sĞĞůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌtĞŶĚƚ ? “ollective Identity Formation and the 
International StaƚĞ ? ?American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 384-396. 
726 ZĂůƉŚ , ? dƵƌŶĞƌ ?  “ZŽůĞ dĂŬŝŶŐ ? ZŽůĞ ^ƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚ ĂŶĚ ZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ 'ƌŽƵƉ ĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?American Journal of 
Sociology 61, no. 4 (1956): 316. 
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DQDFWRU¶VVHnse of self, which reflect the appropriation of roles, and which motivate behaviour.727  Role 
in this sense refers to behaviour rather than position.728  Since role identities are formed and sustained 
relationally, they depend on others to be realised.  Wendt DUJXHVWKDWLGHQWLWLHVDUHURRWHGLQDQDFWRU¶V
self-understandings (and are thus subjective) but also depend on whether that identity is recognised by 
other actors, which gives them an intersubjective quality.729  Identity formation processes provide 
information on who the actors are (what defines them), and on how the actors should behave in social 
interactions.730  Through these social processes, actors can uphold a set of expectations regarding 
behaviour directed towards them, and these processes also determine how other actors would like to, or 
are able to, respond to the actions of others.  The social nature of identity imbues social interactions 
with some degree of predictability, by creating a sense of social order.731   
 
The continual production and UHSURGXFWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LVDQHQJUDLQHGµKDELWRI
OHDGHUVKLS¶ VKDSHGE\ LWV LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK WKHGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWV732  Policy-
makers can therefore conceive of their nation playing different roles, or serving different functions in 
separate issue areas, geographical regions or sets of relationships.733  The perception of its hegemonic 
role identity by American political officials frames their understanding of how the U.S. should, or will 
act, in a particular context, since its role identity refers to its internalised attitude towards others in the 
regional hierarchy ± the regional social environment ± in the Asia-Pacific.734  U.S. subjectivity views 
itself as a powerful nation, the regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific, overseer of regional commons and 
defender of regional order.735  Internal and external factors interact to produce the U.S. as an actor with 
                                                          
727 :ĞŶŶŝĨĞƌDŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚPolitics P^ƚĂƚĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝůĞŵŵĂ ? ?European 
Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 357. 
728 dƵƌŶĞƌ ? “ZŽůĞdĂŬŝŶŐ ?ZŽůĞ^ƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚĂŶĚZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ'ƌŽƵƉĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
729 tĞŶĚƚ ? “ŶĂƌĐŚǇŝƐǁŚĂƚt^ates make of It ? ?391-425. 
730 Badredine ƌĨŝ ? “Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of IŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Security Studies 8, no. 1 (1998): 158. 
731 Social identities, as Benedict Anderson observed, are socially constructed, imagined communities. See 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991).  
732 ƵǌĂŶ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŚĂďŝƚŽĨ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŝƐĞŶŐƌĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŶh ?^ ? ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-image, 
internally supported by the longstanding belief in American exceptionalism.  SĞĞĂƌƌǇƵǌĂŶ ? “>ĞĂĚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
&ŽůůŽǁĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
733 <ĂůĞǀŝ,ŽůƐƚŝ ? “EĂƚŝŽŶĂůZŽůĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?International Studies Quarterly 14, 
no. 3 (1970): 253. 
734 &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐ^ƚŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
735 Holsti sets out a typology of national roles. The patterns of role concepts specific to the U.S. in the course of 
its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific include, regional leader, regional protector liberator supporter, anti-
imperialist agent, mediator, ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌĂŶĚĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůĂůůǇ ?,ŽůƐƚŝ ? “EĂƚŝŽŶĂůZŽůĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 122 
 
a specific hegemonic role identity, which in turn, affects state action.736  Since role identities are co-
constituted, states are profoundly dependent on each other for role recognition.737   
 
Identity provides a useful conceptual link to threat construction.738  To gain insight into threat 
construction, consideration must first be given to what is, or what needs to be secured.  Security, 
DFFRUGLQJWR:LOOLDPVDQG.UDXVHLVµDGHULYDWLYHFRQFHSW¶ZKLFKLQLWVHOILVPHDQLQJOHVV7RKDYH
PHDQLQJ µVHFXULW\SUHVXSSRVHV VRPHWKLQJ WREH VHFXUHG¶739  From this, it can be assumed that the 
concepts of security and identity are interconnected, which can help address questions about what is to 
EHVHFXUHGRUµZKRVHVHFXULW\LVEHLQJDVVXPHG¶740  Buszynski PDLQWDLQVWKDWµXOWLPDWHO\VHFXULW\LV
DERXWSURWHFWLRQRILGHQWLW\¶741  Given the relational nature of identity, who and what we are, is most 
FOHDUO\GHILQHGE\µKLJKOLJKWLQJZKRRUZKDW³ZH´DUHQRWDQGZKDW³ZH´KDYHWRIHDU¶ZKLFKVHUYHV
as a source of insecurity.742  Ontological inVHFXULW\ UHIHUV WR WKH µGHHS LQFDSDFLWDWLQJ VWDWH RI QRW
knowing which dangers to confront and which to LJQRUH¶743  In talking about national security, 
WKHUHIRUHPDNLQJ VHQVHRI VWDWH LGHQWLW\ LV HVVHQWLDO VLQFH µGHILQLWLRQVRI WKUHDW DQG LQWHUHVW«KDYH
VWURQJHIIHFWVRQQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLFLHV¶744  &ULWLFDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVPDVVXPHVWKDWµLQVHFXULW\LVLWVHlf 
the production of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, 
DUH FRQVWLWXWHG¶745  Identities and insecurities themselves are not pre-given, or natural occurrences 
H[LVWLQJVHSDUDWHO\EXWZKLFKµDUHSURGXFHGLQDPXWXDOO\FRQVWLWXWLYHSURFHVV¶746  Rather than looking 
DW ZKDW IDFWRUV FDXVH WKH VHOI¶V insecurity FULWLFDO FRQVWUXFWLYLVWV DUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ H[SORULQJ µWKH
background conditions and linguistic constructions (social discourses) that made [such insecurity] 
SRVVLEOHLQWKHILUVWSODFH¶747 Both aspects are now considered in more detail. 
                                                          
736 &ŝŶŶĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚ^ŝŬŬŝŶŬ ? “dĂŬŝŶŐ^ƚŽĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
737 Mitzen notes that ontological security needs can also be met through relationships that sustain and routinise 
competition. She notes thaƚƐŽŵĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ŽŶůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĚŽƚŚĞǇ
ŬŶŽǁǁŚŽƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ? ?DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ?-363. 
738 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 413. 
739 Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause,  “Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies ? ?in Critical Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (London: UCL Press Limited, 1997), xi. 
740 Z ? ?: ?tĂůŬĞƌ ? “The Subject of Security ? ?in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases eds. Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997), 69. 
741 Leszek Buszynski, Asia Pacific Security  W Values and Identity (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 1. 
742 Campbell, Writing Security, 48. 
743 Mitzen,  “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
744 Peter <ĂƚǌĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?ŝŶThe Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
18-19. 
745 :ƵƚƚĂtĞůĚĞƐ ?DĂƌŬ>ĂĨĨĞǇ ?,ƵŐŚ'ƵƐƚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚZĂǇŵŽŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ/ŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?ŝŶ
Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh 
Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 10  
746 Weldes et al,  “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ/ŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?11.  
747 :ĞĨĨƌĞǇd ?ŚĞĐŬĞů ? “Constructivism and Foreign Policy ? ?in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Steve 
Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73. 
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The traditional understanding of security, as derived from physical security, imbues state apparatus with 
WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFWWKHLUQDWLRQ¶VWHUULWRU\DQGJRYHUQDQce structure from others who can cause 
material and physical harm.  States also engage in ontological security-seeking.  In its base form, 
RQWRORJLFDO VHFXULW\ LV LGHQWLW\ VHFXULW\ LW LV WKH QHHG WR IHHO VHFXUH LQ RQH¶V LGHQWLW\748  It is the 
µVXEMHFWLYH VHQVH RI ZKR RQH LV ZKLFK HQDEOHV DQG PRWLYDWHV DFWLRQV DQG FKRLFH749  Physical and 
ontological security concerns co-exist, in distinct and interrelated layers, that can be transformed into 
different conditions of physical (in)security and ontological (in)security by political actors, since 
µFRQFHUQVDERXW LQVWDELOLW\DQGXQFHUWDLQW\FDQHDVLO\EHSROLWLFDOO\PRELOLVHGDQGPDQLSXODWHG LQWR
FRQFHUQV DERXW VXUYLYDO¶750  The disaggregation of the two conditions of security thus facilitates a 




stability in the social world, knowing what to expect, and having trust in the stability of relations with 
others so that a state can continue to uphold its sense of identity and purpose.751  Since ontological 
VHFXULW\LVµFORVHO\OLQNHGWRQDUUDWLYHLGHQWLW\SUDFWLFHDQGDFWLRQ¶LWLVXVHIXOWRGLVDJJUHJDWHbeing 
and doing ontological security, assuming that states engage in both behaviours to maximise their 
ontological security.752  In assuming that states are motivated by the search for ontological security, the 
next step would be to assume that they would also engage in strategies to maintain and reproduce a 
sufficient level of ontological security.  In the process of maintaining and reproducing ontological 
security, the state of being and the state of doing are interlinked and mutually constitutive.  These 
conditions cannot be understood in isolation from each other, linked by the narrative and identity nexus 
that aims to secure a stable identity and biographical continuity.753   
 
Current IR literature on ontological security is characterised by different approaches regarding the 
relationality and the constitution of identity.754  Steele stresses that identities emerge endogenously, not 
MXVW µLQ WKH GLDOHFWLF between self and other, but within the internal dialectic that arises from the 
                                                          
748 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
749 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
750 Bahar Rumelilŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞWŝƚĨĂůůƐŽĨŽŶĨůĂƚŝŶŐKŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚWŚǇƐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?
Journal of International Relations and Development 18, no. 1 (2015): 58. 
751 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ?
752 &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐĂƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĚŽŝŶŐĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ^ĞĞ dƌŝŶĞ &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ?  “dŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ^ƚƌŽŶŐ EdK EĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ P &ƌŽŵ Ă
 ‘WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ dĂůŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŽ Ă  ‘WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ ŽŝŶŐ ? ? ?International Politics 49, no. 1 (2012): 78-97. See also Trine 
Flockhart,  “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? 
753 &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?-815. 
754 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
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ontological security-VHHNLQJSURFHVV¶755  6WHHOH¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKLVGXDOGLDOHFWLFFHQWUHVRQWKHLGHD
that states, just like individuals, are social actors seeking security within as well as from one another.  
The first layer of being, the internal dialectic, is concerned with self-integrity, insecurity and the 
production of shame.   
 
)RU*LGGHQVDQDFWRU¶VVHQVHRIVHOIFDQEHDIIHFWHGE\DµFULWLFDOVLWXDWLRQ¶ZKLFKSURduces anxiety in 
so far as their sense of self is being challenged.756  If an actor chooses a course of action that is 
incongruent with their sense of integrity within their perception of self-identity, they experience what 
Giddens calls shame.757  Shame occurV ZKHQ WRR PXFK GLVWDQFH H[LVWV EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH¶V
autobiographical narrative and the actions that fulfil a sense of self-identity.758  $V6WHHOHQRWHVµLWLV
XQQDWXUDOIRUDVWDWHWRLGHQWLI\RQHZD\DQGWRµSHUIRUP¶DFWVLQDGLIIHUHQWZD\¶759  Actions, therefore, 
must reinforce the self-conceptualisation.  The timing of the rebalance announcement and the content 
of the strategy in November 2011 was induced by the ongoing concern that inaction would be 
LQFRQJUXHQWZLWK$PHULFD¶VRZQSHUFHSWLRQof its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific.  Hegemonic 
identity is mutually constituted with the biographical narrative of the United States concerning its 
perception of its hegemonic role and historical memory in the Asia-Pacific.   
 
The second layer of being rests on the relationship between self and other.  In post-structuralist 
expressions, identity of self presupposes the fashioning of an external other in contrast to oneself.  
Mitzen underscores the relational nature of identity by placing emphasis on routinised cooperative 
and/or conflictual practices with significant others.760  This understanding of identity follows the work 
of Campbell, who articulates that µwe secure ourselves as beings mainly by discourses and practices 
that differentiate ourselYHVIURPRWKHUV¶761  The United States is experiencing instability and uncertainty 
RIEHLQJ LQ LWV UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK&KLQD DV WKH µRWKHU¶ 2QWRORJLFDO LQVHFXULW\PD\DULVH IURPGHHS
XQFHUWDLQW\DQGRUIURPWKHIDLOXUHWRKDYHLWVVHQVHRIµVHOI¶DIILUPHGby others.762   
                                                          
755 Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 32. 
756 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 
1991), 43-4. 
757 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 64-5. 
758 Brent J. Steele ? “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil 
tĂƌ ? ?Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 527. 
759 Steele ? “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity ? ?527. 
760 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?341-370.  
761 Campbell, Writing Security, 15. 
762 ǇƔĞĂƌĂŬŽů ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?/Ŷ )ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ^ƚĂƚĞĞŶŝĂůŽĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌŝŵĞƐ PdƵƌŬĞǇĂŶĚ:ĂƉĂŶ ? ?International 
Relations 24, no. 1 (2010): 3-23.  
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U.S.-&KLQD UHODWLRQV DUH IUDPHG ZLWKLQ WKH FRQVWUXFW RI D VHFXULW\ QDUUDWLYH LQ ZKLFK WKH µVHOI¶
experiences anxieties about what the U.S. perceives to be the WKUHDWIURP&KLQD¶VULVH 2QWRORJLFDO
security can be used to explain actions and behaviour that appear to be driven by traditional security 
motivations.763  In seeking to maximise ontological security, there can be unintended physical security 
consequences.764 This helps explain why actors respond to feelings of ontological insecurity through 
securitisation strategies, since the role of the state as the provider of physical security blurs with its 
ontological security needs.765  Consequently, the attempt to uphold an established basis for ontological 
VHFXULW\PD\LQWXUQXQGHUPLQHRWKHUHOHPHQWVRIDQDFWRU¶VVHFXULW\)URPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHWKH86
UHVSRQGVWRWKHWKUHDWWRLWVKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\IURP&KLQD¶VULVHWKURXJKWKHOHQVRISK\VLFDOVHFXULW\ 
± military and economic ± by focusing on LVVXHVVXFKDV&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\PRGHUQLVDWLRQIUHHGRPRI
navigation in the South China Sea, or Chinese cyber-attacks on American corporations and government 
networks.     
 
The strategy of doing maximises and reinforces ontological security by upholding a stable cognitive 
environment and the autobiographical/threat narratives through routinised practice.766   Giddens notes 
WKDWµVHOI-identity is not something that is just given, as a result of the FRQWLQXLWLHVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V
action-system, but something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of 
the individual.¶767  However, ontological security is derived from WKH DJHQW¶V FDSDFLW\ WR PDQDJH
changes in routine rather than in managing the normal ± handling emergent change, disruptive events 
or unintended consequences.768  Actors adopt different ontological security-seeking strategies in 
response to feelings of ontological insecurity.  One such strategy is to rely on established routines which 
DUH D ZD\ RI UHDVVHUWLQJ WKH ELRJUDSK\ RI RQH¶V OLIH769  When identities are challenged by critical 
situations or in the broader context of structural transformations, actors turn to the past and reaffirm 
established routines, identities and stories to uphold a sense of ontological security and continuity.770  
                                                          
763 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
764 Mitzen notes that states can become attached to relationship routines that perpetuate physical insecurity 
and which are harmful, because they provide ontological security. Mitzen,  “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ tŽƌůĚ
Politics ? ? ? ? ? ? 
765 Ontological and physical security considerations do not always align. DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚ
Politics ? ? ? ? ?. 
766 &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?  ? ? ? ?ZŽĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞĐurity Dilemma that Never 
tĂƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
767 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 52. 
768 Ian Craib, Experiencing Identity (London: Sage, 1998), 72; Flockhart notes that being ontologically secure is 
not about securing a stable identity.  The condition of ontologiĐĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĨ ?
to be continually reconstituted through narrative and identity processes. Ontological security is constantly under 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ  ‘ĚŝƐůŽĐĂƚŽƌǇ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽur deemed 
undesirable, either externally or internally. &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?807. 
769 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 




adapt to a changing environment, some states are likely to reproduce particular ontological security 
seeking behaviours, albeit compromising their physical security.771  
 
National security narratives: Identifying danger and containing threats 
Narrative acts as a central support for identity and subjectivity since narrative is critical to meaning-
making which is integral to definitions of threats and interests in the construction of national security.772  
Central to any state of ontological security is the ability to tell convincing stories about themselves and 
others and to gain recognition for their self within intersubjectively constructed groupings.773  As 
constructivists have consistently argued, rational explanations obscure the influence of intersubjective 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRQDJHQWV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIPDWHULDO LQFHQWLYHV774 µ6WUuctures do not come with an 
LQVWUXFWLRQVKHHW¶DQGH[RJHQRXVHYHQWVDQGXQFHUWDLQWLHVPXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHGWKH\FDQQRWEHGHILQHG
simply in terms of their effects on military or economic capabilities.775  Events do not reflect some 
objective reality, they require interpretation, since they gain meaning through our perception and 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKHP DV WKH\ EHFRPH IDEULFDWHG LQWR µFRKHUHQW VWRULHV¶776  It is through the 
employment and reflexive recollection of the past that the continuity of the narrative in the present is 
ensured and it is through social processes of identity construction that intersubjective understandings of 
what constitutes good practice and shared knowledge are achieved.777   
 
&LXWă FKDUDFWHULVHV WKH relationship between identity and narrative as a dynamic process called the 
µQDUUDWLYH VKXIIOH,¶ in which narratives and identities are continuously reinterpreted and realigned 
against each other in a constant process between narratives and identity construction processes.778   The 
narrative shuffle produces a continuous process of reconstruction of both narratives and identities so 
that one supports the other.  Political agents self-consciously and strategically seek to make sense of the 
                                                          
771 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ?-7; Mitzen,  “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?342.  
772 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
773 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
774 tĞƐůĞǇt ?tŝĚŵĂŝĞƌ ?DĂƌŬůǇƚŚĂŶĚ>ĞŽŶĂƌĚ^ĞĂďƌŽŽŬĞ ? “ǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ^ŚŽĐŬƐŽƌŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
dŚĞDĞĂŶŝŶŐƐŽĨtĂƌƐĂŶĚƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2007): 748. 
775 Mark Blyth,  “Structures Do Not Come With an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in Political 
Science ? ?Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 4 (2003): 695 W706. 
776 Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 278.   
777 Flockhart notes that practice - understood to be inherently social and grounded in particular identities and 
normatively sanctioned repertoires of conduct - is an important but largely overlooked influence on both 
narrative and identity. dƌŝŶĞ&ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “>ŝďĞƌĂů/ŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ PdƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ>ŽŐŝĐƐŽĨ>ŝďĞƌĂůKƌĚĞƌ ? ?ŝŶLiberal 
World Orders, eds. Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81. 
778 Felix Ciutĉ ?  “dŚĞ ŶĚ ?Ɛ ) ŽĨ EdK P ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ^trategic Action and Narrative TƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Comparative 
Security Policy 23, no. 1 (2002): 38. 
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world and to shape how others make sense of the world through an authorised narrative.  However, in 
practice, there are always other plausible ways of narrating an event, of representing the setting, the 
actors and their purposes.779  Through the narrative shuffle, there is a µFRPSOH[PRYLQJEDFNDQGIRUWK
between HYHQWVDQGSORWVWUXFWXUHXQWLOERWKDUHILWWHGWRJHWKHU¶780  In this process, the meaning, rules 
and context of interaction are given a purpose and sense, µcontinuously adapted to the intentions, 
expectations and serendipities that shape the daily conduct of actors.¶781   
 
Framing the national security narrative consists of fitting the preferred policy into broadly accepted 
YDOXHVDQGµJUDIWLQJ¶QHZ LVVXHVRQWRZHOO-established ones.782  This process is essential because it 
grounds social life and weaves the community together.  Constructing a credible threat around which 
WKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\QDUUDWLYHFDQEHZRYHQLVLQWULQVLFDOO\OLQNHGWR$PHULFD¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIVHOIDQG
the distinct other, in this case, China.  In constructing a coherent story concerning &KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVD
discursive connection is created between historical events, the articulation of national security interests 
and specific security threats that reinforce identity and justify certain uses of American power to 
enhance American ontological security.  There are two distinct and inter-related narrational processes 
occurring simultaneously.  The first is autobiographical and the second relates to the external other. 
 
The first narrational process involves upholding self-biographies, which is critical to maintaining a 
sense of ontological security because they incorporate a story of self (who I am and what I want) and 
past experience (what I have done and why).783  Such biographies locate the individual in time and 
space and in particular subject positions in respect of events, other actors that establishes the 
expectations of continuity of relations and a sense of order over those events in the first place.784  The 
VHFRQG QDUUDWLRQDO SURFHVV LQYROYHV µRWKHULQJ¶ ZKLFK LV DOVR FULWLFDO WR KHJHPRQLF identity 
construction.785  Exceptionalism further animates an expression of a distinctly American sense of 
                                                          
779 Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 279. 
780 ŽƵŐůĂƐǌǌǇ ?  ‘dŚĞŽƌŝǌŝŶŐEĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ P^ǇŵďŽůŝĐ /ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĂŶĚ,ĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐƐ ? ?The Sociological 
Quarterly 39, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 245. 
781 This theoretical framework is presented in detail in Felix Ciutĉ ?  “Narrativity, Social Constructivism, and 
International Relations Theory ? ?paper delivered at the 5th Brave New World conference, University of 
Manchester, June 2000. 
782 Public story-telling is powerful because it structures the field of political play, not because it leads to a 
particular policy outcome. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 37-39. 
783 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 35-36; 54. 
784 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
785 Huntington notes that identity requires differentiation and differentiation necessitates comparison: the 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ŽƵƌ ? ŐƌŽƵƉ ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ? ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ĂůƐŽ engaged in a similar 
process ?dŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶůĞĨƚƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞŝŶŝƚƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇĐůĞĂƌ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?
against which to define itself. Huntington, Who are We?, 25, 260. 
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LGHQWLW\ZKLFK UHOLHVXSRQFRPSDULVRQZLWK DFRUUXSW DQGGDQJHURXV µRWKHU¶ WR LQIRUP WKHQDWLRQDO
security narrative.786  Although defining the exact nature of the threat is not necessary, the identification 
DQGµRWKHULQJ¶RIWKHHQHP\DOORZVDQ\DGPLQLVWUDWLRQIOH[LELOLW\LQGHWHUPLQLQJZKRWKHHQHP\LVDQG
how that enemy should be contained or defeated.787   
 
7KH µVWDWH¶ DQG LWV LQVWLWXWLRQV DFW DV WKH Srincipal provider of national security, with the President 
KROGLQJµQDUUDWLYHDXWKRULW\¶URRWHGLQWKHSXEOLF¶VWUXVWDORQJVLGHDOLPLWHGQXPEHURIVSHDNHUVZLWKLQ
WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DXWKRULVHG µWR VHUYH DV WKH FRPPXQLW\¶V GHVLJQDWHG DJHQWV RI QDUUDWLYH
SURGXFWLRQ¶788  One way in which the U.S. foreign policy establishment rationalises its activities is by 
dint of an overarching threat narrative.789  The daily practices, and  articulations of top Washington 
officials and governmental institutions continuously reproduce and reinforce core interpretations and 
QDUUDWLYHV SURYLGLQJ D FRQFUHWH H[WHUQDO µUHDOLW\¶ DQG D VHQVH RI OHJLWLPDF\ IRU WKH SXEOLF790  
*RYHUQPHQWLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHSULPHGWRUHFHLYHDQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSULRULW\GLVFRXUVH&RQVHTXHQWO\
U.S. security institutions are highly attuned to central narratives and representations of threats to 
$PHULFDQQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\ WKDWDUHµUHSURGXFHGHPEHGGHGDQGQRUPDOLVHGDFURVVD UDQJHRIRWKHU
VRFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG SUDFWLFHV¶791  Over time, narratives become institutionalised and embedded 
within the institutions, practices and material interests of American society and politics, to the extent 
WKDW DFFHSWHG µWUXWKV¶ DSSHDU H[WHUQDO DQG VHOI-evident.  For its part, the American foreign policy 
establishment, through decades of cultural practice, is continually developing an interpretive framework 
which constructs and gives responses to threats in a highly militarised and impulsive fashion.792  The 
American public look to authoritative speakers within an administration to provide a national sense of 
purpose.   
 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) ± the formal outline of U.S. foreign policy strategy ± is a 
significant source of communication between the White House and the populace (and American allies 
and rivals), that sets out the strategic priorities and security agenda for that administraWLRQ7KH'2'¶V
Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), the last in 2014, assesses the threat environment and rebalances 
WKH 3HQWDJRQ¶V µVWUDWHJLHV FDSDELOLWLHV DQG IRUFHV WR DGGUHVV WRGD\¶V FRQIOLFWV DQG WRPRUURZ¶V
                                                          
786 McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 27. 
787 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 157.  
788 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 50.  
789 Campbell asserts that the way the US interprets danger and secures boundaries of its identity. Therefore 
danger, difference and threat constitute US identity. Campbell, Writing Security, 56.  
790 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?  “Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of) Change in US 
Counterterrorism PŽůŝĐǇĨƌŽŵƵƐŚƚŽKďĂŵĂ ? ?International Politics 48, nos. 2/3, (2010): 394. 
791 :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ? “Culture, Identity and Hegemony ? ?399. 
792 See Campbell, Writing Security, 70. 
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WKUHDWV¶793  The publication of regular NSS and QDR documentation creates the illusion that threats, 
DQGE\H[WHQVLRQWKHQDWLRQ¶VVHFXULW\FDQEHSUHGLFWHGDQGPDQDJHGLQDGYDQFHWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
has near full knowledge of the threats (and opportunities) it is likely to face.  Strategising is a way for 
an administration to show the thought processes behind its choices but formal strategy documents are 
YDJXH W\SLFDOO\ OD\LQJ RXW D µODXQGU\ OLVW¶ RI WKUHDWV DQG FKDOOHQJHV ZLWK SRWHQWLDOO\ VHOI-fulfilling 
implications by turning potential threats into real ones.794   
µ7KH ULWXDO RI FUDIWLQJ VWUDWHJ\ HQFRXUDJHV SDUWLFLSDQWV WR VSLQ D QDUUDWLYH WKDW
magnifies the scope of the national interest and exaggerates global threats. The 
aggressive policies adopted in reaction to the perceived threats makHWKHPUHDO¶795  
The process of creating a national security strategy also justifies big defence budgets and limits policy 
choices by validating potentially more aggressive responses to counter the threat identified in the NSS 
DQG4'53XWVLPSO\µWRHQWHr the world of the National Security Strategy is to enter a world always 
DW ULVN¶ZKLFKGLYHUJHVZLWK WKHJRDORI WKHSURFHVVZKLFK LV WRFUHDWH WKH LOOXVLRQRIVHFXULW\DQG
certainty, presenting the idea to the nation that the government is in control.796   
 
Dominant narratives of national security establish the common-sense givens of debate, set the 
boundaries of the legitimate, and limit what political actors can publicly justify.  These narratives 
therefore shape the national security policies that states pursue because they define the national interest 
and identify global challenges and opportunities.797  Through the dominant narrative, officials generally 
legitimate their preferred policies with reference to it and thereby reproduce it.798  Dominant narratives 
do not abolish political difference but they do support a limited range of perspectives.799  A single 
unifying storyline reduces the likelihood of multiple narratives entering the public sphere, limiting the 
scope of the debate.800  The need for ontological security and the public demand for narrative order 
means that national officials are responsible for making sense of the world.801   
 
Reflecting on his first term, Obama admitted that the presidential remit was not just about policy, rather, 
µWKHQDWXUHRf this office is also to tell a story to the American people that gives them a sense of unity 
                                                          
793 ĂǀŝĚD ?ĚĞůƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚZŽŶĂůĚZ ?<ƌĞďƐ ? “ĞůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2015):110-
111. 
794 ĚĞůƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚ<ƌĞďƐ ? “ĞůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
795 ĚĞůƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚ<ƌĞďƐ ? “ĞůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
796 ĚĞůƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚ<ƌĞďƐ ? “ĞůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
797 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 3, 276. 
798 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 33. 
799 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 33. 
800 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 33.  
801 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 289. 
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DQG SXUSRVH DQG RSWLPLVP HVSHFLDOO\ GXULQJ WRXJK WLPHV¶802  2EDPD¶V DGPLVVLRQ KLJKOLJKWV WKH
importance of narrative leadership in domestic and foreign affairs, particularly concerning national 
security.  The importance of owning and communicating the dominant narrative on national security is 
essential to the positive perception of the administration by the general public.803  Without it, the 
administration is viewed as lacking a coherent national security strategy.  The Obama administration, 
NHHQ WRPRYHDZD\IURP WKHGRPLQDQW*:%XVKµ:DURQ7HUURU¶QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\QDUUDWLYHKDV
found it difficult to construct a credible alternative.   
 
(i) The threat to American hegemony in the Asia-3DFLILF7KHµULVLQJ&KLQD¶QDUUDWLYH 
Shared understandings of perceived or real threats provide a cultural resource which political officials 
FDQLQYRNHWROHJLWLPLVHRUµVHOO¶QHZSROLFLHVDQGSURJUDPPHV804  Identification of threats, however 
YDJXHO\GHILQHGLVDFULWLFDOUHVRXUFHIRUWKHVWDWHLQUHSURGXFLQJLWVLGHQWLW\DVWKHQDWLRQ¶VSURWHFWRU
In Writing Security, Campbell notes that specific sources of danger were not fixed during the Cold 
War.805  The Soviet threat was assessed in geopolitical terms but was often understood as a political 
rather than a primarily military danger, and often represented in cultural and ideological terms.806  Since 
threats to U.S., and more broadly, to American interpretations of global security, are typically 
XQGHUVWRRGLQWHUPVRIGLVRUGHUWKHµ&KLQDWKUHDW¶FDQEHPRGLILHGDFFRUGLQJO\807  The construction of 
WKHµ&KLQDWKUHDW¶SULPDULO\GULYHQE\WKHµULVHRI&KLQD¶QDUUDWLYHLVQRWPHUHO\ZKDWLVVDLGDERXW
                                                          
802 Lindsey ŽĞƌŵĂ ?  “KďĂŵĂ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ŽŶ ŚŝƐ ŝŐŐĞƐƚ DŝƐƚĂŬĞ ĂƐ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ? ?CBS, July 12, 2012.  
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-reflects-on-his-biggest-mistake-as-president/  (accessed October 26, 
2015). 
803 dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉƵďůŝĐůŽŽŬƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? Wto make sense of developments 
at home and abroad - to maintain narrative order. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 50. 
On interpretive leadership, see tŝĚŵĂŝĞƌ ?  “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇƌŝƐĞƐ P /ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?779-
794. 
804 Washington has also had a hard time using the China threat discourse to convince regional states, who are 
generally wary of being caught up in this particular narrative. :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ? “Culture, Identity and Hegemony ? ?397. 
805 Campbell, Writing Security, 31. Campbell considers how no all-encompassing or fixed conception of the Soviet 
threat was constructed during the Cold War. Although the Soviet threat was regarded as constant, the threat 
ǁĂƐ  ‘ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌ ƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ did not flow from a constant military 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ĂǀŝĚĂŵƉďĞůů ? “'ůŽďĂů/ŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ P,Žǁ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Alternatives 15, 
no. 3 (1990): 268-9. 
806 Campbell, Writing Security, 31. 
807 The type of threat can also be very specific. In February 2015, President Obama identified Russia and China 
as the main sources of threat to military (and economic) information technologies, and terrorists as the main 
threat to social media  W a medium through which human rights and democracy can be spread - but which 
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƵƐĞ ƚŽ ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŚĂƚĞĨƵů ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ? dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “Remarks by the President at the 
Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Summit, ? Stanford University, February 13, 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-
protection-summit  (accessed November 18, 2015). 
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&KLQD LW LV µD paradigm for how &KLQD LV WR EH XQGHUVWRRG¶ DQG PRUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ KRZ WKH 86
XQGHUVWDQGV&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\808   
 
:DVKLQJWRQ EDVHV LWV DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH &KLQD WKUHDW RQ %HLMLQJ¶V JURZLQJ UHJLRQDO LQIOXHQFH
determining that, as a different type of rising power, China intends to replace the U.S. as regional 
hegemon in the Asia-Pacific.809  &KLQD¶VJURZLQJHFRQRPLFZHLJKWDQGPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVJLYHLWWKH
FDSDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHUHJLRQDORUGHUWKXVSUHVHQWLQJWKHJUHDWHVWWKUHDWWR$PHULFD¶s liberal hegemonic 
order in the Asia-Pacific.810  $V%HLMLQJ¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRID&KLQHVHYLVLRQRIUHJLRQDORUGHULQWKH$VLD-
Pacific, discussed below, is interpreted as threatening, these assertions are assumed to challenge 
American hegemony across the Pacific Ocean ± a cornerstone of American national security.  Viewed 
WKURXJKWKLVOHQVDQ\DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI&KLQD¶VFRUHLQWHUHVWVLVLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQLQGLFDWLRQWKDW
what China really seeks is U.S. compromise on areas of disagreement between the two.811  Moreover, 
seemingly separate issues are combined to provide evidence of this threat.  Consequently, the speed and 
type of military modernisation and the level of military spending has attracted attention, especially since 
the PLA is developing anti-access/area-denial capabilities that, under the right conditions, might 
FKDOOHQJHWKH86PLOLWDU\¶VDELOLW\WRRSHUDWHLQWKHZHVWHUQ3DFLILFFRPSRXQGHGE\&KLQD¶VLVODQG-
building activities in the South China Sea.812   
                                                          
808 Chengxin Pan, <ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ĞƐŝƌĞ ĂŶĚ WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ 'ůŽďĂů WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ P tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ZŝƐĞ 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 22.  
809 There is much debate as to whether China is a revisionist rising power. Foreign policy hawks, especially neo-
conservatives argue that China is attempting to alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific in its favour, hence 
its expansion needs to be contained, or at least checked.  See ĂǀŝĚ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “ŚŝŶĂŽƌŵĞƌŝĐĂ PtŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ƚŚĞZĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ?Survival 43, no. 3 (2001): 25-30. For a ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĞ&ĞŶŐ,ƵŝǇƵŶ ? “/ƐŚŝŶĂĂ
ZĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚWŽǁĞƌ ? ?The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 3 (2009): 313-334. Johnston argues that 
while there is less currently interest in revisionism in China, this trend may change in the future. Alastair Iain 
:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “/ƐŚŝŶĂĂ^ƚĂƚƵƐYƵŽWŽǁĞƌ ? ?International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 56. Schweller and Pu argue 
that China pragmatically accepts American hegemony but also simultaneously contests the legitimacy of US 
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ZĂŶĚĂůů> ?^ĐŚǁĞůůĞƌĂŶĚyŝĂŽǇƵWƵ ? “ĨƚĞƌhŶŝƉŽůĂƌŝƚǇŚŝŶĂ ?ƐsŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌŝŶĂŶ
ƌĂŽĨh ?^ ?ĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ?International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 52.  
810 Washington is concerned about the lack of transparency surrounding the control of the PLA, which is not 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ďƵƚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚWĂƌƚǇ ?W )ĂŶĚƌƵŶďǇƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĂů
Military Commission, not the Chinese Ministry of Defence.  The CCP is even less transparent and accountable 
than the government. Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, August 2013), 1-3. For the Chinese perspective on US concerns, see Zhu Feng, 
 “ŚŝŶĞƐĞWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞh ?^ ?ZŽůĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Southeast Asian Affairs (2013): 55. 
811 ŚŝŶĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂŐƌĞĂƚ  ‘ŵŽƌƚĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ? ?based on tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĂďŝůity to gauge 
Chinese intentions in cyber, counter-intelligence and military expansion beyond territorial issues, including the 
expansion of its operations into the Indian Ocean. :ĂŵĞƐZ ?ůĂƉƉĞƌ ? “h^/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇtŽƌůĚtŝĚĞ
Threat Assessment: Statement for ƚŚĞZĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 
21-22. http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/203-congressional-testimonies-2014/1005-
statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community (accessed June 24, 
2014). 
812 There has been a great deal of ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌǁŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŵĞĂŶƐ ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ŝƚƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽ
challenge the U.S. military. At current levels, the projection is that China is expected to overtake US defence 
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Through the national security framework, particular events are deemed critical situations which amplify 
and feed into the threat construction process.  Although military modernisation is occurring throughout 
the Asia-3DFLILF LW LV &KLQD¶V PLOLWDU\ PRGHUQLVDWLRQ ZKLFK KDV GHYHORSHG LQWR DQ actual threat to 
American interests and regional hegemony, prompting an immediate response from Washington.813  
Chinese cyber activities have become a focal point for emphasising the direct threat that China presents 
to the United States, mainly because U.S. power projection, like the U.S. economy, depends heavily on 
computer networks for command and control.  U.S. security analysts are concerned that Chinese cyber-
attacks could be used to deter or restrict U.S. intervention in an East Asia crisis.814  Contrastingly, 
Beijing appears more concerned with the ideological threats of an open, unrestricted internet on its 
domestic environment, rather than emphasising the technical threats that encompass the Western notion 
of cyber-security. 815   
 
/LQGVD\REVHUYHVWKDWµWKHGiscourse on China and cybersecurity routinely conflates issues as different 
DVSROLWLFDOFHQVRUVKLSXQIDLUFRPSHWLWLRQDVVDXOWVRQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGLQWHUQHWJRYHUQDQFH¶816   All 
DVSHFWVRI$PHULFDQ IHDUVDERXW&KLQD¶V ULVHDUHFRQIODWHG LQWRHDFK LVVXH ± be it cyber security or 
Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea.817  $FWLQJRQUHJLRQDOFRQFHUQVRI&KLQD¶VLQWHQWLRQV
DORQJLWVSHULSKHU\IXUWKHUERRVWVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RI:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFRQFHUQVLWVUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\DQG
its choice of policy action.818  As China rises and its challenge manifests on multiple levels of social 
and international interaction ± militarily, institutionally, structurally and discursively ± Chinese 
DFWLYLWLHVUHLQIRUFH$PHULFDQDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGV&KLQD¶VULVHDVµFRPPRQVHQVH¶ and justifies American 
action in order to protect the hegemonic identity of the United States.  Singling out specific threats can 
                                                          
spending in 2025 but it will take far longer for it to develop traditional capabilities to match those of the US. 
yĞŶŝĂ ŽƌŵĂŶĚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ZŽƌǇ <ŝŶĂŶĞ ?  “ƐŝĂ-Pacific Security: A Changing Role for the United States, ? ŚĂƚŚĂŵ
House, April 2014, 17.  
813 In contrast to the US position on China, the other regional rising power, India, viewed in the US ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ
largest democracy, ? is treated as a friendly strategic and economic opportunity for the United States. See Charles 
Z ?<ĂǇĞ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞĂŶĚůǇƐƐĂǇƌĞƐ ? “,Žw the US should respond to the RŝƐĞŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ? ?Fortune, November 
15, 2015. http://fortune.com/2015/11/12/india-narendra-modi-tpp/ (accessed November 17, 2015); for the full 
report, see ŚĂƌůĞƐZ ?<ĂǇĞ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞĂŶĚůǇƐƐĂǇƌĞƐ ? “tŽƌŬing with a Rising India: A Joint Venture for the 
EĞǁĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ?  ? ) ? 
814 :ŽŶZ ?>ŝŶĚƐĂǇ ? “dŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŚŝŶĂŽŶǇďĞƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ P&ŝĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ&ƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?International Security 39, no. 3 
(Winter 2014/2015): 13. 
815 In 2010, the director of the State Council Information Office and External Propaganda Department of the 
ŚŝŶĞƐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚWĂƌƚǇůŝŶŬĞĚ ‘ŚŽƐƚŝůĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝǀĞ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
in China, with the potential to undermine the power of the state. Information Office of the ^ƚĂƚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ? “dhe 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ? ?ĞŝũŝŶŐ, June 8, 2010. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm 
(accessed June 24, 2016).   
816 >ŝŶĚƐĂǇ ? “dŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŚŝŶĂŽŶǇďĞƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
817 ƌŝŬ'ĂƌƚǌŬĞ ? “dŚĞDǇƚŚŽĨǇďĞƌǁĂƌ PƌŝŶŐŝŶŐtĂƌŝŶǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞĂĐŬŽǁŶƚŽĂƌƚŚ ? ?International Security 
38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 41-73.  
818 S.D. DƵŶŝ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶAsian Strategic Review 2014: U.S. Pivot and Asian Security, eds. S.D. Muni and 
Vivek Chadha (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014), 6. 
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lead to the exaggeration of the actual danger that a particular threat presents, exacerbating the existing 
environment of mistrust.   
 
(ii) Chinese exceptionalism: A competing narrative 
7KH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH &KLQD µWKUHDW¶ in the American psyche has been further reinforced by the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VRZQYHUVLRQRIH[FHSWLRQDOLVP7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI&KLQD¶VULVHDQGLQFUHDVLQJ
political engagement in global affairs also dominate Chinese academic and policy elite discussion 
DURXQGWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRI&KLQD¶VJOREDOLGHQWLW\LQDWUDQVIRUPLQJUHJLRQDQGLQFRQVWLWXWLQJLWVYLVLRQ
for global order.819  &KLQD¶VJURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROitical and diplomatic responsibilities are pushing 
a reconsideration of the Dengist low profile strategy of the past to deal with numerous multi-faceted 
global issues, whilst not destabilising domestic reforms.820  As part of the debate over the meaning of 
CKLQD¶VFKDQJLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOH&KLQD¶VVHOI-perception is one of a civilisational entity, rather 
than merely another state.821  &KLQD¶VVHQVHRIEHLQJH[FHSWLRQDOLVMXVWRQHLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFH
of national identity in its thinking, as it considers its international position.   
 
2QHVXFKSRWHQWLDOLQYRFDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQHZO\DVVHUWLYHJUHDWSRZHULGHQWLW\FRPHVLQWKHIRrm of Xi 
-LQSLQJ¶VChinese Dream narrative.  On taking over the mantle of CCP leadership in 2012, President 
;LODXQFKHGWKHµ&KLQHVH'UHDP¶VWUDWHJ\SULPDULO\DYLVLRQRIGRPHVWLFSURJUHVVLRQEXWDOVRRXWOLQLQJ
KLVYLVLRQIRU&KLQD¶VJOREDODVSLUDWLRQV ,WGHWDLOV&KLQD¶VQDWLRQDOUHYLYDOIROORZLQJWKHFHQWXU\RI
KXPLOLDWLRQ VSHFLI\LQJ WKDW &KLQD ZLOO UHPDLQ µIDLWKIXO WR LWV ULFK FXOWXUDO KHULWDJH DQG VRFLDOLVW
LGHQWLW\¶822  ;L¶VHODERUDWLRQRIWKHChinese Dream LQGLFDWHV&KLQD¶VUH-emergence as a great power, 
pursuing an independent foreign policy.823  7KHXQGHUO\LQJQDUUDWLYHLVRQHRIDSHRSOHZKRDUHµheirs 
WRDXQLTXHFLYLOLVDWLRQDQGDXWRSLDQGHVWLQ\WKDWHQWLWOHWKHPWRDSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQLQWKHZRUOG¶
XQGHU;L¶VPRUDOOHDGHUVKLS824 For Xi, it spHOOVRXWWKHIRUHWHOOLQJRI&KLQD¶VDVFHQGDQF\WRPLOLWDU\
                                                          
819 dŝŵ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ŚĂƚŚĂŵ,ŽƵƐĞ ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?There is intense debate occurring 
within Chinese political and academic elite circles as to whether China should continue to focus on its internal 
economic development, and internationally pursue Deng XiaoƉŝŶŐ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ  ‘ŚŝĚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ďŝĚŝŶŐ 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐƚŝŵĞ ? ?Chinese studies on grand strategy are becoming available to the English-speaking audience which 
suggests that Chinese academics wish to engage and communicate further afield. The extent of the debate 
ŝŵƉůŝĞƐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŐƌĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƐƚŝůůŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂůƉŚĂƐĞ ?dŚŝƐĚĞďĂƚĞŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĚĞƉƚŚŝn Chapter 6. 
820 Wang Jisi,  “China ?s Search for a Grand SƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 76. 
821 India, too, sees itself in a similar way, although this draws less attention in Washington because it is a 
democracy. See Mike Mochizuki and Deepa OllaƉĂůůǇ ?  “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƐŝĂŶ WŽǁĞƌƐ P tŚĂƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŝƚ ŵĞĂŶ ĨŽƌ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƐŝĂĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚ ? ?International Studies 48, no. 3/4 (2011): 197. 
822 China Daily ?  “'Chinese Dream' to shape Global Landscape: Experts ? ?China Daily, December 7, 2015. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-12/07/content_17159585.htm  (accessed December 18, 2015). 
823 China Daily ? “'Chinese Dream' to shape Global Landscape: Experts. ? 
824 dŚĞŚĂǌŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĞĂŵ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŚĂƐĞŶĂďůĞĚ “ĚƌĞĂŵ ?ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇto spread everywhere in China. See 





an exceptionalist ideology, with the potential to lead China to great power status that clashes with the 
American image of what a great power should be.   
 
The articulation of the competing Chinese Dream narrative suggests that the notion of ChLQD¶V
exceptionalism is gaining traction within the CCP leadership.825  Studies of Chinese foreign policy have 
long recognised that China possesses a distinctive set of foreign policy principles derived from its long 
historical and cultural experience and ChLQD¶V ULVLQJJOREDO LQIOXHQFHKDVJLYHQPRUHZHLJKW WR WKH
notion of Chinese exceptionalism.826  &KLQD¶V H[FHSWLRQDOLVW EHOLHIV DUH SDUWO\ FRQVWUXFWHG WKURXJK
selecting certain aspects of its own unique history, culture and political myths that will underpin its 
trajectory to great power staWXVWKURXJKZKLFK&KLQD¶VZRUOGview can be interpreted.827  Ideas such as 
harmonious world and peaceful development, based oQ&KLQD¶VKLVWRULFDOJUHDWQHVVSUHVHQWDPRGHO
IRU&KLQD¶VZRUOGRUGHUDQGHOHYDWH&KLQDWRWKHmoral high ground.828  The sources of the ideational 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\are being drawn from its own historical and cultural narratives 
RISHDFHDQGDFFRPPRGDWLRQHQDEOLQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI&KLQD¶VJUHDWSRZHUVWDWXVWKDWLVVXSSRVHG
to be distinct from Western paradigms.829  Chinese analysts see their country as the successor of an 
eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defence-minded, non-expansionist, and ethical, whereas 
Western strategic culture - especially that of the United States - is viewed as militaristic, offence-
minded, expansionist, and selfish.830  &KLQD¶VH[FHSWLRQDOLVWGLVFRXUVHGLVFORVHVDGHVLUHWRSUHVHQWD
SDUWLFXODU YLHZ RI &KLQD¶V SDVW EHKDYLRXU ZKLFK WKH RXWVLGH ZRUOG VKRXOG DFFHSW DV WKH µtrue¶ 
representatiRQ RI &KLQD¶VKLVWRU\ DQG FXOWXUH  ,W LV VHOI-protection against what Beijing projects as 
                                                          
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/xi-jinping-china-book-chinese-dream/406387/ 
(accessed November 15, 2015). 
825 Examples ŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
&ĞŶŐŚĂŶŐ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůtŽƌůĚŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ŝŶChina across the 
Divide, ed. Rosemary Foot  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 63; David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: 
The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), especially chapter 2. 
826 ŚĂŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůtŽƌůĚŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
827 ŚĂŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůtŽƌůĚŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ?
828 China professes to strive for a world of harmony and diversity, which separates it from American foreign 
policy that induces it to promote American values and remake the world in its ŝŵĂŐĞ ?&ĞŶŐŚĂŶŐ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ
ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů tŽƌůĚ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?  ? ? ? :ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ŐĂƉ
between ideas such as benevolence, pacifism, peace and accommodation ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĨŽƌŵŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
and historical behaviour. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 27. 
829 &ĞŶŐŚĂŶŐ ? “ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ PĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in 
the Reform EƌĂ ? ?International Politics 49, no. 3 (2012): 319. 
830 ŶĚƌĞǁ: ?EĂƚŚĂŶĂŶĚŶĚƌĞǁ^ĐŽďĞůů ? “,ŽǁŚŝŶĂ^ĞĞƐŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 32-47.  
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foreign misunderstanding, prejudice and misapprehension and is as much an ideal as it is based in 
foreign policy record.831 
 
&KLQD¶VVKLIWWRDPRUHVHOI-assured and assertive great power identity followed the 2008 global financial 
FULVLV  &KLQD¶V KDQGOLQJ RI WKH FULVLV H[SHGLWHG WKH SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW JOREDO SRZHU UHODWLRQVKLSV KDG
FKDQJHGPDUNHGO\DIIHFWLQJ&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQUHODWLYHWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQSDUWLFXODU832  China was 
EHFRPLQJµDVWDWHWKDWZLOOQRWEHEHKROGHQWRRXWVLGHFRQFHSWLRQVRILWVLQWHUHVWVQRUFRQVWUDLQHGE\
PXOWLODWHUDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RU SURFHVVHV¶833  A 2011 White Paper addressed external concerns about 
&KLQD¶VGHIHQFHFDSDELOLWLHVLQSURWHFWLQJ&KLQD¶VFRUHLQWHUHVWVVWDWLQJWKDWµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSXUSRVH
RI PRGHUQLVLQJ WKH &KLQHVH DUPHG IRUFHV LV WR VDIHJXDUG &KLQD¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ VHFXULW\ WHUULWRULDO
LQWHJULW\ DQG LQWHUHVWV RIQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW¶834  7KHDUWLFXODWLRQDQGSURWHFWLRQRI&KLQD¶VFore 
interests indicates that Beijing was starting to formulate a grand strategy contingent on its core interests 
rather than its relations with others ± µDVLJQRIDPRUHVHOI-confident and self-GHWHUPLQLQJSRVWXUH¶WKDW
LVµQRORQJHUSUHGLFDWHGRQ«KRZRWKHUJUHDWSRZHUVGUDZWKHZRUOGPDS¶835   
 
Having an enemy ± real or imagined ± is not cost-free.836  Constructing and treating China as a threat 
increases the likelihood of China becoming a threat in practice.837  7KH&KLQDµWKUHDW¶SDUDGLJPWKXV
EHFRPHV DQ µREMHFWLYH WUXWK¶ LPSO\LQJ WKH QHHG WR H[HUW VRPH OHYHO RI FRQWURO RYHU &KLQD¶V ULVH
                                                          
831 ŚĂŶŐ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů tŽƌůĚ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?  ? ? ? &ĞŶŐ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ
ŚŝŶĞƐĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ Wits strong 
desire to regain its historical great power status, underpinned by a fundamentally statist and nationalistic logic 
that contradicts cultural principles of inclusion, reformism and pacifism. From this perspective, China has no 
intention of pursing a mission civilisatrice, exporting its value system to the rest of the world, unlike what they 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďǇ ƐƉŝƌŝƚƵĂů Žƌ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂƐ ŝƚƐ
neighbours can attest, China has never been afraid to use coercion and intimidation against those it sees as 
contesting its interests. For historical consideration, see Johnston, Cultural Realism. 
832 ^ĞĞZŽŐĞƌ/ƌǀŝŶĞ ? “WƌŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ PŚŝŶĂ ?ƐWĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝƚƐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?China Security 
6, no. 3 (2010): 15-34.  
833 EŝĐŬŝƐůĞǇ ? “ŝĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ,ŝĚŝŶŐEŽ>ŽŶŐĞƌ PŵŽƌĞƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞŚŝŶĂZĂƚƚůĞƐƚŚĞZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?Global Asia 6, no. 4 
(2011): 62-73. 
834 The Information Office of the State Council,  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ WĞĂĐĞĨƵů ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_4.htm  (accessed June 24, 2016).    
835 Wang Jisi,  “China ?s Search for a Grand SƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 68 W79; >ŝĂŶDĂ ? “dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ 
of China ?s Grand Strategy: ŚŝŶĞƐĞWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13, no. 1 (2013): 
164. 
836 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 85. 
837 dŚĞ ? ? ? ?YZĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĐĂůĞŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ůĂĐŬŽĨ
ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇĂŶĚŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐĨƌŽŵŚŝŶĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐďŽƚŚĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞ
United States, to its ability to sustaiŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŐůŽďĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ƉŽǁĞƌ ĂŶĚ ǁŝŶ ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞůǇ ?  ‘ŚŝŶĂ ǁŝůů
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌh^ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐƵƐŝŶŐ ? ? ?ĐǇďĞƌĂŶĚƐƉĂĐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ?ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ
Defense, The Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC, 2014, 4-6.  http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-
Reports/QDR  (accessed June 24, 2016). 
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including the nature of its rising power identity, even though this identity is yet to be defined from the 
Chinese perspective.  The United States is increasingly fixated on the identity of China as an 
authoritarian and nationalistic state, which may eventually provide Washington with the moral 
justification for tougher measures.  This is not to say that the hardening of U.S. policy towards China 
LVQRWURRWHGLQ&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJO\IRUFHIXODQGHUUDWLFVWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXURQLWVSHULSKHU\$IWHUDOO
&KLQD¶VJOREDOLGHQWLW\LVSDUWO\WKHUHVXOWRIWKHZD\LWVEHKDYLRXULVSHUFHLYHGE\RWKHUVDQGLWVUHJLRQDO
policy thinking is also shaped by the foreign policy choices of other regional powers, including the U.S. 
and Japan.838 +RZHYHURWKHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVPD\QRWIXOO\DFFRXQWIRUWKHFRPSOH[QDWXUHRI&KLQD¶V
µLQWHUQDO SURFHVVHV DFWRUV DQG V\VWHPV ZKLFK LQIRUP WKH EHKDYLRXU What China displays on the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDJH¶839  Distrust is self-SHUSHWXDWLQJ LW LV µitself corrosive, producing attitudes and 
DFWLRQV WKDW WKHPVHOYHV FRQWULEXWH WR JUHDWHU GLVWUXVW¶840  As the distrust deepens, it is difficult for 
leaders on each side to be confident they understand the deep thinking among leaders on the other side 
regarding the future U.S.-China relationship.841  The complex nature of bilateral relations between 
Beijing and Washington presents challenges for both, and neither agrees on how this relationship should 
evolve.842   
 
7KHµ&KLQDWKUHDW¶QDUUDWLYHZLWKLWVLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU$PHULFDQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPDQG$PHULFDQUHJLRQDO
hegemonic identity, is critical to understanding how the U.S. responds to China and how it manages 
U.S.-China bilateral relations.843  The increasingly narrowing focus on Chinese identity through the lens 
RIQDWLRQDOLVPDQG&KLQD¶VLGHDVDERXWLWVRZQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPUHLQIRUFHVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI&KLQD¶V
behaviour as aggressive in the American psyche and helps construct the increasingly competitive 
environment in the Asia-Pacific.844  In Canberra, in 2011, President Obama indicated that the U.S. had 
                                                          
838 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 95. 
839 ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐĂůƐŽŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ĂĐƚƚŽƵŐŚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞrnational sphere, playing to the expectations of 
the domestic Chinese audience. ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?ůůĞŶĂƌůƐŽŶ ? “/ƚ^ŚŽƵůĚEŽƚKŶůǇĞ
ďŽƵƚ EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ P ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ WůƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ĂŶĚŝƚƐ /ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
International Studies 48, nos. 3/4 (2011): 224.  
840 <ĞŶŶĞƚŚ>ŝĞďĞƌƚŚĂůĂŶĚtĂŶŐ:ŝƐŝ ? “ĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐh ?^ ?-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?John L. Thornton China Center, 
Brookings Institution, Monograph Series, Number 4 (March 2012), vi. 
841 Lieberthal aŶĚtĂŶŐ ? “ĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐh ?^ ?-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?vi. 
842 At the 2009 White House meeting, Chinese diplomats suggested raising the relationship to one of strategic 
partnership so that h ?^ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŽƵůĚƐŚŽǁƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?/ƚis said the Americans saw 
the process in reverse: the U.S. could not agree on the definition of the relationship until the two countries 
ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚĂĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?^ĞĞ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ,ĂĚůĞǇĂŶĚWĂƵů,ĂĞŶůĞ ? “dŚĞĂƚĐŚ-22 in 
U.S.-ChineƐĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ PƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƚŝĞƐ ? ?Foreign Affairs (February 22, 2015).  
843 To avoid reducing developments in the Asia-Pacific only to the rise of China narrative and bipolar U.S.-China 
relations, other regional narratives, including power diffusion, should be considered. See Xenia Wickett, Jon 
Nilsson Wright and Tim Summers,  “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US WCŚŝŶĂEĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ŚĂƚŚĂŵ
House, September 24, 2015.  
844 Carlson, for example, observes that analysts focus on the narrow conceptualisation of Chinese identity 
through nationalism. Broadening the discussion to national identity formation  W examining the production of 




U.S. would seek morHRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK%HLMLQJ¶845  During the course of the Obama 
administration, there has been a shift in emphasis from strategic reassurance and engagement, to 
strategic competition, in parallel with the intensification of the negative intHUSUHWDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VULVH846   
 
A shift in rhetoric was noticeable during the third presidential candidate televised debate in October 
ZKHQ2EDPDSURQRXQFHG&KLQDWREHDQµDGYHUVDU\¶ZKLOHDGPLWWLQJWKDWLWZDVDOVRµDSRWHQWLDO
partner.¶847  Three years into the rebalance, in his speech to the University of Queensland in November 
2014, Obama signalled that the U.S. was unclear as to what kind of global player China intended to be, 
and expressed uncertainty over the developing framework for Sino-U.S. relations.848   
µIf, in fact, China is playing the role of a responsible actor that is peaceful and 
SURVSHURXVDQGVWDEOHWKDWLVJRRGIRUWKLVUHJLRQLW¶VJRRGIRUWKHZRUOGLW¶VJRRG
for the United States.  6RZH¶OOSXUVXHFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKChina where our interests 
overlap or align.¶849 
Washington is placing the responsibility for improving U.S-China relations onto Beijing.  Complicating 
matters further, President Xi Jinping, with his nationalistic rhetoric and the appearance of an 
uncompromisLQJ DWWLWXGH KDV HQFRXUDJHG WKH GRPLQDQFH RI :DVKLQJWRQ¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ KDZNV LQ
                                                          
over basic aspects of its national identity, and following on from this, its rising power identity. See Allen Carlson, 
 “/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇďĞĂďŽƵƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ PŚŝŶĂ ?ƐWůƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐ/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŚŝŶĞƐĞ
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?International Studies 48, nos. 3/4 (2011): 224.    
845 dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “Remarks By Presidenƚ KďĂŵĂ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament 
(accessed November 15, 2015). 
846  ‘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƚŽ
build trust and reduce the likelihood of conflict, whilst also intending to directly address  sources of political, 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŵŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ?  ^ƚĞŝŶďĞƌŐ ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? ŽŶ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? :ĂŵĞƐ
^ƚĞŝŶďĞƌŐ ĂŶĚ DŝĐŚĂĞů K ?,ĂŶůŽŶ ?Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: Managing US-China Relations in the 
Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). The response to the concept was precarious: 
tĂƐ ŝƚ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ǁŽƌƐĞ ? ĂƉƉĞĂƐĞŵĞŶƚ ? tĂƐ ŝƚ ŵĞĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŽĨ  ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƋƵŝĞƚůǇĚƌŽƉƉĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐŝƚǁĂƐĂŶ idea and not policy. See Josh 
ZŽŐŝŶ ? “dŚĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐZĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?Foreign Policy (November 6, 2009).  Kelley Currie, 
 “dŚĞ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŽĨ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ZĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? ? Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2009. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704224004574488292885761628  (accessed October 8, 
2015). 
847 New York Times,  “dŚĞdŚŝƌĚdĞůĞǀŝƐĞĚĞďĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶDŝƚƚZŽŵŶĞǇĂŶĚĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ? ?dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ, Roca 
Raton, Florida, October 22, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/us/politics/transcript-of-the-third-
presidential-debate-in-boca-raton-fla.html?_r=0 (accessed June 16, 2016). 
848 dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ďǇ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ YƵĞĞŶƐůĂŶĚ ? ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland 
(accessed June 24, 2016). 
849 The White HoƵƐĞ ? “ZĞŵĂƌŬƐďǇWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨYƵĞĞŶƐůĂŶĚ ? ? 
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controlling the narrative.850  Ignoring Chinese assertiveness would only fuel tKH LGHD RI $PHULFD¶V
decline and make the U.S. look weak.851  In the past, U.S. hesitation in taking strong action has been 
viewed by challengers as an opportunity to advance their own interests in the Asia-Pacific.852  This 
amplified narrative, particularly prominent in the media, appears to be obscuring the more moderate 
approach preferred by the administration that recommends the continued engagement and further 
consolidation of China within the existing order, alongside tougher action when required.853   
 
Obama, for his part, has appeared reluctant to produce, or communicate, the focused grand strategic 
thinking required to unify the American domestic audience.  In his vision of global politics, as complex, 
and rapidly transforming into a multipolar and multi-layered world, it is difficult to formulate a specific 
foreign policy doctrine.854  His efforts to HGXFDWHWKH$PHULFDQSXEOLFRQWKHOLPLWVRI$PHULFD¶VSRZHU
and the need to adapt American foreign policy to reflect the realities of transforming international 
politics have undermined the traditional conception of American hegemony rooted in American power 
without replacing it with a new narrative.855  Moreover, his inability to shape a new narrative on China 
has allowed Republicans WR µILOO WKHYDFXXPRI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶856  7KHHPSKDVLVRI2EDPD¶V&KLQD
                                                          
850 The popular and influential Republican Senator for Arizona, John McCain, Chair of the Armed Services 
Committee, advocates US military involvement in Syria and Iraq, and a more assertive US approach to China. 
dŽŵ >ŽŝĂŶĐŽ ?  “'ƌĂŚĂŵ ? DĐĂŝŶ ǁĂŶƚ h ?^ ?->ĞĚ &ŽƌĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ /^/^ ŝŶ ^ǇƌŝĂ ? ? EE ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/30/politics/john-mccain-lindsey-graham-isis-syria/ (accessed September 3, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶŝƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŽďĞĂŵŽƌĞŚĂǁŬŝƐŚƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶŚĞƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?DŝĐĂŚĞŶŬŽ ? “,ŝůůĂƌǇ
ƚŚĞ ,ĂǁŬ ? ?Foreign Policy, July 27, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/27/hillary-the-hawk-a-history-
clinton-2016-military-intervention-libya-iraq-syria/  (accessed September 3, 2016). 
851 'ĞŽĨĨ ǇĞƌ ?  “h ?^ ? ^truggles to get to GƌŝƉƐ ǁŝƚŚ yŝ ? ?Financial Times, September 24, 2015.  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de5c8f72-628d-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz460iJYrVj (accessed 
November 15, 2015). 
852 As American forces withdrew from Vietnam in the mid-1970s, the Chinese grabbed the Paracel Islands from 
^ĂŝŐŽŶ ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚĚƌĞǁ ĨƌŽŵ sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?Ɛ Ăŵ ZĂŶŚ ĂǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞs 
terminated its base agreement with the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef. Bonnie S. Glaser, 
 “WŝǀŽƚƚŽƐŝĂ PWƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌhŶŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 
2012. http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_glaser.pdf  (accessed September 8, 2015). 
853 For instance, G. John Ikenberry argues that the US-led order is sustainable and must incorporate China. See 
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
854 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 290-1. 
855 dŚŽŵĂƐ &ƌŝĞĚŵĂŶ ?  “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ďǇ tŚŝƐƉĞƌ ĂŶĚ EƵĚŐĞ ? ?New York Times, August 24, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-foreign-policy-by-whisper-and-
nudge.html?_r=0 (accessed November 17, 2015); StepŚĞŶ tĂůƚ ?  “KďĂŵĂ :ƵƐƚ ĂŶ ?ƚ ^ĂǇ /ƚ ? ?Foreign Policy, 
August 26, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/obama-just-cant-say-it/?wp_login_redirect=0 (accessed 
November 17, 2015 ) ?dƌƵŵƉ ?ƐƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? “DĂŬĞŵĞƌŝĐĂ Great Again! ?ŚĂƐ, in contrast, 
resonated with the image of a declining America that is no longer exceptional, a pessimism to which many 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞ ?^ ĞĞdŽŵŶŐůĞŚĂƌĚƚ ? “tŚĂƚdƌƵŵƉZĞĂůůǇDĞĂŶƐtŚĞŶ,Ğ^ ĂǇƐ,Ğ ?ůůDĂŬĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ'ƌĞĂƚ
ŐĂŝŶ ? ?The Nation, April 26, 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/what-trump-really-means-when-he-
says-hell-make-america-great-again/   (accessed January 17, 2017).    
856 ĂŶŝĞůƌĞǌŶĞƌ ? “ŽĞƐKďĂŵĂŚĂǀĞĂ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?tŚǇtĞŶĞĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐŝŶhŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶdŝŵĞƐ ? ?Foreign 
Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 57-68. 
 139 
 
VWUDWHJ\ZDVRQHQJDJHPHQWZLWKµLPSOLFLWFRQWDLQPHQWEDODQFLQJRUGHWHUUHQFH¶857  Since the 2011 
rebalance announcement, the deterrence and balancing elements of the strategy have become more 
pronounced, indicating that China is increasingly viewed in Washington as representing a threat to 
American hegemony.  The process of institutioQDOLVLQJ WKH µ&KLQD WKUHDW¶ DOVR H[WHQGV EH\RQG WKH
United States to its regional allies, since the feeling of threat and danger has the vital political function 
of constructing and sustaining any collective identity.858   
 
Containment 2.0: Responding to the China threat 
There is a tendency in sections of the United States (especially in the media and in Congress) to view 
the Asia-Pacific primarily through a China lens in matters of economic and strategic competition.  For 
many in the security community, China has become the new Cold War adversary, or at least the potential 
one.859   This reflects an American predisposition towards an external adversary, particularly on the part 
of military and policy hawks, who historically have required something or someone to plan against.860  
This narrow focus, in part created by the exceptionalist tendency to see a power transition in zero-sum 
terms, is a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates mistrust and suspicion and stops other strategies such as 




use of exceptional means to counter or contain that threat.861  Containment was pivotal in attempting to 
halt the spread of the Soviet communist threat during the Cold War.  This strategy has generally been 
considered the most effective military strategy to check the spread of an aggressive external threat and 
potential carrier of global chaos.862  The policy of containing the Soviet threat aimed to prevent the 
Soviet Union from using its power and position to reshape the post-war international order.  As the 
strategy developed, containing the spread of Soviet ideology was prioritised.  The National Security 
                                                          
857 Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
72. 
858 American allies, including Japan and Australia, have also institutionalised the China threat discourse to 
varying degrees, and embedded it within their security procurement programmes.  Others, including the 
Philippines and Thailand have benefitted directly from U.S. military training and assistance programmes and 
cooperation in non-traditional security areas. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 114; Jackson,  “ƵůƚƵƌĞ ?
Identity and Hegemony ? ?395. 
859 Xenia Wickett, Jon Nilsson Wright and Tim Summers,  “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance: Beyond the US WChina 
EĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ŚĂƚŚĂŵ,ŽƵƐĞ, September 24, 2015, 16. 
860 ,ŽĨƐƚĂĚƚĞƌ ? “dŚĞWĂƌĂŶŽŝĚ^ƚǇůĞŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ?-40, especially 4, 31-32. 
861 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 
2nd edition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007), 106-108, 119. 
862 In his memoirs, George Kennan later disputed the militaristic bent of containment. His intention was the 




Council document, NSC-68, produced in 1950, outlined both the aim of the containment strategy, which 
ZDVWRµEULQJDERXWDQLQWHUQDOFKDQJHLQWKH6RYLHWV\VWHP¶DQGKRZWKH86ZLWKLWVZHVWHUQDOOLHV
ZRXOGµPRUDOO\DQGPDWHULDOO\¶ILJKWWKH&ROG:DU863   
 
Maintaining order, the organising principle of U.S. policy, drawn from NSC-68, ensured U.S. interests 
and mitigated against international chaos.864  The father of containment, George Kennan, intended for 
the internal contradictions of the Soviet regime to bring about its own collapse.865  Therefore, while the 
U.S. could increase the strains under which the Soviet Union and its allies operated, in the end it was 
the inefficiencies of command economies, the absence of political accountability and an ideology that 
suppressed the freedom of its peoples that would bring about its demise.866  Yet, the containment 
strategy arose and developed within a particular period, time and set of circumstances.  It is debatable 
how successful containment was in delivering the end of the Soviet Union and how successful it would 
be against a very different animal that is China and in a geopolitical environment that is more 
interdependent and complex. 
 
Although containment cannot be divorced from the historical context from which it originated, it has 
become shorthand for a range of political, economic and military policies directed at China.  The 
JURZLQJGRPLQDWLRQRIWKHULVHRI&KLQDQDUUDWLYHUHLQIRUFHVWKHQRWLRQWKDW&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJUHJLRQDO
influence must be countered by engaging in some form of containment.  The common aim of these 
measures is to dissuade or deter China from expanding its power beyond certain limits through the 
exertion of various degrees of pressure or coercion.867  The original containment strategy incorporated 
a series of measures to check Soviet military expansion and to weaken the Soviet Union economically 
and diplomatically.868  On this basis, the U.S. would be seeking to isolate China internationally by 
cutting its access to the global trading regime and shutting down its trade and investment ties.  The goal 
                                                          
863 NSC-68 is widely regarded as setting out the rationale and parameters for U.S. post-war foreign policy, 
including containment. The Truman Library,  “dŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůZeport on United States Objectives 
ĂŶĚ WƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ĨŽƌ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf (accessed 
June 24, 2016). 
864 ĂǀŝĚĂŵƉďĞůů ? “'ůŽďĂů/ŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ P,Žǁ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Alternatives 15, no.3 
(1990): 268. 
865 The standard sources for the Cold War policy of containment are 'ĞŽƌŐĞ <ĞŶŶĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ >ŽŶŐ delegram 
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ŝŶContainment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950, eds. Thomas Etzold and John 
Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), and 'ĞŽƌŐĞ<ĞŶŶĂŶ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂƐy ? “dŚĞ^ŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨ
^ŽǀŝĞƚŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs 25 (1947): 566-582. 
866 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during 
the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 386-7. 
867 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 86. 
868 dŚŽŵĂƐ: ?ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ? “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward 
ĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 109-10. 
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of engagement, however, KDV DOZD\V EHHQ WR VXSSRUW &KLQD¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH H[LVWLQJ RUGHU
encouraging it to play a more influential role, which has been a Chinese aspiration also.869  The U.S. 
commitment to engaging China economicall\KDVFRQWULEXWHGWR&KLQD¶VJURZWKDQGKHOSHG&KLQDWR
narrow the relative power gap.   
 
There is the potential for selective rather than wholesale transferability to the current context of the 
&KLQD µWKUHDW¶EXW WKLV LVQRW D6RYLHW-style containment strategy.870  A military containment policy 
ZRXOGLQYROYHLQWHJUDWLQJ&KLQD¶VQHLJKERXUVLQWRDXQLILHGDOOLDQFHV\VWHPDJDLQVW%HLMLQJGHYHORSLQJ
collective defence strategies against China; and pursuing an ideological campaign aimed at 
delegitimising the Chinese state and its governing regime.871  &KLQD¶V PLOLWDU\ PRGHUQLVDWLRQ DQG
general assertiveness along its periphery in the security realm have undoubtedly accelerated the military 
element of the rebalance.  The long-standing practice of technological transfer restrictions on trade with 
China and U.S. pressure on the EU and Israel not to sell weapons to China are two such measures that 
imply military containment or balancing.  In practice, such measures have not altered the general trend 
RI&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJLQIOXHQFHDQGQRUGRWKH\RIIVHWWKe trade, investment and diplomatic policies that 
KDYHFRQWULEXWHGWR&KLQD¶VRYHUDOOULVH872  Alienating U.S. allies and others by forcing them to choose 
China or the United States at a time of relative peace and stability would cost the United States its ability 
to maintain a regional military presence and to build a countering alliance against China if Beijing were 
to become more aggressive in the future.873 
 
The U.S. is not attempting to stall &KLQD¶VFRQWLQXLQJHFRQRPLFJURZWK, which is essential to the global 
economy.  However the U.S. does want to prevent the use of that growing economic power in ways 
unacceptable to the United States.874  A balancing strategy has the core objective of protecting, and 
wherever possible, expanding, U.S. advantages in relative power terms, but without incorporating 
components suggestive of containment.  Safeguarding U.S. hegemony requires Washington to support 
WKH ULVH RI RWKHU SRZHUV DORQJ &KLQD¶V SHULSKHU\ GHHSHQ JOREDOLVDWLRQ LQ VSHFLILF ZD\V WR SURFXUH
enhanced gains for itself and its friends; invest in preserving its military superiority; and, finally, 
revitalise the U.S. economy to sustain its dominance in the new leading sectors of the global 
                                                          
869 See Johnston, Social States. 
870 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 380 & 385. 
871 ƐŚůĞǇ : ? dĞůůŝƐ ?  “ĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ P  h ?^ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĨŽƌ ŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ZŝƐĞ ? ?The 
Washington Quarterly 36, no.4 (2013): 111-112; Phillip C. SaundĞƌƐ ?  “dŚĞh ?^ ? /ƐŶ ?ƚdƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŽŶƚĂŝŶŚŝŶĂ ? ?
Foreign Policy, August 23, 2013. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/the-u-s-isnt-trying-to-contain-china/ 
(accessed November 15, 2015). 
872 ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ? “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? ?110. 
873 ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ? “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? 122. 
874 ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶ dŝĞǌǌŝ ?  “zĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ h^ ŽĞƐ tĂŶƚ ƚŽ ŽŶƚĂŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ  ?^Žƌƚ KĨ ) ? ?The Diplomat, August 8, 2015. 




economy.875  The strategy of nurturing other regional powers along the Asia-Indo-Pacific periphery to 
balance China without containing it, therefore, provides the regional system with the best of both 
ZRUOGV DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ WR OLPLW %HLMLQJ¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU PDOHYROHQFH ZLWKRXW VDFULILFLQJ WKH FRPPRQ
prosperity arising from trade and interdependence.876   
 
A further suggestion is that the U.S. strategy blends engagement with containment/balancing, 
combining military containment with economic engagement.877  A strategy of congagement is 
IUHTXHQWO\GHIHQGHGZLWKFRQIXVLQJVWDWHPHQWV VXFKDV µ:ashington must engage China in order to 
EDODQFHDJDLQVWLWDQGEDODQFHDJDLQVWLWLQRUGHUWRHQJDJHLW¶878  The U.S. military seeks to contain 
China, as demonstrated by the highly offensive Air/Sea Battle operational concept that has emerged in 
response WR &KLQD¶V DQWL-access, anti-denial challenge to American power projection capabilities, 
combined with the increased military presence in the Pacific ± LQ&KLQD¶VEDFN\DUG± over the next 
decade.879  A forward, yet defensive engagement with allies and proxies, deterrence and basing ± 
UHLQYLJRUDWHV $PHULFD¶V SRVLWLRQV RI VWUHQJWK DJDLQVW WKH QH[W ZDYH RI KHJHPRQLF DVSLUDQWV880  
Congagement also infers that Washington is pursuing a strategy of economic engagement, which, it is 
KRSHGZLOOPDNH&KLQDPRUHDPHQDEOHWR$PHULFDQIRUHLJQSROLF\JRDOV+RZHYHU&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJ
wealth will make it harder to contain, as its political and military power develop to match its economic 
power.  In turn, the U.S. is less able to contain China because of the growing economic interdependence 
between them.881  Equally, these approaches downplay the constructive partnership that both 
                                                          
875 Tellis,  “ĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ?-112. 
876 dĞůůŝƐ ? “ĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?113. 
877 :ƵƐƚŝŶ>ŽŐĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚƚŽ ƐŝĂ ? ?Policy Analysis no.717, Cato Institute, January 8, 2013, 
 ? ?>ŽŐĂŶĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĂŚĞĚŐŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?Hedging refers to a decision to make a conser-
vative investment with low but likely returns in order to help cover potential losses from a risky investment with 
high but less likely returns. In the analogy with China policy, the large, risky bet would be trading with China, 
which narrows the relative power gap between the two countries, in the hopes that China will be transformed 
and will not compete with the United States militarily. 
878 ĂŶ ůƵŵĞŶƚŚĂů Ğƚ Ăů ? ?  “ƐŝĂŶ ůůŝĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ?Ɛƚ ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? WƌŽũĞĐƚ  ? ? ? ? /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?August 2011, 5, 
http://project2049.net/documents/Asian_ Alliances_21st_Century.pdf  (accessed November 17, 2015). For 
more on congagement, ƐĞĞ ĂůŵĂǇ <ŚĂůŝůǌĂĚ ?  “ŽŶŐĂŐĞ ŚŝŶĂ ? ? ZE ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ?  ? 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP187.pdf (accessed November 17, 2015). 
879 Defence officials have asserted that tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚ ‘exploit a critical vulnerability ?  ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ
on sea lines of communication. ? Former Pacific Command commander Dennis Blair and China analyst Kenneth 
>ŝĞďĞƌƚŚĂůǁƌŝƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘the United States has employed and will likely in the future continue to use naval blockades 
when necessary ?ǁŝƚŚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?DĂũŽƌ >ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞ^ƉŝŶĞƚƚĂ ?h^& ?  “ ‘dŚĞDĂůĂĐĐĂŝůĞŵŵĂ P ?
ŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ‘^ƚƌŝŶŐŽĨWĞĂƌůƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ>ĂŶĚ-ĂƐĞĚŝƌƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?DdŚĞƐŝƐ ?^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨĚǀĂŶĐĞĚŝƌĂŶĚ^ƉĂĐĞ
Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (June 2006), 
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2006/saas/spinetta.pdf (accessed November 17, 2015); Dennis Blair and 
<ĞŶŶĞƚŚ>ŝĞďĞƌƚŚĂů ? “^ŵŽŽƚŚ^ĂŝůŝŶŐ PdŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ^ŚŝƉƉŝŶŐ>ĂŶĞƐƌĞ^ĂĨĞ ? ?Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 
2007): 12.  
880 ZŽďĞƌƚĚǁŝŶ<ĞůůǇ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƵĂůŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?Geopolitics 15, no. 4 (2010): 718-719. 
881 ƵƌŝŶŐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚyŝ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ‘ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚĂƚƌƵĐĞ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
// ?ƉůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŽďĂĐŬĞŝũŝŶŐ ?ƐďŝĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞŶŵŝŶďŝƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞďĂƐŬĞƚŽĨ/D&ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ƚ
the same time, Washington secured a pledge from Beijing that it would increase contributions to the World Bank 
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Washington and Beijing sHHNLQWKHORQJWHUP%RWKXQGHUVWDQGHDFKRWKHU¶VSRVLWLRQRQPDMRULVVXHV
and work bilaterally on a growing number of areas of global importance.882  U.S.-China strategy is more 
complex than containment or balancing, or blended congagement strategies imply.   
 
7KHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\$PL[HGDSSURDFKWRVHFXULQJ$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\ 
7KH UHEDODQFH VWUDWHJ\ LV WKH SURGXFW RI WKH QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ QDUUDWLYH DQG H[HPSOLILHV 2EDPD¶V
interpretation of exceptionalism that imbues his approach to American leadership and power.  This 
initiative not only seeks to enhance American geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific; it also aims to 
reproduce American identity as the Asia-Pacific power, and deny this role to China.883  It is as much 
DERXWUHSURGXFLQJ$PHULFD¶V$VLD-Pacific identity as it is about geopolitics.  The conception of America 
as the resident Asia-Pacific power provides justification for the normalisation RI$PHULFD¶VFRQWLQXHG
hegemony.  It does not create an Asian identity for the United States.884  The United States, however, is 
not to be one of several Asia-Pacific powers, rather it sees itself, and aspires to remain, the Asia-Pacific 
power.¶885  This conception of being the primary Asia-Pacific power has become even more pronounced 
after the Cold War.886  The refocus on the Asia-3DFLILFVXJJHVWVWKDW$PHULFD¶VFRQFHSWLRQRILWVHOIDV
the resident Asia-Pacific power is enough for it to maintain its military presence in the region.887  
&RQVHTXHQWO\$PHULFDQOHDGHUVKLSµZLOOUHPDLQHVVHQWLDOWRVKDSLQJWKHUHJLRQ¶VORQJ-WHUPWUDMHFWRU\¶
in three critical areas of international relations: enhancing stability and security, facilitating trade and 
                                                          
ĂŶĚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚďĂŶŬƐ ?>ŽŐĂŶ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ WŝǀŽƚ ƚŽƐŝĂ ? ?  ? ? ? ^ŚĂǁŶŽŶŶĂŶ ?  “White 
House Declares TƌƵĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ŽǀĞƌ // ? ? Financial Times, September 27, 2015. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23c51438-64ca-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz4BSKbLAeY (accessed 
November 17, 2015). 
882 There is Sino-American cooperation on a number of global issues, including the Iran nuclear issue, 
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, counter-terrorism, climate change, and epidemic control. Hadley and 
,ĂĞŶůĞ ? “dŚĞĂƚĐŚ-22 in U.S.-Chinese Relations ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƌgovernment-to-government 
ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞƐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?tŝĐŬĞƚƚĞƚĂů ? “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance ? ? ? ?Lieberthal and Wang, 
 “ĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐh ?^ ?-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?executive summary, vi. 
883 See zƵĞŶ&ŽŽŶŐ<ŚŽŶŐ ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? ?ŝŶOxford Handbook 
of the International Relations of Asia, eds. Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
884 ĞƐƉŝƚĞKďĂŵĂ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů Asian credentials, his administration has not successfully convinced Americans of 
its Asia-Pacific identity. US policymakers acting in Southeast Asia of the past often viewed it as a region 
composed of alien and inferior actors. The way in which American exceptionalism reacted with hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific, viewed Asian nations as subordinate, rather than equals.  While the U.S. is deeply embedded in the 
international relations of the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐĂŶĚŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚǇŶĂŵŝƐŵ ?
the United States haƐŶŽƚĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĂŶ ‘ƐŝĂŶ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe 
in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 52. 
885 Khong ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? ?87. 
886 Khong,  “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
887 <ŚŽŶŐ ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? ? ? ?.  
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commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensuring respect of universal rights and 
freedoms.888   
 
2EDPD¶V UHEDODQFH VWUDWHJ\ DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKH FKDQJLQJ JHRSROLWLFDO HQYLURQPHQW LQ WKH $VLD-
Pacific, as a result of the rise of China and India, has LPSOLFDWLRQVIRU$PHULFDQ¶VUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\
The aim is to orient U.S. Asia-Pacific policy towards the re-establishment of existing commitments 
with allies and building new partnerships, based on a less coercive, although not on an entirely equal, 
footing.  The rebalance aspires to redress the imbalance in the American use of power that over the 
course of time has become heavily tilted towards the military, by bringing strategic objectives in line 
with resources, in a period of fiscal constraint.  For key White House and State Department officials, 
therefore, China is only one element of U.S. Asia-3DFLILFSROLF\QRWµWKHGRPLQDQWIRFXVWKDWFRQGLWLRQV
SROLF\ WRZDUGV WKH UHVW RI WKH UHJLRQ¶889  Nevertheless, the rebalance strategy aims to fortify U.S. 
leadership by restraining potential sources of disorder in the Asia-Pacific through its network of 
alliances and partnerships.  India has been encouraged to play a bigger role in regional security and 
politics, as a way to keep China in check.890   
 
As the U.S. tries to shape the economic and strategic environment in which a rising China can operate, 
WKH UHEDODQFH EHFRPHV D VWUDWHJ\ WKDW DW OHDVW IURP &KLQD¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DOVR VHHNV WR FRQWURO WKH
FRQVWUXFWLRQRI&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHURUJUHDWSRZHULGHQWLW\7KHUHIRUHZKLOe the U.S. is not able to 
FRQWDLQ &KLQD¶V SK\VLFDO ULVH WKH 86GRHV ZDQW WR OLPLW WKH LPSDFW RI &KLQD¶V ULVH RQ $PHULFD¶V
KHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\E\VKDSLQJWKHGLVFRXUVHZLWKLQZKLFK&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\operates.  By 
constructing China as the threatening other, by depriving China of its subjectivity, the U.S. is attempting 
WRVKDSHWKHQDWXUHRI&KLQD¶VULVHWKDWFRQIRUPVZLWK$PHULFD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDW&KLQDVKRXOG
EH7KHREMHFWLILFDWLRQRI&KLQDVXVWDLQVWKHGRPLQDQFHRI$PHULFDQµVHOI¶Ln its hegemonic identity. 
 
Critical to the rebalance is the recovery of American prestige in Southeast Asia, demonstrated by the 
fostering of cooperation in areas of traditional and non-traditional security, and trade through bilateral, 
pluri-lateral and multilateral engagement.  The rebalance also acknowledges the roles that a variety of 
large and small actors play in the region, which is substantiated by the deepening of relations with and 
                                                          
888 The White House, National Security Strategy, February 2015, 24. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed June 26, 
2016). 
889 Wickett et al,  “The Asia-Pacific Power Balance ? ? ? ? ?<ƵƌƚĂŵƉďĞůůĂŶĚůǇZĂƚŶĞƌ ? “&ĂƌĂƐƚĞƌŶWƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ PtŚǇ
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƐŝĂ ? ?Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014): 106-116. 
890 The U.S. is facilitating regional allies to develop and enhance partnerships and strategic links with each other 
that could oppose China.  GoldstĞŝŶ ? “,ŽǁŚŝŶĂƐĞĞƐŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐDoves in Asia ? ? 
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between allies and partners and with ASEAN.  The primary driver, however, is the need to extend 
economic and strategic ties across Southeast Asia and to develop better connectivity with India in South 
Asia with a view to reinvigorating the domestic basis of American power.  The TPP represents the route 
to restoring AmeriFDQJOREDOOHDGHUVKLSWKURXJKHFRQRPLFYLWDOLW\VLQFHµSRZHUDQGLQIOXHQFHIROORZ
PRQH\¶891  The TPP is said to be strategically and economically mutually beneficial to regional 
partners, who would have enhanced access to the U.S. market for their products, and availing the U.S. 
of capital, high-value added services, and high-technology goods.892   
 
Through the TPP, Washington is attempting to shape future regional trade by promoting American 
WUDGHVWDQGDUGVWKDWVHHNWRUHJXODWH&KLQD¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGVWUHQJWKHQ$PHULFD¶VFRPSHWLWLYHSRZHU
&KLQD¶V H[FOXVLRQ IURP 733 VXJJHVWV WKH 86 LV VHHNLQJ WR FUHDWH QHZ QRUPV ZLWKRXW &KLQD¶V
SDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGDFWLYHO\REVWUXFWLQJ&KLQDIURPLQIOXHQFLQJUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
active (if ineffective) discouragement of its allies from joining the China-led AIIB reinforces this 
view.893  U.S. executive policy statements on China have two, often contradictory, aims: they seek to 
UHDVVXUH%HLMLQJWKDW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VLQWHQWLRQVDUHEHQLJQDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKH\VHek to reassure 
WKH$PHULFDQSXEOLFDQG$PHULFDQDOOLHVWKDWWKH86ZLOOQRWDOORZ&KLQD¶VULVHWRWKUHDWHQ$PHULFDQ
LQWHUHVWV7KLVFRPELQDWLRQSURGXFHVZKDW&KLQHVHDQDO\VLVSHUFHLYHWREHµVXJDU-FRDWHGWKUHDWV¶894  
:LWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI $PHULFD¶V µ&KLQD WKUHDW¶ QDUUDWLYH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V IUHTXHQW GHQLDOV WKDW WKH
rebalance is not a containment strategy have not alleviated, and are not likely to alleviate, Chinese 
concerns, nor convinced regional allies.895    
 
&RQIURQWLQJWKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHSUHVHQWVWR$PHULFDQVHFXULW\RIVHOIVHUYHVDVDµOLWPXVWHVWRI
86FUHGLELOLW\RQWRORJLFDO VHFXULW\DQG LGHQWLW\¶896  Should the U.S. fail to stand up to the China 
                                                          
891 /Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ E&W ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? 'ĂůĂ ǁĂƌĚƐ ŝŶŶĞƌ ? <Ăƌů t ? ŝŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŽƵƌƉŽǁĞƌ ?/ƚƉĂǇƐĨŽƌŽƵƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?/ƚƵŶĚĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŽƵƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ. It taps 
the potential of our people and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century 
ĂƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĂƐǁĞĚŝĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ ? ?<Ăƌůt ?ŝŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “dŚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞhƐĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWŽǁĞƌ PĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐďƌŽĂĚ ? ?American Foreign Policy Interests 34, no. 5 (2012): 229-230. 
892 dĞůůŝƐ ? “ĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?114. 
893 ĞŶŐ ŚĞŶŐŚƵŝ ?  “/Ɛ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽŶƚĂŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ ? ?The National Interest, April 6, 2015. 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-trying-contain-china-12555 (accessed June 26, 2016). 
894 EĂƚŚĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐŽďĞůů ? “,ŽǁŚŝŶĂ^ĞĞƐŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?
895 Key members of the administration have repeatedly tried to reassure China.  See Daniel R. Russel,  “dĞƐtimony 
bĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ŽŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĨĨĂŝƌƐ ^ƵďĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ŽŶ ƐŝĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? tashington, DC, 
February 5, 2014. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm (accessed November 17, 2015). In 
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐKďĂŵĂ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚǀŝƐŝƚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ŚĞƐŽƵŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƚŽ ‘ĚĞďƵŶŬƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ QƚŚĂƚŽƵƌƉŝǀŽƚ
to Asia is about containing China. ?dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in 
Joint Press Conference, ? Beijing, China, November 12, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference (accessed 
November 15, 2015). 
896 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 93. 
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threat, it would no longer seem committed to, nor have the resolve for, the security and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific.897  Pan observes that aQµLQWHOOHFWXDOEOLQGQHVV¶RQWKHSDUWRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶V&KLQDWKUHDW
DQDO\VWVLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHNH\SDUWWKH\SOD\LQWKHVSLUDOPRGHORIµWLW-for-WDW¶LQ6LQR-U.S. relations, 
FUHDWHV µD VHOI-fulfilling, self-productive and self-SHUSHWXDWLQJ SRZHUIXO PRGH RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶898  
Consequently, the perception of the rebalance has developed into a strategy for containing any aspect 
RI&KLQD¶VULVH*LYLQJVSDFHWRDOWHUQDWLYHQDUUDWLYHV, Obama has been unable, or unwilling, to change 
the dominant domestic narrative on China from one of threat, and instead has perpetuated that narrative, 
to capture the attention of the domestic political audience.   
 
In the age of Obama, the narrative of exceptionalism is a more influential political force in U.S. 
domestic politics than at any other point in U.S. history.899  However, the domestic debate on American 
H[FHSWLRQDOLVPKDVLQFUHDVLQJO\IRFXVHGRQ&KLQD¶VULVHDVDWKUHDWWR$PHULFDQVHFXULW\DQGVXVWDLQLQJ
$PHULFD¶VKHJemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific.  The rebalance strategy has further heightened the 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVLQWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VH[FHSWLRQDOLVWQDUUDWLYHZKLFKHPSKDVLVHVWKHLGHDOVRI
American uniqueness and superiority, whilst conceding to the practical requirement of burden-sharing, 
asking its regional partners (in the Asia-Pacific and Europe) to shore up American hegemony.  
$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDOOLEHUDOKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\UHPDLQVWKHFHQWUDOLGHDGULYLQJLWVVWUDWHJLFYLVLRQDQG
action in the Asia-Pacific.  However, while the logic of the rules-based liberal order retains global 
VXSSRUWRQWKHZKROHWKH86LVVWULYLQJWRUHPDLQWKHµRZQHUDQGRSHUDWRU,¶VXSSRUWLQJWKHUXOHVDQG
institutions of liberal internationalism and continuing to provide military security that helps maintain 
open markets and stability, whilst simultaneously recognising the limits of its power to act alone.900   
 
Conclusion 
Completing the theoretical framework of the thesis, this chapter has sought to make explicit how the 
co-constitutive processes that reinforce American exceptionalist ideology, national security and 
hegemonic identity interconnect to create a convincing threat narrative allowing for specific foreign 
policy behaviour as a means to protect hegemonic order.  µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ KDV EHHQ SUHVHQWHG DV WKH
biggest threat to American security in the Asia-Pacific.  <HW WKH QRWLRQ RI µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ contains 
SK\VLFDODQGLGHDWLRQDOFRQGLWLRQVWKDWKDYHOHGWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶DVWKUHDWHQLQJWRWKH
                                                          
897 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 93. 
898 Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, 105-6. 
899 Brooks, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Obama, 125.  
900 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 2. ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
order, which focuses specifically whether the U.S. can continue to maintain the legitimacy of the current order 
ĂŶĚ ǁŚǇ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŚĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƌĞĂĚŝůǇ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞ ŝŶƚŽ ƌĞŐŝŽnal dominance of hegemony. Goh, The 
Struggle for Order, 19. 
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United States.  A constructivist approach facilitates the examination of the production and reproduction 
of identity, security, threat constructions and narratives in a continuous and co-constituted cycle.   
 
$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ LV IXVHGZLWK WKH$PHULFDQEHOLHI in its exceptionalism.  Not only is 
American exceptionalism an essential component of American identity, it is also implicitly exhibited in 
American foreign policy ± through notions of leading by example and the mission to export American 
values of democracy and human rights.  The processes that produce hegemonic identity are also critical 
to the normative foundations of the American hegemonic order.  Obama has attempted to recalibrate 
U.S. foreign policy through his interpretation of exceptionalism that emphasises engagement, burden-
sharing and leading by example, requiring a globally shared vision of U.S. foreign policy objectives.  
Yet, his approach to U.S. hegemony, by appearing to disaggregate hegemony from primacy, has added 
to the insecurity being felW LQ $PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ OHDGLQJ WR TXHVWLRQV DERXW LWV JOREDO
purpose and leadership role.  µ6HFXULW\¶ therefore, it not simply a physical condition of security-for-
survival.  There is also security-of-being ± DVWDWH¶Vontological security ± which in its most base form, 
is WKHVHFXULW\RIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\   
 
Ontological security has been further separated here into conditions of being ± through ideas of self and 
other ± and doing ± managing continuity, through routinised practice, and change.  This chapter has 
argued that D VWDWH¶V FRQFHUQV DERXW LWV RQWRORJLFDO VHFXULW\ DUH RIWHQ SROLWLFDOO\ PRELOLVHG DQG
normalised into concerns of survival through narrative.  Storytelling creates a plot that sequentially 
structures a series of events into a coherent whole; it defines the characters, gives meaning to the rules 
of behaviour, sets the context, and ultimately can determine a specific course of action.  The national 
security narrative, in particular LV PDGH µUHDO¶ WKURXJK WKH QDWLRQDO VHFurity documentation that 
elucidates SRWHQWLDODQGµUHDO¶WKUHDWVWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHµ&KLQDULVH¶QDUUDWLYHQRWRQO\GHILQHV
how China is understood by the United States, but also determines how the U.S. understands China's 
rising power identity in UHODWLRQ WR$PHULFD¶VRZQLGHQWLW\ This narrative is connected to both the 
physical and ontological security of the United States.  China is increasingly represented as DµUHDO¶
threat to the U.S. through its cyber, military and economic policies.  However these threats are a physical 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHSUHVHQWVWR$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\ rather that a threat 
to the survival of the United States  $PHULFD¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V ULVLQJ SRZHU LGHQWLW\ LQ
relation to its RZQ KHJHPRQ\ LGHQWLW\ FRQWUDGLFWV &KLQD¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI LWV µULVH¶ RU µUHYLYDO¶
&KLQD¶V LQFUHDVLQJO\ VHOI-DVVXUHGQHVV RQ WKH JOREDO VWDJH FDQ DOVR EH FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK $PHULFD¶V




The rebalance strategy draws together the two critical aspects of hegemony outlined in the theoretical 
framework ± order and identity.  The subsequent three empirical chapters use Barnett DQG'XYDOO¶V
taxonomy of power as the analytical framework to animate WKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSURGXFWLRQRI
American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  Informed by the theoretical framework, the following chapters 
initially show how the rebalance exemplifies the ongoing production of the social structures of 
hegemonic order, including aspects of coercion and consent, and the search to maintain legitimacy from 
the subordinate states for the current order.  Since hegemonic order and identity are mutually dependent, 
the rebalance strategy is also viewed here as a foreign policy outcome of these interrelated identity, 
security and narrative processes.  The subsequent chapters then emphasise the role of the rebalance as 
DPHDQVWRVHFXUH$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\LQUHODWLRQWRVHOIDQGWR&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\
In this sense, the U.S. is attempting to reproduce its hegemonic role identity in the Asia-Pacific, also 
reproducing the normative foundations of its hegemonic order, while seeking to control the narrative 
boundaries within which China rises.  The rebalance LVDOVRDQH[SUHVVLRQRI$PHULFD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
RI &KLQD¶V ULVH DV D SK\VLFDO WKUHDW WR $PHULFDQ KHJHPRQ\ DV PDQLIHVWHG E\ &KLQD¶V LQFUHDVLQJO\
assertive behaviour in the region.  This narrative flows into collective identity formation processes as a 
means to maintain social cohesion. 
 
In its role as regional hegemon, the U.S. has an as yet unmatched range of power assets at its disposal 
which it uses to maintain the structure and character of order.  American exercise of power is direct and 
indirect; it is consensual and coercive; it is manifested materially and is inherent in language and 
meaning; it also has the capacity to generate behaviour that complies with the rules of hegemonic order.  
The U.S.-led order is also internalised by subordinate states to varying degrees.  What is considered in 
the following chapters is the purpose behind the exercise of American power in the Asia-Pacific.  Each 
chapter takes an aspect of the rebalance strategy and examines how the U.S. exercises various forms of 
power simultaneously to maintain order and to secure its hegemonic identity.  The features of hegemony 
outlined here ± as the production of hegemonic order and hegemonic identity ± are identifiable themes 
within each chapter, and continually intersect with the subsequent examination of the American exercise 




Rebalancing Asia-Pacific Security  
 
As the U.S. sets about shaping the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration 
has relied on the exercise of compulsory and institutional power to reproduce regional hegemonic order 
by means of the rebalance strategy.901  U.S. regional hegemony relies on its ability to underpin regional 
security through its military aptitude and leadership as a way to maintain social cohesion.   This chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. does not impose regional order on the basis of coercive military 
power.  Instead, there is evidence to show that a majority of states in the region give their consent to 
the U.S. military presence, and to the alliance system operating since 1945.  Furthermore, many regional 
allies reinforce U.S. regional hegemony, soliciting increased U.S. military engagement and a 
strengthening and development of the alliance system pursued by the Obama administration.   
 
,QOLQHZLWK*UDPVFL¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHKHJHPRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRSUHVHUYHLGHRORJLFDOFRQWURO, I explore 
how the alliances with the United States have been assimilated into the post-war identities of Japan and 
South Korea.  In addition, there is focus on the way in which the U.S. deliberately XVHVLWVµ&KLQDULVH¶
narrative to align with, give voice to, and coordinate, fears and concerns FUHDWHGE\&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHU
that are present across the Asia-Pacific region.  Finally, an effective way for a hegemon to derive 
consent by subordinate states is through its commitment to regional multilateral institutions.  
&RQVHTXHQWO\2EDPD¶VDWWHPSWVWRHPSKDVLVHDQGVWUHQJWKHQ86FRPPLtments to ASEAN and the 
East Asian Summit, as a means to extend its influence and to steer the direction of regionally-instigated 
order-building activities, is examined in some depth.      
 
This chapter focuses on three specifics of the military rebalance strategy.  The first two aspects of the 
military rebalance demonstrate the American use of its compulsory power.  As the most critical aspect 
of U.S. security hegemony, and the core of the American-led regional security architecture, 
consideration is first given to how the alliance structure with key regional allies, Japan, South Korea 
and Australia, are being adapted to meet contemporary regional security threats and to ensure their 
ongoing support for the existing regional security order.  The second aspect of compulsory power 
                                                          
901 dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌŝƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞ ?
narrative, and the American use of productive power in more detail.  Instead, the American use of productive 
power is inferred through its framing of regional security issues as being directly and indirectly linked ƚŽĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
regional activities, with the twin goals of moulding China into a responsible regional player, while dissuading it 




concerns the efforts to transform relations between U.S. allies.  Under the Obama administration, time 
and energy has been expended on facilitating the development of pluri-lateral relationships between 
American alliance partners, and with other strategic partners, including India.  These networks are 
VLJQLILFDQWEHFDXVHWKH\FUHDWHZHEVEHWZHHQWKHH[LVWLQJVSRNHVLQWKHµKXEDQGVSRNHV¶VWUXFWXUHRI
U.S. alliances.  Not only do these nascent arrangements conform to the norms of American security 
arrangements, they also strengthen interoperability between U.S. partners, which, it is hoped in the 
longer term, will deter China from challenging U.S. regional hegemony in the security sphere.   
 
The third aspect of the military balance relates to the American use of institutional power.  The Asia-
3DFLILFUHJLRQ¶VPXOWLODWHUDOIRUXPVSUHVHQWDFKDOOHQJLQJHQYLURQPHQWWKURXJKZKLFKWKH86DWWHPSWV
WRLQIOXHQFHWKHGLUHFWLRQRIUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\:DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK$VLD-Pacific regional 
institutions with a security remit has been at best ambivalent.  Despite this backdrop, the Obama 
administration has been keen to develop better relationships with two key regional security institutions, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).  Engaging with regional 
institutions is viewed as a way to build confidence among Asia-Pacific states of U.S. intentions to 
sustain its regional presence, and also, to influence the direction of regional multilateral security.  The 
intention to rebalance concerns maintaining American superiority and the existing balance of power in 
regional security.   
 
The Asia-Pacific sub-regional context 
The sub-regional division of the Indo-Asia-Pacific expanses into Northeast, Southeast and South Asia 
was a practical bureaucratic necessity for the Pentagon and State Department, and a result of the Cold 
War geopolitical situation.  Northeast and Southeast Asian (collectively East Asia) post-war 
experiences were shaped by the preponderant military power of the United States, exercising a form of 
µORQJ-GLVWDQFH OHDGHUVKLS¶ WKDW DOORZHG LW WR H[HUFLVH GHFLVLYH LQIOXHQFH RYHU WKH GHYHORSPHQWDO
trajectory of the entire region.902  During the early 1950s, the U.S. established a series of defence 
partnerships in key strategic position across the Asia-3DFLILF 7KH µ6DQ)UDQFLVFRV\VWHP¶RI86-
sponsored politico-military bilateral alliances stretching across the Asia-Pacific that developed during 
the 1950s remains an enduring feature of the post-Cold War regional security architecture.    
 
                                                          
902 DĂƌŬĞĞƐŽŶĂŶĚŝĂŶĞ^ƚŽŶĞ ? “WĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ P^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ? ?The Pacific Review 
27, no. 4 (2014): 509. 
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0XFKRI(DVW$VLD¶VVHFXULW\DUFKLWHFWXUHZDVGHILQHGE\WKHSRVW-war and Cold War context, with U.S. 
strategic focus on Northeast Asia, particularly on Japan and the Korean Peninsula, from the late 1940s.  
In the 1970s, following the normalisation of relations with China, the unsettled status of Taiwan, neither 
officially recognised as a sovereign state, nor as part of the PRC, led to the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 
which provided Taiwan with U.S. military protection against attack or military intervention from 
Beijing.903  In Southeast Asia, the U.S. strategic presence was formalised through defence treaties with 
the Philippines (1951) and Thailand (1954).  From the 1960s, U.S. attention was drawn to containing 
the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.  The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 significantly reduced 
U.S. involvement in South East Asia.  Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. signed the ANZUS 
GHIHQFH WUHDW\ ZLWK $XVWUDOLD DQG 1HZ =HDODQG   1HZ =HDODQG¶V $1=86 membership was 
VXVSHQGHGLQIROORZLQJWKH1HZ=HDODQGJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIXVDOWRDOORZthe U.S. Navy to harbour 
its nuclear warships LQ 1HZ =HDODQG¶V WHUULWRULDO ZDWHUV.  Nevertheless, New Zealand, along with 
Australia, plays a key role in maintaining stability across the Southwestern Pacific, with both supporting 
an active U.S. security presence in the region.904   
 
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. strategic presence is less formal.  Involvement in South Asia 
during the Cold War was mainly limited to a quasi-strategic relationship with Pakistan on an issue-by-
issue basis, as the U.S. sought to contain Soviet influence in South Asia.  The G.W. Bush administration 
viewed engagement with Pakistan as critical to fighting the war on terrorism.  Under the Obama 
administration, attempts have been made to demonstrate U.S. commitments to U.S.-Pakistan strategic 
ties.  Strengthening the U.S²Pakistan relationship has been severely hampered by the American 
extraction of Osama bin Laden from his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, without permission, and 
American accusations that Islamabad is not committed to eradicating Islamic terrorist activities along 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.905  Following independence, India adhered to a non-alignment policy, 
although consistently maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.906  
                                                          
903 Shirley A. Kan, ŚŝŶĂ ?dĂŝǁĂŶ PǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ “KŶĞŚŝŶĂ ?WŽůŝĐǇ ?Key Statements from Washington, 
Beijing, and Taipei (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2014), 1. 
904 As part of the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration has re-established close defence and security 
cooperation with New Zealand. The New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, has also sought to restore bilateral 
relations with Washington. The desire to strengthen relations is demonstrated by the signing of the Wellington 
Declaration (2010) and the Washington Declaration on Defence Cooperation (2012), which opened the way for 
further enhanced strategic dialogue and defence cooperation and included the lifting of the ban on New Zealand 
naval ship visits. High level U.S. officials have since made trips to New Zealand, including the then U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, Leon Panetta, in September 2012, and Vice President Joe Biden in July 2016. See Bruce Vaughn, New 
Zealand: U.S. Security Cooperation and the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia Strategy (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, March 8, 2013), 1-2. 
905 K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 114th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, May 14, 2015), 2. 




U.S. strategic relations with India have improved since the end of the Cold War, formalised by the U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Agreement (2005) and the Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation 
(2006), and further expanded through operational and defence cooperation activities, such as the annual 
U.S-Indian Malabar naval exercises.   
 
As the regional security architecture has started to adapt to the realities of post-Cold War geopolitics, 
various overlapping regional collective security mechanisms have come to exist alongside the San 
Francisco alliance system.  Figure 1 highlights the overlapping regional institutions and memberships 
encompassing the Asia-Pacific.  There is no single regional collective security institution encompassing 
all Asia-Pacific sub-regions.  Instead, the Asia-Pacific has a relatively underdeveloped collective 
security architecture with institutions having varying remits, and including diverse memberships.  The 
µKXE-and-VSRNHV¶DOOLDQFHV\VWHPRSHUDWHVDORQJVLGHWKHEURDGO\ LQFOXVLYHDQGUHJLRQDOO\-developed 
East Asian collective security mechanisms, primarily advocating dialogue and confidence-building 
measures, through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT).  Despite the 
existence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) ± an institution, which, 
on paper, has economic and geopolitical responsibilities, in practice, South Asian security has primarily 
been defined by tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations.   
 
Constructing a 21st century regional security architecture 
The U.S. has underpinned regional stability through its regional guarantees since 1945.  Yet, Asia-
Pacific security has been in a state of flux since the end of the 1990s.  Into the twenty-first century, 
regional geopolitics are defined by a rise in nationalism, asymmetric economic competition, increasing 
military modernisation, nuclear proliferation and threats to the global commons (air and maritime) in 
the East and South China Seas.907  Security challenges across the Indo-Asia-Pacific are no longer 
FRQILQHG WR WKUHDWV WR D VWDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG WHUULWRU\ ZLWK QRQ-traditional threats increasing in 
scope.908  With the shift in what constitutes a security threat, interaction between states in the region 
                                                          
907 dƐƵƚŽŵƵ<ŝŬƵĐŚŝ ? “dŚĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚZŽůĞŽĨZĞŐŝŽŶĂůƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶZĞŐŝŽŶĂůZĞƐƉŽŶƐes 
to the Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific, Chatham House, November 7, 2014. 
908 Ed^ ŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ  ‘ƚŚŽƐĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĞƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůĂŶĚǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƐĂŶĚ
states that arise primarily out of non-military sources such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious 
diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational 
ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŶŽŶ-ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
definition of traditional security issues, so traditional security may also include energy security and cyber 
security. Mely Caballero-ŶƚŚŽŶǇĂŶĚůŝƐƚĂŝƌ ? ?ŽŽŬ ? “Ed^&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ?ŝŶNon-Traditional Security in Asia: 
Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2013), especially 1-5. 
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has changed, as they face common threats that go beyond national boundaries and require transnational 
solutions.909   
 
The security environment in the Asia-Pacific offers the United States the opportunity to change 
incentives and promote better integrated capabilities among allies and partners as they adapt to new 
security challenges.910  From the American strategic view, adherence to a strict separation of sub-
regions, sandwiched between the vast Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become less vital, with growing 
economic interdependence and the blurring of traditional and non-traditional security threats requiring 
a broader regional focus.911  The adoption of the rebalance strategy confirmed that the Asia-Pacific, or 
broader Indo-Asia-Pacific, region is emerging as a critical element of contemporary international 
relations and a crucial component of American global strategy that supports American core interests.912   
Consequently, the rebalance strategy was introduced as a comprehensive American response to reviving 
American hegemony at a time of intensifying geopolitical change in the Asia-Pacific region by further 
embedding the U.S. strategic presence.913   
 
The reorientation of U.S. policy towards the Asia-Pacific started in the mid-V DQG 2EDPD¶V
rebalance strategy adopts and extends many of the policies initiated by the G.W. Bush administration.914  
The rebalance represents minor physical and doctrinal updates ± an internal restructure ± in U.S. military 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific, rather than a transformation in strategic aims.915  The aim of the 
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office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific (accessed May 14, 2016). 
910 Sean Kay,  “Rebalancing and the Role of Allies and Partners: Europe, NATO and the Future of American 
>ĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ŝŶAugmenting Our Influence: Alliance Revitalisation and Partner Development, ed. John R. Deni 
(U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2014), 70. 
911 The 2015 E^^ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĂƉŝĚ ƉĂĐĞ ŽĨ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŚĂƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ‘as 
interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, 
ƉĂŶĚĞŵŝĐ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?The White House, National Security Strategy, 
Washington, DC, February 2015, 4. 
912 US core interests include: defending the U.S. homeland from emerging regional threats (i.e., long-range 
Chinese and burgeoning North Korean nuclear weapons systems); preventing great power wars (such as 
between China and Japan) that could spill over to undermine U.S. strategic and economic viability; maintaining 
allies security; preventing or at least containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ensuring an 
open and liberal international trading system; and advancing democracy. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, 
 “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PĞďĂƚŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ&ƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂƚŚ P'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞEĞǆƚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂtion, eds. 
Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Century, May 2012), 8. 
913  dŽǁ ? “WƵƌƐƵŝŶŐh ?^ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ PWŝǀŽƚŝŶŐǁĂǇĨƌŽŵŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
914 EŝŶĂ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ Ph ?^ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?International 
Security 40, no. 4 (2016): 46. 
915 Janine DaviĚƐŽŶ ?  “ZĞƚƌĞŶĐŚ Žƌ ZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ĞĨĞŶĐĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ŚĂƚŚĂŵ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?
(September 2014), 6. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/retrench-or-rebalance (accessed September 
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reorientation, initiated by the G.W. Bush administration and continued by the Obama administration, is 
to preserve the existing power balance in the region, underpinned by U.S. hegemony and therefore to 
dissuade China from competing for that role.916   
 
The doctrinal shift of the rebalance involves updating the types of threat and responses to those threats 
that the Pentagon expects to encounter in the Asia-Pacific in the future.917  The Quadrennial Defense 
Review (2014) outlines a deliberate shift in tactical arrangements towards air/sea battle and anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) and potential for traditional competition between two near-peer 
competitors.918  Consequently, the Pentagon is prioritising investment in technologies to counter high-
end warfare and near-peer competitors, including in A2/AD capabilities.919  The Joint Operational 
Access Concept (JOAC), alongside the classified Air-Sea Battle concept (ASB) form a military strategy 
that gives preference to methods that counter the A2/AD capabilities of a rival.920  The updated strategy 
encourages interoperability between different services and use of dispersed forces in several bases to 
RSHUDWHLQµPXOWLSOHLQGHSHQGHQWOLQHVRIRSHUDWLRQIURPVWUDWHJLFGLVWDQFH¶921  Consequently, the U.S. 
military is undergoing retraining and modernisation, with investment in nuclear and cyber technologies, 
infrastructure and force structure, unmanned air and undersea systems, missile defence and an 11-carrier 
QDY\UHTXLUHGWRVXVWDLQ$PHULFD¶VJOREDOSUHVHQFH922  The JOAC and ASB concepts underscore the 
                                                          
9, 2016). The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) sets out that US interactions with China, as the ascendant 
state with the capacity to compete with the US, are long term and multi-ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂů ?dŚĞŐŽĂůŝƐƚŽ ‘ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞ
near term challenges whilĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂŶĚĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐh^ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐ ? ?^ĞĞNational Defense Strategy 
(2008): 10. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=154949  (accessed May 14, 
2016). 
916 According to Silove, the 2001 Defense Strategic Review  ?ŶŽƚƉƵďůŝĐĂůůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ )ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽh ?^ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ?57. The NDS also set out 
that to sustain American hegemony, deterrence and dissuasion against potential competitors will be applied. 
See Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (March 2005): 4. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=10986 (accessed May 14, 2016) and National Defense Strategy (2008), 
10. 
917 The current commitmeŶƚŝƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ‘ ? ?ƐƚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐh ?^ ?ĨŝƐĐĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ?The 
QDR (2014) focuses on the need to counter numerous future threats, from non-state extremists and terrorists, 
to near-peer adversaries with sophisticated high-end military capabilities. There is a substantial emphasis on 
modernisation and a shift towards HADR missions to counteract global trends including climate change. 
ĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ ? “ZĞƚƌĞŶĐŚŽƌZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?2-6. 
918 ZŽďĞƌƚ ?<ĞůůǇ ? “dŚĞ ‘ƉŝǀŽƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?The Pacific Review 
27, no. 3 (2014): 492.  
919 Anti-access/area denial involves strategies that seek to prevent an adversary from accessing territory and 
preventing them from using technologies deny your defence of that land.   
920 The ASB concept aims to ensure continued freedom of manoeuvre for the U.S. in the Western Pacific. See 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? “EĞǁh ?^ ?DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽŶĐĞƉƚDĂƌŬƐWŝǀŽƚƚŽ^ĞĂĂŶĚŝƌ ? ?Strategic 
Comments 18, no. 20 (May 2012). See also, U.S. Department of Defense, The Joint Operational Access Concept 
(JOAC) (U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, January 17, 2012), 27. 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%202012_signed.pdf  (accessed November 10, 2014) 
921 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept, 27.  
922 In 2016, the U.S. military budget is approximately $612 billion.  See 




the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. security interests, whilst recognising that that the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans represent a potential flashpoint for future conflict.   
 
Strengthening regional security through the rebalance  
The first goal of the rebalance is to maintain the superiority of the existing alliance structure in the Asia-
Pacific, by upgrading military hardware (particularly air/naval) and forward presence via its regional 
network of bases and port accesses.923  There is acknowledgement in the White House that the traditional 
bilateral security alliances must be adapted to meet structural changes occurring in the region, and must 
also meet American needs to reduce military spending.   A priority of the rebalance has been to 
rebalance within the Asia-Pacific, by intensifying the forward presence in South and Southeast Asia, 
through deepening and developing strategic relations with Australia, Singapore, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam, and India.924  By moving assets towards Southeast Asia, and potentially South 
Asia in the future, the aim, consistent with U.S. strategic interests, is to protect the sea lanes and promote 
responsible norms of maritime behaviour.  
 
The second goal of the rebalance is to encourage U.S. regional allies to promote their own self-defence 
and resilience in the longer term to support the critically important economic stability of the region.  In 
this way, the U.S. seeks to reduce its financial costs of providing regional security, and create a network 
of allies with interoperable capabilities.  Washington supports the expansion of selected multilateral 
UHJLRQDOJURXSLQJVDVµVSHFLDOLVHGDJHQWVIRUFKDQJHDQGGHYHORSPHQW¶925  The Obama administration 
has been particularly supportive of infusing mini-lateral (or pluri-lateral) security diplomacy into its 
existing regional alliance frameworks and related security partnerships to create networks.926 Under this 
                                                          
923 According to DOD 2014 data, Japan has 215 sites, South Korea, 86. Japan has 54, 845 personnel, South Korea, 
33 697, Australia 166 personnel, Guam has 9 650 personnel, Singapore, 210 and Thailand, 108. Department of 
Defense, Base Structure Report, FY 2014 Baseline. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY14.pdf (accessed August 3, 
2015). 
924 The 2010 QDR outlined the expansion of rotational marine deployments to Darwin, littoral combat ships 
docking in Singapore, the reopening of the Subic base in the Philippines, re-posturing 60% of the US Navy to the 
region by 2020, missile defence assets to Japan, and new access and cooperation agreements with the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. US capabilities on Guam, in Alaska and Hawaii have also been augmented to 
reduce US vulnerability to Chinese missile forces.  
925 William T. Tow and H. ?W ?ŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific: Can 
ŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶƚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇtŽƌŬ ? ? IFANS Review 19, no. 2 (December 2011): 53. 
926 The development of pluri-lateral arrangements has generated a subtle process of bilateral-multilateral co-
existence or what Victor Cha has labelled  ‘Ă  “ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬ ? ŽĨ ďŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ? ƉůƵƌŝ-lateral, and multilateral 
arrangements and instrumentalities ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Victor D. ŚĂ ? “ŽŵƉůĞǆWĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬƐ Ph ?^ ?ůůŝĂŶĐĞƐĂƐWĂƌƚŽĨ
ƐŝĂ ?ƐZĞŐŝŽŶĂůƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?Asia Policy 11 (2011): 27-50.  
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PXOWLODWHUDOSRVWXUHRIµVSHFLDOLVDWLRQ¶WKHVXUYLYDODQGUHOHYDQFHRIWKH86 bilateral alliance system 
remains central for realising longer term convergent security objectives.927  Moreover, the goal is not 
HYHQWXDOPLOLWDU\LQGHSHQGHQFHIURP:DVKLQJWRQ,QVWHDG:DVKLQJWRQ¶VHPSKDVLVRQSXUVXLQJµVKDUHG
REMHFWLYHV¶ LQ UHJLRQDO VHFXULW\ SROLWLFV VHOHFWV µWKH EHVW IURP ERWK WKH ELODWHUDO DQG PXOWLODWHUDO
ZRUOGV¶928  By encouraging the development of networks of American allies, with enhanced capabilities 
and greater interoperability with one another, the strengths of these relationships and commitments 
between the allies would complement U.S. capabilities, and deter potential adversaries.929  This move 
also secures consent from U.S. allies for the continuing operation of the alliance system, thereby 
consolidating regional hegemonic order.    
 
7KHWKLUGJRDORIWKHUHEDODQFHFRQFHUQVWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VPRUHYLVLEOHDQGPRUHH[WHQVLYH
involvement in multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific.930  The 2010 National Security Strategy 
underscored the importance of regional order-building, engagement, and collaboration as the preferred 
options for building long-term regional stability.931  Adding an intensified diplomatic element to the 
rebalance, and in a series of confidence-EXLOGLQJPHDVXUHVWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVLJQHG$6($1¶V7UHDty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in July 2009, the precondition for membership of the East Asia 
Summit (EAS), formally joining the organisation, with President Obama in attendance, in November 
2011.  Highlighting the importance of ASEAN, President Obama also appointed the first resident 
American ambassador to ASEAN, Nina Hachigian, to formally represent U.S. interests, and to glean 
insider knowledge, in this forum with an exclusively Southeast Asian membership.932  In February 2016, 
President Obama also convened the first U.S.-ASEAN summit held in the United States.  It was a 
significant step for U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, which has historically prioritised Northeast East Asian 
                                                          
927 Reflecting the changing nature of bilateral alliance security politics, the old defence burden-sharing debates, 
for example, will assume new forms that accentuate niche areas of collaboration and require higher levels of 
allied commitment to the U.S. strategic doctrine and postures (i.e. the new ASB concept). Tow and ŶǀĂůů ? “The 
U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific, ?68. 
928 Pluri-lateral or mini-lateral arrangements involve three or four states meeting and interacting informally to 
discuss issue-areas involving mutual threats, or, more often, to go over specific tasks related to building regional 
stability and order. The U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and a resurgence of trilateral 
consultations between American, Japanese, and South Korean officials at side-talks during Shangri-La Dialogues 
and in other informal but important multilateral forums have become important foundations for increasing 
interoperability. dŽǁĂŶĚŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?62. 
929 ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
930 Tow and ŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific ? ?55-56. 
931 <ĂƌĞŶĞzŽƵŶŐ ?  “KďĂŵĂZĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƐEĂƚional Security Strategy, looks beyond Military DŝŐŚƚ ? ?Washington 
Post, May 27, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html  (accessed August 2, 2015). 
932 Washington has played a role in shaping the agenda for the ASEAN DefencĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐA? ?Žƌ “DD
WůƵƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐďŽƚŚtraditional security issues such as maritime confidence-building in the South China 
^ĞĂ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ Žƌ  “ŶŽŶ-ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?Tow and ŶǀĂůů ?  “The U.S. and Implementing 
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific ? ?49. 
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FRQFHUQVDQGZKLFKLVDµSRZHUIXOV\PERO¶RIWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VFRPPLWPHQW to Southeast 
Asia, and specifically, its acknowledgment of the importance of ASEAN in Southeast Asian affairs.933 
 
Washington has not endorsed a single, over-arching approach in building, supporting, or participating 
in regional institutions.  Instead, it pursues a discriminate strategy of using different and existing 
multilateral bodies to manage specific issue-areas.  The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
grouping remains the paramount means for advancing U.S. economic interests, although this is 
incUHDVLQJO\VXSSOHPHQWHGE\:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSURPRWLRQRIWKH733WRIDFLOLWDWHUHJLRQDOIUHHWUDGH7KH
Obama Administration has prioritised the EAS as the preferred forum for developing regional security 
GLDORJXHVEHFDXVHWKHUHJLRQ¶VPDMRUSOD\HUVWKHWHQ$SEAN members plus China, Japan, South Korea, 
India, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and the U.S.) are members.  U.S. policy-makers tend to view 
the EAS as less prone to domination by China.  In contrast, Beijing prefers the ASEAN Plus Three 
format for discussing East Asian security issues on a more regionally exclusive basis, since this forum 
excludes the United States.934   
 
As part of its evolving regional security posture, the move toward multilateral security policies is 
relatively discriminatory and limited.  Obama also applies several preconditions for U.S. involvement 
in regional multilateral arrangements.  Such involvement must be  
µconsistent with the purpose and maintenance of its bilateral alliances in the region, 
must reflect clear and shared interests and values which the U.S. could endorse and 
support, and must pursue clearly designated action plans to realise those interests 
DQGYDOXHV¶935   
Consequently, the smart power strategy, endorsed by the Obama administration, has attempted to 
combine the need for hard power capabilities, underpinned by the bilateral alliance politics, with 
diplomatic and politico-cultural soft power components that are most conducive to building regional 
confidence in American cooperation, thereby reproducing consent from subordinate states for the 
existing regional order.  At the same time, American hegemonic interests continue to be promoted, with 
a view to producing an American-led regional security architecture that can potentially balance against 
rising Chinese regional power and influence.936   
                                                          
933 Prashanth ParameswĂƌĂŶ ? “What Did the US-^E^ƵŶŶǇůĂŶĚƐ^ƵŵŵŝƚĐŚŝĞǀĞ ? ?The Diplomat, February 
18, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-did-the-us-asean-sunnylands-summit-achieve/  (accessed 
May 15, 2016). 
934 Tow and ŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific ? ?62. 
935 dŽǁĂŶĚŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?49. 
936 Tow and ŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific ? ?56-57. 
 158 
 
Compulsory Power: Strengthening and adapting the bilateral alliances in Northeast Asia 
&RPSXOVRU\ SRZHU LQYROYHV µSRZHU DV UHODWLRQV RI LQWHUDFWLRQ RI GLUHFW FRQWURO E\ RQH DFWRU RYHU
DQRWKHU¶937  In the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. is the asymmetrical provider of security.  As the regional 
security hegemon, the existence of its superior military capabilities and regional presence commands 
UHVSHFW  7KH ELODWHUDO DOOLDQFHV IRUP WKH EHGURFN RI :DVKLQJWRQ¶V UHJLRQDO VWUDWHJ\ DQG VHFXULty 
presence as part of the broader process of post-Cold War order-building.938  As the preponderant 
regional maritime power, the U.S. is the only state with the capacity to construct a security order in the 
Asia-Pacific that offers this degree of protection and stability.939  However, the hegemonic relationship 
is more complex than one of pure dominance: the U.S. also relies on its major regional allies to help it 
sustain regional order.  The manner in which Tokyo has reconsidered Article 9 of its post-war pacifist 
WUHDW\QRWRQO\KLJKOLJKWVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI86KHJHPRQ\WR-DSDQ¶VVWDELOLW\LWLVDOVRLQGLFDWLYHRI
a two-way symbiotic, albeit asymmetric, relationship that benefits both dominant and subordinate states 
in regional order production.     
  
(i) The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security  
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation (1960) committed the United States to defend Japan if Japan came 
under attack, and also facilitated the continuation of the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia 
through the provision of bases and ports for American armed forces.  Under the American security 
umbrella, Japan could concentrate on economic recovery and the U.S. was able to project power into 
the western Pacific.  With this bargain, the United States had undertaken to defend Japan following an 
attack, while Japan had no reciprocal obligations.  Since the Japanese constitution prohibited the 
exercise of collective self-defence, Japan was under no obligation to send troops or military hardware 
to support American combat operations.940  Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, outlining -DSDQ¶V
civilian and pacifist status was a means to DOOD\UHJLRQDOFRQFHUQVDERXWDUHWXUQWR-DSDQ¶VSUH-war 
militaristic traditions.  However, the Japanese constitution had increasingly become a major obstacle to 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSODQVIRUGHHSHQLQJDQGPRGHUQLVLQJWKHVHFXULW\DOOLDQFHVLQWKHUHJLRQ$VDUHVXOWRI
                                                          
937 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
938 China asserts that this order is an outmoded relic of the Cold War and is an attempt by Washington to contain 
ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ?^ĞĞ :ĂĞ :ĞŽŬWĂƌŬ ?  “dŚĞh ?^ ?-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů dŚƌĞĂƚƐ Žƌ ĂŶ hŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ DƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ KƌĚĞƌ ? ?The Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (May 
2011): 138. 
939 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “/ŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇand Security Order in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?ŝŶAmerica Unrivalled: 
The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 183. 




these diverging interests, Washington consistently pushed for domestic reform of Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution.941  
 
For Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an integral part of the Japanese constitution that has enabled it to 
remain relatively unarmed, and facilitated its pacifist, non-threatening post-war identity.  It is fully 
socialised into the American-led regional security order and entirely dependent on the array of western 
regional and multilateral economic and security organisations for its stability and functioning as a state 
since 1945.942  Article 9 has, however, been problematic in that it restricted the participation of Japanese 
Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in multilateral overseas commitments.  With the encouragement of 
Washington, in 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe embarked on the process of normalisation through 
reforming Article 9, controversially challenging a pillar of regional stability in the post-war era.943  In 
SDUW$EH¶VGHFLVLRQWRUH-evaluate Japanese security arrangements was driven by domestic concerns 
about regional stability.  Tokyo has become increasingly uncertain of the future reliability of American 
security guarantees in view of a potentially underfunded American military.944  While the September 
2015 legislative ELOOGLGQRWFKDQJH$UWLFOH¶VODQJXDJH± that would require constitutional amendment 
± it does enable a UHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµVHOI-GHIHQFH¶945  Regardless, this is a significant shift away from 
WKHUHQRXQFHPHQWRIZDUHWFKHGLQWR-DSDQ¶VSRVW-war pacifist national identity.  
 
Following the renegotiation of the U.S-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty, finalised in April 2015, the 
Japanese SDF can participate in disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, missile defense and other 
                                                          
941 Article 9 underpins the peaceful constitution by prohibiting the use of force under any circumstance.  It 
renounces war, outlaws the use and threat of force to settle international disputes, and relinquishes the right 
to maintain armed forces. tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉƵƐŚ ĨŽƌ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛmilitary normalisation grew from the influential 
Armitage Report published in October 2000, from a bipartisan group of Japanese policy specialists and diplomats 
that were calling for Japan to become a  ‘normalised ? military power but tightly tied to the U.S. in an alliance with 
a wider regional and global presence.  EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨĞŶƐĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ:ĂƉĂŶ PĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚĂDĂƚƵƌĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Institute for National Strategic Studies (October 11, 2000). http://spfusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/ArmitageNyeReport_2000.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014). The report was updated 
in 2007.  See Richard L. ArmŝƚĂŐĞĂŶĚ:ŽƐĞƉŚ^ ?EǇĞ ? “dŚĞh ?^-:ĂƉĂŶůůŝĂŶĐĞ P'ĞƚƚŝŶŐƐŝĂZŝŐŚƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007. 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf (accessed October 8, 2014). 
942 For example, Japan funds approximately 20% of the UN budget, supports international commitments to 
human security and is a generous provider of official development assŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?^ĞĞ' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “EĞǁ
KƌĚĞƌŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?ŝŶEast Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis 
Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 226-7. 
943 WĂƵů: ?>ĞĂĨ ? “WƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĚWŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůWĞƌŝů P:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇEŽƌŵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?The Diplomat, September 4, 2014. 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-and-potential-peril-japans-military-normalization/  (accessed 
September 19, 2014). 
944 /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “EĞǁKƌĚĞƌŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ?-9.  
945 DĂƚƚ &ŽƌĚ ?  “:ĂƉĂŶ ƵƌƚĂŝůƐ /ƚƐ WĂĐŝĨŝƐƚ ^ƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?Atlantic, September 19, 2015. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/406318/ (accessed 
May 9, 2016). 
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military missions, and to assist U.S. forces patrolling areas around Japan.946  The Joint Defence 
Guidelines outline an expanded role for the Japanese SDF, removing many of the limits placed on their 
activities by Article 9, including geographical restrictions on the SDF.947  An enlarged role for the 
Japanese SDF implies that the U.S. is unlikely to fight a war in the Asia-Pacific without direct assistance 
from Japan.948  The revised guidelines also allow Japan to respond to attacks on third parties, not just 
the United States, if those states have a close association with Japan.  The renegotiation of the functions 
of the alliance gives Japan a greater stake in regional security.  Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan is 
JUDGXDOO\FRQWULEXWLQJ WRDµIDYRXUDEOHVWUDWHJLFDQGPLOLWDU\EDODQFH¶IRU:DVKLQJWRQDOWKRXJKWKH
move was criticised by China and South Korea, and also split the Japanese nation.949  By renegotiating 
the conditions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance structure can be adapted to meet the twenty-first 
century geopolitical environment.950  -DSDQ¶VFOHDUSRVLWLRQLQVXSSRUWRIWKHV\VWHPRIDOOLDQFHVDQG
security partnerships is an important step towards this system remaining an effective tool of dissuasion 
against regional near peer-competitors.  Ongoing Japanese consent is therefore critical to the 
reproduction of the U.S hegemonic order.   
 
-DSDQ¶V PLOLWDU\ QRUPDOLVDWLRQ LV D FRQWHQWLRXV LVVXH IRU $PHULFD¶V RWKHU 1RUWKHDVW $VLDQ DOOLDQFH
partner, South Korea.  Japanese-South Korean relations are at an all-time low, with Seoul unwilling to 
cooperate with Japan on trilateral military intelligence sharing, or on missile defence agreements with 
                                                          
946 The Japanese SDF has historically maintained a defensive orientation. With 240,000 military personnel, 400 
fighter jets, 3 pseudo aircraft carriers, 16 submarines and 47 destroyers, Japan has the capability to project 
offensive power outside Japanese territorial waters. In the year up to March 2014, Japan scrambled fighter jets 
415 times (a high that is up 36 percent from the previous year) to intercept Chinese aircraft encroaching its 
claimed airspace.  ^ĞĞ>ĞĂĨ ? “WƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĚWŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůWĞƌŝů ? ? 
947 The guidelines also make explicit that the security guarantee covers the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands under 
Japanese administration. U.S. Department of Defense, Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 
(Washington, DC: April 27, 2015). http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-
JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.pdf (accessed May 16, 2016); :ƵůŝĂŶ  ? ĂƌŶĞƐ ?  “U.S., Japan Announce New 
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-japan-announce-
new-security-agreement-1430146806 (accessed August 2, 2015). 
948 Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 95-96. 
949 For instance, South Korean President, Park Geun-ŚǇĞ  ‘ƚƌĞĂĚĞĚ ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ ? ŝŶ ŚĞƌ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ
guidelines ? ĐĂƵŐŚƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ŽǀĞƌ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ƌŽďƵƐƚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ:ĂƉĂŶ ?>ĞĞŚƵŶŐDŝŶ ? “^ ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?
Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, May 15, 2015. http://www.theasanforum.org/a-
korean-perspective/ (accessed July 25, 2015). For more specific details of South Korean concerns, see Tae-Jung 
<ĂŶŐ ?  “South Korea Frets over US-:ĂƉĂŶ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ 'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ? ?The Diplomat, April 28, 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-korea-frets-over-us-japan-defense-guidelines/  (accessed July 25, 
2015). 
950 :ŽŚŶ >ĞĞ ?  “dŽŬǇŽ ƐĐĞŶĚŝŶŐ P ďĞ ?Ɛ EĞǁ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?World Affairs Journal (Summer 2015). 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tokyo-ascending-abe%E2%80%99s-new-defense-strategy 
(accessed September 30, 2015) 
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Tokyo and Washington.951  The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance has moderated the South Korean 
UHVSRQVHWRWKHFKDQJHVLQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOHOHDYLQJ3UHVLGHQW3DUNWRIRFXVRQ-DSDQ¶VLPSHULDO
historical conduct, which is a domestic vote-winner.952  There is fear in Seoul that any increase in 
Japanese military power, as a result of the changes to the U.S-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty, and the 
UHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH  PD\ KDYH WKH XQLQWHQGHG HIIHFW RI LQFUHDVLQJ 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V PLOLWDU\
modernisation anG%HLMLQJ¶VDVVHUWLYHEHKDYLRXULQWKHUHJLRQand potentially creating tension in ROK-
China relations.953   
 
'HVSLWHWKHXQHQWKXVLDVWLFUHVSRQVHWR-DSDQ¶VUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOHLQ1RUWKHDVW$VLD-DSDQ¶V
moves towards military normalisation has been better received by other U.S. regional partners, 
LQFOXGLQJ$XVWUDOLD,QGLDWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQG9LHWQDP$VDUHVXOWRIWKHFKDQJHVLQ-DSDQ¶VGHIHQFH
role, military cooperation between Japan and each of these countries in the sphere of military training 
and aid, joint weapons development, and arms sales has risen.  Even Taiwan, also occupied by Japan 
during World War Two, appears receptive, with former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui stating that 
Japan¶V move towards military normalisation would make the region safer.954  By enhancing its alliance 
with the U.S., Japan will assume a greater regional security role with American support, which enhances 
the central position of the alliances to regional order.955  The outcome being, that not only do Japanese 
interests remain closely aligned to those of the U.S., but through the alliances, the U.S. is also able to 
indirectly determine the narratival boundaries of regional insecurity.  The China rise narrative supports 
the ongoing existence of the regional alliances, and maintains the asymmetric and hierarchic structure 
of regional order.  
                                                          
951 South Korean President Park Geun-hye has refused to speak to Prime Minister Abe. Park likely considers 
rapprochement with Japan politically risky, with nearly half of South Koreans deeming Japan a military threat to 
ƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂŶƐďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚďĞǁŚŝƚĞǁĂƐŚĞƐ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉĂƐƚ, including the issue of Korean 
comfort women, and high profile visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war dead, including 12 convicted 
war criminals, are honoured.  >ĞĂĨ ? “WƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĚWŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůWĞƌŝů ? ? 
952 WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWĂƌŬ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌďĞ ?Ɛ ? ?th anniversary commemoration speech marking the end 
of the war in August 2015 was muted.  The nationalist Prime MinisteƌďĞƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞĚ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƉĂƐƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ
of remorse but did not offer a new apology.  Park ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚ  ‘ůĞĨƚŵƵĐŚƚŽďĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƐĂŝĚ
:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌĚƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďĂĐŬĞĚ ƵƉ ǁŝƚŚ  “ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƐŝŶĐĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ? ŚŽĞ ^ĂŶŐ-,ƵŶ ?  “^ŽƵƚŚ <ŽƌĞĂŶ
LeadĞƌ DĂƌŬƐ ŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ ŽĨ tĂƌ ?Ɛ ŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ tĂƌŶŝŶŐƐ ƚŽ EŽƌƚŚ <ŽƌĞĂ ? ?New York Times, August 15, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/world/asia/park-geun-hye-warns-north-korea-in-war-anniversary-
speech.html?_r=0 (accessed August 15, 2015). 
953 ,ĂŶŶĂ/ŶŐďĞƌ ? “^ŚŝŶǌŽďĞ ?ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇWůĂŶƌĂǁƐ^ŚĂƌƉZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐĨƌŽŵZĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ?New York Times, July 18, 
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/world/asia/shinzo-abes-military-plan-draws-sharp-response-
from-readers.html?_r=0 (accessed May 9, 2016). 
954 Taipei has ŶŽƚƉƵďůŝĐůǇƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĞĚdŽŬǇŽ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ Ă ƌĂĚĂƌ ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ
troops on Yonaguni Island, which is 67 miles from Taiwan and 93 miles from islands claimed by Beijing, Tokyo 
and Taipei.  ^ĞĞ :ĂƐŽŶ WĂŶ ?  “>ee Teng-ŚƵŝ ƉƉůĂƵĚƐ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ^ĞůĨ-Defense MŽǀĞ ? ?Taipei Times, July 4, 2014. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/04/2003594320 (accessed September 19, 2014). 
955 :ĂĞ:ĞŽŬWĂƌŬĂŶĚ^ĂŶŐŽŬDŽŽŶ ? “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨKƌĚĞƌĂƐĂ^ŽƵƌĐĞŽĨůůŝĂŶĐĞŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ? ?The Pacific Review 
27, no. 2 (2014): 154. 
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(ii) The U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defence Treaty  
The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, signed in 1953 following the Korean War ceasefire, guaranteed 
South Korean national security, acting to deter the North by providing a nuclear umbrella and troops, 
while also bolstering defence for Japan.  U.S.-ROK security relations are defined by the situation on 
the Korean Peninsula, and issues of East Asian strategic importance, particularly relating to China and 
Japan.    
 
Their periodically differing attitudes to North Korea has often proven to be an issue of contestation 
between the U.S. and South Korea.  During the G.W. Bush administration, relations were strained over 
their diverging North Korean policy, with Washington during this period attaching greater weight to its 
global interests, including WMD and non- and counter-proliferation.  During the War on Terror, 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V JOREDOUHJLRQDO VWUDWHJ\ ZRUNHG DJDLQVW 6HRXO¶V LQWUD-Korean/regional outlook, with 
detrimental effects on the alliance.956  7KH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VKDUGOLQHRYHU1RUWK.RUHDQ
nuclear prROLIHUDWLRQFRQWUDGLFWHG6HRXO¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRDVRIWHUHQJDJHPHQWVWUDWHJ\RQ3HQLQVXOD
relations, which it interpreted not only through a security lens, but also through one of potential future 
reunification.  During the governments of President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and President Roh 
Moo-hyun (2003-2008), there was a South Korean shift towards seeking reconciliation and unification 
with North Korea, as part of the South Korean Sunshine Policy.957  Subsequently, the hardening U.S. 
military posture on North Korea was frequently blamed for prolonging the political division of the 
Peninsula.958  Between 1998 and 2008, the relationship also developed problems on a wide range of 
issues including burden-sharing and division of labour within the alliance.959  The Roh Moo-hyun 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVHOI-proclaimed balancer role between China and Japan in 2005 was met with criticism 
LQ :DVKLQJWRQ LQWHUSUHWLQJ 6HRXO¶V VWUDWHJ\ DV LQGLFDWLYH RI 6RXWK .RUHD¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR PRYH
                                                          
956 WĂƌŬĂŶĚDŽŽŶ ? “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨKƌĚĞƌĂƐĂ^ŽƵƌĐĞŽĨůůŝĂŶĐĞŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
957 Instigated and developed by President Kim, the Sunshine Policy sought to improve North and South Korean 
relations through this conciliatory policy of engagement. The Clinton administration approved of, and 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ<ŝŵ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĞ' ?t ?ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚƌĞĂƚĞĚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂŶĂƐĂƐƚĂƚĞ
that supported terrorism. This hard line stance emphasising coercion and punishment created unfavourable 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ^ĞŽƵů ?Ɛu^nshine Policy. The Sunshine Policy was abandoned when Lee Myung-bak assumed the 
South Korean presidency in February 2008. See zŽƵŶŐŚƵůŚŽ ? “ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ&ŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶ
Peninsula: United States' Different North Korea Policies, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, and United States W
South Korea WEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?International Relations of the Asia Pacific 10, no. 1 (2010): 93-127.  
958 &ƌĂŶĐŝƐ &ƵŬƵǇĂŵĂ ?  “dŚĞ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƐŝĂ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ŝŶEast Asian 
Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008), 235. 
959 WĂƌŬĂŶĚDŽŽŶ ? “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨKrder as a Source of Alliance CŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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closer to China.960  This move was considered incompatible with the U.S-ROK alliance and was 
subsequently dropped by President Roh under pressure from Washington.961  
 
Despite the challenges of balancing global and regional interests during the G.W. Bush era, Washington 
and Seoul recognised their alliance as a natural extension of regional security policy and coordinated a 
series of bilateral talks focused on transforming the alliance into a more mature partnership.962  The Roh 
administration made several concessions to Washington in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to 
WKH DOOLDQFH GHVSLWH IXQGDPHQWDO GLVDJUHHPHQWV RQ 1RUWK .RUHDQ SROLF\ DQG 3UHVLGHQW 5RK¶V
aspirations to develop a foreign policy less driven by American security interests. The renegotiation of 
the terms of the alliance included a major realignment of United States Forces, Korea (USFK), 
permission to grant deployment of USFK in operations outside of the Peninsula (strategic flexibility), 
and the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq, despite widespread domestic opposition.963  The 
G.W. Bush administration additionally agreed to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to the 
South Korean military by April 2012 ± an issue President Roh viewed as an important step in achieving 
a more equal alliance partnership.964  Although this transfer has never taken place, due to South Korean 
concerns over increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula:DVKLQJWRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRUHQHJRWLDWHWKH
terms of the alliance was symbolic for Seoul and reinvigorated South Korean consent to U.S. regional 
hegemony.  During the second half of the G.W. Bush administration, its stance on Pyongyang softened, 
after initial progress on the Six-Party Talks led to greater cooperation and coordination with Seoul on 
North Korean policy.  On the issue of strategic flexibility, Washington also addressed South Korean 
FRQFHUQVDERXWµDOOLDQFHHQWUDSPHQW¶ LI86 WURRSVZHUHGHSOR\HG LQDFRQIOLFWRXWVLGH WKH.RUHDQ
Peninsula.965 
 
                                                          
960 &ƌĂŶĐŝƐ&ƵŬƵǇĂŵĂ ? “dŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƐŝĂĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
961 /ƚŝƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌZŽŚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?ŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?  ‘ďŽƚŚƐƚĂƚĞƐĐĂŵĞƚŽƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh ?^ ?
ŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝŶĂůďĂůĂŶĐĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?WĂƌŬĂŶĚDŽŽŶ ? “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽf Order as a Source of Alliance CŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ? ?156-
7. 
962 ^ƚĞƉŚĂŶŝĞ ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ŶĚƌĞǁ zĞŽ ?  “ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĂƐ hƐƵĂů P dŚĞ ZŽůĞ ŽĨ EŽƌŵƐ ŝŶ ůůŝĂŶĐĞ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 2 (2015): 15. 
963 Despite strong domestic opposition, the US-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) was finalised 
between Seoul and Washington in 2007, in a move to show solidarity with the U.S. alliance. The FTA came into 
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964 The U.S. retains wartime control over South Korean troops under OPCON  W the transition of this control to 
South Korea has been postponed on at least three occasions and has now been postponed into the 2020s.  
Center for Strategic and International Studies,  “h ?^ ? &ŽƌĐĞ WŽƐƚƵƌĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĂ-Pacific Region: An 
/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ? ? (June 27, 2012): 27. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf (accessed July 31, 2014). 
965 ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶĂŶĚzĞŽ ? “ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐhƐƵĂů ? ? ? ? ? 
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The Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) prioritised the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
into DPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOµVWUDWHJLFDOOLDQFH¶966  Since 2013, President Park Geun-
hye has followed the path of her predecessor, and widened the partnership to include political, 
economic, social and cultural cooperation.967  )URP :DVKLQJWRQ¶V Serspective, the U.S.-ROK 
relationship is in its best state for decades.968  South Korea is undertaking an increased global role, 
slowly developing capabilities to enhance its own force projection, while complementing American 
global strategic objectives, and bearing more financial costs of the relationship. 969   :KLOH6HRXO¶V
moves to adopt a global role have occurred outside of, and independent from, the mutual defence treaty 
DOOLDQFHDWWKHVDPHWLPH3UHVLGHQW3DUN¶VKDVZRUNHGKDUGWRUH-align American and South Korean 
interests through a joint strategic vision emphasising shared liberal democratic values.970   
 
U.S.-ROK strategic attitudes towards China and Japan, however, often diverge.  South Korea is hesitant 
to antagonise China, and, like China, is mistUXVWIXORI-DSDQ¶VUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILWVFRQVWLWXWLRQWKDW
would expand Japanese military capabilities.971  China's rise creates a strategic dilemma for South 
Korea, placing it between its relationships with the United States and China.  Given the strength of the 
HFRQRPLFDQGGLSORPDWLFWLHVEHWZHHQ6HRXODQG%HLMLQJDQG%HLMLQJ¶VSRVLWLRQDVWKHRQO\EHQHIDFWRU
of North Korea, South Korea is trying to balance its positive relations with both Washington and 
Beijing.  When President Park attended the military parade in Beijing, commemorating the 70th 
anniversary of the end of World War Two, DORQJZLWKµDQDVVRUWPHQWRIDXWRFUDWVDQGGLFWDWRUV¶ in 
                                                          
966 Han Suk-ŚĞĞ ? “^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ^ĞĞŬƐƚŽĂůĂŶĐĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Council on Foreign 
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967 See Jung-Ho Bae and Abraham Denmark, eds., US.-Korean Alliance in the 21st Century (Seoul: Korean Institute 
for National Unification, December 2009). http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-
ROK%20Alliance%20in%20the%2021st%20Century_Denmark%20and%20Fontaine.pdf (accessed September 
30, 2015). 
968 Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2014), 
executive summary. 
969 In January 2014, the United States and South Korea committed to a new five-year Special Measures 
Agreement (SMA), under which Seoul will raise its host nation support payments for U.S. forces in Korea by 
nearly 6 percent, increasing spending to around $870 ŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞƌǇĞĂƌ ?DŝĐŚĂĞůZ ?ƵƐůŝŶ ? “^ƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐh ?^ ?
Alliances in Northeast Asia, ?dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇďĞĨŽƌĞdŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ^ƵďĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶĂƐƚƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ
Pacific Affairs, March 4, 2014, 4. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030414_Testimony%20-
%20Michael%20Auslin.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014). 
970 ďƌĂŚĂŵ ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?  “dŚĞ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚ EŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ ? ? ŝŶUS.-Korean 
Alliance in the 21st Century, eds. Jung-Ho Bae and Abraham Denmark, (Seoul: Korean Institute for National 
Unification, December 2009), 37. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-
ROK%20Alliance%20in%20the%2021st%20Century_Denmark%20and%20Fontaine.pdf  (accessed November 
14, 2014). 
971Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations, executive summary. 
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September 2015, her presence received disapproval across the region and in Washington.972  Her 
presence was politically significant, as she was the only leader of a U.S. ally to attend an event that 
implicitly targeted Japan as the aggressive invader in the region.  Yet the U.S.-ROK alliance remains a 
critical element of South Korean security strategy, and a feature of its post-Korean War identity.  South 
Korea balances its security commitments to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and its economic well-being, 
dependent on the ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership. The challenge for Seoul is to achieve a 
balance between maintaining the alliance with Washington, whilst building positive economic relations 
with Beijing, whilst simultaneously engaging both in the maintenance of relative stability on the Korean 
Peninsula.973  However, sustaining friendly relations with both powers has often proven difficult.   
 
Attempts to enjoy beneficial bilateral interactions with China complicates South Korean security 
cooperation with the United States.974  Equally, South Korean perceptions of China are also reflected in 
North Korean security-related issues.975  In March 2010, the North Korean sinking of the South Korean 
naval vessel Cheonan was followed in November 2010 by attacks on Yeonpyeong Island.  In the wake 
RI WKHVH SURYRFDWLRQV E\ 3\RQJ\DQJ SRVVLEO\ WKH UHJLPH¶V UHDFWLRQ WR :DVKLQJWRQ¶V GHFLVLRQ WR
suspend the Six Party Talks and the cessation of U.S. aid to North Korea in 2009, the ROK-U.S. joint 
military exercise in August 2011 focused on improving combat readiness on the Korean Peninsula.  
Beijing reacted strongly to the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, identifying the ROK-U.S. alliance as 
a regional security threat, whilst consistently defending North Korean actions.976  8QKDSS\ZLWK6HRXO¶V
emphasis on the U.S. relationship, Beijing has often questioned whether Seoul can manage the 
incompatibility between the Sino-6RXWK.RUHDQ µVWUDWHJLF SDUWQHUVKLS¶ DQG WKH52.-86 µVWUDWHJLF
DOOLDQFH¶977   
 
%HLMLQJ¶VFULWLFLVPRI86-ROK relations has frequently triggered debates in South Korea concerning 
the future of the alliance and whether it is too costly to Sino-ROK relations, or can ameliorate the 
situation on the Korean Peninsula in the longer term.  Despite pressure from Beijing, Seoul has not 
compromised on maritime territorial issues in the East China Sea (over Socotra/Suyan Rock).978  
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978 Along with North Korean security threats stemming from nuclear weapons and potential provocations, South 





When China refused to redraw its ADIZ, Seoul expanded its own ADIZ in December 2013, with Sino-
South Korean relations temporarily cooling until 2014.980   
 
)RU:DVKLQJWRQ1RUWK.RUHDSUHVHQWVµRQHRIWKHPRVWYH[LQJDQGSHUVLVWHQWSUREOHPVIRU86IRUHLJQ
policy in the post-Cold War era.981  The critical state of intra-Korean relations since the 2010 attacks 
has not exposed major policy disagreements between Washington and Seoul during the Obama 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ  ,Q OLQH ZLWK WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V DSSURDFK RI HTXDOLVLQJ SDUWQHUVKLSV and 
building consensus, Washington has appeared to allow Seoul to take the lead on managing North Korea 
strategy.982  PresideQW3DUNDQG3UHVLGHQW2EDPDKDYHµPDLQWDLQHGWLJKWFRRUGLQDWLRQRYHU1RUWK.RUHDQ
SROLF\ IRUJLQJD MRLQWDSSURDFKFRQWDLQLQJHOHPHQWVRISUHVVXUHDQGHQJDJHPHQW¶983  In a move to 
strengthen defence ties, and to increase interoperability, in February 2015, U.S. and South Korean 
defence officials convened the first meeting of a Cyber Cooperation Working Group created to upgrade 
intelligence sharing on North Korean cyber threats.984   
 
In managing the increasingly tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, followiQJ3\RQJ\DQJ¶VEDOOLVWLF
missile testing (2012, 2013, 2014) and fourth nuclear testing (January 2016), the threat of an existential 
QXFOHDUWKUHDWWR6RXWK.RUHDFRQWLQXHVWRGHILQH3UHVLGHQW3DUN¶VDWWLWXGHDQGDSSURDFKWRWKH86DQG
China.985  While President Park initially hoped that the strength of Sino-ROK economic ties and strong 
                                                          
on China's economy high on the list of potential security threats to South Korea in the mid-to-long term. Han, 
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waters in the Yellow Sea.  China does not recognise the inter-Korean sea border (the Northern Line Limit) and 
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 ?<ĞůůǇ ? “The Complex China-^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?The Diplomat, June 
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14, 2014). 
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981 Under the terms of the bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, the US is obligated to defend both from 
an attack by North Korea. Emma Chanlett-Avery, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal 
Situation (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2016), 2.  
982 Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2014), 
3. 
983 Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations, executive summary.  
984 tŝůůŝĂŵd ?dŽǁ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƐŝĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? PZĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝŶŐZĞďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ? ?Asian 
Survey 55, no. 1 (2015): 14. 
985 ůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWĂƌŬŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐEŽƌƚŚ
Korean nuclear tests in January 2016, Seoul unilaterally announced sanctions against Pyongyang.  Choe Sang-
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North Korean nuclear intentions, it has become evident that Beijing has limited control over Kim Jong 
Un and that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have significantly cooled.  The U.S.-South 
Korean approach seeks to avoid pushing Beijing into a position where it feels compelled to provide 
more financial and diplomatic assistance to Pyongyang.986  Nevertheless, as North Korea becomes 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ PLOLWDULVHG QXFOHDULVHG DQG HUUDWLF 3DUN¶V GHFLVLRQ WR GHSOR\ WKH 86 7HUPLQDO +LJK
Altitude Air Defence (THAAD) missile system in South Korea is based on her need to protect her 
homeland DQGIUXVWUDWLRQVRYHU%HLMLQJ¶V1RUWK.RUHDSROLF\.  )ROORZLQJ3\RQJ\DQJ¶VODXQFKRIWKUHH
ballistic missiles in August 2016, President Park described the situation as evidence for THAAD in 
South Korea, despite strong domestic opposition to its deployment.987  For the first time, Seoul is in 
DJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH86RQWKHQHHGIRUUHJLRQDOPLVVLOHGHIHQFHGHVSLWH%HLMLQJ¶VREMHFWLRQVWRWKH
U.S. placing missile defence near to its border, and to the sharing of South Korean intelligence on North 
Korea with Japan.  
 
Extending and deepening regional partnerships in Southeast Asia 
The preceding discussion has focused on the U.S. alliance structure with key regional allies.  This next 
section considers the efforts of the U.S. to develop the hub-and-spokes alliance structure into a network 
of pluri-lateral relationships that will ultimately strengthen U.S. regional hegemony.  The rebalance 
strategy supports the expansion of U.S. capabilities and those of its strategic regional partners and allies.  
Washington has made inroads into adapting the traditional hub-and-spokes model of alliance operations 
towards the construction of a more diffuse and distributed network across Southeast Asia.  Part of the 
challenge for the United States is to facilitate the improved coordination of its allies to address specific 
non-traditional security challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery (HADR), in 
addition to responding to existing security matters and irregular threats.988  Concerns over sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea have kept most Southeast Asian nations amenable to the U.S. military 
presence and the security advantages derived from the continued U.S. presence in the region, acting as 
a balance to growing Chinese military power.  For the U.S., the broader perspective is to sustain its 
regional hegemony by protecting its freedom of maritime action.  U.S. activities are narratively 
supported through the rhetoric of protecting the global commons against China, whose military 
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modernisation and assertive use of its military capabilities in the South China Sea seeks to transform 
the post-World War II regional order that lays the foundations of Asia-Pacific post-war stability and 
prosperity.989   
 
The two U.S. security partners in Southeast Asia, the Philippines990 and Thailand,991 vacillate between 
acceptance of, and detachment from, American regional security hegemony, often complicating the 
U.S. regional security picture as a result of their internal political disarray.992  The Philippines relies 
heavily on the U.S. to guarantee its external security and for the U.S., the relationship has gained 
renewed prominence as a result of the rebalance.993  With the escalation of tensions in the South China 
Sea, and its formal request of an arbitration tribunal througK81&/26DJDLQVW&KLQD¶V FODLPV WKH
Philippines under former president, Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), became more open to the U.S. 
military rebalance.  )XUWKHUPRUHWKH86DQG3KLOLSSLQHVQDUUDWLYHRQµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶DOVRDOLJQHGGuring 
the Benigno Aquino presidency, creating opportunities for Washington to draw the Philippines further 
into its sphere of influence.   
 
In view of its own rebalancing goals, and its own concerns over the growing influence of China in the 
South China Sea, the U.S. took the opportunity to enhance the limited capabilities of the Philippine 
navy, also allocating USD30 million in military financing for the Philippines in 2012.994  The Enhanced 
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the PhilippineƐŝƐŝƌŽŶĐůĂĚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?KďĂŵĂĚŝĚŶŽƚĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞDƵƚƵĂůĞĨĞŶĐĞdƌĞĂƚǇǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞ
South China Sea disputed islands.  dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ďǇ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ ĂŶĚ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ĞŶŝŐŶŽ
Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint PrĞƐƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?April 28, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi (accessed May 
14, 2015). 
994 Thomas Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests ? 2014 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, May 15, 2014), 10. 
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Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), finalised in April 2014, allows for an increased but non-
permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines, and U.S. access to Philippine military bases and 
ports.995  The path to the EDCA was not guaranteed, despite the situation in the South China Sea.  The 
EDCA was finally determined to be constitutional by the Philippines Supreme Court in January 2016, 
after much internal deliberation on re-granting the U.S. military access to Philippine territory.996  
Nevertheless, in line with U.S. views on enhancing interoperability between its allies, the Philippines 
has also strengthened defence ties with other Asia-Pacific states, including Vietnam and Japan, also in 
dispute with China over maritime territorial boundaries.997   
 
Given 7KDLODQG¶V strategic value to the United States, and status as a long time U.S. strategic ally, the 
Obama administration hoped that Thailand would play a larger role as a partner in the rebalance.  
However, the rebalance has been complicated by political instability in Thailand following the 2014 
military coup.  Since the military junta had overthrown a democratically elected government, the United 
States suspended security assistance funds and cancelled joint military exercises and restricting U.S. 
involvement in the Thai-led Cobra Gold military exercises.998  Although the democratic rationale for an 
ongoing military relationship has been considerably undermined, maintaining the U.S.-Thai 
relationship is considered vital for the rebalance.999  :LWKRXWLWWKH86PD\ORVHDFFHVVWR7KDLODQG¶V
strategicall\ ORFDWHG PLOLWDU\ IDFLOLWLHV DQG &KLQD¶V LQIOXHQFH LQ 6RXWKHDVW $VLD PD\ DFFHOHUDWH1000  
Amid democracy concerns, the U.S. military has participated in the Thai-led Cobra Gold military 
exercises February 2015 and 2016, albeit on a limited basis.1001  With Bangkok internally occupied with 
SROLWLFDOFULVHV7KDLODQG¶VDELOLW\WRKHOSZLWKUHJLRQDOLQLWLDWLYHVSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHVXSSRUWHGE\WKH
United States, appears limited.1002   
 
                                                          
995 Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests ? 2014, summary. 
996 ZĞŶĂƚŽƌƵǌĚĞĂƐƚƌŽ ? “WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚĂƉƉƌŽǀĞƐ ? ?ƐŝĂDĂƌŝƚŝŵĞdƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?
Center for Strategic and International Studies (February 1, 2016). http://amti.csis.org/philippine-supreme-court-
approves-edca-unlocking-door-return-u-s-strategic-footprint-southeast-asia/  (accessed May 15, 2016). 
997 In recent years, the Philippines and Vietnam have formalised cooperation in the areas of maritime security, 
through navy-to-navy contacts, and information sharing. Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. 
Interests ? 2014, 10. 
998 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, July 29, 2015), 2. 
999 The contradictions of the U.S-Thai relationship highlight the tension in the need to maintain regional order 
and the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony that uphold US values and a commitment to democracy and 
the rule of law. 
1000 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, summary. 
1001 Prashanth Parameswaran,  “US, Thailand Launch 2016 Cobra Gold Military Exercises amid Democracy 
ŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? ?The Diplomat, February 9, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/us-thailand-launch-2016-cobra-
gold-military-exercises-amid-democracy-concerns/  (accessed May 15, 2016). 
1002 Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, 1. 
 170 
 
With the broadening of regional security relations already under way during the G.W. Bush 
administration, maintaining and extending the relationships as part of the rebalance strategy became a 
natural next step.  Widening the network of U.S. security ties to include other security partners as part 
of the rebalance is a work in progress.  Unlike its more formal bilateral relationships with well-
established pathways for negotiation and management, U.S. security relations with informal partners 
more typically involve collaboration over specific issue-areas.1003  A key factor driving these informal 
VWUDWHJLF UHODWLRQVKLSV LV VKDUHG FRQFHUQ DERXW &KLQD¶V LQFUHDVHG DVVHUWLYHQHVV LQ 6RXWKHDVW $VLD
particularly in the South China Sea.1004  However, China is not the only motivation.  The U.S. also 
supports partners in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia and Indonesia, in combatting people 
trafficking, counter-terrorism and maritime piracy.1005  The U.S. has been slowly and carefully 
developing a defence dialogue with Vietnam, which is becoming a crucial U.S. partner in Southeast 
Asia.  Washington and Hanoi launched an annual defence policy dialogue in 2010, achieved a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 2011, and announced DµFRPSUHKHQVLYHSDUWQHUVKLS¶LQ1006   
 
In July 2005, the United States signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation 
Partnership in Defence and Security with Singapore.  While the terms of the agreement were not 
publicly disclosed, it is thought that it strengthened existing arrangements for U.S. ships and combat 
DLUFUDIWWRDFFHVV6LQJDSRUH¶VPLOLWDU\IDFLOLWLHV, and authorised greater levels of defence technology 
sharing.  With the aim of improving interoperability in the region, security cooperation between the 
U.S. and Singapore has continued to grow under the Obama administration, with increased bilateral 
exercises and training.1007  The strategic relationship was further broadened in June 2011, following the 
DQQRXQFHPHQW WKDW IRXU 86 OLWWRUDO VKLSV ZRXOG EH RQ URWDWLRQ WKURXJK 6LQJDSRUH¶V QDYDO SRUW
designed to accommodate U.S. naval ships.  This partnership strengthens U.S. regional engagement 
through joint naval activities and exchanges.1008  The Singapore Army and the U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM) maintain well-developed relations through professional exchanges and military exercises.1009   
                                                          
1003 Tow,  “WƵƌƐƵŝŶŐh ?^ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-W ĐŝĨŝĐ PWŝǀŽƚŝŶŐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
1004 sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŚŝŶĂŝƐŝƚƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞsŝĞƚŶĂŵĞƐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐ
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ůŽŶŐ-term goal is to erode the sŝĞƚŶĂŵĞƐĞ ŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚ WĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ  ?sW ?Ɛ ) ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ŽŶ
power.  &ŽƌŝƚƐƉĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞh ?^ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?DĂƌŬ ?DĂŶǇŝŶ ?U.S.-
Vietnam Relations in 2014: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, June 24, 2014), summary and 5. 
1005 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “&ĂĐƚ^ŚĞĞƚ PĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ. ? 
1006 dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŽĂ
 ‘ŶĞǁƉŚĂƐĞ ? ?Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2014, 5. 
1007 DĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚŚŝŶĂĂŶĚ ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ŝƐĂŬĞǇƐƚŽŶĞŽĨ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
policy. Singapore often portrays itself as a useful balancer and intermediary between major powers in the region. 
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, July 26, 2013), 4. 
1008 ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
1009 dŽǁ ? “WƵƌƐƵŝŶŐh ?^ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific: PivotinŐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ?-23. 
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Regional training exercises are viewed as opportunities to foster and sustain cooperative relationships 
in the region, focusing on areas designated by the U.S. as of regional interest, such as disaster relief, 
counter-piracy operations, mine clearing operations, and anti-submarine and air defense exercises.1010  
The multilateral Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise is the largest international maritime exercise; 
and the Cobra Gold exercises held in Thailand, are now regarded as the primary multilateral ground 
exercise in the region.1011  In 2005, PACOM launched Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) with its series of mainly bilateral, annual exercises focused on counter-piracy and aimed at 
bolstering naval interoperability between the U.S. and partner nations, as well as increasing the 
capabilities of those partner nations, which now include all ASEAN member states with the exception 
of Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.1012 The U.S.-Philippines annual military exercise, Balikatan, was 
established to help the Philippines tackle the threat from regionally-based transnational terrorist 
organisations and also aims to improve interoperability between the U.S. and the Philippine militaries 
in the area of crisis response.1013   In addition to the regional military reorientation, the U.S. has also 
H[SDQGHGPLOLWDU\HQJDJHPHQWZLWK&KLQDLQDQHIIRUWWRFKDQQHO&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\PRGHUQLVDWLRQLQD
more positive direction of regional cooperation.  In 2014, the Chinese took part in RIMPAC for the first 
time.1014   
 
Integrated into these combined training and knowledge-building exercises, U.S PACOM coordinates 
regional humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR), and search and rescue (SAR) activities.  
HADR and SAR are favourite areas for cooperation between navies and related services, without the 
political controversy that often accompanies defence cooperation.  Collaboration emphasises the softer 
side of U.S. coercive military power and emphasises the value system underpinning U.S. hegemony 
through, for example, U.S. undertakings in humanitarian assistance activities.  While HADR and SAR 
are considered to be at WKHµVRIW¶HQGRIWKHVSHFWUXPRIVHFXULW\FRRSHUDWLRQWKH\are useful areas in 
                                                          
1010 ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶdŝĞǌǌŝ ? “ ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐDŽŵĞŶƚ ? PŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ŚŝƉƐ,ĞĂĚƚŽZ/DW ? ? ? ? ? ?The Diplomat, June 11, 2014.  
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/a-historic-moment-chinas-ships-head-to-rimpac-2014/ (accessed November 
14, 2014).   
1011 By 2012, 20 nations were participating in these exercises, including seven  W the U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea - contributing forces.   
1012 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽWKD ?ĂŶŶƵĂůďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŶĂǀĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŶĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵĂƌĞ ‘Zd-ůŝŬĞ ? ?^ĞĞ
:ĂŵĞƐ,ŽůŵĞƐ ? “ZŽƵŐŚtĂƚĞƌƐĨŽƌŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ-ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶCooperation from Strength: The United States, China 
and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 
2012), 5. 
1013 With US focus directed towards extremist terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia since September 2001, 
the U.S. has increased its regional counter-terrorist efforts against groups operating in the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, including the Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf groups. Bruce Vaughn, 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2009). 
1014 China was represented at RIMPAC by the Haikou (a missile destroyer), the Yueyang (a missile frigate), the 
Qiandaohu (a supply ship), and the Peace Ark (a hospital ship). A total of 1,100 Chinese officers and soldiers took 
part in the drill, including a diving squad and a commando unit. dŝĞǌǌŝ ? “A 'Historic Moment': China's Ships Head 
ƚŽZ/DW ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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which to develop personal relationships and interoperability, as well as providing an opportunity to 
generate goodwill.1015  The U.S. military also works alongside other governments, regional and 
international organisations, and NGOs that complement its own activities in HADR.  HADR activities 
do promote American values, but trust-building is an important consequence of these joint training 
exercises, showing the softer face of American compulsory power, and also providing a valuable service 
of capacity-building in a region where natural disasters are a frequent occurrence.  Building trust further 
extends the legitimacy of the alliance structure and U.S. security hegemony.  The American military 
response to regional natural disasters such as the Tsunami and earthquake in the Indian Ocean in 2004, 
or  Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, often yield positive consequences for building future 
FRRSHUDWLRQVLQFHVXFKDFWLYLWLHVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDµKHDUWVDQGPLQGV¶DSSURDFK 
 
(i) Developing ties between U.S. allies: The emergence of pluri-laterism 
As part of the rebalance strategy, the Obama administration has been keen to promote the development 
RISDUWQHUVKLSVEHWZHHQLWVWUDGLWLRQDOUHJLRQDODOOLHVWKHµVSRNHV¶DQGRWKHUVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVDFURVV
WKH3DFLILFDQG,QGLDQ2FHDQVDVVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVFRQYHUJH0RYLQJEH\RQGWKHµKXEDQGVSRNHV¶
model, and workLQJ WRZDUGV µD PRUH QHWZRUNHG DUFKLWHFWXUH RI FRRSHUDWLRQ¶ 86 DOOLHV DUH EHLQJ
encouraged to develop stronger security relations with each other under the guidance of the United 
States.1016  Under the Obama administration, the frequency and scope of multilateral military training 
across the Asia-Pacific continues to be expanded.  The U.S., Japan and India conducted their first 
trilateral naval exercises in April 2007, and the U.S.-India Malabar exercise now includes Japan, 
Singapore, and Australia.1017  Other bilateral exchanges are also slowly proliferating through the Asia-
Pacific: the Japanese-Australian Nichi Gou Trident exercises and the U.S.-Australia-Japan TAMEX 
anti-submarine maritime surveillance exercise, alongside the enhancement of U.S.-initiated 
partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and New Zealand.1018   
 
                                                          
1015 ĂǀŝĚ ƌĞǁƐƚĞƌ ?  “dŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂ-Australia Security and Defence Relationship: Developments, Constraints and 
WƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ?Security Challenges 10, no. 1 (2014): 78. 
1016 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “&ĂĐƚ^ŚĞĞƚ PĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?ŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
between allies ŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇŝŶŝŵŝĐĂů ?ƚŽh ?^ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŝĨŝƚůĞĂĚƐ ƚŽŵŽƌĞƐĞůĨ-confident and still supportive 
grouping of American regional security partners across the Asia-Pacific. Such cooperation builds on the existing 
bilateral framework for pluri-lateral activities. Tow and ŶǀĂůů ? “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security 
in the Asia-Pacific ? ?66.  
1017 Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, 155-6. 
1018 >ĞŽŶ WĂŶĞƚƚĂ ?  “ŚĂƉƚĞƌ dǁŽ P dŚĞ h^ ƌĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? &ŝƌƐƚ WůĞŶĂƌǇ ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?  ? ?th Asia 
Security Summit, Shangri La Dialogue, Singapore (June 2, 2012), 21. 
https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/conference%20proceedings/sections/shangri-la-aa36/the-shangri-la-
dialogue-2012-b4e5/sld12-05-chp-2-plenary-1-57b9 (accessed April 4, 2015). 
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These nascent relationships are cautiously advancing to avoid triggering an adverse response from 
Beijing.  Australia and Japan jointly explored the possibility of an arms deal that would see Japan build 
a dozen submarines for Australia, using coveted Japanese technology, and binding these two vital U.S. 
UHJLRQDODOOLHVWRJHWKHUµLQWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDUHDRIVHFXULW\¶1019  For Japan, this would have been the 
first major deal since it lifted its self-imposed ban on weapons exports in 2014.  This deal would have 
further cemented the Australian-Japanese defence cooperation agreement signed by the then Prime 
Minister Tony $EERWWDQG3ULPH0LQLVWHU$EHLQ&DQEHUUD¶VGHFLVLRQWRUHMHFWWKHJapanese bid 
in May 2016 caused disappointment in Washington defence circles, as a successful Japanese bid would 
have provided real strategic benefit for the U.S-Japan-Australia trilateral relationship.1020  Media 
reporting in May 2016 suggested that Canberra¶VGHFLVLRQZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\%HLMLQJ¶VGHPDQGVDQG
WKH7XUQEXOOJRYHUQPHQW¶VIHDURIupsetting Beijing.1021      
 
Indian participation in the emerging networked architecture in the Asia-Pacific, and expanding security 
cooperation with Japan, Australia and ASEAN, also serve U.S. interests.1022  Since the signing of the 
United States-India 2005 U.S.-India Defence Framework Agreement and 2006 Indo-U.S. Framework 
for Maritime Security Cooperation, India now conducts more exercises with U.S. forces than any other 
couQWU\  2YHU RQH WKLUG RI 3$&20¶V WRWDO H[HUFLVHV DUH FRQGXFWHG ZLWK ,QGLD LQFOXGLQJ PLOLWDU\
exercises across all services (including the naval exercise, Malabar, HADR and amphibious 
exercises).1023  India also participates in a Trilateral Security Dialogue with the United States and Japan 
at the sub-secretary level.1024  Bilateral dialogues between Australia and India have expanded 
opportunities for engagement in security and defence but have not, as yet, produced any concrete 
                                                          
1019 :ŽŚŶ'ĂƌŶĂƵƚ ?  “Australia-Japan Military Ties are a 'Quasi-Alliance', say OĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?Sydney Morning Herald, 
October 26, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/national/australiajapan-military-ties-are-a-quasialliance-say-
officials-20141026-11c4bi.html#ixzz3J3jN7EUP  (accessed November 14, 2014). 
1020 DĂůĐŽůŵĂǀŝƐ ? “tŚǇ:ĂƉĂŶ>ŽƐƚƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ?ŝůůŝŽŶ^ƵďŵĂƌŝŶĞĞĂů P&ĞĂƌŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? ?National Interest, 
May 3, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-lost-australias-40-billion-submarine-deal-
fear-16026  (accessed May 10, 2016). 
1021 ĂǀŝƐ ? “Why Japan Lost Australia's $40 Billion Submarine Deal ? ?The decision not to align Australia so closely 
reflects Prime Minister Malcolm dƵƌŶďƵůů ?ƐŵŽƌĞŚŝŶĂ-centric strategy than his predecessor, Tony Abbott. In 
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?,ƵŐŚtŚŝƚĞƉƌŽƉŚĞƚŝĐĂůůǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚdƵƌŶďƵůů ‘ǁŝůůďĞůĞƐƐŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŚĂŶŚŝƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƚŽ
presume the US knows how Australia should progress its relationship ǁŝƚŚŚŝŶĂ ? ? :ĂŵŝĞ^ŵǇƚŚ ?  “ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ
Potential Policy Turns under NĞǁ WD DĂůĐŽůŵ dƵƌŶďƵůů ? ?Financial Times, September 15, 2015. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cca59db4-5b80-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz48FiyXegH (accessed May 
10, 2016). 
1022 Center for Strategic and International Studies,  “h ?^ ?&ŽƌĐĞWŽƐƚƵƌĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific Region: An 
/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ? ?Washington, DC, June 27, 2012, 38. 
1023 Center for Strategic and International Studies ? “h ?^ ?&ŽƌĐĞWŽƐƚƵƌĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
1024 The then Australian PM, Kevin Rudd, damaged Australian credibility with India, when he pulled Australia out 
of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the U.S., India, Japan and Australia in February 2008.  This has 
been viewed by some as a missed oppŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ĂǀŝĚƌĞǁƐƚĞƌ ? “dŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂ-Australia Security and 
ĞĨĞŶĐĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ PĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐĂŶĚWƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ?Security Challenges 10, no. 1 (2014): 72. 
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results.1025  Nevertheless, there is hope in the longer term that India will eventually become fully 
integrated into the existing regional order.  The development of pluri-lateral dialogues enhances the 
opportunity for multilateral naval exercises, and increased cooperation and interoperability between 
U.S. partners.  
 
Through the bilateral alliances, and offer of pluri-lateral security cooperation underpinned by American 
security guarantees, the U.S. is able to directly drive the alliance system forward in a direction that 
serves its purposes.  The strategy of developing pluri-lateral and networked relations, building on 
converging issues between the spokes, deepens American security hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, 
anchors the U.S. firmly into the Asia-Pacific and keeps the Asia-Pacific centred on the Pacific, rather 
than developing an order centred on China or Asia.  The process of modernising and strengthening the 
alliance structure not only enhances the military capabilities and interoperability of allies, this process 
further aligns the interests of strategic partners with those of the United States.  The willingness of these 
U.S. partners to engage in these networked relationships and to align with U.S interests, consistent with 
the aims of the strategic rebalance, is indirectly influenced by the potency of the American narrative on 
China.  7KHSRZHUIXODQGQHJDWLYHQDUUDWLYHFRQFHUQLQJ&KLQD¶VULVHLVRIWHQLPSOLFLWLQWKHcontrasting 
SRVLWLYH PHVVDJHV DERXW $PHULFD¶V UROH LQ WKH $VLD-Pacific that is typically presented to regional 
partners.  7KH86RIIHUVSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\DQGZLOOHQKDQFHµDVWDEOHDQGGLYHUVLILHGVHFXULW\RUGHU¶
prioritises cooperation rather than compellence, and reinforces a rules-based regional order, in contrast 
WR WKH XQNQRZQ TXDQWLW\ RI &KLQD¶V SRWHntial regional hegemony.  Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
current tensions in the security environment draw allies closer to the U.S. regional outlook.      
 
7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHVHFXULW\DOOLDQFHVZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKDSHVDOOLHV¶QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LQWHUHVWV
and often requires internally unpopular trade-offs.  Being within the American security sphere 
complicates their diplomatic and economic relations with China.  Both Seoul and Canberra are 
influenced by their economic dependence on Beijing. For Australia, the decision to choose the French 
bid over the Japanese one, appeared to reflect &DQEHUUD¶VIHDURIDQJHULQJ%HLMLQJ%HLMLQJ¶VJURZLQJ
criticism oI6HRXO¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK:DVKLQJWRQelicited debates in the ROK about the future of its 
alliance with the U.S. in light of Chinese security concerns.  In Japan, changes to the pacifist 
constitution, while supported in Washington, prompted similar domestic debates.   
 
                                                          
1025 For India, the U.S.-Australia alliance remains a material factor in Indian thinking ? ƌĞǁƐƚĞƌ ?  “dŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂ-
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ? ? ?-8. 
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The United States has a strategic interest in encouraging greater interoperability and military exercises 
involving both the ROK and Japan, and nurturing stronger strategic ties between Japan and Australia.  
Nevertheless, political officials in South Korea and Australia continually attempt to balance their 
intimate relationships with the United States in strategic affairs against and their economic relations 
with Beijing.  South Korean sensitivities regarding its historical grievances towards Japan continue to 
influence security cooperation with Tokyo.1026   Despite their common interests in regional trends, 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRGHYHORSEHWWHUVHFXULW\FRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ6HRXODQG7RN\RKDVEHHQOHVV
successful.1027  Washington views the poor bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo as a major 
roadblock in the realisation of its security web between Northeast and Southeast Asia, particularly for 
WKH3HQWDJRQ¶V LQWHQWLRQ WRFUHDWHDQ LQWHJUDWHG86-Japan-South Korea missile defence system.1028  
7KH ZDUPLQJ RI 6HRXO¶V DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV 7+$$' DUH ultimately driven by fear of North Korean 
nuclear proliferation.1029  However, the thawing of relations between President Park and Prime Minister 
Abe in December 2015, as a result of the progress made on the long-disputed matter of comfort women, 
has reduced this salient obstacle to the improvement of relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and 
SRWHQWLDOO\RSHQVXSWKHSURVSHFWRIWKHLUZRUNLQJWRJHWKHUWRFRXQWHU3\RQJ\DQJ¶VDFWLYLWLHV.1030  The 
U.S. is hoping that the current geopolitical situation will work to its advantage by enabling the 
development of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan and South Korea that could serve as 
leverage to restart dialogue with Pyongyang and, more generally, enhance the existing regional security 




                                                          
1026 ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? “h ?^ ?&ŽƌĐĞWŽƐƚƵƌĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
1027 Tense relations between Seoul and Tokyo are historically-related and also derive from the continuing dispute 
over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan. 
1028 Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 24, 
2014), 6. 
1029 The House of Representatives has taken an interest in the comfort women issue and Japanese school 
textbooks, introducing two resolutions, in 2006 and 2007. These resolutions express the sense of the House that 
Japan should  ‘ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂƉŽůŽŐŝƐe, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal 
manner ? for its abuses of the comfort women. In 2013, Congress also urged the Secretary of State to encourage 
the Japanese government to address the issues raised. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations, 6. 
1030 In December 2015, Seoul and Tokyo signed an accord on the matter of the comfort women - South Korean 
women used as sex-slaves by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II - with Japan agreeing to reparation 
costs and an official apology by Prime Minister Abe concerning the treatment of the women. Kwanwoo Jun and 
Alexander Martin,  “:ĂƉĂŶ ?^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂŐƌĞĞƚŽŝĚĨŽƌ ‘ŽŵĨŽƌƚtŽŵĞŶ ? ? ?Wall Street Journal, December 28, 
2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-south-korea-reach-comfort-women-agreement-1451286347 
(accessed August 18, 2016). 
1031 DĐĂŶŝĞůtŝĐŬĞƌ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐEĞǆƚDŽǀĞŝŶƐŝĂ P:ĂƉĂŶ-^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?National Interest, February 
24, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-next-move-asia-japan-south-korea-alliance-15301 
(accessed August 18, 2016). 
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(ii) Adapting the alliance partnerships, not the alliance structure 
The alliance system is being increasingly used to manage changing regional power dynamics and to 
SUHVHUYH$PHULFD¶VSRVLWLRQDV the Asia-Pacific hegemon.1032  The alliances are an essential element of 
U.S. compulsory power, working directly through its interactions with its partner states, creating 
conditions that suit the U.S. and which, in turn, affects their ability to control circumstances.1033  
Continuing to cultivate special relationships with key states in the region through the existing bilateral 
alliances is a critical means by which the U.S. can assert its interests, and reinforces its position as the 
superior partner.  The U.S. uses its military power to directly shape the actions of its partners, also 
constituting the social capacities and interests of its alliance partners which maintains their subordinate 
positions in the regional order.  The aim is to shape perceptions, knowledge, and preferences in such a 
way as to get the other states to accept their supporting, yet subordinate, role in the existing order of 
things.  Consequently, the U.S. does not need to exercise direct coercive control over the other states in 
the region because the regional security architecture already operates to maintain the existing hierarchy, 
µUHSURGXFLQJWKHLQWHUQDOO\-related positions of super- and subordination (or domination) that actors 
RFFXS\¶1034   Over time, regional interests tend to converge with U.S. interests and in so doing, the 
alliance system, as well as its new adaptations, are reinforced as a legitimate source of regional stability, 
thereby reproducing the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony. 
 
National security policies and their legal infrastructure are closely connected to the U.S. alliances 
through the creation of norms and shared commitments to regional security.1035  While the U.S. military 
continues to maintain wartime operational control of South Korean armed forces through OPCON, it 
can influence the national military capability procurement, technical standards and procedures of its 
allies.  A security consensus is thus built into the institutional framework of alliances and related 
domestic security institutions.1036  The U.S. alliance has also become a natural extension of both 
Japanese and South Korean national security policy, shaping national security interests.  Alliance 
members are likely to consult the United States about their own security initiatives, which in time 
becomes a naturalised process.  As has often been the case, alliance partners do question the policies 
                                                          
1032 The American regional vŝƐŝŽŶ ‘ďĞŐŝŶƐǁŝƚŚĂƉƌĞĞŵŝŶĞŶƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇďŽƚŚĂƐƚŚĞŬĞĞƉĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
peace, a wellspring for economic prosperity, an advocate for open markets and a role model for social, cultural 
ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?h ?^ ?ŐŽĂůƐĂƌĞ ? ‘ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ single power from dominating Asia; to maintain peace 
and stability through a combination of military presence, alliances, diplomatic initiatives, and economic 
interdependence; and to increase access for U.S. exports and companies through the WTO, APEC and free trade 
ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ^ĞĞ ŝĐŬ < ? EĂŶƚŽ ?East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security 
Arrangements and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 4, 2008), 30-
31. 
1033 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ 'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?
1034 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1035 ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶĂŶĚzĞŽ ? “ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐhƐƵĂů ? ? ? ? 
1036 ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶĂŶĚzĞŽ ? “ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐhƐƵĂů ? ? ? ? 
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that the U.S. wants to pursue in the name of the alliance.  However, the existence of the alliance provides 
its members with a sense of belonging, rather than specific µRSHUDWLRQDORUWDFWLFDOOHYHO¶SROLFLHV1037  
Over decades, these alliances have become integral to their respective national identities.  Since the 
SULQFLSOHV RI WKH DOOLDQFHV DUH DOVR µZUDSSHG ZLWKLQ OHJDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPHZRUNV¶ official 
perceptions and beliefs about the U.S. alliance in Japanese and South Korean defence policy, and, by 
extension, its influence over national security narratives, are also sustained.1038  The durability of the 
alliances demonstrates that, despite disagreements over specific policies from time to time, the Mutual 
Defence Treaties remain central to allied security strategies, with overall management determined by 
Washington.   
 
The hub-and-spokes pattern serves as a foundation for nascent pluri-lateral linkages developing among 
regional allies, siting between the U.S.-led bilateral alliances and less formal regional multilateral 
security initiatives.  The existing exclusive bilateral system is being adapted to support more inclusive 
overlapping trilateral dialogues between American alliance partners and other regional partners with 
whom the U.S. has some form of strategic relationship.1039  The long term goal is to leverage the close 
alliance relationships, developing them into a broader network focused on regional concerns that 
converge with U.S. regional priorities, in particular, the disputes in the East and South China Seas, 
counter-terrorism and combatting a range of transnational issues, including drugs and human 
trafficking, and climate change.1040  While these arrangements could form the basis of an eventual 
regional multilateral security mechanism, they ultimately exist to service American compulsory power.  
In other words, the development of a networked architecture of cooperation rests on the existing alliance 
structure, bilaterally managed through Washington, and acts as a hedge against the emergence of an 
XQGHVLUDEOHPXOWLODWHUDORUGHULQWKHUHJLRQWKDWFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\HURGH$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFVWDWXV1041  
The American exercise of compulsory power through its military dominance, is thus not being used 
coercively.  Subordinate states across the region actively consent to U.S. military dominance.  
                                                          
1037 ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶĂŶĚzĞŽ ? “ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐhƐƵĂů ? ? ? ? 
1038 Andrew Yeo, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-US Base Protests (New York: Cambridge University Press), 16. 
1039 The existing U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances serve as the basis for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. Jae 
:ĞŽŬ WĂƌŬ ?  “dŚĞ h ?^ ?-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an Undesirable 
DƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇKƌĚĞƌ ? ?The Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (May 2011): 146-147. 
1040 ^ĞĞDŝĐŚĂĞůƵƐůŝŶ ? “^ŚĂƉŝŶŐĂWĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ƵƚƵƌĞ PtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ'ŽĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞdƌŝůĂƚĞƌĂů^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ? ?ŝŶ
Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, eds. William T. Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, 
Zhu Feng and Sheldon W. Simon, National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle, WA: Dec 2008), 1-2; Shaun Breslin, 
 “^ƵƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ĞŵĂŶĚ Žƌ ĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐ ^ƵƉƉůǇ ? Ŷ ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ>ŽŽŬ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ Forces driving East Asian Community 
BuŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? WŽůŝĐǇ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ƌŝĞĨ  ?The Stanley Foundation, November 2009), 5. 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/Breslin_07_PAB.pdf (accessed April 4, 2015 ) ? WĂƌŬ ?  “dŚĞ
U.S.-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific ? ?146. 
1041 WĂƌŬ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-Led Alliances in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Nonetheless, the strength of the U.S. military presence is meant to be a powerful symbol of deterrence 
in light of any attempt by China, or North Korea, to challenge the status quo.  
 
Institutional Power: Regional security institutions 
To support developments in the San Francisco alliance structure, the Obama administration has also 
directed its attention to deepening ties with the multilateral regional institutions with a view to indirectly 
exerting influence over regional developments.  Institutional power also involves interactions between 
actors, but is used indirectly, consequently, this aspect of power stresses consensus-building.  Through 
institutional power, a dominant actor is able to design or shape institutions to its long term advantage 
and to the disadvantage of others.  The medium through which influence is channelled is indirect, or 
diffuse because µA stands in a particular relation to the relevant institutional arrangements,¶ where its 
actions exercise power over B.1042  In the complex array of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific, it is 
more difficult for the U.S. to exert influence over the regional agenda, or to shape their longer term 
GLUHFWLRQ*LYHQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHRIH[HUWLQJGLUHFWLQIOXHQFHDQGVKDSLQJUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\
through the bilateral alliances, there has been little consistent interest in moulding the style and format 
of regional multilateral institutions.  Consequently, the U.S. has not been engaged in decision-making 
processes, or the internal mechanisms, that have shaped these regional forums since their inception, and 
the U.S. absence from taking the lead over emerging multilateral processes up to 2008 was conspicuous.  
Consequently, the U.S has played only a limited role in institutionalisation processes in these 
mechanisms it now seeks to influence.   
 
Significant attempts to weave regional security into the more developed cooperation mechanisms in 
trade and finance surfaced after the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998).1043  What was viewed in 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDDVGLUHFWLQWHUYHQWLRQE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKURXJKWKH,0)LQWRWKHUHJLRQ¶VILQDQFLDO
affairs created space and need for regional institutions with a narrower East Asian focus.  Increased 
unilateralism under the G.W. Bush administration prompted a regional response that could work round 
$PHULFD¶V µVHOI-FRQVFLRXV H[FOXVLRQ¶1044  Regional concerns reinforced the imperative to construct 
                                                          
1042 Since the US cannot gain membership of ASEAN or the APT, the U.S. has installed a permanent ambassador 
to ASEAN, and through this role, the U.S. is able to exert institutional power. However, through its bilateral 
alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, it may use its existing compulsory power to exert indirect influence 
ŽǀĞƌ^EǀŝĂƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?-16. 
1043 d ? : ? WĞŵƉĞů ?  “ZĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů dŝĞƐ ? ? ŝŶƌŝƐŝƐ ĂƐ ĂƚĂůǇƐƚ P ƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ǇŶĂŵŝĐ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂl Economy, eds. 
Andrew MacIntyre, T.J Pempel and John Ravenhill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 173. 
1044 Mark Beeson, Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 73, 75. 
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multilateral institutions that would supplement the security guarantee bargain with the United States.1045  
A security order has emerged in Southeast Asia, organised around the hard bilateralism of the American 
alliances, and an emerging soft multilateralism, through the regional institutions. 
 
Regional efforts at security cooperation have been overseen by ASEAN, the leading multilateral 
LQVWLWXWLRQ RI 6RXWKHDVW $VLD ZKLFK KDV LQVWLJDWHG PXFK RI 6RXWKHDVW $VLD¶V SROLWLFDO DQG VHFXULW\
FRRSHUDWLRQ$6($1¶VFRPSOHPHQWDU\VXEJURXSLQJVGUDZLQ1RUWKHDVW$VLDQVWDWHVLQFOXGLQJ-DSDQ
China, and South Korea, in addition to states in the wider Indo-Asia-Pacific, including the U.S., 
$XVWUDOLDDQG,QGLD$6($1¶VUROHLVWRRIIVHWWKHYDULRXVLQWHUHVWVDQGSHUVSHFWLYHVRIUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\
because there is no single identifiable common threat around which to build a security bloc.1046  Rather 
than creating formal multilateral security organisations, cooperative security mechanisms have been 
incorporated into the frameworks of existing institutions, as the main channel for dealing with 
unavoidable political and security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific.1047  There is considerable overlap 
within these institutions over matters concerning traditional and non-traditional security.  The most 
significant post-Cold War security mechanisms are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).1048   
 
(i) ASEAN-led initiatives 
ASEAN is central to regional transformation.  This association oversees and instigates dialogues with 
an increasing number of states across the Asia-Pacific in formal and informal settings.1049  The most 
inclusive multilateral regional security organisation, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), has the 
REMHFWLYHRIHVWDEOLVKLQJDµPRUHSUHGLFWDEOHDQGFRQVWUXFWLYHSDWWHUQRIUHODWLRQVIRUWKH$VLD-Pacific 
UHJLRQ¶EULQJLQJ together ASEAN and non-ASEAN nations through confidence-building activities.  
                                                          
1045 The urgency of the G.W. Bush aĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-September 2001 security objectives offered the 
opportunity for East Asian states to seek a more reciprocal bargain with the United States. Goh, The Struggle for 
Order, 60. 
1046 The cooperative security norm (without legalistic and formal mechanisms) of the ARF embraces 
inclusiveness, enabling dyads such as the U.S. and China, India and Pakistan, and North and South Korea to exist 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŵŝƚĂǀĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?EŽƌŵƐĂŶĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŶInternational Relations Theory 
and Regional Transformation, ed. T.V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 208.  
1047 Extending its inclusive credentials, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) was formed in 1977, 
opening up ASEAN to the participation of actors outside the Southeast Asia sub-region, including the U.S, Japan, 
and China and South Korea. After the internal ASEAN summit, meetings with the additional groupings are held, 
including the PMC, ARF and ASEAN +3. There is also an annual meeting for defence ministers (ADMM), and 
ADMM-WůƵƐ ?ĨŽƌ^EĞĨĞŶĐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ^E ?Ɛ ?ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐƚŚĂƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐďŝĞŶŶŝĂůůǇ ? 
1048 APEC is discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
1049 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created in 1994 as a forum for informal confidence-building measures 
in security issues among the ten ASEAN members plus seventeen others, including China, the U.S., Australia, 
Canada, and Pacific-facing Latin America states. North Korea but not Taiwan has membership.  
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The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process, incorporating ASEAN and Japan, China and South Korea, was 
established in 1997 against the backdrop of the Asian Financial Crisis as a means to broaden and 
strengthen political and security cooperation between Northeast and Southeast Asia, principally in areas 
of non-traditional security.1050  For many leaders in East Asia, ASEAN was considered too small to 
manage the severity of the financial crisis, while APEC was too big to fully represent the interests of 
its Asian members.1051   
 
Alongside the more exclusively Asian APT, the East Asian Summit (EAS), established via the 2005 
.XDOD/XPSXU'HFODUDWLRQLVDIRUXPIRUGLDORJXHRQµEURDGVWUDWHJLFSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFLVVXHV
RIFRPPRQLQWHUHVWDQGFRQFHUQ¶LQYROYLQJ$6($1DQGQRZHLJKWRWKHU$VLD-Pacific nations.1052  The 
membership of the EAS underscores the significance of these formal and informal arrangements as 
reflecting the pattern for regional cooperation, offering a uniquely Asia-Pacific way of addressing a 
complex array of interests and issues.  µ6RIW¶UHJLRQDOLVPLQWKHIRUPRIGLDORJXes such as the APT and 
the EAS, work alongside more formally institutionalised mechanisms including APEC and the ARF, 
intersecting the broader Asia-Pacific region.1053  
 
                                                          
1050 The APT dialogue is not a formal agreement. It remains a consultative organ for view exchange rather than 
making specific binding policy comŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƵŐůĂƐtĞďďĞƌ ? “dŚĞZĞŐŝŽŶĂů/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶdŚĂƚŝĚŶ ?ƚ,appen: 
Cooperation without Integration in the Early Twenty-First CĞŶƚƵƌǇĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?The Pacific Review 23, no. 3 (2010): 
317.  Areas of cooperation include: transnational crime; trade and investment; finance; tourism; food, 
agriculture, fishery and forestry; minerals; small and medium enterprises; information and communication 
technology; energy; environment and sustainable development; networking of Track II diplomacy; poverty 
alleviation, promotion development of vulnerable groups; culture and people-to-people contact; education; 
science and technology; public health; and disaster management.  
1051 ^ŚĂƵŶƌĞƐůŝŶ ? “dŚĞŽƌŝƐŝŶŐĂƐƚƐŝĂŶZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ ) PEĞǁZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƐŝĂ ?Ɛ&ƵƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ) ? ?ŝŶAdvancing 
East Asian Regionalism, eds. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (London: Routledge, 2007), 40-41. See also 
Yasumasa KomŽƌŝ ? “ƐŝĂ ?Ɛ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009): 169.  
1052 The original 16 members of the EAS were the ASEAN 10, plus Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand and India. Membership was expanded after 2009 to include the U.S. and Russia. The summit is usually 
held back-to-back with annual ASEAN leaders' meetings ? ^ĞĞ ^E ?  “The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the 
ƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^E ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? <ƵĂůĂ >ƵŵƉƵƌ ? ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?. 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-charter-
kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005 (accessed September 19, 2014). 
1053 There is no exclusively Northeast Asian mechanism for dealing with issues in this sub-region. The ad hoc Six-
Party Talks, involving China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the U.S. and North Korea, as a forum for discussing 
NortŚ <ŽƌĞĂ ?Ɛ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ not developed into a formal regional security organisation. Talks 
broke down in 2009 with little to show for the six years they were active. Attempts were made to resume the 
talks in September 2013 by Beijing but Washington opposed a restart until Pyongyang had made serious moves 
to halt its nuclear programme.  See Jayshree Bajoria, and Beina Xu,  “dŚĞ Six Party Talks on North <ŽƌĞĂ ?Ɛ Nuclear 
WƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? ?Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-
north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593 (accessed September 19, 2014). ^ĞĞĂůƐŽŶŬŝƚWĂŶĚĂ ? “dŚĞ>ŽŶŐZŽĂĚ
ĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞ^ŝǆWĂƌƚǇdĂůŬƐ ? ?The Diplomat, February 28, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-long-road-
back-to-the-six-party-talks/ (accessed September 19, 2014). 
 181 
 
(ii) The ASEAN Regional Forum 
The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual gathering of foreign ministers and 
other senior officials to discuss a wide range of regional political and security topics, has an inclusive 
and broader Asian-Pacific, rather than exclusively narrower Asian-centric, membership.  Encompassing 
27 nations, pOXVWKH(8WKH$5)LQLWLDWLYHZDV$6($1¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWWKDWLWQHHGHGWRUHPDLQ
relevant in matters of post-&ROG :DU VHFXULW\ DQG GRPLQDWH WKH UHJLRQ¶V VHFXULW\ GLVFRXUVH
Establishing the ARF ensured ASEAN participation in all regional security deliberations.  By binding 
-DSDQ&KLQDDQGWKH86LQWRWKH$5)$6($1FRXOGSOD\DFHQWUDOUROHLQVHFXULQJ6RXWKHDVW$VLD¶V
stability, connecting the big regional players into a Southeast Asian-OHGLQVWLWXWLRQUHIOHFWLQJ$6($1¶V
preferred strategy of consensus diplomacyNQRZQDVµWKH$6($1:D\.¶1054   
 
The ARF UHSURGXFHV$6($1¶VSUHIHUUHG VWUDWHJ\RI FRQVHQVXVGLSORPDF\ WKURXJKZKLFK UHJLRQDO
problems can be managed, rather than resolved.  Since it is not a collective security arrangement, the 
ARF is ill-designed to resolve specific disputes.1055  The ARF has limited capacities and little leverage 
over members, and has shown little ability tR DGGUHVV WKH UHJLRQ¶V SULQFLSDO flashpoints, including 
Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula.1056  ASEAN centrality DQGWKHµ$6($1ZD\¶
of consensus-building block a more proactive agenda, presented by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and 
Canada. Since only an ASEAN state can chair the ARF, disputes between ASEAN and non-ASEAN 
members are deliberated with great difficulty.1057  The ARF still serves primarily to build confidence 
and trust, and has neither moved onto the proposed second stage of preventive diplomacy, nor to its 
longer term goal of conflict resolution.1058  Multilateral cooperation on security issues remains 
consultative and marginal regarding the management of critical regional security concerns such as 
China-Taiwan relations, the North Korean weapons programme, and the territorial disputes in the East 
                                                          
1054 For Southeast Asian states, the priority is to tie Japan and China into Southeast Asia, rather than binding 
^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐŽĨEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ?^ĞĞĂƌƌǇƵǌĂŶ ? “^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƐŝĂ PdŚĞ
/ŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇŽĨZĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ'ůŽďĂů>ĞǀĞůƐ ? ?The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003): 156. 
1055 ^ŚĞůĚŽŶ t ? ^ŝŵŽŶ ?  “dŚĞ ^E ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů &ŽƌƵŵ P ĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ dĂůŬ ^ŚŽƉ ? ? dŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƵƌĞĂƵ ŽĨ ƐŝĂŶ
Research (Seattle, WA: July 2013). http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=676  (accessed May 17, 2016). 
1056 For instance, the creation of the Six Party Talks to address security issues on the Korean Peninsula was a 
blow to ARF centrality in managing specific issues. Beeson, Institutions of the Asia Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and 
Beyond, 72-73. 
1057 ^ŝŵŽŶ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵ PĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂůŬ^ŚŽƉ ? ? 
1058 ^ŝŵŽŶ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵ PĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂůŬ^ŚŽƉ ? ? 
 182 
 
and South China Seas.1059  Any U.S. expectation of the ARF moving beyond confidence-building is a 
colossal task.1060   
 
This distinct process of regional institution-building is defined as µthe ASEAN Way,¶ encapsulating an 
Asian approach to regional institution-building, rather than the formal, legalistic approach to order-
building favoured by Washington.1061  µ$VLDQ¶ PXOWLODWHUDOLVP LQWHQWLRQDOO\ FRQWUDVWV ZLWK WKH
µH[FOXVLYHELODWHUDOLVP¶RIWKHKXE-and-spokes bilateral alliances.  By consciousO\UHMHFWLQJµLPSRUWHG
PRGHOV¶LHµZHVWHUQ¶RIPXOWLODWHUDOLVPWKH$6($1:D\ of regional multilateral institution-building 
is defined by open regionalism (inclusive membership), consensus, and soft regionalism (confidence-
building).1062  Regional securit\FRRSHUDWLRQDQGGLDORJXHVUHYROYHDURXQGµFRRSHUDWLYHVHFXULW\¶ZKLFK
is a commitment to inclusiveness, whereby criteria for participation or an agenda cannot be imposed, 
and adherence to decisions are on a voluntary basis.1063  Asian order-building narratives often contradict 
the U.S. position on regional institutional order-building.  Rather than formalising obligations, the focus 
of the ASEAN Way is on the development of an informal, slow-moving, and consultative process based 
on existing regional norms and practices that promote consensus and good will, which occur in a non-
confrontational and non-threatening multilateral setting.1064  For ASEAN, the method of multilateral 
institution-building and the development of practices promoting cohesion have become more important 
than the realisation of specific or concrete goals.1065    
 
 
                                                          
1059 Track Two dialogues, such as the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue provide another informal forum for discussion. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/track_ii_diplomacy  ^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ ƌŝĂŶ > ? :Žď ?  “dƌĂĐŬ dǁŽ
ŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ P/ĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐƐŝĂ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇKƌĚĞƌ ? ?ŝŶAsian Security Order: Instrumental 
and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 241-279.   
1060 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 27. 
1061 The ASEAN Way  ‘ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƐƚŽůŽĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝces, ? which adapts regional/sub-regional concepts and 
practices of cooperation to a wider international context involving Western actors through APEC and ARF. 
ŵŝƚĂǀĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-Building: FƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘^EtĂǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝĂ-Pacific WĂǇ ? ? ?The 
Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 320-1, 327. 
1062 Consultation tend to be open-ended and not tied to a specific timetable or agenda. Care is taken not to 
embarrass or isolate any individual ASEAN member.  ASEAN-style consensus has limited effect when dealing 
with issues that engage fundamental national interests, including sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such 
issues tend ƚŽďĞ ‘ƐǁĞƉƚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĐĂƌƉĞƚ. ?Duch of the discussion and agreed outcomes for regional summits 
are pre-agreed, or done on the side lines of official events. ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-Building ? ?
320-332, 327-329. 
1063 The 1995 ARF Concept Paper envisaged three types of security cooperation: confidence-building, 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇĂŶĚ ‘ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ? ? ?dŚŝƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ
rather than the substance of an agreement to prevent conflict). Acharya ?  “/ĚĞĂƐ ? /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1064 ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1065 ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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(iii) The East Asia Summit 
The East Asia Summit (EAS), first convened in December 2005, is a complementary dialogue to other 
existing regional security arrangements.1066  It was initially set up as an annual summit held by the 
leaders of East and South Asia, as µWKHVROH OHDGHUV-led institution focused on political and security 
LVVXHV¶1067  The EAS was initiated by the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohammed, 
who was uncompromising in his vision for a regional organisation that only represented the views of 
Asian countries.1068  ASEAN sets the EAS agenda and schedule, and establishes the criteria for 
membership, with accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation a prerequisite to 
membership of the EAS.1069  Since the U.S. was not invited to attend the EAS, its creation caused some 
concern in Washington.1070  7KHFRQFHUQZDV WKDW WKH($6ZRXOGUHSODFH$3(&DV$PHULFD¶VEHVW
medium through which to shape regional trade, marking a new era of Asian regionalism that would 
potentially limit U.S. influence.1071  Such a transformation in regional affairs would negatively affect 
$PHULFD¶VFHQWUDOUROHLQWKH$VLD-Pacific and Washington would find it difficult to set the agenda and 
shape the goals for multilateral cooperation.   
 
With China a member of the EAS, Washington anticipated that Beijing would use the EAS to 
consolidate a leading role in the Asia-Pacific and weaken U.S. influence, through its preference for an 
µ$VLDQRQO\¶JURXSLQJ7KHVWrategic importance of the EAS process was contained within its potential 
as the basis for a future East Asian community with a potential capacity to make collective agreements 
on trade or even security affairs without U.S. input, whilst also shifting the centre of the region from 
the broader Pacific Rim (including the U.S.) towards East Asia (and China).1072  The creation of the 
EAS, and its formal exclusion of the U.S. represented a region pushing back against an increasingly 
unilateral U.S. foreign policy under the G.W. Bush administration.  
                                                          
1066 The EAS is mainly concerned with matters of non-traditional security as a trust-building, preferring the 
 ‘^E-ǁĂǇ ? ƚŽ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-building.  There are five EAS priority areas for cooperation: finance, 
education, avian flu, disaster management, and climate change. Summits have also broached nuclear non-
proliferation, the Korean Peninsula, developments in Syria and Iran, maritime security and management of 
disputes in the South China Sea. In non-traditional security, and economic spheres, progress in priority areas of 
functional cooperation include regional economic and financial integration, education, regional disaster 
response, energy and environment, health and connectivity.  
1067 Michael Fuchs,  “U.S. Strategic Interests and the APEC and East Asia Summits ? ?Testimony before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, December 2, 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/12/250315.htm (accessed May 17, 2016). 
1068 The divergent visions of an Asian-only identity, contrasted with an Asia-Pacific identity, are discussed in 
depth in Chapter 5.  
1069 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 63. 
1070 Bruce Vaughn, East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
December 9, 2005), 5. 
1071 Vaughn, East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, summary. 
1072 Vaughn, East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, 1 
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The establishment of the EAS emphasises the struggle for supremacy between China and the U.S. in 
determining the centre of regional order-building, and has also become a battle ground for competing 
influence between Japan and China.1073  There are diverging regional views between those states 
pushing for an exclusive Asian-centric grouping (led at different times by China and Malaysia), 
countered by a need for a broader Asia-Pacific grouping (pursued by U.S. allies, Japan and 
Australia).1074  In developing the EAS framework, China favoured a future East Asian community based 
on the more restricted membership of the ASEAN Plus Three states which would exclude Australia and 
New Zealand with their close alignment to the United StateV,QGLDDV&KLQD¶VWUDGLWLRQDOULYDOLQ$VLD
was also to be excluded, especially since India was developing closer ties with the United States.  China 
reportedly favoured a draft joint declaration for the summit, which portrayed ASEAN Plus Three states 
as only having a dialogue with India, Australia and New Zealand at the summit.  Japan reportedly 
opposed such a definition of the extended grouping. India reportedly opposed any joint declaration that 
did not imply that the EAS would form the basis of a future East Asian Community.1075  The outcome 
in favour of the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand to counter-balance Chinese influence 
reflects a regional preference for an Asia-Pacific rather than Asian-centric dynamic, aligning with U.S. 
preferences, and highlighting the indirect influence of the U.S. over regional interests and norm 
diffusion.      
 
U.S. capacity to shape regional institutions 
Under the Obama administration there has been a shift towards the recognition of what regional 
multilateral institutions can facilitate with regard to regional order-building.  The bilateral alliance 
system offers insufficient capacity on its own to manage the array of regional security problems.  The 
numerous multilateral institutions and dialogues can also offer value, by complementing and reinforcing 
the existing alliance network.1076  :DVKLQJWRQ¶V HQGRUVHPHQWV RI UHJLRQDO VHFXULW\ GLDORJXHV LQ WKH
Asia-Pacific have consistently been accompanied by strong reaffirmation of its traditional emphasis on 
bilateral alliances.  While the U.S. has not been an initiator of regional institutions emerging in post-
Cold War East Asia, it has still been able to exert a degree of political influence because, on the whole, 
the region accepts American security hegemony and wants to keep the U.S. firmly engaged.  Thus the 
regional institutions act as a social framework for legitimising American regional power and leadership. 
 
                                                          
1073 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 64. 
1074 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 4. 
1075 Yomiuri Shimbun  ?dŽŬǇŽ ) ? “:ĂƉĂŶ ?ŚŝŶĂůĂƐŚKǀĞƌĂƐƚƐŝĂ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? 2005, cited in Vaughn, 
East Asia Summit (EAS): Issues for Congress, 3 
1076 tŝůůŝĂŵd ?dŽǁĂŶĚƌĞŶĚĂŶdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?Review of International Studies 
36, no. 1 (2014): 101. 
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American strategic thinking under the Obama administration views more multilateral cooperation 
between allies and security partners as enhancing regional security.1077  +LOODU\ &OLQWRQ¶V IRUPDO
DFFHSWDQFHRI$6($1¶V7UHDW\RI$PLW\DQG&RRSHUDWLRQ7$&DWWKH-XO\$6($15HJLRQDO
Forum (ARF) perhaps best illustrates this, driven as it was by WashinJWRQ¶V DVSLUDWLRQ WR JDLQ
membership in the East Asia Summit.1078  5HPLQLVFHQWRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKH
ARF, which was driven by the changing strategic context of the early 1990s, an important motivation 
behind U.S participation in the E$6KDVEHHQWRUHDVVXUHWKHUHJLRQRI$PHULFD¶VRQJRLQJFRPPLWPHQW
and involvement, whilst also inevitably drawing benefits from being on the inside.  There is utility in a 
regional multilateral security dialogue in helping to reassure friends and allies in the region of U.S. 
continued commitment and in demonstrating its willingness to accept constraints to American power, 
as a way to reproduce consent for U.S. hegemony.1079   
 
The U.S. approach to these multilateral mechanisms is drawn from its own requirements for regional 
order, and the construction of an Asia-Pacific identity integral to U.S. self-perception as the Asia-Pacific 
hegemon.  Consequently, U.S. policy-makers have two main concerns relating to the role of regional 
multilateral institutions in the overarching regional security architecture.  The first concerns the 
geographic boundaries and degree of inclusiveness of these institutions regarding non-Asian Asia-
3DFLILF VWDWHV  7KH 86 KDV WUDGLWLRQDOO\ DGYDQFHG DQ µRSHQ¶ DQG µLQFOXVLYH¶ Uegional security 
DUFKLWHFWXUH XQGHU WKH LQFOXVLYH GHVFULSWLRQ RI µ$VLD-3DFLILF¶ RQ WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW VXFK
geographical designations can shape and develop the meaning behind architectural design.1080   
 
The second preoccupation relates to the purpose or function of these institutions within the broader 
regional security architecture.  Washington typically conceives regional security architecture in material 
terms, derived from judgements about utility and future viability, centred upon the production of 
outcomes as defined by the U.S., particularly in the area of crisis management.1081  :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
preference is for formal and legalistic rules that embed legally-binding commitments covering a wide 
                                                          
1077 Robert M. Gates,  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ^ ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇZŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific ? ?First Plenary Session, The Shangri-La Dialogue, 
(30 May 2009), 4. 
1078 dŽǁĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1079 The same assurances were given to the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, when there was also regional concern over 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ, leading to American involvement in the ARF ?^ĞĞǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “The ASEAN 
ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵŝŶhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐƚƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 52. 
Since 2008, the U.S. has become more receptive to the concrete gains it can acquire from regional cooperation. 
See Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture. 
1080 dŽǁĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1081 Tow and dĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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range of issues.1082  This contrasts with the ASEAN Way, advocating a consensual and non-legalistic 
and non-binding commitments.  ASEAN has instigated regional norms and practices towards 
cooperation, offering a distinct interpretation of the role that regional institutions can and should play 
in security cooperation. $6($1¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUSURFHVV-driven mechanisms, where style and process 
are more meaningful, tends to conflict with the American outcome-driven approach which prioritises 
short-term policy outcomes.1083   
 
Historically, the U.S. has advanced a role for the ARF as a forum for confidence-building, rather than 
as a collective security mechanism, consistent with its own interests.  The G.W. Bush administration 
opportunistically used the ARF as a forum to garner support for international norms, especially on 
human rights and counter-terrorism, rather than a forum for generating regional norms.1084  
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH*:%XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V HQJDJHPHQWZLWK WKH$5)ZDVSXUHO\ WUDQVDFWLRQDO
During the global war on terror, the U.S.-initiated campaign against terrorism became the prime issue 
of common interest among ARF members.  Keeping its options open, the U.S. simultaneously forged 
various counter-terrorism agreements with ASEAN.1085  The attitude of U.S. policy makers towards the 
ARF during the G.W. Bush era emphasised its role as a forum for dialogue and declaratory statements, 
rather than an institution for affecting change, effectively downgrading its status as an emerging 
regional security institution.  As the ARF moved its agenda towards discussion of non-traditional 
security issues, the G.W. Bush administration viewed the ARF as unable to offer any real contribution 
to the traditional security issues deemed critical to the United States.1086  Instead, the G.W. Bush 
interpretation of multilateralism was subsequently channelled through APEC, with its economic 
liberalisation focus and summit-level meetings, and not the ARF.    
 
                                                          
1082 ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ?  “/ĚĞĂƐ ? /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?  ? ? ?  ?  ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽĂƌƌǇƵǌĂŶ ?  “,ŽǁƌĞŐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ
ŵĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐŝĞƐĨŽƌǁŽƌůĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ PĂŶŶŐůŝƐŚ^ĐŚŽŽůƌĞĐŽŶŶĂŝƐƐĂŶĐĞ ? ?ŝŶInternational Relations Theory 
and Regional Transformation, ed. T.V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37. 
1083 dŽǁĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1084 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵŝŶhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐƚƐŝĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 
(2004): 59. 
1085 The US chose the ARF meeting in 2002 as the forum to sign an anti-terrorism agreement with ASEAN. ASEAN 
announced at the 2003 ARF that the two sides would endorse a counter-terrorism plan which would involve US 
assistance in safeguarding shipping in the Malacca Straits. This was apparently viewed with some anxiety by 
Beijing. 'ŽŚ ? “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
1086 From the American point of view, the Taiwan issue, peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, and the India W
Pakistan nuclear contest rank top on US priorities, and a regional institution which could not address these 
issues, represented  ‘low stakes ? for the superpower. 'ŽŚ ?  “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East 




administration.  The 2014 and 2015 forums addressed a plethora of traditional and non-traditional issues 
important to the United States, including:  
µmarine environmental protection and conservation; the South China Sea; concerns 
RYHUWKH'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD¶VSURVFULEHGQXFOHDUDQGEDOOLVWLF
missile programs and human rights situation; the humanitarian crisis emanating 
from the irregular maritime movement of people in Southeast and South Asia and 
the Mediterranean; and regional cooperation on issues ranging from cyber-security 
to non-SUROLIHUDWLRQWRKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQGGLVDVWHUUHOLHI¶1087   
The U.S. generally exerts indirect influence over the ARF through back channels and bilateral 
discussions.  Securing agreements, or coordinating an approach to specific issues, for example over 
1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVprogramme and the prospects for a code of conduct on the South China 
Sea, tend to occur on the sidelines.1088  Typical ASEAN form requires positions and arrangements to be 
reached prior to the ARF meeting.1089  Nonetheless, Washington can use these annual gatherings to 
advance its strategic thinking on regional issues, and unify regional narratives DURXQG$PHULFD¶VRZQ
QHJDWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVRI&KLQD¶VULVH.  $6($1¶VFRQWLQXHGGRPLQDQFHRIWKH$5)PD\well strengthen 
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶SRVLWLRQLQWKHUHJLRQJLYHQWKDWWKHDVVRFLDWLRQLVFXUUHQWO\VXSSRUWLYHRIWKH86
regional presence, and also FRQFHUQHG RYHU &KLQD¶V LQWHQWLRQV DQG JURZLQJ PLOLWDU\ FDSDELOLWLHV LQ
Southeast Asia.1090   
 
The role of the rebalance in increasing American influence over regional institutions 
U.S. concerns over the expansion of Asian-centric groupings that could undermine the American-led 
security order dominate its interactions with regional security institutions.  Socialised during the Cold 
War into a hierarchical mode of interacting with East Asian partners within asymmetric alliances, 
Washington appears unwilling to have its strategic options constrained by alternative, regionally 
developed norms, such as the ASEAN Way.1091  Consequently, the U.S. appears reactive rather than 
proactive in leading regional multilateral institution-building.  The creation of the EAS further 
highlights the often passive role of the U.S. in discussions over the development of regional 
                                                          
1087 ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “U.S. Engagement in the 2015 ASEAN Regional Forum ? ? ƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/245759.htm  (accessed November 15, 2014). 
1088 ^ŚĞůĚŽŶt ?^ŝŵŽŶ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵ PĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂůŬ^ŚŽƉ ? ? ?^ĞĂƚƚůĞ ?t PThe National Bureau 
of Asian Research), July 11, 2013.  http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=676 (accessed November 
15, 2014). 
1089 ^ŝŵŽŶ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵ PĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂůŬ^ŚŽƉ ? ? 
1090 ^ŝŵŽŶ ? “dŚĞ^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵ PĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂůŬ^ŚŽƉ ? ? 
1091 Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, 66. 
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undertakings that occur outside the American-led alliance structure.  The U.S. often undermines 
regional security dialogues by using other instruments of statecraft at its disposal, including the bilateral 
alliances, through which it can directly channel its preferences.  As with the case of the EAS, until U.S. 
membership in 2011, 86 UHJLRQDO DOOLHV YLHZHG WKHPVHOYHV DV µUHJLRQDO DGMXGLFDWRUV¶ IRU 86
interests through their widening relationships with China and through participation in regional 
institutions.  Their regional security policies are coordinated with Washington, thereby ensuring U.S. 
involvement in Asian-centric regional-order building initiatives.  Regional allies act as a check against 
the expansion of Asian-centric order-building and Chinese influence on multilateralism.1092   
 
U.S. policy changes under the Obama administration reflect a shift in the position that Asian 
multilateralism was inimical to American interests.1093  The principal attractions of the EAS for the U.S. 
are, first, its key regional allies such as Japan and Australia are already members, and second, it 
SRWHQWLDOO\RIIHUVDZD\RIFXUELQJ&KLQD¶VLQIOXHQFH1094  As a signatory to TAC, the U.S. acceded to 
the EAS, confirming that the Obama administration placed ASEAN-led institutions at the heart of the 
rebalance strategy.  In November 2011, Hillary Clinton emphasised,  
µWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPXOWLODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQ, for we believe that addressing complex 
transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions 
FDSDEOHRIPXVWHULQJFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶1095   
Gaining membership of the EAS has been a prominent feature of the rebalance strategy.  That regional 
multilateral institutions are seen by the Obama administration as potentially important ways of exerting 
influence is significant.  More importantly, the U.S. has been able to shape the EAS agenda to focus on 
key political and security issuHV LQFOXGLQJ µ,6,/ DQG YLROHQW H[WUHPLVP (EROD DQG JOREDO KHDOWK
VHFXULW\,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPDQGPDULWLPHFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD¶ and is moving the 
EAS towards adopting a rules-based approach to managing inter-state relations in the future.1096   
 
U.S. presence at regional summits is thus both critical and reassuring, proving the importance of using 
WKH3UHVLGHQW¶V WLPH WRDWWHQG WKHVHDQQXDO VXPPLWV  2EDPD¶V IDLOXUH WRDWWHQG WKH(DVW$VLD
                                                          
1092 WĂƌŬ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-Led Alliances in the Asia-PacifŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1093 ĂǀŝĚĂƉŝĞĂŶĚŵŝƚĂǀĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ PEĞǁĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƐƚƐŝĂ
Forum, November 20, 2011. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/20/the-united-states-and-the-east-asia-
summit-a-new-beginning/  (accessed October 31, 2014) 
1094 ĞĞƐŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚŽŶĞ ? “WĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1095 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ? 
1096 The decision to establish regular engagement in Jakarta between the Ambassadors to ASEAN of EAS 
members, ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ƵƉ ŽŶ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ
initiatives, is further evidence of US influence over the EAS. Fuchs,  “U.S. Strategic Interests and the APEC and 
East Asia Summits. ?  
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Summit and APEC meetings as a result of the U.S. government shutdown did nothing to emphasise 
$PHULFD¶VUHQHZHGFRPPLWPHQWWRPXOWLODWHUDOLVPLQWKHUHJLRQ1097  ,QFRQVLVWHQF\LQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
rhetoric and actions towards the region further compounds the regional view that U.S. interest in the 
EAS is unsustainable over the longer term.  7KH 3UHVLGHQW¶V DWWHQGDQFH DW WKHVH UHJLRQDO VHFXULW\
GLDORJXHV LV DQ HVVHQWLDO FRPSRQHQW RI WKH UHEDODQFH VWUDWHJ\ IXUWKHU VXEVWDQWLDWHV $PHULFD¶V
commitment to the region and enables the U.S. to influence the direction of these forums.  While the 
current administration is relatively happy to engage with ASEAN and other EAS members to gradually 
VKDSHWKHIXWXUHDJHQGDDQGSULRULW\LVVXHVDVSDUWRIWKHUHEDODQFHLWVSUHIHUHQFHIRUDµUHVXOWV-oriented 
DJHQGD¶ KDV QRW FKDQJHG  The new Trump administration is likely to change strategy, either 
withdrawing from, or reducing U.S. engagement with multilateral institutions.1098  As was the case with 
its participation in the ARF, U.S. frustration with the EAS may grow in the future if the EAS does not 
develop the capacity to meet its goals and adhere to its commitments.1099 
 
ASEAN depictions of an emergent regional architecture typically afford pride of place to ASEAN-led 
processes such as the ARF and the EAS.  This preference for its own multilateral institutional 
arrangements largely reflects a desire to resist U.S. and Chinese dominance in the shaping and 
management of regional architecture.1100  At the same time, ASEAN seeks to bind both the U.S. and 
China within an ASEAN-led regional framework.  
µ6RXWKHDVW$VLDQJRYHUQPHQWVFRQWLQXHWRYLHZWKH86UROHDQGLWVDSSURDFKWR
Asian community building with some ambivalence [. . .] From the perspective of 
ASEAN states, the limited U.S. interest and engagement in broader, longer-term 
institutions [. . .] has worked to the advantage of the lesser powers, especially 
ASEAN itself, which does not want great-power dominance in the regional order-
EXLOGLQJSURFHVV¶1101   
                                                          
1097 ĂĐŚĂƌǇ <ĞĐŬ ?  “KďĂŵĂ ĂŶĐĞůƐ ZĞƐƚ ŽĨ ƐŝĂ dƌŝƉ ? ?The Diplomat, October 4, 2013. 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/obama-cancels-rest-of-asia-trip/  (accessed October 31, 2014). American 
press coverage focused on the advantage this situation gave to President Xi in promoting Chinese credentials as 
the business partner for emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific.  ŶŶĞ'ĞĂƌĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐyŝdĂŬĞƐĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨ
Obama Absence from Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ dƌĂĚĞ ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ? Washington Post, October 7, 2013. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-xi-takes-advantage-of-obama-absence-from-asia-
pacific-trade-summit/2013/10/07/58bf23e4-2f6c-11e3-9ddd-bdd3022f66ee_story.html (accessed October 31, 
2014). 
1098 WŚŝůŝƉ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶƐ ? “dƌƵŵƉWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ PŵĞƌŝĐĂ&ŝƌƐƚŽƌŵĞƌŝĐĂůŽŶĞ ? ? Financial Times, January 9, 2017. 
https://www.ft.com/content/ae092214-d36f-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0   (accessed January 20, 2017). 
1099 ĂƉŝĞĂŶĚĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ PEĞǁĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?
1100 dŽǁĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1101 Acharya,  ‘dŚĞ^ƚƌŽŶŐŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚŽĨƚŚĞtĞĂŬ P^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŝŶƐŝĂ ?ƐZĞŐŝŽŶĂůƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?in ƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, eds. Michael J. Green and Bates 
Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 180 W1. 
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The ASEAN Way of consensus-building tends to focus ASEAN efforts on non-traditional security 
issues (NTS).  While NTS issues are pressing, they also tend not to raise the same level of sensitivity 
that traditional security issues generate.1102  There are also doubts as to whether the ASEAN Way can 
provide practical solutions to regional security problems, especially since bilateral or multilateral issues 
are carefully and routinely kept outside the agenda of formal ASEAN meetings in favour of broader 
confidence-building measures.1103  Consequently, most regional actors turn to bilateral and pluri-lateral 
agreements to advance security goals, thereby falling back on bilateral defence relationships with 
Washington.1104  Multilateralism will not replace the existing bilateral alliances in managing regional 
security problems in the near future.    
 
With the Asia-Pacific region divided over the future role of its multilateral institutions, American 
regional hegemony is ultimately strengthened.  The lack of regional consensus on the structure and 
membership of regional security architecture limits attempts to define Asia-Pacific security.1105  The 
core of the debate centres on whether there ought to be an inclusive institutional bargain which builds 
on the American-led security order, and one which also includes China.  The alternative is an 
exclusively East Asian order, with China at the centre.1106    Ultimately, the root of the discussion lies 
in the extent to which the region accepts the criticality of the American security guarantee for regional 
stability.1107  An Asian-centric multilateralism would challenge the U.S.-led order, especially if China 
attempts to further isolate the United States from regional order-building.1108  In situations and periods 
                                                          
1102 dŽǁĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƐŝĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1103 The informal and non-legalistic procedures of the ARF require a creative approach to conflict resolution, 
requiring a non-threatening atmosphere for exploring problem-solving. Acharya argues that there is no evidence 
that slow institutionalisation, informal and indirect bargaining and consensus-seeking will ultimately produce 
better outcomes than multilateral institutions preferring formal and legal approaches. ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? 
and Institution-Building ? ?335, 338. 
1104 ĐŚĂƌǇĂ ? “/ĚĞĂƐ ?/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ-ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1105 Various ideas for regional integration have been put forward. In the early 1990s, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad initiated the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), an Asian-centric group, which sought to 
exclude the US and Australia and western values. The EAEG initiative was eventually incorporated into APEC, 
which did include the US and Australia. In the late 2000s, former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, put 
forward the Asia-Pacific Community (APC)  W an inclusive initiative spanning the entire Asia-Pacific. Henry 
DĂŬĞŚĂŵ ? “China and the Enlarged East Asia Summit: The MakiŶŐƐŽĨĂŶƐŝĂWĂĐŝĨŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ĂƐƚƐŝĂ
Forum, October 20, 2011. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/20/china-and-the-enlarged-east-asia-
summit-the-makings-of-an-asia-pacific-community/ (accessed June 25, 2016). 
1106 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 69. 
1107 At critical times since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has pushed to decrease its economic reliance on 
the United States.  The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) was one such point, leading several Southeast states to build 
political relations with China in various multilateral settings, including the ARF, the APT and the EAS. The 
consequences of the AFC will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
1108 WĂƌŬ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific ? ?147. 
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where regional preferences shift towards multilateralism, Washington has been forced to reciprocate, 
so as not to risk losing an important source of legitimacy for its regional hegemony.1109   
 
7KH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSOHGJHWRLQFUHDVH$PHULFDQFRPPLWPHQWWRUHJLRQDOPXOWLODWHUDOIRUXPV
is acknowledgement that greater involvement in regional security dialogues is critical for legitimising 
U.S. regional hegemony.  American legitimacy as both an Asia-Pacific state and regional hegemon are 
VWUHQJWKHQHGZKHQLWZRUNVZLWKLQPXOWLODWHUDOIUDPHZRUNV+RZHYHU:DVKLQJWRQGRHVQRWµSRVVHVV¶
the regional security institutions.  ASEAN members do not give Washington their unqualified support, 
particularly if Washington appears likely to bring them into confrontation with China, or they are forced 
to choose between China and the United States.1110  There is no regional appetite for an overt or 
complete containment of China.1111  There is broad regional acceptance for the status quo in regional 
order: a U.S. military presence, in addition to stable economic relations with China.  There remains 
uncertainty as to whether the U.S. is always a reliable partner and willing to work with the developing 
UHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVLQFH$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDOPXOWLODWHUDOHQJDJHPHQWKDVWHQGHGWREHVSRUDGLFUDWKHU
than consistent.1112  Nonetheless, American engagement remains critical for the achievement of the 
regional goal of binding Chinese power into the region.  In 2003, the Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh 
Chok Tong (1994-2004) emphasised that µQRRWKHUFRXQWU\RUFRPELQDWLRQRIFRXQWULHVFDQEDODQFHD
JURZLQJ&KLQD¶1113  American intentions also emphasise the need to build institutional arrangements 
that bind, rather than exclude China.1114  
 
Washington is keen to assert its Asia-Pacific credentials.  Despite its long-standing ties to the region, 
the United States is not an East Asian nation in the way that China is.  Although the U.S. has been 
deeply involved in the Asia-Pacific, its global commitments mean it is often only intermittently attentive 
to the Asia-Pacific.1115  :DVKLQJWRQ¶V SULPDU\ LQWHUHVWV DUH QRW HQWLUHO\ $VLD-Pacific-related.  
                                                          
1109 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 70. 
1110 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ ^ƚƵďďƐ ?  “^E ?Ɛ >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶ ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶ-Building: Strength in WĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ ? ?The Pacific 
Review 27, no. 4 (2014): 536. 
1111 David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 
195-6. 
1112 Kang asserts that it is unlikely the U.S. would militarily defend Vietnam, Malaysia or Indonesia against China.  
It is also questionable whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan now as it did during the 1996 China-Taiwan crisis. 
Kang, China Rising, 186, 194-5. 
1113 ƐŝĂ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? “Keynote Speech ďǇWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ'ŽŚŚŽŬdŽŶŐ ? ?Washington Gala Dinner, May 7, 2003. 
https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/washington/newsroom/press_statements/2003/2003
05/press_200305_03.html  (accessed November 3, 2015). 
1114 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 34. 
1115 Kang deems the U.S. to be an offshore balancer in East Asia. A state has to have more than interests in a 
region in order to be defined as a state of that region. The issues within the region have to be the primary ones 
upon which the state focuses.  In this way, the U.S. is a global actor with regional interests and thus is defined 




rather than on a continual basis, as is the case for regional actors with regional perspectives.1116  The 
American perspective contrasts with that of many Asia-Pacific states, who, with their geographical 
proximity, cultural/ethnic ties, historical memory, and regional outlook, concede that a consensual 
approach offers the necessary compromise for regional institution-building.1117   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the interests of regional security remain predicated in terms 
favourable to the United States, providing evidence of U.S. capacity to exert compulsory and 
institutional power to produce regional hegemony.  As a result, U.S. security interests come to be seen 
as the common interest of regional security.1118  It is a means for the powerful to set the context for 
GHFLGLQJ ZKDW DQ LQWHUHVW LV FRQVHTXHQWO\ $PHULFDQ SRZHU FDQ VLWXDWH WKH RYHUDOO µUXOHV RI WKH
JDPH¶1119   The alliances demonstrate an alignment of interests occurring within the alliance states ± in 
relation to order-building and order-maintenance ± mirroring those interests of the United States.  A 
U.S. presence in the region has, for many decades, been considered DV µWKH HVVHQWLDO LQJUHGLHQW IRU
VWDELOLW\¶ WKDW DOVR LQGLUHFWO\ DIIHFWV WKH DJHQGD Ln multilateral security dialogues and forums.1120  
Within this reiterated U.S. commitment through the rebalance, the regional institutional agenda is also 
progressively being dictated by the American agenda in the South China Sea, which has assumed an 
important tangible and symbolic status in relation to regional stability.1121  U.S. management of the 
disputes in the South and East China Seas shape regional perceptions of its commitments to the Asia-
Pacific, allowing the U.S. to determine the regional agenda, and to construct the framework within 
which its alliance partners, and regional institutions, will act.1122  
                                                          
1116 ƌĂŶƚůǇ tŽŵĂĐŬ ?  “China ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ tŽƌůĚ ? ?The China Journal 61, (January 2009), 12. 
http://people.virginia.edu/~bw9c/Publications/ArticlesandChapters/2009a.pdf (accessed November 4, 2014). 
1117 Kang, China Rising, 187. 
1118 Bryan Mabee, Understanding American Power: The Changing World of U.S. Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 79. 
1119 Mabee, Understanding American Power, 82. 
1120 Former Senator James Webb, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on East Asia and Pacific 
ĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶƌĂŝŐtŚŝƚůŽĐŬ ? “WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐDĂǇůůŽǁ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌh ?^ ?DŝůŝƚĂƌǇWƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶZĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
RŝƐĞ ? ? Washington Post, January 25, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/philippines-may-allow-greater-us-presence-in-latest-reaction-to-chinas-
rise/2012/01/24/gIQAhFIyQQ_story.html (accessed November 4, 2015). 
1121 Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 153. 
1122 Raine and Le Mière, Regional Disorder, 154. 
In an example of aligning of alliance interests in accordance with the U.S. vision, the U.S. Japan and Australia 
agreed ƚŽ ĚĞĞƉĞŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ďŽŽƐƚŝŶŐ  ‘ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĂ-Pacific region. The aim was to allay concerns among allies of the U.S. 
commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, vowing it ǁŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶĂ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĨŽĐƵƐ ?ŽĨh ?^ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚ
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$PHULFD¶V$VLD-Pacific strategy seeks to first prevent any other power from dominating the security 
order in the Asia-Pacific and second, maintain peace and stability through a combination of military 
presence, alliances, diplomatic initiatives and economic interdependence.1123  The goal is to shape the 
emerging regional security order to allow the U.S. to remain the preponderant air/maritime power, and 
preeminent regional power, in the Asia-Pacific.  Through the rebalance, efforts have been made to 
extend and further embed the importance of the alliances in East Asia.  The continued existence of this 
structure requires the (re)production of legitimacy and purpose in the alliances, which act as the basis 
for the hierarchical structure of regional order.   
 
The military rebalance strategy seeks to reinforce the U.S. as the principal source of regional order in 
three ways.  The rebalance has prioritised a renegotiation of regional bilateral security alliances, through 
which it can assert direct influence, to enable partners to take on a greater role in regional security.1124  
These long-term alliances also provide the foundations for consent to U.S. regional hegemony among 
its regional allies.  For Japan and South Korean, for example, these alliances have supported the creation 
of post-ZDULGHQWLWLHVZKLFKLQWXUQEROVWHU$PHULFD¶VRZQKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\and giving purpose to 
its continuing military presence in the region.  Demonstrating the adaptive capacity of U.S. hegemony, 
the U.S. has also encouraged the development of a number of pluri-lateral strategic relationships 
between key regional partners, primarily on an issue-by-issue basis, which strengthens the existing 
regional security order.  Finally, the Obama administration has also endeavoured to increase 
involvement in regional security dialogues and frameworks, as a way to reassure the region of its 
continued commitment and to strengthen the consensual basis for its regional hegemony.  Working 
alongside its military power, the U.S. has been able to indirectly shape the regional security architecture 
through the regional institutions, especially the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum.  The 
Obama adminisWUDWLRQ¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWRWKHUHJLRQKDV
strengthened the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony and helped to bind China, albeit begrudgingly, more 
closely with U.S. security interests, thereby consolidating existing asymmetries in regional order.   
 
The rebalance strategy highlights U.S. domination of the regional security narrative and its unifying 
effects, through its discursive perspective on &KLQD¶VULVH.  To this end, the Obama administration has 
largely been able WRFRPPDQGWKHQDUUDWLYHFRQFHUQLQJ&KLQD¶VDVVHUWLYHEHKDYLRXULQWKH$VLD-Pacific, 
FUHDWLQJDUHJLRQDOUDOO\LQJHIIHFWDURXQGWKHQHJDWLYHSHUFHSWLRQRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶ that has not only been 
                                                          
ůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?Financial Times, November 16, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a34e028-6cb3-11e4-b125-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz46fOuDXMq (accessed November 4, 2015). 
1123 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 30. 
1124 <ƵƌƚĂŵƉďĞůůĂŶĚ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ĂƐƚĞƌŶWƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ PtŚǇtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ^ ŚŽƵůĚ&ŽĐƵƐŽŶƐŝĂ ? ?Foreign Affairs 
(May/June 2014): 109. 
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channelled through the alliances, as would be expected, but has also been routed through regional 
institutions.  American pressure on ASEAN, via American regional allies, has created a source of 
tension in this Southeast Asian institution.  'HVSLWH%HLMLQJ¶VFKDUPRIIHQVLYHDQGLWVDWWHPSWVWRLQGXFH
support for its position in the region through its regional economic projects, China has not been able to 
RYHUWXUQ$PHULFD¶VGRPLQDQWQDUUDWLYH on its emerging rising power status, which serves the purposes 
of producing U.S. hegemonic identity at the same time.1125  The U.S. has also discursively shaped the 
terms of meaning that influence how actors see what is possible and desirable, which simultaneously 
legitimates the structure of regional order and the importance of the alliance structure within it.1126  In 
so doing, Washington has been able to indirectly shape the regional security agenda to suit its priorities 
and interests.   
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not clear whether this shift will improve Sino-Philippines relations in the South China Sea, as the Philippines 
hopes.  
1126 As the bilateral alliances demonstrate, structures allocate differential capabilities and different advantages 
to different positions, shaping self-understanding and subjective interests. Despite the asymmetric military 
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because their interests have been structured to support the existing order. Structural power operates even when 





The Economic Rebalance 
 
Discussion now turns to $PHULFD¶Vability to influence the shape of the regional economy and trade, as 
an essential aspect of its regional hegemony.  Gramsci asserted that the prevailing group must be at the 
centre of economic activity, by controlling the dominant means of production.  This chapter focuses on 
the ways in which the U.S. exercises various forms of power that overlap in the economic sphere.  In 
addition, it is in the economic sphere where the U.S. meets more resistance to, but not wholesale 
rejection of, its hegemony.  This resistance is accentuated by the challenges the U.S. experiences in 
pushing forward its neoliberal agenda, and in its continuing efforts to dominate the structure of regional 
trade as part of the rebalance strategy, most notably, through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  The 
TPP is meant to counter other regional proposals from ASEAN and China, who both also seek to 
dominate the future of regional economic order.  The American exercise of structural and institutional 
power is combined with its quest to productively dominate and also modify elements of its neoliberal 
narrative since the 1990s, as a means to garner consent for its regional order.      
 
Improving American access to Asia-Pacific trade and investment is a crucial aspect of the rebalance 
strategy.  The region is vitally important to the U.S. economy: China, Japan, ROK and Taiwan are 
among the U.S. top twelve trading partners; the twenty-one APEC economies purchase almost 60% of 
86 JRRGV DQG WKH WHQ PHPEHUV $6($1 JURXSLQJ LV FRQVLGHUHG D µODUJH DQG FULWLFDO¶ WUDGLQJ
partner.1127  $VZLWKLWVVHFXULW\VWUDWHJ\:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRSRVW-Cold War regional economics 
KDVEURDGO\IRFXVHGRQPDLQWDLQLQJ86KHJHPRQ\DQGDVVHUWLQJ86LQWHUHVWVE\EXLOGLQJµLQFOXVLYH
economic frameworks that will define the rules of trade and investment in the 21st FHQWXU\¶1128  Regional 
trade and security configurations have taken historically divergent approaches.  While regional security 
has advanced along bilateral lines, Asia-Pacific trade relations have developed on a more multilateral 
basis, influenced by the American exercise of structural power - its domination of global economic 
governance through institutions with global reach, such as the WTO and IMF.1129  With the failure of 
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the WTO Doha Round, the U.S. has adapted its regional trade policy to combine bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms. 
 
Since American hegemony in the economic sphere is more widely contested by many regional players, 
and not just China, Washington has to work harder to maintain overall control.  There is greater regional 
desire for cooperation in trade matters, reflected in the number of initiatives to enhance cooperation that 
have originated from the region.  U.S. capacity to shape the direction of regional economic matters is 
made more problematic by the U.S. domestic political arena and the lack of domestic consensus 
concerning the benefits of free trade agreements on the U.S. economy.  To start, the chapter focuses on 
the pragmatic continuity in the U.S. approach to bilateral and multilateral regional trade in the post-
Cold War era, and also addresses a significant event that continues to influence contemporary U.S.-
Asia-Pacific trade relations.  The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) had a major effect on the manner 
in which many East Asian nations define their own approaches to forums for regional cooperation, and 
also how they continue to perceive U.S. structural power and U.S. influence in international financial 
institutions, including the IMF.  There are competing visions for the future of regional trade: an 
inclusive Asia-Pacific order versus an Asian-centric order. 
 
To assess the exertion of structural power, this chapter considers the role of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  The TPP is the main mechanism through 
which the Obama administration seeks to dominate the rules for, and shape of, regional economic order 
in the 21st century.  Structural power is closely linked to the exertion of American institutional power 
indirectly through the TPP membership ± many of whom are members of ASEAN and APEC.  This 
provides the U.S. with another lever to assert its influence over regional institutions and to push forward 
its vision for the future of regional trade.  Simultaneously exercising structural and institutional power, 
the U.S. uses regional institutions to promote the U.S. agenda and its structural power to both absorb 
calls for change and shape the direction of change whilst maintaining the status quo.  In recognition of 
the interconnectivity between regional economic and security matters, the TPP is not simply a trade 
deal.  Washington views the TPP through a strategic lens ± as a means to UHLQIRUFH$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDO
position amongst its allies, show commitment by binding the U.S. to the region further, and provide it 
with additional strategic ties.1130   
 
                                                          




American productive power ± its power to dominate and shape narratives, or stories ± has often been 
deployed with its compulsory power in the economic sphere.1131  This discussion focuses on 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVUHJLRQDOGHYLDWLRQVIURPQHROLEHUDOLGHRORJ\in the 1990s as outlined 
in the Washington Consensus:DVKLQJWRQ¶VVKLIWWRZDUGVFRHUFLYHSUDFWLFHVDZD\IURPFRQVHQVXV-
building, and reinforced by its discursive attack on the Asian development models, as a means to absorb 
resistance to its hegemonic ideas, has had far-reaching consequences for developments in regional 
economic and trade cooperation:DVKLQJWRQ¶VGLVFXUVLYHGHOHJLWLPisation of the Asian development 
models following the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998), targeted the role of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in many East Asian economies as the antithesis of fair competition and a level playing field.  
Washington continues to promote the same narrative through the TPP, whilst additionally accentuating 
WKH733¶VUROHDVWKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶)7$ZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUUHJLRQDOLQLWLDWLYHV 
 
Transformations in regional economic governance in the 1990s 
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has used multilateral forums to expand economic engagement 
and generate global growth and prosperity.1132  The American approach to regional trade veers towards 
pragmatism rather than principles, particularly in relation to multilateral institutions in the Asia-
Pacific.1133  The U.S. UHOLHVRQµZKDWZRUNV¶LQDSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHIRFXVLQJLQEURDGHUIRUHLJQ
SROLF\ REMHFWLYHV UDWKHU WKDQ SXUVXLQJ D µSULQFLSOHG FRPPLWPHQW WR ELODWHUDOLVP PXOWLODWHUDOLVP RU
unilateralism.¶1134   
 
The post-war liberal economic order has undergone several transformations XQGHU$PHULFD¶VZDWFK1135  
Post-World War II, the U.S. concentrated its efforts on building global multilateral institutions such as 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and 
World Bank).  The multilateral approach served its own long term economic interests, and its 
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1135 ' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “>ŝďĞƌĂů/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŝůĞŵŵĂƐŽĨ>ŝďĞƌĂůtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌ ? ?
Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 71-87. 
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commitment to an open world economy.1136  By the late 1970s and through the 1980s, partly as a 
UHVSRQVHWR-DSDQ¶VGHYHORSPHQWPRGHODQGSURWHFWHGPDUNHWV WKH86VKLIWHG it approach towards 
bilateralism.  The pragmatic solution was to negotiate bilaterally with Japan, using a variety of 
aggressive measures, to pry open markets across a number of sensitive sectors, including the automotive 
industry.  The post-Cold War era saw a move towards support for global multilateral economic 
institutions and the establishment of the WTO.  However, with the failure of the Doha Round of the 
WTO in the mid-VDQG:DVKLQJWRQ¶VLQDELOLW\WRVWRSWKH$VLD-Pacific shift towards Asian regional 
projects, U.S. trade strategy has also shifted towards regional measures in an effort to ensure its ongoing 
leadership of Asia-Pacific trade.1137 
 
During the 1980s and early-PLGV:DVKLQJWRQ¶VGRPHVWLFSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKEXGJHWGHILFLWVZDV
DPSOLILHG E\ -DSDQ¶V HFRQRPLF ERRP  &RQVHTXHQWO\ FULWLFLVP ZDV OHYHOOHG DW -DSDQ¶V SHUFHLYHG
security free-ULGLQJRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZKLFKKDGIDFLOLWDWHG-DSDQ¶VHFRQRPLFVXUJH ,QDGGLWLRQ
-DSDQ¶VLQGXVWULDOSROLF\XQGHUSLQQHGE\LWVDOWHUQDWLYHGevelopment model, was viewed as inconsistent 
with U.S. principles of open markets and free trade.1138  :LWKWKHUHJLRQ¶VFRQILGHQFHEROVWHUHGE\WKH
economic success of the Asian tigers, strengthening regional trade cooperation and processes of 
economic liberalisation were in vogue in the late 1980s.1139  These combined factors resulted in the 
FUHDWLRQRI$3(&LQ1RYHPEHUWKHUHJLRQ¶VILUVWPXOWLODWHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQIRUFRRUGLQDWLQJUHJLRQDO
economic cooperation.1140  $NH\LQFHQWLYHIRU$3(&¶VFUHDWLRQZDVWRELQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQWRD
UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG PDNH 86 HFRQRPLF SROLFLHV µPRUH SUHGLFWDEOH DQG DYDLODEOH IRU
regional multilateral VFUXWLQ\¶ 1141   'HVSLWH$6($1¶VLQLWLDOUHOXFWDQFHJapanese officials insisted on 
American inclusion, in part to mollify some of the tension created by the U.S.-Japan bilateral trade 
disputes, but mainly as a way to contain American unilateralism on trade issues.1142    
                                                          
1136 G. John Ikenberry and Takashi /ŶŽŐƵĐŚŝ ?  “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶThe Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and 
Governance in East Asia, eds. John G. Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15. 
1137 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?-42. 
1138 Joseph 'ƌŝĞĐŽ ? “ZĞĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶĂŶĚ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů^ ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ
ƵƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ? ?ŝŶUnipolar Politics; Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, eds. Ethan 
Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
1139 The Asian Tigers were Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, joined later by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand. 
1140 APEC members are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
ŚŝŶĞƐĞdĂŝƉĞŝ ?dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ?hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?  ‘WǁĂƐďŽƌŶŽƵƚŽĨ ĨĞĂƌ  W fear of a unilateralist or 
isolationist America, fear of [the] balkanisation of the world into competing economic blocs, and fear of the 
death of the GATT-ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚǁŽƌůĚƚƌĂĚŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?zŽŝĐŚŝ&ƵŶĂďĂƐŚŝ ?Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ƵƐŝŽŶ P:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐZŽůĞ ŝŶW 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 105. 
1141 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of International Order 
After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 242. 
1142 The ASEAN nations accepted Japanese rationale with regard to ƚŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽŶ-ƐŝĂŶ ?h^ŝŶW ?
Ikenberry, After Victory, 242-243. 
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Despite initial misgivings, Washington did come to VXSSRUWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI$3(&DVWKHUHJLRQ¶V
core economic institution, on the basis that its remit intersected with the objectives of American policy 
in the Asia-Pacific.1143  Since APEC lacked substantive formal trade agreements, its capacity to 
challengH86KHJHPRQ\ZDVPLQLPDO:DVKLQJWRQ¶VVXSSRUWRI$3(&ZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHQHHG
to reformulate its regional economic strategy, rather than the promotion of regional multilateralism.  
Moreover, the APEC grouping was a better proposition than the one offered by the Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Mahathir Mohammed.  His East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) proposal sought to bring 
about a formal regional trade bloc designed to counter the rise of North American and European trade 
blocs, NAFTA and the EU.  The Malaysian scheme also played on $6($1VWDWHV¶FRQFHUQVWKDW$3(&
ZLWK LWV LQFOXVLYH PHPEHUVKLS ZRXOG LQFUHDVH $PHULFDQ SUHVVXUH RQ WKHP WR µDGRSW IRUPDO
QHJRWLDWLRQVFRQWUDFWXDOFRPPLWPHQWVDQGLQYDVLYHUHJXODWLRQVIRUIUHHUWUDGH¶1144  )URP:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
perspective, the exclusively East Asian EAEG proposition would exclude the United States, could bring 
DERXWWKHFORVXUHRI(DVW$VLDQPDUNHWVWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKHUHE\EROVWHU-DSDQ¶VSRVLWLRQ1145  
The G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations successfully applied pressure on U.S. East Asian allies 
to quash the EAEG proposal.    
 
The two proposals ± an inclusive APEC vis-à-vis an exclusive EAEG ± underscore a constant theme of 
East Asian versus Asia-Pacific regionalism that has existed since the 1990s.  The two options ± APEC 
and the EAEG ± emphasise a choice between the exclusively Asian EAEG, which would break with 
the U.S.-oriented Cold War bargain and create a more unified Asian voice in global trade negotiations,  
and the broader, more inclusive APEC.  At this time, the APEC proposition would keep the United 
6WDWHVLQNHHS-DSDQFRQVWUDLQHGDQGDOORZUHJLRQDOVWDWHVWRµGLYHUVLI\WKHLUGHSHQGHQFLHV¶RQ-DSDQ
and the United States.1146  In order to sustain U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific, via APEC, some East 
Asian states agreed to the incremental opening of their economies to the U.S., whilst simultaneously 
restricting the formal liberalisation of domestic economic policies.  East Asian states tried to constrain 
U.S. power, making it impossible for Washington to achieve or maintain domination, by shifting 
negotiations into APEC, an institution with consensual decision-making procedures and no enforcement 
mechanism, and an inclusive membership that could dilute American influence.1147  
                                                          
1143  ‘dŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƐƉƌĞĂĚǀĂůƵĞƐƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚďǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶďǇŽƚŚĞƌƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?ZŝĐŚĂƌĚĂŬĞƌ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚWZĞŐŝŵĞƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶ
Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC, eds. Vinod Aggarwal and Charles Morrison 
 ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ P^ƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
1144 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 38. 
1145 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 39. 
1146 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 41. 




The Asian Financial Crisis: Consequences for American hegemony 
The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) was a critical turning point for East Asia, shaping both 
contemporary East Asian identity and the framework for regional trade cooperation.1148  The episode 
DOVR HPSKDVLVHG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR H[HUFLVH WKH IXOO JDPELW RI FRPSXOVRU\ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
structural and productive power in coercive mode, which had long-term consequences for the perception 
of American economic hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  The Asian Financial Crisis highlights 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VOLPLWVLQLPSRVLQJLWVQHROLEHUDOLGHRORJ\XVLQJFRHUFLRQThe application of Washington 
Consensus neoliberal principles following the Asian Financial Crisis, and the full force of American 
compulsory power in its pursuit of austere bail out conditions through the IMF, were perceived as 
punishment across East Asia.  /DFNLQJ UHJLRQDOFRQVHQW IRU LWVPHDVXUHV:DVKLQJWRQ¶V attempts to 
force the embedding of economic liberalisation across East Asia following the crisis by the IMF were 
highly contested and extremely unpopular.  Moreover, the degree to which the bailout conditions were 
implemented was contradictory, ambiguous and uneven across the region.1149  The crisis generated a 
normative environment within which support for region-centric multilateralism thrived, thus reducing 
regional consent to American dominance of regional economic hegemonic order.   
 
The conditions set by the IMF in response to the Asian Financial Crisis were not specific to East Asia.  
However, the Asian bailout ZDVWKHODUJHVWDQGPRVWLQWUXVLYHLQWKH,0)¶VKLVWRU\ZKLFKDWWKHWLPH
triggered controversy over its role.1150  Bailouts, with structural conditionalities, had been previously 
tried and tested in Latin America and Africa, under the auspices of the Washington Consensus.1151  The 
structural adjustment conditionalities imposed by the IMF, and the demands of the World Bank, 
prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, were targeted at deregulating financial and trade regimes, 
imposing monetary stability and fiscal austerity across developing regions.1152  The ideological core of 
                                                          
1148 The crisis started in Thailand in July 1997, spreading through much of Southeast Asia and also affecting Japan, 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŵĂũŽƌ ĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?  /ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ? ^ŽƵƚŚ <ŽƌĞĂ ĂŶĚ dŚĂŝůĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ
economies of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also damaged.  The rest of the region, 
including China, Taiwan, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam were not directly affected but suffered from a loss of 
demand and confidence. 
1149 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚZŽďŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ<ĞǀŝŶ,ĞǁŝƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌials of Neo->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?The Journal of Development 
Studies 41, no. 2 (2005): 191. 
1150 ^ĂůŝůdƌŝƉĂƚŚŝ ? “/ŶƚŚĞ,Žƚ^ĞĂƚ PƐŝĂŶƌŝƐŝƐdƌŝŐŐĞƌƐZĞǀŝ ǁŽĨ/D& ?ƐZŽůĞ ? ?Far Eastern Economic Review (May 
14, 1998): 65. 
1151 In response to the debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, in 1990, John Williamson set out a set of economic 
ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐƚŚĂƚŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ƚŽƐĞƚƚŚĞŝƌŚŽƵƐĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ
ĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ‘ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ĚĞŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ on how these instruments 
should be deployed. Williamson identified ten economic policy instruments to support growth, low inflation, 
ďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞŝŶĐŽŵĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?:ŽŚŶtŝůůŝĂŵƐŽŶ ? “tŚĂƚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŵĞĂŶƐďǇWŽůŝĐǇ
ZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ? WĞƚĞƌƐŽn Institute for International Economics, April 1990. 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486 (accessed August 2, 2014). 
1152 The US capitalised on, and in some cases, caused, the destabilisation in many Latin American countries during 
the 1960s and 1970s, and used the subsequent debt crisis to intervene in the political and economic affairs of 
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the neoliberal project emphasises the market, fiscal discipline, trade, investment and financial 
liberalisation, deregulation, decentralisation, privatisation and a reduced role for the state.1153  The 
pillars of the Washington Consensus bound the policies of the World Bank and the IMF tightly to the 
U.S. government, notably through the U.S. Treasury.1154  U.S. intervention via the IMF allowed the 
U.S. to influence the economic restructuring processes in these developing countries, and determine 
outcomes favourable to U.S. business.1155  
 
The manner in which the East Asian economic miracle of the 1980s and 1990s had occurred, presented 
a challenge to :DVKLQJWRQ¶VQHROLEHUDOLGHRORJ\$OWKRXJKWKH$VLDQGHYHORSPHQWPRGHOVSUROLIHUDWLQJ
DFURVV (DVW $VLD ZHUH µH[SODLQHG DZD\¶ E\ WKH :RUOG %DQN DV µPDUNHW-FRQIRUPLQJ¶1156 an 
unambiguous discrepancy existed between the policy instruments recommended in the Washington 
Consensus WKDWZRXOGIDFLOLWDWHµSUXGHQWPDFUR-economic policies, outward orientation and free market 
FDSLWDOLVP¶and East Asian success.1157  Prior to 1997, the World Bank had praised Asian economies, 
alleging that an economic miracle was occurring.1158  When the crisis hit in July 1997, Washington and 
the IMF dominated the narrative, determining the cause of the crisis to be the close relationship between 
the state and business, characteristic of many East and Southeast Asian economies.1159   Following the 
crisis, the economic policies of these countries, some of whom were also U.S. security allies, were 
condemned as µFURQ\FDSLWDOLVP¶ZLWKVWDWHLQYROYHPHQWLQEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVEUDQGHGDVFRUUXSWDQG
                                                          
the affected countries, pushing for deep neoliberal economic restructuring across the region in the 1980s.  US 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă  ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ? ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ? ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
channels. ?tŝůůŝĂŵ/ ?ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 9 
1153 ZŽďŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞǁŝƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌŝĂůƐŽĨEĞŽ->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1154 ZŽďŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞǁŝƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌŝĂůƐŽĨEĞŽ->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ?&ŽƌƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
Bretton Woods institutions and their relationship with the WTO and global neoliberalism, see Richard Peet, 
Unholy Trinity: The IMF, the World Bank and WTO, 2nd edition (London: Zed Books, 2009). 
1155 Stiglitz links neoliberalism - ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ ?- to the policies of the US Treasury and 
the IMF. In Globalization and Its Discontents, Stiglitz details how the Washington Consensus doctrine was applied 
in Latin America as a means to advance globalisation and used as a pretext for the implementation of policies of 
market fundamentalism. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 
1156 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993).  ^ĞĞĂůƐŽŚĂƌůĞƐ'ŽƌĞ ? “dŚĞZŝƐĞĂŶĚ&ĂůůŽĨƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĂƐĂWĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĨŽƌĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?World Development 28, no. 5 (2000): 799. 
1157 WilliamsŽŶ ? “tŚĂƚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŵĞĂŶƐďǇWŽůŝĐǇZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?
1158 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
1159 Separate from the US and IMF narrative, the Japanese determined the cause as a currency crisis created by 
excessive capital liberalisation. Developing countries had opened their capital accounts too much and too 
quickly, allowing the flight of capital flows out of developing nations to occur at the slightest loss of market 
confidence. See Goh, The Struggle for Order, 129. For the Japanese perspective on its attempts to move beyond 
h^ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƉƌŝŽƌ ƚŽƚŚĞƐŝĂŶ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌŝƐŝƐ ?ƐĞĞZŽďĞƌƚtĂĚĞ ?  “:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌƚŽĨ




inefficient.1160  The Asian development models were sXEVHTXHQWO\µPDUJLQDOLVHGDQGGLVFUHGLWHGE\D
VXVWDLQHGGLVFXUVLYHDQGLGHRORJLFDODWWDFNHPHUJLQJIURPERWKWKH86DQGWKH,0)¶1161  Following 
the crisis, the U.S. felt vindicated in stressing the importance of open markets, thereby consolidating 
the authority of the Washington Consensus over alternative models.1162     
 
Contrasted with U.S. support for the Mexican bailout in 1994, Asian leaders were critical of U.S. policy 
towards the unfolding Asian crisis, reasoning that U.S. reluctance to support Thailand from the outset 
had expedited the spread of the crisis to other countries in the region.1163  There was a sense around the 
UHJLRQWKDW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VGHOD\LQUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHFULVLVZDVSXQLVKPHQWRIWKH$VLDQGHYHORSPHQW
models.  Not only did the U.S. refuVHWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHLQLWLDOELOOLRQIXQGLWODWHURSSRVHG-DSDQ¶V
proposal to set up a permanent regional Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that would help the region avoid 
the structural conditions attached to IMF bailouts.1164  Although the AMF scheme was not widely 
supported by many regional governments, the IMF had not provided a solution that best suited Asian 
economies, and both Washington and the IMF had quashed the only regionally-derived potential 
remedy that could avoid the harsh restructuring conditionalities accompanying the IMF deal.1165   
 
Washington firmly opposed the AMF proposal on the basis that the fund would be exclusively financed 
by Asian states and it would potentially legitimise the Asian statist development models that were not 
consistent with neoliberal orthodoxy.  In addition, Washington wanted to prevent the advance of a 
strong Yen that could potentially act as the basis for the creation of a common currency in Asia and, in 
the long term, become a direct competitor of the dollar as the currency of last resort.  The AMF also 
offered the chance for Japan to demonstrate a leadership role commensurate with its regional economic 
                                                          
1160 Affected allies were South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines but also indirectly, Japan. Richard Higgott, 
 “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?New Political Economy 3, no. 3 (1998): 333.  
1161 ZŽĚŶĞǇ  ? ,Ăůů ?  “dŚĞ ŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞ ĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĂŶ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ DŽĚĞů ? ?International Studies 
Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 73. 
1162 ZŽďŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞǁŝƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌŝĂůƐŽĨEĞŽ->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1163 The Mexican bailout of 1994 entailed an international rescue package of $50 billion to stabilise the Peso at 
once without an attached reform programme until several months after the credit line became available.  The 
difference in the policy response Wade attributes first, to the economic reform programme already initiated by 
the Mexican government upon the creation of NAFTA in January 1994, and second, the U.S. had a strong national 
interest in seeing a quick recovery on its southern border.  U.S. national interests in East Asia, in contrast, lay in 
the opening of markets so that American firms could operate in the region as easily as Japanese firms. Robert 
tĂĚĞ ?  “tŚĞĞůƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶtŚĞĞůƐ PZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐŝĂŶƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƐŝĂŶDŽĚĞů ? ?Annual Review of Political 
Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 109-110. 
1164 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?New Political Economy 
3, no. 3 (1998): 340.     
1165 The disagreement between Washington and Tokyo over the Japanese-proposed AMF was overtly political, 




importance, potentially facilitating the creation of a Japanese-led, rather than U.S.-led regional 
policy.1166   7KURXJK:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSUHVVXUHRQ7RN\R-DSDQDEDQGRQHGLWVSURSRVDOFRQFHGLQJWR86
and IMF claims that an AMF would duplicate the activities of the existing international financial 
institutions.  Japan subsequently admitted that there was a danger that any adjustment funds not under 
the direct or indirect control of the IMF might be misused.1167  With the U.S. Treasury and the IMF 
domination of the boundaries of the discussion, the logical inference to be drawn from the AFC was 
that East Asian states were unable and untrustworthy in the management of their own financial affairs.   
 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHDOIHDUZDVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIYLDEOHUHJLRQDOILQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWFRXOGGLPLQLVK
American influence, and challenge the existing regional hierarchy.  A successful AMF would be 
altogether inimical to U.S. regional economic interests.1168  Washington made full use of its economic 
and security leverage in coercive mode.  While the socio-political practices of the Asian development 
models were tolerated during the Cold War, in the post-Cold War context, Washington increasingly 
YLHZHGWKHVHSUDFWLFHVDVFRQIOLFWLQJZLWKµWKHLQWHUHVWVRISULYDWHFDSLWDOLQVHDUFKRIJUHDWHUPDUNHW
VKDUHDQGSURILWVLQDQHUDRIGHUHJXODWLRQ¶1169  :DOO6WUHHW¶VFRQFHUQZLWKWKH$0)was that it would 
slow down the liberalisation of Asian financial markets and the U.S. Treasury made clear that support 
for bailouts, especially in South Korea, was contingent on continued financial opening.1170  The U.S. 
Treasury virtually dictated the conditions attached to the emergency IMF financing arranged for 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea.  The crisis-hit countries, which by then had limited bargaining 
power, would be forced to accept the conditions and undertake structural changes intended to create 
institutions and rules closer to the American version of capitalism, and more acceptable to U.S. 
business.1171   
 
Washington perceived the AFC as an opportunity for a convergence of the Asian development models 
with strengthened neoliberal structuring in favour of free markets, private sector capitalism, enhanced 
transparency and good governance.  It was expected that state-led capitalism would be challenged, 
reformed and replaced across the region.1172  The regional response to the IMF terms was mixed.  The 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, viewing the IMF bailout as a western conspiracy, 
                                                          
1166 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1167 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1168 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ?-346. 
1169 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1170 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1171 tĂĚĞ ? “tŚĞĞůƐǁŝƚŚŝŶtŚĞĞůƐ PZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝĂŶƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŝĂŶDŽĚĞů ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1172 ZŽďŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ,ĞǁŝƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌŝĂůƐŽĨEĞo->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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refused to accept the terms and refuted the deal.1173  Seoul, on the other hand, was driven by Peninsula 
security concerns IROORZLQJ 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V ODXQFK RI D ORQJ-range rocket in August 1998, which far 
H[FHHGHG1RUWK.RUHD¶VNQRZQFDSDELOLWLHV7KHUHZDVDOVRFRQFHUQDERXWthe growing movement in 
Washington that was calling for an end to the free-riding of U.S. junior partners in the Pacific 
alliance.1174  Economic trade liberalisation and financial deregulation were the pay-off for a continued 
U.S. security presence on the Korean Peninsula.   
 
Regional pushback against U.S. economic hegemony 
The U.S. also used its influence in the APEC forum to quash the AMF proposal and assert the 
FRQWLQXDWLRQRI,0)FRQWURORYHUDGMXVWPHQWIXQGLQJ,QODWHZLWK86HQGRUVHPHQWWKH,0)¶V
dominant role in the adjustment process was subsequently institutionally legitimised at the Vancouver 
APEC meeting.  With the backing of APEC ± DWWKHWLPHWKHUHJLRQ¶VRQO\LQVWLWXWLRQLQFOXGLQJDOO(DVW
Asian nations ± RIWKH,0)¶VUROHWKH$VLD-Pacific region had endorsed the U.S.-promulgated model of 
macroeconomic policy reform.  APEC had, in effect, sanctioned painful restructuring processes that 
would affect many APEC countries, including those in East Asia.1175  $3(&¶VDSSURYDORIWKHQHROLEHUDO
ideology highlighted deep divisions between the two sides of the Pacific, reinforcing the separation 
between East Asia and the Anglo-centric, neoliberal Pacific states.  The situation was aggravated by 
UHJLRQDOUHVHQWPHQWWRZDUGVWKH86IRULWVXQFRPSURPLVLQJDWWLWXGHDQGWKH,0)¶VFRUURERUDWLRQRI
86QHROLEHUDOLGHRORJ\LQUHVSRQVHWRDQµ$VLDQ¶FULVLV1176   
 
Rather than being a potential instrumeQWIRUWUDGHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQDGKHULQJWR$6($1¶VSULQFLSOHVRI
voluntarism and non-binding consensus, APEC had become an additional forum through which the U.S. 
could pursue capital market liberalisation and intervene in the domestic trade and commercial practices 
of other states.1177  More broadly, U.S. commercial and national interests, enveloped in the language of 
the Washington Consensus, implied the existence of a universally agreed set of principles on what 
constituted a proper national economic and trade development agenda.1178  In Washington, American 
economic interests were viewed as synonymous with global economic interests, often coming at the 
                                                          
1173 Wall Street Journal ? “Mahathir Rules Out IMF Bailout fŽƌDĂůĂǇƐŝĂ ?ZĂŝůƐĂƚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĞƌƐ ? ?December 31, 1997. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB883586713304528000 (accessed May 14, 2016).  
1174 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1175 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1176 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1177 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ P^ƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨZĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1178 DĂƌŬĞĞƐŽŶĂŶĚ/ǇĂŶĂƚƵů/ƐůĂŵ ? “EĞŽ->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚĂƐƚƐŝĂ PZĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ?The 
Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 2 (2005): 211. 
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expense of the interests of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which further entrenched the asymmetry 
of regional economic relations. 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis had a profound effect on East Asia in a number of ways.  First, it emphasised 
WKHUHJLRQ¶VIHHOLQJVRIYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGHFRQRPLFRYHU-dependence on the United States, prompting 
perceptions that the regLRQ¶VH[LVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVQHHGHGWREHWUDQVIRUPHGDQGRUVXSSOHPHQWHG1179  
The crisis had highlighted the weakness of both APEC and ASEAN in formulating an effective regional 
response to emerging crises.  Second, the East Asian experience of IMF conditionality, and the Asia-
Pacific nature of APEC, influenced by an Anglo-Western UDWKHUWKDQ$VLDQLGHQWLW\LQVSLUHGDQµ$VLD-
FHQWULF¶DVRSSRVHGWRDQµ$VLD-3DFLILF¶YLHZRIWKHUHJLRQ1180  The fostering of a regional identity was 
also inspired by shared experience at the hands of the western-dominated IMF.  Consequently, there 
was a growing awareness that solutions to the management of East Asian financial interactions could 
be regionally produced.1181  The response was the gradual, concerted effort to restructure and strengthen 
intra-regional trade processes.   
 
Many East Asian governments supported the creation of regional support mechanisms that would 
circumvent Washington and the IMF.1182  New regional mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI)1183 and the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) emerged during the early 2000s, emphasising the shift 
towards an intra-Asian regional order recognising regional complexities, and a shift away from the 
dangers for financial stability of a Washington-centric configuration.1184  The creation of CMIM, an 
intra-Asian financial arrangement operating since March 2010, was a response to the enduring 
resentment of the conditions and delays associated with the IMF.1185  Since the creation of an emergency 
                                                          
1179 At the time, neither APEC nor ASEAN had the means to respond to the scale and speed of the crisis 
simultaneously affecting numerous states in the region. Nor had finance been a central feature of regional 
cooperation ƵƉƚŽƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌĞference for maintaining sovereignty. Ralph Emmers and John 
ZĂǀĞŶŚŝůů ?  “The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian RĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Contemporary 
Politics 17, no. 2 (2011): 134, 136. 
1180 ,ŝŐŐŽƚƚ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1181 Higgott ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ?-341. 
1182 John ŝŽƌĐŝĂƌŝ ?  “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International Politics and Institution-Building in 
Asia ? ?Asian Survey 51, no. 5 (2011): 926-928.  
1183 Following the AFC, the CMI, initially a bilateral swap arrangement, was first mooted in May 2000, as a means 
to support regional currency reserves. When this arrangement was found to be inefficient, the CMI was 
multilateralised into the CMIM (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation) in December 2009, taking effect in 
March 2010. 
1184 Kent E. ĂůĚĞƌ ?  “ƌŝƚŝĐĂů :ƵŶĐƚƵƌĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚŽƵƌƐ ŽĨ EŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ ƐŝĂŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?in East Asian 
Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2008), 9-10, 35. 
1185 D/D ?Ɛ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ^E ƉůƵƐ ŚŝŶĂ ? ,ŽŶŐ <ŽŶŐ ? :ĂƉĂŶ ĂŶĚ ^ŽƵƚŚ <ŽƌĞĂ ?  ŝŽƌĐŝĂƌŝ ?
 “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization ? ?927. 
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financial mechanism would still require nominal support from Washington, the CMIM became the first 
regional facility to possess an explicit link to the IMF.  Eschewing a multilateral bailout system, on the 
scale of an Asian Monetary Fund, this compromise helped allay Western fears that the swaps would be 
XVHGWRSURYLGHµHDV\PRQH\¶DQGDYRLGHGSROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQIURP:DVKLQJWRQ1186   
 
The exclusive intra-Asian ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping, formally institutionalised in 1999, also 
JUHZIURPWKHQHHGWRGLYHUVLI\(DVW$VLD¶VHFRQRPLFrelations and to increase collective bargaining 
leverage.1187  The APT initiative, a new, overlapping arrangement, emerged from the need to better 
protect East Asia against future financial instability, and widened the scope of cooperation by linking 
ASEAN to the largest economies in Northeast Asia under one economic and financial umbrella.1188  
0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\LWH[FOXGHG$3(&¶VZHVWHUQPHPEHUVWKH86DQG$XVWUDOLD1189  Without the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the idea of the APT might not have gained the necessary impetus from within the 
region.1190 :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DSSDUHQW ODFN RI RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI WKH $37 ZDV UHJDUGHG DV
legitimising the pursuit of exclusively Asian institutions, which also generated a degree of consensus 
RQµ(DVW$VLD¶DVDUHJLRQDOFRPPXQLW\1191   
 
Beijing hoped that the APT grouping would dilute American power within the region, as well as being 
a mechanism through which it could reassure its neighbours.1192  Rather than contesting U.S. hegemony, 
%HLMLQJVRXJKW WRUHVKDSHWKHµLQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUH¶ WKrough its membership of the APT, so that they 
would not become complicit in any overt attempt by the United States to constrain China.1193  Reflecting 
%HLMLQJ¶V JURZLQJ UHJLRQDO LQIOXHQFH Ln 2005, the year in which the CMI process was formally 
announced, ASEAN Plus Three raised the share of funds available through CMI without an IMF 
programme from 10 per cent to 20 per cent.1194  That decision, and the intention to multilateralise the 
                                                          
1186 ŝŽƌĐŝĂƌŝ ? “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization ? ?929. 
1187 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 55. 
1188 ŵŵĞƌƐĂŶĚZĂǀĞŶŚŝůů ? “dŚĞƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ'ůŽďĂů&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?135. 
1189 ůƐŽŶŽƚĞǁŽƌƚŚǇ PĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞWdƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝǀĂů^
that included Australia, New Zealand and India, and now also includes the U.S. and Russia.  
1190 dĂŬĂƐŚŝ dĞƌĂĚĂ ?  “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ  ‘ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂŶ ? ŽŶĐĞƉƚand Growing Regional Identity: From EAEC to 
^EA? ? ? ?The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003): 251-277.  
1191 dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂƐƚƐŝĂŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞďŝůĂƚĞƌĂů:ĂƉĂŶ-
China relationship, which is increasingly viewed as the key determinant of regional economic order. In this sense, 
ƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂĐƚƐĂƐĂ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁĞŝŐŚƚ ƚŽĞŝũŝŶŐ ?ƐĂŶĚdŽŬǇŽ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌŝǀĂůƌǇĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? 'ŽŚ ?The 
Struggle for Order, 57, 61. 
1192 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 56. 
1193 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 57. 
1194 South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, all of whom had recently concluded their own IMF restructuring 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĞĂŐĞƌƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞ&ƵŶĚĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƚŽDĂůĂǇƐŝĂ ?ƐƉƵƐŚĨŽƌĂůŽŽƐĞƌ
CMI-IMF linkage. Japan ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůŝŶŬƚŽƚŚĞ/D&ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƌĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ?^E ? “The Joint Ministerial 
Statement of the 8th ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers ?Meeting, ? Istanbul, Turkey, May 4, 2005, para. 6 (IV). 
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CMI, did raise concerns in the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, but the incremental nature of the change, 
and continued link to the IMF, restrained opposition in Washington.  While the U.S. has not objected 
to the development of Asian regionalism in principle, Washington has insisted that Asian regionalism 
supports multilateral trade and financial regimes in keeping with globally-operating neoliberal 
principles, and consistent with its own interests.1195   
 
Overcoming U.S. ambivalence to Asia-Pacific economic regionalism 
Global and regional forces, including globalisation and the rise of China, had created a shifting 
landscape in East Asian economic development that were orienting the region towards integration and 
multilateralism ± increasingly without the United States.1196  With U.S. priorities focused elsewhere 
during the early-mid 2000s, minimal attention had been directed towards the economic cooperation 
initiatives emerging from East Asia.  Seizing this opportunity and spurred on by China¶V JURZLQJ
economic power status, East Asian states had quietly started to transform the regional economic 
architecture along Asian-centric lines.  Following the 2008 global financial crisis, some Asian officials 
additionally expressed support for a more ambitious financial arrangement, reflecting greater Asian 
confidence vis-à-vis ailing Western economies.1197  The global financial crisis also exacerbated global 
imbalances, with emerging markets taking advantage of the U.S. government bailout and stimulus plans 
to step up purchases of American debt.1198  In addition, the so-called emerging economies have pushed 
for enhanced leadership roles in existing international economic governance institutions, leading to the 
formation of the G20.  East Asian nations have also pressed for additional IMF votes to boost their 
OHYHUDJHLQOLQHZLWKWKHUHJLRQ¶VJURZLQJHFRQomic importance.1199   
 
The growing influence of China, whose domination of regional institutions is likely to be inimical to 
U.S. interests, has come to dominate U.S. regional economic strategy in the 21st century.  Fear of 
&KLQD¶V FDSDELOLW\ WR XQGHUPLQH 8S. security and economic interests, but more importantly, its 
SRWHQWLDOWREHFRPHWKHKXERIUHJLRQDOSRZHUKDVPDMRULPSOLFDWLRQVIRU$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLF
                                                          
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/the-joint-ministerial-statement-of-the-
8th-asean3-finance-ministers-meeting-istanbul-turkey-4-may-2005 (accessed August 8, 2014). 
1195   ?ZĂŶĚĂůů,ĞŶŶŝŶŐ ? “KďĂŵĂƐŚŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞĂYƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚŶĚŽƌƐĞŵ nt to Asian RĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?WĞƚĞƌƐŽŶ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
for International Economics, November 6, 2009. http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=1013 (accessed August 5, 
2014). 
1196 ' ? :ŽŚŶ /ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇĂŶĚdĂŬĂƐŚŝ /ŶŽŐƵĐŚŝ ?  “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶThe Uses of Institutions: The U.S., Japan, and 
Governance in East Asia, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 21. 
1197 ŝŽƌĐŝĂƌŝ ? “ŚŝĂŶŐDĂŝ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞDƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?934. 
1198 Following the global financial crisis, the ASEAN Plus Three nations hold more than half of global dollar 
reserves.  Goh, The Struggle for Order, 144.  
1199 ŝŽƌĐŝĂƌŝ ? “ŚŝĂŶŐDĂŝ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞDƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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RUGHU  &KLQD¶V VXEVWDQWLDO LQIOXHQFH LQ UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF DIIDLUV YLV-à-YLV $PHULFD¶V GLPLQishing 
authority and expanding trade deficit was compounded by the burgeoning network of regional Free 
Trade Agreements (FTA) being concluded, and brought to the fore with the completion of the China-
ASEAN FTA in 2004.  This provided confirmation that AmerLFD¶VSDVVLYHDWWLWXGHWRZDUGV(DVW$VLDQ
regionalism was increasingly outmoded: 
µ,I WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV FRQWLQXHV WR GRZQSOD\ $VLDQ UHJLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV ± 
GHPRQVWUDWLQJ DQ DWWLWXGH RI µEHQLJQ QHJOHFW¶ DQG D SUHIHUHQFH IRU ELODWHUDO
agreements only ± it wilOJUDGXDOO\ORVHLQIOXHQFHHVSHFLDOO\UHODWLYHWR&KLQD¶1200 
([DFHUEDWHG E\ :DVKLQJWRQ¶V VHOI-exclusion from regional economic decision-making, and its own 
restrained response to the developing Asian regionalism, the view in Washington was that Beijing 
inteQGHGWRµUHFODLPLWVSRVLWLRQDVWKHOHDGHURI$VLD¶E\GLVSODFLQJ-DSDQDQGWKH86DVWKHSULPDU\
trading partners of Southeast Asian nations. 1201  Increasingly able to provide economic assistance to the 
developing nations in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing could move the region towards an exclusively Asian 
economic order.   
 
By the final year of the G.W. Bush administration, Washington recognised the need to modify its 
SRVLWLRQ RQ (DVW $VLDQ UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF DUFKLWHFWXUH LQ OLJKW RI &KLQD¶V LQFUHDVLQJ influence, the 
proliferation of regionally-negotiated FTAs and the stasis in the Doha Round of the WTO from 2006.1202  
In the 1990s, the U.S. had opposed Asian regionalism, leading to the self-exclusion of the U.S. from 
nascent regional economic cooperation mechanisms.1203  Following the global financial crisis, the U.S. 
could no longer afford to be excluded from the developments occurring in this global economic hub.  
While Washington acknowledged a shift in strategy towards regional economic governance was 
required, none emerged that would best support U.S. interests and goals.  Rarely at the forefront of 
multilateral ventures in the Asia-Pacific, Washington required a pragmatic, rather than principled 
approach to retain its influence, and to shape the direction of regional economic cooperation.1204  G.W. 
Bush administration strategists concluded that U.S. policy towards the evolving economic arrangements 
                                                          
1200 ůůĞŶ&ƌŽƐƚ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨƐŝĂ ? ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
transcript, July 21, 2005. http://www.aei.org/files/2005/07/21/China-and-the-New-Economic-Geography-of-
Asia.html (accessed August 3, 2014). 
1201 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 4, 7.  It is important to note here that by the 2000s, Tokyo had been 
ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚďǇĞŝũŝŶŐĂƐtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĐŽmpetitor and free-rider.  
1202 TŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞtdK ?ƐŽŚĂZŽƵŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ&dƐŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific, have facilitated the 
shift in policy towards supporting regional integration, in an effort to ensure its position in Asia-Pacific trade. It 
was the G.W. Bush administration that agreed to the US joining the negotiations for the TPP. Nanto, East Asian 
Regional Architecture, 5.   
1203 This decision taken by East Asian nations not to invite the U.S. to join the EAS in 2005 was indication of US 
self-imposed exclusion from East Asian affairs during the G.W. Bush administration. 
1204 Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama,  “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶEast Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional 
Stability, eds. Kent. E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 9. 
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in the Asia-3DFLILF UHTXLUHG DWWHQWLRQ WR µPDWWHUV RI LQWHQVLW\ LQFOXVLYHQHVV DQG ILQDO VWUXFWXUH¶1205  
Intensity DQG LQFOXVLYHQHVV ZRXOG EH LQIOXHQFHG E\ EURDGHU UHJLRQDO PDWWHUV VSHFLILFDOO\ &KLQD¶V
growing influence and the potential creation of an Asian-only organisation.   
 
7KH86QHHGHG WRVWUHVV LWVFUHGHQWLDOVDV WKHUHJLRQ¶V µVHFXULW\ VWDELOLVHUDQGHFRQRPic partner of 
FKRLFH¶1206  :DVKLQJWRQ¶V W\SLFDOH[WHUQDOKHJHPRQDSSURDFK to its ad hoc, and occasionally heavy 
handed interventions in East Asian affairs, KDGUHVXOWHGLQµ$VLDQQDWLRQVWDN>LQJ@WKHOHDGLQSURSRVLQJ
YDULRXVRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶1207  For the U.S. to maintain its position as regional hegemon and indispensable 
partner in the Asia-Pacific, it would need to embed itself more fully into the region - not as an external 
power but as an Asia-Pacific power.  This move would require the constitution of an inclusively Asia-
Pacific rather than exclusively Asia-centric geographical designation.  Washington maintains that the 
strategic and economic geography, upon which the Asia-Pacific can best build on its successes, is 
through trans-Pacific partnerships and institutions.  Asia-Pacific multilateral structures would not only 
strengthen existing regional partnerships, including the bilateral U.S. security alliances, a broader Asia-
Pacific outlook would make the region less inward-ORRNLQJ7KH86µZRXOGOLNHIRUAsian institutions 
WR VWUDGGOH WKH 3DFLILF 2FHDQ UDWKHU WKDQ VWRSSLQJ DW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO GDWH OLQH LQ WKH 3DFLILF¶1208  
Working through regional institutions and broadening their membership to include Pacific-facing 
nations in the Americas, and moving towards the Indian Ocean to include another key regional player, 
India, is the strategy of choice in Washington, as the best means to increase trade flows and sustain U.S. 
influence.  
 
The pragmatic approach assumed Washington would take a proactive leadership role.1209  The emerging 
VWUDWHJ\ WKHUHIRUH UHTXLUHG PDLQWDLQLQJ 86 DFFHVV WR WKH UHJLRQ YLD µELODWHUDO DJUHHPHQWV JOREDO
LQVWLWXWLRQVRUWKURXJKFORVHFRRUGLQDWLRQZLWKIULHQGO\PHPEHUQDWLRQV¶1210  For the U.S. to maintain 
its regional position and influence over the direction of regional trade, U.S. policy would need to 
DFFRXQWIRUWKHUHJLRQ¶V LQWHUHVW LQ)7$V +RZHYHUJLYHQ WKH ORQJKLVWRU\RIGHEDWH LQWKH8QLWHG
States concerning the disputed merits of FTAs, the G.W. Bush administration was conflicted on whether 
to conclude more FTAs with Asian economies, to continue with the status quo, or to halt further 
                                                          
1205 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 2. 
1206 ZŽďĞƌƚ^ƵƚƚĞƌ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ P/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌh ?^ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?Washington Policy Studies 21, (East-
West Center, 2006), vii-ix.  
1207 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 5. 
1208 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 33. 
1209 DĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?-42. 
1210 Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy  
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated April 15, 2010), 16. 
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efforts.1211  It was inconceivable in Washington that the Asia-Pacific region could take important trade 
integration decisions without U.S. involvement, since µ$PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV LQ $VLD«DUH VR GHHSO\
LQJUDLQHG DQG WKH $PHULFDQ SUHVHQFH VR ODUJH WKDW«$PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV QHHG WR EH UHSUHVHQWHG
ZKHQHYHU$VLDQVPHHW¶1212  The negotiation of regional FTAs was likely to continue with or without 
U.S. input, and given the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the well-being of the U.S. economy, the U.S 
could not afford for its market to be displaced by China or intra-regional trade.1213     
 
The strategy that emerged during the G.W. Bush administration involved negotiating FTAs with 
countries spanning the Americas and the Asia-Pacific.1214  According to Robert Zoellick, the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSULPDU\7UDGH5HSUHVHQWDWLYH8675-2005), there was no focus on a particular 
region, rather, with the stalling of the global free trade agenda, the goal was to be the successful 
negotiation of FTAs, with the view to promoting trade liberalisation more generally.1215  Consequently, 
consideration for FTA partners centred on whether the conditions in the U.S. and in the target countries 
were conducive, for instance, whether counterparts in the target countries were amenable, and willing 
to liberalise.1216  In the Asia-3DFLILF HIIRUWV ZHUH DOVR FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ LQIOXHQFLQJ WKH UHJLRQ¶V
economic progression through the regional institutions, APEC and ASEAN, in addition to working 
towards formalising trade and investment relationships through FTAs and other preferential trading 
arrangements.1217 In February 2008, the U.S. also joined the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 733 WKDW ZRXOG EHFRPH WKH FRUQHUVWRQH RI WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V HFRQRPLF
rebalance strategy the following year.    
 
The Obama administration and the economic rebalance strategy 
Under the Obama administration, the economic rebalance is motivated by domestic and regional 
HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWV7KHILUVWPRWLYDWLRQLVDGRPHVWLFRQHWRDGGUHVV$PHULFD¶VGHHSHQLQJWUDGH
deficit with the Asia-Pacific, especially with China.  The intention is to sustainably grow the American 
                                                          
1211 The debate concerns whether regional FTAs detract from multilateral negotiations via the WTO. What has 
emerged is the strategic importance of U.S.-negotiated FTAs, which lock in partners to economic liberalisation 
and potentially facilitate American leverage in other issue areas. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3. 
1212 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3. 
1213 Trans-Pacific economic and financial relationships have become fundamentally unbalanĐĞĚŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
favour. China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan alone account for about 40% of the U.S. merchandise trade 
deficit. Those same countries have become major financiers of U.S. budget and saving deficits. Many U.S. jobs 
are also being outsourced to Asia. Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 28. 
1214 In the Asia-Pacific, the G.W. Bush administration oversaw FTAs with Australia and Singapore, and the US-
ROK FTA was eventually signed off under the Obama administration.  
1215 ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
1216 ZŽďĞƌƚŽĞůůŝĐŬ ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ?
1217 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 3. 
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economy in the Asia-Pacific region, in recognition that the Asia-Pacific is likely to be the hub of global 
economic growth in the twenty-first century.1218  Expanding American access to Asia-Pacific trade is 
essential for the U.S. domestic economy, since its share of total trade in the region in 2010 had steadily 
declined by at least 3 per cent since 2005,1219 with a negative goods trade balance of $154.6 billion with 
the TPP countries reported in 2012.1220   
 
The second, crucial element of the economic rebalance involves manipulating the structure of regional 
trade, and influencing regional institutions in favour of American trade interests to sustain U.S. 
economic order.1221  The goal is to shape the regional economic institutions to best support the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VXQGHUWDNLQJWRJURZWKH86 economy in the Asia-Pacific.  The Obama administration 
recognises the value of regionally-fronted moves towards regional integration, but insists that 
Washington takes the lead on the direction and scope of integration.  Although the G.W. Bush 
administration had signed up to the TPP negotiations in February 2008, the Obama administration has 
been the driving force behind the negotiations as the signature element of its regional economic 
reorientation strategy.  The Obama administration immediately assumed a leadership role over the trade 
DJHQGDDQGGHFLGHGXSRQ733¶VIXWXUHGLUHFWLRQ1222   
 
Structural Power: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
8QWLO WKHIDLOXUHRIWKH:72¶V'RKD5RXQGLQWKH86W\SLFDOO\SUHIHUUHGUXOHV-based global 
multilateral forums, like the WTO, to fulfil its trade objectives.1223  The preference for a global system, 
and the limited number of American negotiated FTAs during this period also originated in the lack of 
                                                          
1218 <ƵƌƚĂŵƉďĞůůĂŶĚƌŝĂŶŶĚƌĞǁƐ ? “ǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?^ ? ‘WŝǀŽƚ ?ƚŽƐŝĂ ? ?ŚĂƚŚĂŵ,ŽƵƐĞ ?August 2013, 2, 5. 
1219 <ƵƌƚĂŵƉďĞůů ? “WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨh ?^ ?ŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ^ƵďĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶ
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 21, 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/134168.htm (accessed August 3, 2014). 
1220 The U.S. continues to have a healthy trade surplus of $78, 207 million in services trade, according to 2012 
data. Ian F. Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, August 21, 2013), 58.   
1221 Norrlof argues that the U.S., as global hegemon, has benefited disproportionately from its structural power.  
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂƚƚƌĂct capital, to provide a safe investment environment and strong tradition of property 
rights are related to the power of the U.S. Dollar.  The U.S. is the monetary hegemon. Norrlof, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂů
Advantage, 28 
1222 In 2009, Tim Groser, N.Z. Minister of Trade, asserted that the recommencement of the TPP negotiations 
ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽĚĞĐŝĚĞ ǁŚŽ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ
agenda would be. Wikileaks, Cable: 09WELLINGTON128_a, June 4, 2009. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09WELLINGTON128_a.html (accessed September 10, 2014). 
1223 U.S. trade policy objectives are broadly (1) to secure open markets for U.S. exports, (2) to protect domestic 
producers from foreign unfair trade practices and from rapid surges in fairly traded imports, (3) to control trade 
for foreign policy and national security reasons, and (4) to help foster global trade to promote world economic 
growth. William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2014), 3. 
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domestic consensus on whether FTAs could achieve long-term U.S. national interests and trade policy 
objectives.  The debate centres on whether FTAs are a substitute for, or a complement to, U.S. 
commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the WTO.1224  Deliberation 
over the benefits of FTAs continues to dominate the U.S. domestic trade agenda.1225  There is bipartisan 
opposition to these big trade deals, especially to NAFTA and the TPP, on the grounds that they remove 
domestic manufacturing jobs from the U.S. to developing nations.1226 Opposition to FTAs is also 
supported by unions, and environmental and consumer groups.1227  Despite this opposition, U.S. trade 
policy since the 1990s has been slowly, but increasingly dominated by bilateral and regional FTA 
negotiations, following rather than setting the trend.1228   
 
Despite negotiating its first FTA with Israel in 1985, the U.S. was relatively late in signalling its interest 
in bilateral and regional free trade agreements.1229  The Asia-Pacific region in contrast had already 
moved towards bilateral and regional trade agreements as a means to improve regional trade integration.  
The regional shift towards formalising relations with ASEAN was a calibrated response towards the 
realisation of an all-Asian free trade association after decades of dialogue but with little progress.   
$PHULFD¶VDOPRVWLGHRORJLFDOUHVLVWDQFHWRZDUGVUHJLRQDO)7$VPHDQWLW ODJJHGEHKLQG&KLQDLQWKH
negotiation of bilateral FTAs, and the U.S. had no regional equivalent to the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
                                                          
1224 Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, summary. 
1225 During the 2016 presidential election campaign, both nominees, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, opposed 
the TPP in its completed form.  While Hillary may have conceded to some kind of TPP deal for strategic purposes, 
President-elect Trump indicated that he would walk away from TPP on his first day in office and renegotiate 
E&d ?ĞŵĞƚƌŝ^ĞǀĂƐƚŽƉƵůŽ ? “ “dƌƵŵƉsŽǁƐƚŽZĞŶŽƵŶĐĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐdƌĂĚĞĞĂůŽŶ&ŝƌƐƚĂǇŝŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?Financial 
Times, November 22, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/dd98598a-b044-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1 (accessed 
January 21, 2017).  
1226 The NAFTA model is highly controversial in the US.  According to Lori Wallach, since January 1, 1994, NAFTA 
has created a  ‘ ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝon U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA partners, Mexico and Canada, and the related loss of 1 
million net U.S. jobs under NAFTA, growing income inequality, displacement of more than one million Mexican 
farmers and a doubling of immigration from Mexico, and more than $360 million paid to corporations after 
 ‘investor-state ? ƚƌŝďƵŶĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƌŽůůďĂĐŬƐŽĨ ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ? >ŽƌŝtĂůůĂĐŚ ? “NAFTA at 
20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality ? ?Huffington Post, January 6, 2014. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/nafta-at-20-one-million-u_b_4550207.html (accessed September 
10, 2014). 
1227 DĂƌŬ>ĂŶĚůĞƌĂŶĚ:ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶtĞŝƐŵĂŶ ? “dƌĂĚĞ WĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƐŝĂĨĂĐĞƐ/ŵƉŽƐŝŶŐ,ƵƌĚůĞ PDŝĚƚĞƌŵWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?New 
York Times, February 14, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/politics/biden-remark-casts-doubt-
on-pillar-of-us-trade-agenda.html?_r=0 (accessed May 16, 2016). 
1228 FTAs currently in force in the Asia-Pacific are: Australia (2004), Singapore (2004) and South Korea (concluded 
2007, implemented 2011). US-Thailand FTA negotiations commenced in 2004 but were suspended following the 
2006 coup.  
1229 US structural advantages meant it could pursue unilateral measures, threatening retaliation, usually in the 
ĨŽƌŵŽĨƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐƚƌĂĚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞǀĂƐƚh ?^ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚer to get the partner to either open its 
markets to U.S. exports, or to cease other commercial practices and policies which the U.S. considers unsuitable. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the US applied unilateral measures against Japan and South Korea to get Japan to amend 
domestic laws, regulations, and practices that prevented U.S. exporters from securing what they considered to 
be a fair share of the Japanese market  W particularly in the automotive industry.  Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: 
Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 3-4. 
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Area (ACFTA) that came into effect in 2010.  While the U.S remains a major regional economic player, 
the ASEAN-China FTA served to emphasise that in matters of trade, the U.S. is increasingly being 
overshadowed by China in Southeast Asia.1230  Moreover, through these initiatives, China is attempting 
to create a regional order that seeks to lessen the U.S. presence and influence.1231    
 
The trend in the Asia-Pacific towards FTAs could be supported by Washington on the basis that such 
agreements can be structured in a manner that serves as the building blocks of a global free trade 
system.1232  In the absence of any new global trade agreements, bilateral and regional FTAs can also 
lock countries into the process of neoliberal restructuring.  This is done through the construction of 
formal-legal regimes designed to protect open, transparent and rules-based free market economy 
policies.  The sacrifice of principles in favour of pragmatism, of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
like the TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Trade Partnership (TTIP), has advantages for the United States, 
with its large economy.1233  PTAs are a template for asymmetric trade agreements with weaker 
economies, through which the U.S. can directly shape the interests of the other parties.  Specifically 
targeted, asymmetric FTAs also limit the problem of the dilution of neoliberal principles and the 
compromise needed for WTO trade rounds, enabling Washington to assert more control over the 
agenda, including the expansion of non-trade-specific areas now included in PTAs.1234  U.S. PTAs are 
a mechanism through which Washington advances U.S. values, adding a normative agenda to trade 
negotiations that seeks to influence the domestic policies of the negotiating countries.1235  The TPP 
exemplifies this updated form of PTA.   
 
                                                          
1230 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture, 14. 
1231 Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 2 
1232 As part of a broader foreign policy strategy that promotes respect for international rules and norms for trade. 
Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 13. 
1233 dŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂĚĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐTPP, with Pacific Rim nations, and TTIP, the US-EU 
equivalent, which are mega-regional trade deals, deemed to be ambitious and far-reaching. Through these trade 
deals, the US aims to shape the direction of economic liberalisation for its largest trading partners into the 21st 
century. 
1234 For instance, the G.W. Bush administration incorporated a competition in liberalisation policy into its FTA 
framework. From DĂǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ŶĞǁ &dƐ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů >ĂďŽƵƌ KƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Right of Work. U.S. FTA partners would be expected to agree to a 
range of conditions considered essential to the U.S., including, but not limited to, multilateral environmental 
agreements, port security, and foreign investor rights in investor-state disputes.  Cooper, Free Trade 
Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 5. 
1235 Bhagwati, economist and supporter of multilateral trade, notes his concern over the breadth of non-trade 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽ&dƐ ? ‘that such templates now extend beyond conventional trade issues (for example, 
agricultural protection) to vast numbers of areas unrelated to trade, including labor standards, environmental 
rules, policies on expropriation, and the ability to impose capital-account controlƐŝŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?Jagdish 
ŚĂŐǁĂƚŝ ?  “dŚĞ ƌŽŬĞŶ >ĞŐƐ ŽĨ 'ůŽďĂů dƌĂĚĞ ? ? WƌŽũĞĐƚ ^ǇŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ? DĂǇ  ? ?, 2012. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-legs-of-global-trade#POZLuZHxCu1ObRz5.99 (accessed August 7, 2014). 
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When the rebalance strategy was officially launched in November 2011, the TPP negotiations assumed 
DGGLWLRQDO VLJQLILFDQFH DV WKH HFRQRPLF HOHPHQW RI WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V UHRULHQWDWLRQ WR WKH
Asia-Pacific.  Alongside the repositioning of regional security arrangements, the economic rebalance 
RIIHUHG VXEVWDQFH WR $PHULFD¶V UHQHZHG FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH $VLD-Pacific.1236  There are distinct 
geopolitical and geo-economic elements in the TPP.  The TPP fits into the Obama DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
broader aim of securing its position as the dominant driving force within the regional economic 
architecture, by shaping regional economic rules, tightening economic linkages between the U.S. and 
its Asia-Pacific allies, and embedding eleven other Asia-Pacific states into an American-led formal 
trade agreement consistent with neoliberalism.1237  It is hoped that the TPP agreement will complement 
86VHFXULW\DUUDQJHPHQWVE\µDOWHULQJFRXQWULHV¶perception RIZKHUHWKHLUVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVOLH¶1238  
In one comprehensive agreement, the TPP extends U.S. FTAs to five of the eleven TPP negotiating 
countries, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam.1239  For the TPP partners with whom 
the U.S. does not have a bilateral FTA, the TPP enables the U.S. to play a proactive role in shaping the 
UHJLRQ¶VUXOHVDQGQRUPVE\LQFOXGLQJDPDMRUUHJLRQDOSOD\HUZLWKZKRPQRIRUPDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQW
currently exists.1240  There is broad scope for the U.S. to force open areas of their economies and 
formally commit them to a rules-based trade regime, including a mechanism for dispute settlement.1241   
 
7KH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDVGHSLFWHG WKH733DV WKHPRGHO IRUDOO IXWXUH86)7$V 7KH µJROG
VWDQGDUG¶86)7$VRIWKHIXWXUHZLOOIRFXVRQSROLFLHVwithin borders, rather than those more basic 
)7$VWKDWIRFXVRQµalong ERUGHUV¶LVVXHVVXFKDVWDULIIVThe U.S. outlines the contents for 21st century 
FTAs, setting the agenda and determining the interests of other actors.  The negotiations of TPP chapters 
have incorporated disciplines from intellectual property rights, trade in services, government 
procurement, investment, rules of origin, competition, labour, to environment standards.  Some topics, 
                                                          
1236 ůĂƵĚĞ ĂƌĨŝĞůĚ ?  “hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ WŝǀŽƚ ƚŽ ƐŝĂ ? ? ƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ ? ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ZŽƵŶĚ dĂďůĞ ? 
Washington, DC, January 31, 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/31-us-
asia/20120131_us_asia_panel_one.pdf (accessed June 19, 2016). 
1237 DŝŶzĞ ?  “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐooperation in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ PdWW ?ZWĂŶĚƚŚĞEĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ? ?Asian 
Security 11, no. 3 (2015): 207. 
1238 Emphasis in original. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 4. 
1239 Existing US FTA partners in the TPP negotiations are Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. 
The eleven partners account for 37% of US trade and the 12 combined account for 37% of global GDP. Williams, 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 6.   
1240 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 16. 
1241 Japanese accession to the TPP negotiations provided the U.S. with opportunities to push for the liberalisation 
of Japanese protected sectors, including agriculture, health and pharmaceuticals, and to remove the remaining 
Japanese restrictions on the import of American beef.  Tokyo and Washington are focused on liberalising each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶŵŽƚŽƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƚĂƌŝĨĨƐďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞŽŶ both sides. Progress in the bilateral 
U.S.-Japan negotiations put pressure on the other members to liberalise their own sensitive sectors which push 
the negotiations towards a high standard agreement. Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and 
Issues for Congress, 15; BBC,  “dWW P tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ƚ ^take with tŚĞ dƌĂĚĞ ĞĂů ? ? Ɖƌŝů  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27107349 (accessed September 10, 2014). 
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such as state-owned enterprises, regulatory coherence, and supply chain competitiveness are innovative 
in FTA negotiations.1242  Consequently, the TPP is a means by which the U.S. has pushed for regulatory 
reform in Asia-Pacific economies, especially relating to what it sees as unfair and uncompetitive 
practices.  A particular area of contention for Washington concerns the area of state-influenced 
corporations, monopolies and state-owned enterprises, with a substantial presence in many Asia-Pacific 
economies.  The TPP agreement will µLQYROYH VXEVWDQWLDO UHVWUXFWXULQJ RI WKH HFRQRPLHV RI VRPH
particLSDQWV¶LQWKHORQJHUWHUP1243 
 
Such restructuring would align the economies of the TPP trading partners better with $PHULFD¶V
neoliberal principles such as trade and financial liberalisation.  The aim is to shape the economic 
architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonising existing agreements with U.S. FTA partners, to 
establish regional rules in new policy issues facing the global economy, whilst potentially supporting 
future multilateral liberalisation under the WTO.1244  0RUHRYHUDVDµOLYLQJDJUHHPHQW¶WKH733KDV
the potential to be formally extended to others throughout the Asia-Pacific.1245 Any nation will be able 
to join so long as all domestic laws and regulations adhere to TPP rules.1246  Not only is Washington 
aiming to set the agenda for the composition of future trade agreements, it will have already pre-




been resistance to some of the far-reaching neoliberal-inspired American proposals.1248  Washington 
FRQFHGHGWKDWLWµPD\QRWEHDEOHVLPSO\WRLPSRVHLWVYLVLRQRUVWDQGDUds on those countries, and they 
                                                          
1242 The TPP includes obligations in the SOE chapter that require increased transparency and prohibit 
governments from providing advantages to SOEs that distort their competition with private firms in commercial 
markets. Ian F. Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, updated, February 9, 2016), 13. 
1243 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, summary.   
1244 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, summary.  
1245 The expectation is that TPP will be expanded  W so long as new members strive for the same level of trade 
liberalisation as the current negotiating partners.  Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand have 
already publicly expressed inƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?^ĞĞFergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 7; Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 6.   
1246 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 43. 
1247 >Žƌŝ tĂůůĂĐŚ ?  “dWW P E&d ŽŶ ^ƚĞƌŽŝĚƐ ? ?The Nation, July 16-23, 2012. 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids (accessed August 11, 2014). 
1248 The TPP negotiations were also subject to high levels of domestic criticism, especially among civil society 
groups, critical of the unprecedented levels of secrecy shrouding the drafting and negotiation process, and the 
content of the proposed agreement which safeguards corporate rather than public interests. tĂůůĂĐŚ ?  “dWW P
NAFTA on Steroids ? ? 
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DUHOLNHO\WRPDNHGHPDQGVIRUFRQFHVVLRQVIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶1249  During the negotiations, there 
was opposition to some of the more extreme corporate demands, with Australia refusing the parallel 
court system.  Both Australia and New Zealand rejected a U.S. proposal to allow pharmaceutical 
FRPSDQLHVWRFKDOOHQJHWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWPHGLFLQHIRUPXODULHV¶SULFLQJFRQGLWLRQVWKDWNHHSVWKHLUGUXJ
costs lower than in the United States.  Every country rejected the U.S. proposal to extend drug patent 
monopolies.  This wholesale rejection was attributed to the leaking of the text which enabled 
government health officials and activists to fight back.1250  Some negotiating countries pushed for 
concessions from the U.S., including greater access to its agricultural markets (dairy and sugar) in 
particular.1251   
 
Another issue that raised concerns among East Asian nations specifically, relates to the ability of 
governments to impose controls on capital outflows.  Many TPP member countries also rejected a U.S. 
SURSRVDOSURKLELWLQJFRXQWULHVIURPXVLQJFDSLWDOFRQWUROVWD[HVRURWKHUµPDFUR-prudential measures 
WR OLPLW WKH SRZHU RI ILQDQFLDO VSHFXODWRUV SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WLPHV RI ILQDQFLDO FULVLV¶1252  This is an 
important issue for many East Asian countries who had implemented capital control procedures as a 
consequence of the Asian Financial Crisis.1253  Also controversial has been the inclusion of the Investor-
State Dispute Resolution mechanism, which empowers corporations to sue governments (outside their 
domestic court systems) over any action the corporations believe undermines their expected future 
profits or rights under the pact.1254 
 
7KH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V VXSSRUW IRU WKH 733 LV JURXQGHG LQ VWUDWHJLF DV ZHOO DV SROLWLFDO DQG
economic, logic.  The TPP will not, in all likelihoodFORVH$PHULFD¶VWUDGHGHILFLWLQWKH$VLD-Pacific, 
                                                          
1249 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 4. 
1250 According to Inside U.S. Trade, neither the authenticity of the document, nor the date of the document have 
been confirmed. Inside U.S. Trade,  “>ĞĂŬĞĚdWWWĂƉĞƌŽŶƌƵŐ/W>ĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĞƐ^ŚŽǁƐǆƚĞŶƚŽĨŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?July 
31, 2013. http://insidetrade.com/Inside-U.S.-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-08/01/2014/leaked-tpp-paper-on-drug-
ip-landing-zones-shows-extent-of-divisions/menu-id-710.html (accessed August 20, 2014). 
1251 Manyin, Pivot to the Pacific? 23. 
1252 Previous U.S. FTAs have also included clauses that call for the free flow of capital in order to facilitate trade 
and investment and also allow for exceptions where controls are imposed to alleviate short-term balance of 
payments problems to protect the stability of the financial system. See Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 42. 
1253 After the AFC fallout, the IMF officially shifted its position on capital controls, endorsing their use by countries 
to relieve the effects of capital volatility during periods of economic instability. The IMF policy reversal is cited 
as an effort by the IMF to modernise and accept the economic power emanating from the G20 countries. See 
Bloomberg,  “/D& KĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇ ŶĚŽƌƐĞƐ ĂƉŝƚĂů ŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ŝŶ ZĞǀĞƌƐĂů ? ? ĞĐ ŵďĞƌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/imf-officially-endorses-capital-controls-in-reversal.html 
(accessed August 12, 2014). 
1254 To date, the NAFTA version of this scheme has forced governments to pay more than $350 million to 




or create American jobs.1255  Nor will the TPP solve the problem of state capitalist practices, or orientate 
many Asia-Pacific states from their export-driven economies towards embracing free trade.1256  The 
successful conclusion of the negotiations within five years of the Obama administration is meant to 
future-SURRI $PHULFD¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH UHJLRQ  For the United States, the TPP represents the 
reversal of its declining dominance, also recalibrating U.S. leadership in crafting global trade rules.1257  
For President Obama, nearing the end of his second term, the successful completion of the TPP 
negotiations in February 2016 has broader significance for the success of the rebalance strategy, and 
his legacy of renegotiating the regional institutional bargains that position the United States as hegemon 
in the Asia-Pacific.1258  $VRQHH[SHUWREVHUYHVµWKHUHLVQR$VLDSLYRWZLWKRXWDQHFRQRPLFFRPSRQHQW
DQGWKDWFRPSRQHQWLVWLHGXSLQ733¶1259  Without the economic reorientation element, the rebalance 
strategy would be reduced to a security strategy and open to further criticism that it is a thinly-veiled 
attempt to contain China.   
 
The Obama administration has been able to push forward with the successful conclusion of the TPP 
negotiations.  Countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore have been motivated by the benefits 
WKDW GHHSHU $PHULFDQ HQJDJHPHQW ZLOO EULQJ LQFOXGLQJ WKH EHQHILWV RI $PHULFD¶V UHJLRQDO VHFXULW\
commitments and open markets.  They also hope to mitigate against any American shift towards 
protectionism in light of AmeULFD¶VJURZLQJWUDGHGHILFLWwith the Asia-Pacific.1260  The U.S. does not 
need to exert direct coercive pressure to compel Asia-Pacific states into accepting an American-led 
regional economic order.1261  Nor is this relationship directly exploitative.  Subordinate states acquiesce 
to capitalism as the dominant mode of production.  The U.S. has been able to extract some bargains 
                                                          
1255 As with NAFTA, the criticism of these FTAs is that they only further increase the US trade deficit with the 
negotiating countries that costs American jobs and continues to downgrade the competitive of American 
manufacturing.  ^ĞĞtĂůůĂĐŚ ? “dWW PE&dŽŶ^ƚĞƌŽŝĚƐ ? ? 
1256
 ůǇĚĞ WƌĞƐƚŽǁŝƚǌ ?  “dŚĞ WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WŝǀŽƚ ? ?The American Prospect, March 13, 2012 
http://prospect.org/article/pacific-pivot (accessed August 27, 2014). 
1257 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief, summary. 
1258 WĞƚĞƌ ĂŬĞƌ ?  “dŚĞ dƌĂŶƐ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ Ă WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ >ĞŐĂĐǇ ? ?New York Times, June 14, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/asia/the-trans-pacific-trade-deal-and-a-presidents-
legacy.html?_r=0  (accessed August 24, 2015). 
1259 Walter Lohman, director of the Asian studies program at the Heritage Foundation, ƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶĂŬĞƌ ? “dŚĞ
Trans-Pacific PartnerƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĂWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂĐǇ. ? 
1260 WƌĞƐƚŽǁŝƚǌ ? “dŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐWŝǀŽƚ ? ?EŽƌƌůŽĨƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƵŶůŝŬĞƚƌĂĚĞĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƐŝŶƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐĞĞŶ
as a liability, a U.S. trade deficit does not have the same impaĐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐ ‘ŵƵůƚŝ-ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƉŽǁĞƌďĂƐĞ ? ?tŝƚŚ
its structural power advantage, the US is able to absorb more capital and goods, possesses the currency of last 
ƌĞƐŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚ ƌĞƚĂŝŶƐ ŵŽƌĞƉŽůŝĐǇĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ? /ƚƐ  ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇ-error threshold is also higher than for other countries. 
Others have a wide-range of incentives to invest in dollar-denominated assets.  Norrlof, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ 'ůŽďĂů
Advantage, 4-5. 
1261 ƐEŽƌƌůŽĨŶŽƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞh ?^ ?ŚĂƐƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂƌŐĞƐƚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƚŚĞŬĞǇǁŽƌůĚĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƐƚ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŝƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?dŚĞƐĞ
attributes enable the U.S. to shape the rules and institutions of international economic life.  It is a system of 
 ‘ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?EŽƌƌůŽĨ, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ, 6-7.  
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from the TPP negotiations because of its economic and military advantages, exacerbated by the 
uncertain geopolitical situation, tensions in the East and South China Seas, uncertain energy supplies, 
a volatile, potentially nuclear North Korea, and an assertive China in the neighbourhood.  These 
problems draw many of the nations in the region into the American security sphere.1262   
 
7KH ELJJHVW FKDOOHQJH WR VHFXULQJ 2EDPD¶V OHJDF\ is home-grown ± in Congress.1263  The Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA), which shields trade deals from domestic legislative debate, became the 
biggest and most publLFHPEDUUDVVPHQW WR WKHSRVLWLYH UHDOLVDWLRQRI2EDPD¶VUegional trade policy 
during summer 2015.1264 The TPA negotiations emphasised the strength of legislative opposition to free 
trade agreements that are seen to disadvantage Americans.1265  After much political wrangling, the 
gaining of TPA in June 2015 was a crucial step towards congressional approval of the TPP.  Regardless 
of the importance of the TPP to foreign policy, there is little bipartisan consensus on the TPP, with 
Congressional members viewing the agreement through a domestic economic lens.  There is no 
guarantee of congressional approval for TPP, even with TPA.1266  $V2EDPDREVHUYHGµ*HRSROLWLFV
JHWVLWYHU\IHZYRWHV¶1267  Without TPA, the TPP negotiations may have become inconsequential for 
the negotiating states, which could have led Japan, Vietnam and other partners to reverse course on 
economic reforms or tariff concessions required for the TPP agreement.  If the TPP negotiations stalled, 
Washington would have had to contend with the possibility that momentum may have then shifted 
toward other regional economic institutions and agreements that exclude the United States, including 
                                                          
1262 WƌĞƐƚŽǁŝƚǌ ? “dŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐWŝǀŽƚ ? ? 
1263 There is little domestic consensus between officials and experts on the longer term impact of the TPP on 
the US economy. See Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 2. 
1264 TPA forces Congress to vote for or against trade deals in their entirety, thereby speeding up the approval 
process and shielding FTAs from House and Senate amendments and scrutiny of the agreement minutiae. 
1265 The previous TPA was enacted in 2002, and expired in 2007.  It continued to apply for agreements already 
under negotiation, and thus, would not be applicable to the TPP. In 2012, the Obama administration began the 
process of TPA renewal.  TPA was finally granted to the White House on June 29, 2015, after months of domestic 
ǁƌĂŶŐůŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ?initial rejection, ŽŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'ƌĞŐEĞůƐŽŶ ? “KŶdƌĂĚĞ ?,ĞƌĞ ?ƐtŚĂƚƚhe President 
^ŝŐŶĞĚŝŶƚŽ>Ăǁ ? ?The White House, June 29, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/29/trade-here-
s-what-president-signed-law (accessed August 24, 2015). See also, John Harwood,  “'ůŽďĂůdƌĂĚĞdĂůŬƐdŚƌĞĂƚĞŶ
KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ >ŽŶŐƚŝŵĞ ĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ Đƚ ? ? New York Times, February 17, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/U.S./politics/global-trade-talks-threaten-obamas-longtime-balancing-
act.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A18%22%7D&_r=0 
(accessed August 12, 2014). 
1266 Republican Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell, warned the White House that the TPP should not be 
sent to Congress for approval until after the 2016 elections  ?  and maybe not until after Obama leaves office. 
WĂƵů<ĂŶĞĂŶĚĂǀŝĚEĂŬĂŵƵƌĂ ? “DĐŽŶŶĞůůtĂƌŶƐƚŚĂƚdƌĂĚĞĞĂůĂŶ ?ƚWĂƐƐŽŶŐƌĞƐƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? ? ?lectionƐ ? ?
Washington Post, December 10, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mcconnell-warns-that-trade-
deal-cant-pass-congress-before-2016-elections/2015/12/10/b8151f26-9f66-11e5-8728-
1af6af208198_story.html (accessed May 30, 2016). 
1267 WĞƚĞƌ ĂŬĞƌ ?  “dŚĞ dƌĂŶƐ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ Ă WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ >ĞŐĂĐǇ ? ?New York Times, June 14, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/asia/the-trans-pacific-trade-deal-and-a-presidents-
legacy.html?_r=0 (accessed May 30, 2016). 
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the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), &KLQD¶VOne Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative, and the ASEAN-led RCEP.1268  
 
There is no prospect of Congressional consent to the TPP agreement before the presidential election in 
November 2016, which will push the formalities of the highly contentious TPP into the next 
administration.1269  Nevertheless, the Obama administration has consistently defended the agreement 
on the basis that without it, China, not the U.S., will write the rules on regional trade.1270  The 
administration has also advanced a foreign policy argument that, without TPP, the U.S. would create a 
regional void for China to fill.1271  Also to contend with is the potential reputational damage caused to 
the U.S. from within the region, if the agreement fails to survive Congress.1272  In the Asia-Pacific, the 
TPP is directly linked to U.S. regional leadership and commitment, with significant implications for the 
regional perception of the U.S. if it fails to secure the TPP agreement.  The Prime Minister of Singapore, 
valued regional partner of the U.S., has ZDUQHGWKDWµIailing to get the TPP done will hurt the credibility 
DQGVWDQGLQJRIWKH86QRWMXVWLQ$VLDEXWZRUOGZLGH¶1273  Without U.S. commitment to the deal, it 
is increasingly unlikely that the TPP will survive.     
 
(i) Contestation of U.S. structural power? 
The TPP is an extensive free trade agreement involving twelve Pacific Rim countries, notably including 
-DSDQDQGH[FOXGLQJ&KLQD &KLQD¶V DEVHQFH IURP WKH WUDGHQHJRWLDWLRQV, initially, at least, fuelled 
criticism from China that the TPP is the U.S. attempt to design East Asian trade, inspired by the ultimate 
goal of containing China.1274  The U.S. has consistently pursued efforts to integrate China into the global 
                                                          
1268 WĞƚĞƌĂŬĞƌ ? “The Trans-WĂĐŝĨŝĐWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚĂWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂĐǇ ? ?
1269 President Trump has stated that multilateral trade deals are a disaster for the US and has instead indicated 
a preference for bilateral trade deals that he ƐĂǇƐǁŝůůŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶũŽďŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ZŽďŝŶ,ĂƌĚŝŶŐ ? “dWW
 ‘ŚĂƐ ŶŽ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ h ?^ ? ? ƐĂǇƐ ^ŚŝŶǌŽ ďĞ ? ?Financial Times, November 22, 2016. 
https://www.ft.com/content/59972c38-b058-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1 (accessed January 20, 2017).  
1270 Barack ObĂŵĂ ? “dŚĞdWWtŽƵůĚ>ĞƚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?EŽƚŚŝŶĂ ?>ĞĂĚƚŚĞtĂǇŽŶ'ůŽďĂůdƌĂĚĞ ? ?Washington Post, 
May 2, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-
china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html 
(accessed May 24, 2016). 
1271 Jon Huntsman, a Republican former governor of Utah, ǁŚŽƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƐDƌ ?KďĂŵĂ ?ƐĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽŚŝŶĂ
before mounting a campaign to challenge his re-election in 2012, quoted in Baker,  “The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
ĂŶĚĂWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂĐǇ. ? 
1272 EŝůĞŽǁŝĞ ? “ObaŵĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐdƌĂĚĞĞĂůdƌĂŝůƐďĞŚŝŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚsŝƐŝŽŶ ? ?Counterpunch, July 7, 
2015.http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/07/obamas-pacific-trade-deal-trails-behind-chinas-
development-vision/ (accessed August 24, 2015). 
1273 Singapore Prime MinŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐKĨĨŝĐĞ ? “dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŽĨ<ĞǇŶŽƚĞ^peech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 
Shangri->ĂŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ?DĂǇ ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/transcript-keynote-speech-prime-
minister-lee-hsien-loong-shangri-la-dialogue-29-may-2015 (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1274 tĞŶ:ŝŶzƵĂŶ ? “dŚĞdƌĂŶƐ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ^ ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ?ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ
International Studies, June 2012, 1-4. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
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economy, thereby seeking to socialise China into international rules and norms.  Furthermore, U.S.-
China economic relations are also served by the current negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT), and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).  )URP WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
perspective, the long-term U.S. strategy is not to contain China, but rather to constrain it within the 
existing structure of global economic governance.1275  The size of the Chinese economy, its significance 
to the global economy, and the extent of the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China are 
all facWRUV WKDW QHJDWH WKH FRQWDLQPHQW DUJXPHQW  5DWKHU WKDQ DQ µHFRQRPLF GHQLDO¶ VWUDWHJ\ WKH
intended effect of the TPP deal, as it indirectly relates to China, is to raise the standards on regional 
economic liberalisation, thereby putting pressure on China to do the same.1276   
 
The TPP is a concerted attempt by the Obama administration to set the rules of the trade game in the 
Asia-Pacific, increasing the prospect that the future rules of the global economy will be devised through 
86LQIOXHQFH&KLQD¶VDEVHnce from the TPP may be politically expedient, but it may also undermine 
the potential potency of the trade agreement in the longer termJLYHQ&KLQD¶VFHQWUDOLW\WR the regional 
economy.1277  To draw China into TPP would strengthen the regional framework.  However, while 
China has expressed interest in joining the TPP, it would not be able to meet all the necessary 
requirements for membership at this stage, needing to implement reforms to state-owned enterprises, 
intellectual property rights and labour standards.1278  The U.S. would not be prepared to make 
FRPSURPLVHVRQWKH733¶VQRQ-trade-related provisions, since this would potentially undermine what 
the U.S. is attempting to achieve through the TPP - to set high standards and rules of trade and 
investment for the region.1279   
 
(ii) Other regional initiatives 
The TPP is by no means the only regional initiative with the potential to lead to the intended goal of a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).  In November 2010, APEC leaders declared that,   
                                                          
public/legacy_files/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016). For more oŶŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞdWW ?ƐĞĞĂůƐŽŚĂŶŐyŝĂŽƚŽŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐsŝĞǁƐŽĨƚŚĞdWW PdĂŬĞ/ƚŽƌ>ĞĂǀĞ/ƚ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞ
YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?The International Spectator 50, no. 1 (2015): 111-116.  
1275 Yuan,  “dŚĞdƌĂŶƐ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?
1276 ^ŝůŽǀĞ ? “dŚĞWŝǀŽƚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? 
1277 Economist ? “tŚĂƚŚŝŶĂtĂŶƚƐ ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1278 ĂƌƌǇ EĂƵŐŚƚŽŶ ?  “tŚĂƚ ǁŝůů ƚŚĞ dWW ŵĞĂŶ ĨŽƌ ŚŝŶĂ ? ? &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ 7, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/ (accessed June 
26, 2016). 
1279 :ĂŐĚŝƐŚ ŚĂŐǁĂƚŝ ?  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ dŚƌeat to Trans-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ dƌĂĚĞ ? ? WƌŽũĞĐƚ ^ǇŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ? ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-s-threat-to-trans-pacific-
trade#WlcwuJWAgbqesG2V.99  (accessed August 7, 2014). 
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µDQ )7$$3 should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade agreement by 
developing and building on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+6, and the Trans-3DFLILF3DUWQHUVKLSDPRQJRWKHUV¶1280  
In addition to the U.S.-led TPP, there are two other frameworks being developed. The first is the 
ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) process which aims to place 
ASEAN at the centre of regional trade.1281  The RCEP, officially launched in 2012, has a broad 
membership, joining ASEAN and its six FTA partners ± Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand 
and South Korea into one collective FTA.  As an ASEAN-led initiative, ASEAN centrality defines the 
RCEP process.  Several countries, including Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Vietnam are negotiating partners in both the TPP and the RCEP.1282  RCEP members 
have not set themselves the same level of ambition in terms of tariff reduction and trade liberalisation 
as is required of the TPP.   
 
7KHVHFRQGIUDPHZRUNLV&KLQD¶V6LON5RDGEconomic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Road (MSR), 
combined creating the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative.  The OBOR is a land and sea-based 
Asian-centric initiative that is not a formal, standardised free trade agreement, but which does embody 
&KLQD¶VDSSURDFKWRUHJLRQDOWUDGH8QYHLOHGE\3UHVLGHQW;LLQWRGDWHWKHLQLWLDWLYHFRPELQHV
µGLSORPDF\DQGLQYHVWPHQWIXQGV¶IRUSURMHFWVZLWKQHLJKERXUVDFURVV$VLDVXSSRUWHGE\WKHQHZO\-
established AIIB as the means to fund infrastructure projects along the SREB.1283   Through the OBOR 
initiative, Beijing is directing its leadership efforts towards under-developed areas and meeting unmet 
developmental needs throughout Eurasia, incorporating Central, South, and East Asia.1284  In contrast 
to the 733¶VKRPRJHQLVLQJIUDPHZRUNFRQQHFWLQJQDWLRQVthrough common rules and regulations, the 
OBOR connects nations with common interests in infrastructure, trade and investment rather than by 
practices of economic liberalisation.1285 
                                                          
1280 W ? “W ? ? ? ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2010/2010_aelm.aspx  (accessed August 8, 2014). 
1281 See ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? “dWWĂŶĚZW PŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŽƌŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇDŽĚĞůƐŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
event transcript, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, February 11, 2014. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/2/11%20asia%20pacific%20economic%20integration/20140
211_tpp_rcep_transcript.pdf  (accessed September 3, 2014). 
1282 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 7. 
1283 During 2015, the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was created, with the announcement of a hydro 
power plant in Pakistan. PƌŽũĞĐƚƐĂŶĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚ<ĂǌĂŬŚƐƚĂŶĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂ
and Competing Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1284 The OBOR initiative will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. 
1285 ůŝĐĞ  ? Ă ?  “tŝůů ƚŚe TPP and OBOR challenge ASEAN CĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ &ŽƌƵŵ ? DĂǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?




The TPP, RCEP and OBOR offer three pathways for regional cooperation towards the goal of an 
FTAAP.  Advanced by the U.S., ASEAN and China respectively, each framework represents different 
LQWHUHVWV µHFRQRPLF QRUPV DQG GHYHORSPHQWDO LPSDFWV¶ IRU WKH UHJLRQ1286  Each also emphasises 
regional cooperation, and overlapping membership offers opportunities for future coordination and 
specifically targets Southeast Asia ± the sub-region connecting land and sea, and the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans.1287  The three pathways also point to the competition between the three to strengthen their 
leadership potential in Southeast Asia.  According to Wang Jinqiang, a professor at Shanghai 
University, 5&(3ZDV$6($1¶Vresponse to the TPP.1288  As the other formal framework, the RCEP 
is viewed by Washington as having the greatest potential to rival the American-led TPP and lessen 
American influence of the direction of regional trade development towards an FTAAP, chiefly because 
RI&KLQD¶VPHPEHUVKLS+RZHYHUDFFRUGLQJWRREVHUYHUVIURPZLWKLQWKHUHJLRQ&KLQD¶VGHFLVLRQWR
join the 5&(3ZDVPRWLYDWHGE\-DSDQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRMRLQWKH733UDWKHUWKDQWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH733
itself.1289   
 
With growing regional and global interest in the AIIB and OBOR%HLMLQJ¶VDWWHQWLRQWRthe RCEP has 
declined, accentuated b\$6($1¶Vdemands over ASEAN centrality in the RCEP negotiations, which 
DPRXQWV WR µSURFHVV ZLWKRXW SURJUHVV¶ UHJLRQDOLVP.1290  &KLQD LV IUXVWUDWHG E\ 5&(3¶V ODFN RI
DFKLHYHPHQW FUHDWHG LQ ODUJHSDUW E\$6($1¶V HPSKDVLVRQ$6($1FHQWUDOLW\, which puts China 
under ASEAN leadership.1291  7KH86YLHZV&KLQD¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIthe RCEP, combined with China-
led initiatives, the OBOR DQG$,,%DVSROLFLHVGHVLJQHGWRLQFUHDVH&KLQD¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKHJOREDO
economic system and simultaneously counter, or reduce, U.S. influence.1292  Since all 12 TPP members 
and 15 RCEP countries are also members of APEC, the pathway chosen to form the basis of the FTAAP 
is likely to be decided in this forum.1293 
 
                                                          
1286 zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐooperation in the Asia-Pacific ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1287 TPP currently only includes four Southeast Asian members. Washington has been actively engaging with 
others to gain their participation in further rounds. Ă ? “tŝůůƚŚĞdWWĂŶd OBOR Challenge ASEAN CĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? 
1288 Wang Jinqiang, cited in zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ?  
1289 zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐooperation in the Asia-Pacific ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1290 zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐooperation in the Asia-Pacific ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1291 zĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐooperation in the Asia-Pacific ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1292 Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications, 10-11.   
1293 India does not currently hold APEC membership. Following President-ĞůĞĐƚ dƌƵŵƉ ?Ɛ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ
withdraw from the TPP in November 2016, RCEP has attracted new interest from Latin American states including 
Peru, and stimulated ASEAN and Chinese efforts to conclude RCEP in early 2017. China has also opened its OBOR 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƚŽ >ĂƚŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ^ŚĂǁŶ ŽŶŶĂŶ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ WůĞĚŐĞƐ ƚŽ >ĞĂĚ dŚĞ tĂǇ ŽŶ 'ůŽďĂů dƌĂĚĞ ? ?
Financial Times, November 19, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/ad63bc0e-ae88-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1 
(accessed January 20, 2017).  
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Institutional Power: U.S. influence over APEC and ASEAN 
The Obama administration views regional multilateral organisations as a means to promote and deepen 
the structures of neoliberalism, in support of trade and investment liberalisation.  This goal can be 
achieved indirectly through the regional institutions.  U.S. involvement with two regional institutions, 
APEC and ASEAN, is discussed here.  The aim is to show that the Obama administration seeks to shape 
the structure of regional trade through regional forums regardless of whether the U.S. has membership. 
 
(i) APEC 
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the primary vehicle for economic cooperation within the 
broader Asia-Pacific, has typically been the main organisation through which the U.S. has attempted to 
influence the direction and structure of regional economic development.  Consistent with the U.S. 
agenda, APEC has predictably focused its efforts on regional structural reform, good governance and 
transparency, and moves to reduce corruptive practices in its member states.  It also promises to promote 
cross-border services trade and eliminate protectionism.1294  APEC aspires to create the FTAAP.  
However, as a forum for dialogue and non-binding commitments, relying on consensus-based, 
voluntary reductions in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers centred on µRSHQ UHJLRQDOLVP¶ WKLV LV an 
ambitious goal.1295  Progress towards the fulfilment of its key regional strategy - the Bogor Goals ± has 
been slow, and many short-to-medium term targets, that would move APEC in the direction of the 
FTAAP, are consistently missed.1296   
 
The G.W. Bush administration sought to elevate the importance of APEC as a means to reassert U.S. 
UHJLRQDO OHDGHUVKLS WR FRXQWHU &KLQD¶V ULVLQJ LQIOXHQFH DQG DV D FRPSOHPHQW WR 86 ELODWHUDO
                                                          
1294 W ?  “^ƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ 'ƌŽǁƚŚ ĂŶĚ ŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?  ? ? ? ? W >ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ
Declaration, 14-15 November, 2009. http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/2009/2009_aelm.aspx (accessed August 6, 2014). 
1295 Michael F. Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2010), 1. 
1296 In 1994, APEC members agreed on the BŽŐŽƌ'ŽĂůƐ ?ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ‘free and open trade and investment 
in the Asia-Pacific ? by 2010 for industrialised countries, and 2020 for developing countries. Three principles 
underpin the Bogor Goals: The promotion of sustainable economic growth; developing and strengthening the 
multilateral trading system, and increasing the interdependence and economic prosperity of its members. See 
W ?  “ƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŐŽƌ 'ŽĂůƐ ? ?http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Achievements-and-Benefits/Bogor-Goals.aspx (accessed September 10, 2014). In 2010, an assessment of 
five developed and eight developing economies that volunteered to be part of the exercise declared that no 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŚĂĚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŽŐŽƌ'ŽĂůƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŵ ?^ĞĞEĞǁ
Zealand Ministry ŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐĂŶĚdƌĂĚĞ ? “W ?ƐŐŽĂůƐĂŶĚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵ ŶƚƐ ? ?ůĂƐƚƵƉĚĂƚĞĚ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ?
2013. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/APEC/2-Goals-and-achievements.php 
(accessed September 2, 2014). 
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ventures.1297  The administration envisaged APEC as a ready mechanism to drive through regional 
economic integration, moving towards the FTAAP, and served as a potential counter mechanism to 
$6($1HIIRUWVWRFUHDWHDQµ$VLDQRQO\¶PRGHOIRUUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFLQWHJUDWLRn.  Bringing together 
21 nations, the APEC forum was also a central point for the U.S. to hold bilateral and multilateral 
discussions on non-economic matters in the Asia-Pacific region, such as international security and 
human rights.1298  APEC became the priQFLSDO YHKLFOH WR VXSSRUW WKH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
economic and security interests.   
 
The Obama administration initially continued to uphold U.S. support for APEC, acknowledging APEC 
WREHDµYDOXDEOHDVVHWWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶DQGµDSULPDU\YHQXH for multilateral engagement with the 
Asia-3DFLILFRQHFRQRPLFDQGRWKHUNH\LQWHUHVWV¶1299  Over the course of the Obama administration, 
$3(&¶VUROHDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQGRZQJUDGHGWRa, but not the forum, for advancing U.S. interests in 
the Asia-Pacific.  In August 2014, Secretary Kerry did not mention APEC as a forum for realising 
$PHULFD¶V YLVLRQ IRU $VLD-Pacific economic integration.1300  $3(&¶V UROH LV GHVFULEHG DV
complementary to the TPP in its promotion of regional economic integration but not as the primary 
vehicle towards the realisation of the FTAAP.1301   
 
$3(&KDVEHHQUHDVVLJQHGWRGHOLEHUDWLQJRQKXPDQVHFXULW\LVVXHVLQFOXGLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJHZRPHQ¶V
affairs and educational exchange, which are all important and necessary areas for regional cooperation 
but the role APEC plays in U.S. trade policy under the Obama administration, outside the speeches at 
least, is less clear.1302  $3(&KDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGDVµpotentially important in the promotion of liberalised 
international trade and investment in Asia, DQGSRVVLEO\WKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG¶1303  Potentially suggests 
                                                          
1297 TŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ‘ƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŚŝŶĂĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇ ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞŵƵƚƵĂůůǇďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂů
ƚƌĂĚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ? ĂŶĚ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŶŽƌŵƐ ŝŶ the areas of trade, 
international security and human rights, ?the G.W. Bush administration identified the APEC forum as a   ‘ready 
mechanism for pursuit of such initiatives ? to  ‘revitalise United States engagement in East Asia ? ?ŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞ
original. Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 1. 
1298  ?Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 1. 
1299 h^ ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “<Ƶƌƚ dŽŶŐ P dŚĞ &ƵƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ W ? ? dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ďefore the House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, October 14, 2009. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/10/130556.htm (accessed September 10, 2014). 
Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, took pains to stress the importance of ASEAN.  See State Department, 
 “Hillary Clinton: Beginning a New Era of Diplomacy: Remarks with ASEAN Secretary, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ? 
Indonesia, February 18, 2009. http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119422.htm 
(accessed September 10, 2014). 
1300 h^ ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? :ŽŚŶ <ĞƌƌǇ ?  “h ?^ ? sŝƐŝŽŶfor Asia-Pacific Engagement: Remarks at the East West 
ĞŶƚĞƌ ? ? ,ŽŶŽůƵůƵ ? ,ĂǁĂŝ ?/ ? ƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230597.htm  
(accessed May 15, 2016). 
1301 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “&ĂĐƚ^ŚĞĞƚ PĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? 
1302 Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 2. 
1303 Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, summary. 
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WKDW WKH SXUVXLW RI 86 JRDOV DQG LQWHUHVWV FDQQRW EH VLQJXODUO\ DFKLHYHG WKURXJK $3(&  $3(&¶V
approach to trade liberalisation through consensus and compromise does not reflect the Obama 
adminiVWUDWLRQ¶V high level, gold standard formalised approach to regional trade integration.  The 
concern is that its informal modus operandi and voluntary implementation of decisions make APEC a 
secondary and support forum through which the U.S. can actualise its vision for regional economic 




under the Obama administration.1304  While the Obama administration asserts that the TPP will provide 
the structure for the creation of an FTAAP in line with the long-term vision for regional economic 
integration under the APEC banner, the formal TPP negotiationV FRQWUDGLFW $3(&¶V FRQVHQVXV
approach to trade liberalisation.1305  The importance of the TPP to the administration as the platform for 
IRUPDOLVLQJ WKH GLUHFWLRQ RI UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF LQWHJUDWLRQ XQGHUOLQHV WKH VKLIW DZD\ IURP $3(&¶V
consensus- and voluntary-based approach as the best way to pursue the American regional goals of 
formalised, rules-EDVHGWUDGHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQDQGIXUWKHUVXEVWDQWLDWHV:DVKLQJWRQ¶VJHQHUDOO\SUDJPDWLF
attitude towards regional institutions in the pursuit of American interests.  Formalising U.S. relations 
with ASEAN, and the TPP negotiations, underline the pragmatic approach the U.S. takes in its dealings 
with multilateral institutions; the implication is that the U.S. uses numerous bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms, in and through which, to pursue its interests, according to need.   
 
(ii) ASEAN 
8QGHUWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUµDUXOHV-based regional order, a stable regional order 
RQ FRPPRQ UXOHV DQG QRUPV RI EHKDYLRXU WKDW DUH UHLQIRUFHG E\ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ UHO\ RQ µHlevating 
HQJDJHPHQWLQPXOWLODWHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVIURPWKH$6($15HJLRQDO)RUXPWRWKH(DVW$VLDQ6XPPLW¶1306  
The first official meeting between the U.S. and ASEAN, in which both parties formally agreed to 
broaden and deepen ASEAN-U.S. cooperation, occurred at the 2009 APEC conference.  The U.S. 
DFFHVVLRQWR$6($1¶V7UHDW\RI$PLW\DQG&RRSHUDWLRQKDVDOORZHGWKH86WRIRUPDOO\MRLQ$6($1
discussions, including on the potential creation of the FTAAP.1307  The administration has also used the 
U.S.-ASEAN summit as a forum to promote the rebalance strategy, build support for TPP, and address 
                                                          
1304  Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 8. 
1305 For instance, the 21 APEC countries do not negotiate FTAs.  It is a forum for dialogue and establishes non-
binding commitments towards the goals of open and free trade and investment in the region. 
1306 h^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ Ph ?^ ?sŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? 
1307 Martin, The 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meetings and U.S. Trade Policy, 8.   
 226 
 
issues such as the South China Sea.1308  The 2016 U.S.-$6($1VXPPLWZDVGHVFULEHGDVDµGLSORPDWLF
UHFUXLWLQJVHVVLRQ¶WROLQHXS6RXWKHDVW$VLDQVXSSRUWIRU86$VLD-Pacific policy.1309  The U.S. is also 
ZRUNLQJZLWK$6($1WRVWUHQJWKHQWKHUROHRIWKH($6µDVWKHSUHPLHURUJDQLVDWLRQIRUDGGUHVVLQJ
SROLWLFDODQGVHFXULW\LVVXHV«DQGEROVWHULWVLQVWLWXWLRQDODELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRFULVHV¶1310   
 
In a move to further embed the spread of neoliberal economic liberalisation across Southeast Asia over 
the longer term, the U.S. has actively encouraged ASEAN initiatives for economic cooperation and 
integration.  The U.S. was instrumental in the creation of the ASEAN common market ± a potential 
precursor to deeper economic union ± in December 2015.1311  Washington has also established a number 
of long-term economic programmes with ASEAN partners, including the expansion of U.S. private 
sector support for ASEAN connectivity efforts, supported by the U.S.TDA (Trade and Development 
Agency).  Washington has also committed to a U.S.-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework 
Arrangement (TIFA) in support of regional trade, investment and economic integration in areas as 
diverse as digital connectivity, healthcare, agriculture and consumer goods.  Playing to its corporate 
strengths, Washington has supported the creation of the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund with the aim of 
creating opportunities for U.S. businesses to participate in ASEAN infrastructure projects in the energy, 
transportation, and information and communications technology sectors.1312   
 
The Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative is a framework for economic cooperation 
designed to expand trade and investment ties between the U.S. and ASEAN, with the goal of creating 
new business opportunities and jobs.1313  Many E3 initiatives correspond to specific issues typically 
addressed in trade agreements.  Cooperation with ASEAN on technical barriers to trade and good 
regulatory practices specifically aims to move ASEAN towards the goals of facilitating trade, 
broadening market access, and promoting regulatory coherence, which the U.S. sees as essential 
building blocks towards the creation of a neoliberal-inspired regional economic order.1314  Consistent 
with its typical approach to trade and investment, U.S. operation in the E3 is reinforced by the U.S. 
$JHQF\IRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW¶V86$ID) µ$6($1&RQQHFWLYLW\IRU7UDGHDQG,QYHVWPHQW¶
                                                          
1308 ĞŶ KƚƚŽ ?  “h^ DŽǀĞƐ ƚŽ ŽŽƐƚ dŝĞƐ ŽŶ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ŽŽƌƐƚĞƉ ? ?Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2016. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moves-to-boost-ties-on-chinas-doorstep-1455192365 (accessed June 26, 
2016). 
1309 KƚƚŽ ? “h^DŽǀĞƐƚŽŽŽƐƚdŝĞƐŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŽŽƌƐƚĞƉ ? ? 
1310 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “&ĂĐƚ^ŚĞĞƚ PĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŽƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?
1311 KƚƚŽ ? “h^DŽǀĞƐƚŽŽŽƐƚdŝĞƐŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŽŽƌƐƚĞƉ ? ? 
1312 US State Department ?  “h ?^ ?Economic EngagemĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ^E ? ? :ƵůǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194962.htm (accessed May 15, 2016). 
1313 US State Department ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-ASEAN Expanded Economic EngageŵĞŶƚ ? ? )/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? October 9, 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215235.htm  (accessed May 15, 2016). 
1314 h^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E ? )/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? 
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(ACTI) programme.  The ACTI programme aims to facilitate trade through µimproving standards and 
systems, boosting the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises, accelerating the deployment of 
clean energy technologies and expanding IT connectivity.¶1315  The long-term goal of the E3 initiative 
with ASEAN is to build the capacity in Southeast Asia for future membership of the TPP and the 
FTAAP, and to structurally and institutionally embed the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific into 
a U.S.-dominated regional trade and investment architecture.1316   
 
Motivations for working with regional institutions  
Regional institutions are an essential forum through which the U.S. can promote its liberal trade agenda 
amongst other matters of interest to Washington.  By strengthening its strategic ties to the region through 
these instituWLRQVLWLVKRSHGWKDW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFUHGHQWLDOVDVDQ$VLD-Pacific resident power will be 
improved.  The U.S. still pursues a pragmatic approach to working with regional institutions in that they 
serve broader U.S. foreign policy aims, rather than being an end in themselves.  The signing of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN was an important diplomatic attempt to reshape 
perceptions of the U.S. regional posture, alongside the acceptance of the correlation between increasing 
intra-regional economic activity and increasing intra-regional political and diplomatic cooperation.  
Through its relationship with the Asian-centric ASEAN, the U.S. is pursuing a number of regional trade 
and investment initiatives including the E3 initiative to indirectly influence the interests of the 
developing countries through the provision of USAID.  The creation of an ASEAN-led East Asian 
Economic Community could become a free trade area and powerful Asian trading bloc to rival the free 
trade areas in North America and Europe.1317  The best course of action for Washington is to start the 
process of creating its own community following its rules, using its economic leverage created by the 
high standard TPP.  7KHDLPLVWREHJLQZLWKµDIHZZLOOLQJQDWLRQVRQERWKVLGHV of the Pacific to form 
DQXFOHXV)7$WKDWFRXOGEHH[WHQGHGWRRWKHU$3(&PHPEHUVODWHU¶1318  In this way, the U.S. influences 
the trade agenda of regional economic institutions and directly shapes the structural of regional trade 
through the TPP framework. 
 
The Obama administration initially set about renewing U.S. membership of the inclusive regional 
grouping, APEC, as a means to demonstrate :DVKLQJWRQ¶V $VLD-Pacific credentials, to exercise 
constrained leadership, and to regain regional consensus for its hegemony more broadly.  With the 
general preference in Washington to get legally-binding results, APEC does not currently offer the 
                                                          
1315 h^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-^EǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? )/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? 
1316 ĂŵƉďĞůůĂŶĚŶĚƌĞǁƐ ? “ǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?^ ? ‘WŝǀŽƚ ?ƚŽƐŝĂ ? ? ?-6. 
1317 Martin, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 17. 
1318 Martin, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, 19. 
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administration the short-to-medium term structural gains in trade it wants to see, because it operates on 
a non-binding basis for agreements.  Consequently, the administration shifted its focus to ASEAN, an 
exclusive Southeast Asian grouping, but with whom the administration has been able to negotiate the 
kind of formalised free trade agreements preferred in Washington because they are more likely to attain 
tangible results.  There is a constant bargaining process occurring between the U.S. and the regional 
states as to whether the renegotiated bargain should deliver an Asian-centric grouping that potentially 
excludes the United States, or one which is trans-Pacific in nature that includes the U.S. and other 
nations from the western hemisphere.1319   
 
There are obvious limitations to U.S. capacity to shape regional institutions.  The U.S. is able to 
indirectly influence the direction of regional institutions through its increased engagement but the 
capacity to directly transform the structure of regional Asia-Pacific trade is critical to the production of 
U.S. hegemony.  Therefore, institutions are complementary to U.S. structural power.  Similarly, the 
ability to dominate the narrative on regional trade closely operates with institutional and structural 
power. The debate over the competing visions for regional trade cooperation has hinged on the quality 
and coverage of each agreement on offer.  The quality of the TPP agreement has been regularly offset 
against the inferior scope of other regional FTAs being undertaken, which directs attention towards the 
U.S. domination of regional trade narrative.   
 
Productive Power: reproducing the neoliberal vision 
Through its discursive practices, the U.S. seeks to indirectly legitimise and delegitimise the social and 
economic customs of other states, as well as to determine what constitutes the identity of the actors in 
question.  The U.S. has a long history of exercising productive power in the Asia-Pacific, as a means to 
legitimise its hegemony, particularly associated with neoliberalism.  This section focuses on three 
examples of the ways in which the U.S. exerts control over dominating narratives concerning historical 
events and economic practices in the Asia-Pacific.  The first example focuses on the way in which 
Washington historically and consistently continues to discursively delegitimise state practices that are 
inconsistent with neoliberal vision, especially relating to state-owned enterprises.  The second involves 
WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH733DVWKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶RIIUHHWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVYLV-à-vis other regional 
initiatives; and the third concerns U.S. attempts to create an inclusive regional Asia-Pacific identity 
DURXQGWKH7336LQFHWKHLQWHQGHGRXWFRPHRIWKH733LVWRµORFNLQ¶$VLD-Pacific states to a process 
of economic restructuring compatible with neoliberal orthodoxy, these narrative processes are 
                                                          
1319 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, summary. 
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indicative of the interconnectivity between the exercise of American structural, institutional and 
productive power. 
 
(i) State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
The growth in stature of state-owned enterprises, symptomatic of statist models, is viewed as the biggest 
potential threat to market capitalism in the United States.1320  A Harvard Business School summit of 
IRXQGHUVDQG&(2VRIVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VWRSFRPSDQLHVLGHQWLILHGVWDWHFDSLWDOLVPDQGLWVVXSSRUWIRU
national champions among the ten most important threats to market capitalism.1321  In addition, 
managers of private firms often complain when they find their competitors heavily supported or 
subsidised by local governments.1322  Many of the practices associated with state capitalism, including 
the expansion of state-owned enterprises, present a challenge to the American vision of a market-driven, 
regionally-integrated Asia-Pacific economy.1323  Such practices among Asia-Pacific actors are 
consistently stigmatised in favour of practices that support global trade, and which reproduce the 
neoliberal vision.1324  The fixation with state-owned enterprises, represented as uncompetitive and 
XQIDLUWRWKRVHRSHUDWLQJKRQHVWO\LQWKHJOREDOIUHHPDUNHWV\VWHPKDVEHFRPHDµSHFXOLDUO\$PHULFDQ
SULRULW\¶1325  The popularity of state-owned enterprises amongst developed and developing Asia-Pacific 
nations is treated as a threat to American trade relations, and to the perception that the American version 
of neoliberalism is globally applicable.   
 
 
                                                          
1320 Bremmer asserts that the current wave of state capitalism in developed countries has come about as a result 
of the GFC and will recede as economic growth is restored. However, in a number of developing countries, state 
intervention in the economy is a rejection of the free market doctrine. /ĂŶƌĞŵŵĞƌ ? “^ƚĂƚĞĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵŽŵĞŽĨ
ŐĞ ? ?Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (2009): 40.  
1321 Aldo Musacchio and Sergio Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond 
(Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 16. 
1322 Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 16.  
1323 Bremmer describes four primary actors of state capitalism: national oil corporations, state-owned 
enterprises, privately owned national champions, and sovereign wealth funds. ƌĞŵŵĞƌ ?  “^ƚĂƚĞ ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ
Come of Age, ? 40.   
1324 ^ĞĞZŽĚŶĞǇ ?,Ăůů ?  “dŚĞ ŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ DŽĚĞů ? ?International Studies 
Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 71-99. 
1325 ,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶĂŝŵƐƚŚŝƐĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞĂƌĞworking with China to end unfair discrimination 
against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies, remove preferences for 
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĨŝƌŵƐ ? ?ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?/ƚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ^OEs operate 
any differently to private business when it comes to the pursuit of the national interest. Stephen Grenville, 




September 10, 2014). 
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7KH µGLVFXUVLYH GHPROLWLRQ¶ RI WKH $VLDQ 'HYHORSPHQW 0RGHOV E\ :DVKLQJWRQ DQG WKH ,0)
UHSUHVHQWLQJNH\SUDFWLFHVRIWKH$VLDQGHYHORSPHQWPRGHOVDVµFURQ\¶DQGµFRUUXSW¶JUHZRXWRIWKH
Asian Financial Crisis.1326  The use of such terms by key actors, and the way they were used to represent 
WKHµFDXVHV¶RIWKHFULVLVSURGXFHGDQGUHSURGXFHGWKHVRFLDOPHDQLQJVE\ZKLFKSDVWDQGFXUUHQWVRFLDO
and economic practices were legitimated or delegitimated.  The effect of this process was to re-create 
and reconstitute future conditions for strategic action.  By relating the cause of the AFC specifically to 
the Asian Development Models, Washington and IMF could determine which particular Asian social 
and economic practices and domestic institutional structures were deemed as good or bad according to 
the neoliberal strictures of the Washington Consensus.1327  With blame restricted to the supposedly 
homogenous practices of the Asian states, the spotlight on structural problems in capitalist practices 
was side-stepped.  As a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, Asian development models were 
normatively delegitimated whilst market-based processes and outcomes were simultaneously 
normatively privileged.1328  The attempt to discursively undermine the exclusively Asian economic 
development models was to have major implications for an Asian identity and the direction of regional 
trade during the 2000s, strengthening regional contestation of American hegemonic economic ideology.   
 
Far from moderating contestation of economic neoliberalism, American discursive practices 
strengthened the resolve of many East Asian states to continue developing their own distinctly Asian 
YHUVLRQVRIµVWDWHFDSLWDOLVP¶1329  While many Asian firms owned and operated by their governments 
were privatised between 1980 and 2000, state ownership and influence in those firms has not only 
continued, but has developed.1330  The specific patterns of business-government connections, corporate 
organisation and broader social relations that form an essential part of Asian political economies appear 
to be quite durable.1331  These models have not only proven themselves to be resilient but also 
modifiable, whereby the state works hand in hand with private investors in unusual governance 
arrangements.  The development of new varieties of state capitalism has differed from the basic version 
in which governments own and manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as extensions of the public 
                                                          
1326 ,Ăůů ? “dŚĞŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚDŽĚĞů ? ? ? ?-73.  
1327 ,Ăůů ? “dŚĞŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚDŽĚĞů ? ? ? ? ? 
1328 For instance, the response to the delegitimisation of South Korean social and economic practices had far-
reaching effects that impelled the South Korean state to engage in structural reform in response to the discursive 
redefinition of its developmental state. For President Kim Dae-jung, the neoliberal discourse had been so 
pervasive and intrusive prior to his political career that it had constituted his identity, interests, and practices.  
By 1998, Kim was also using the neoliberal narratives representing market processes and market outcomes as 
natural, neutral, and inevitable. ,Ăůů ? “dŚĞŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚDŽĚĞů ? ? ? ?-92. 
1329 Musacchio and Lazzarini ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ĂƐ P  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or by providing subsidized credit 
ĂŶĚ ?ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐƚŽƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ? Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 12.   
1330 Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 19.  
1331 ĞĞƐŽŶĂŶĚ/ƐůĂŵ ? “EĞŽ->ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚĂƐƚƐŝĂ PZĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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bureaucracy.  Instead, there are three models of state capitalism, in which the state can act either as (a) 
a majority investor, or (b) as a minority investor.1332  In the third, the state seeks to invest in companies 
± including ones not previously government-linked ± through public development banks, sovereign 
wealth funds, pension funds and other vehicles.1333   
 
Not only have various forms of state capitalism survived the Asian Financial Crisis, but they have also 
been adapted to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.  Instead of a smooth transformation into 
open economies, hybrid state capitalist regimes endure across the Asia-Pacific.  Not only is this the case 
in China, but also, more significantly, in some of the biggest economies in the Asia-Pacific, including 
Japan and India.  The attractiveness of the state-owned enterprise is not just a Chinese matter, although 
&KLQD¶VSUDFWLFHVDUHHVSHFLDOO\VLQJOHGRXWDVSDUWRIWKHEURDGHUµ&KLQDULVH¶QDUUDWLYH1334  Partly due 
to strong popular opposition, privatisation programmes have virtually ceased among developing nations 
since the early 2000s, including the largest developing BRICS economies ± a process which has 
accelerated since the 2008 global financial crisis.1335  In order to mitigate against the potential roll-back 
of economic liberalisation amongst G20 nations, the U.S. has specifically targeted SOEs as part of its 
neoliberal-GULYHQ733QDUUDWLYH7KLVLVDWUDGHGHDOWKDWVHHNVWRHQVXUHWKDWµSULYDWH>86@ILUPVKDYH
a fair shot at competing against state-RZQHG HQWHUSULVHV¶1336 DQG WR µOHYHO WKH SOD\LQJ ILHOG¶ IRU
American corporations that are competing against Asian SOEs that receive preferential treatment and 
government subsidies.1337  As a new feature of U.S. trade agreements, an important goal of the TPP is 
to tackle SOEs that increasingly engage in international trade, acting as investors in foreign markets; 
and the regulatory policies that lack transparency and create advantages for SOEs.1338   
 
While the regional challenge does not only originate from China, America has fewer economic and 
security leverage opportunities with its biggest regional competitor.  The result has been an increased 
                                                          
1332 The Chinese state favours the first approach: the state is typically a majority shareholder in 60% of stock 
market capitalised companies.  See Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 13. 
1333 In India, the Life Insurance Corporation, is an example of the third form, being the largest stock market 
investor in the country. See Economist,  “>ĞǀŝĂƚŚĂŶĂƐĂƉŝƚĂůŝst: State Capitalism Continues to Defy Expectations 
of its DĞŵŝƐĞ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    
1334 The number of SOEs among the 100 largest companies in the Fortune Global 500 list, ranking companies by 
revenues, went from 11 in 2005 to 25 in 2010. In 2005, there were no SOEs among the top 10, but by 2010, 
there were four ?:ĂƉĂŶ WŽƐƚ ,ŽůĚŝŶŐƐ ? ^ŝŶŽƉĞĐ ĂŶĚ ŚŝŶĂ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů WĞƚƌŽůĞƵŵ  ?ƚǁŽ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů Žŝů
companies), and State Grid (a Chinese utility). Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 15.   
1335 Musacchio and Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism, 18. 
1336 Barack ObĂŵĂ ? “dŚĞdWWǁŽƵůĚůĞƚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?EŽƚŚŝŶĂ ?>ĞĂĚƚŚĞtĂǇŽŶ'ůŽďĂůdƌĂĚĞ ? ? 
1337 dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ dƌĂŶƐ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership 
(accessed June 26, 2016). 
1338 See USTR on TPP, especially Chapter 17 on SOEs https://ustr.gov/tpp/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
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focus by the Obama administration on a narrative of µOHYHOling the playing field,¶ highlighting the 
capacity of trade projects like the TPP to move into sensitive areas including services, agriculture, and 
state-owned enterprises, forcing open such areas for American businesses amongst the smaller regional 
economies and regional allies.  The Obama administration has connected into the storyline originating 
LQWKHVDQGVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµFRUUXSWSUDFWLFHV¶RI62(VZKLFKZDVDLPHGDWLWVPDLQ
regional competitor, Japan, and to a lesser extent, the other Asian Tigers.  The most recent interpretation 
of this narrative has shifted focus to those particular elements of state capitalism that are hostile to 
American interests and ways of doing business, almost exclusively targeted at China.  With the 
prevalence of SOEs continuing to operate across East Asia, the Obama administration has taken a less 
coercive approach to managing this problem.  State-directed economies that protect domestic industries 
from foreign competition remain antithetic to the American understanding of free trade.  However by 
bundling its quest to reduce the number and capacities of SOEs into the TPP negotiations, the Obama 
administration has used its strategic leverage to bolster its structural power as a means to deflect regional 
resistance to the more extreme elements of its neoliberal ideology.  
 
(ii) 7KH733WKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶)7$ 
Linked to the SOE narrative, the second aspect of American productive power concerns the narrative 
of the superior TPP agreement emanating from Washington officials.  The TPP has been typically 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµDPELWLRXVEXWDFKLHYDEOH¶1339 DQGµDQunprecedented opportunity to update the rules of 
WKHURDG¶1340  The purpose of this is narrative is to highlight the ongoing benefits of membership of the 
U.S. economic order to subordinate states.  The twelve TPP partners, at varying levels of economic 
development, have successfully negotiated the opening of often domestically-sensitive areas to foreign 
competition, eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, 
establishing rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct investment and other economic 
activities, and DGGUHVVLQJ µQHZ DQG FURVV-FXWWLQJ LVVXHV¶ SUHVHQWHG E\ DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ JOREDOLVHG
economy.1341  Ambition and achievement are further consolidatHGWKURXJKUHIHUHQFHWRDµJROGVWDQGDUG¶
DJUHHPHQWPHDVXUHRIWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOHDFKLHYDEOHIHDW7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH733DVDµWZHQW\-
ILUVWFHQWXU\DJUHHPHQW¶DQGLWVUROHLQµHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHVWURQJHVWHQYLURQPHQWDODQGODERXUVWDQGDUGV
of any WUDGHGHDOLQ86KLVWRU\¶FRQYH\VWKHPHVVDge that previous agreements had more modest aims 
and that this framework is the model for all future agreements.1342  The message conveyed through the 
                                                          
1339 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 2.  See also Mike Froman, 
USTR, talking about the U.S. economic outlook, at the 2014 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, 22-25 
January 2014, Davos, Switzerland.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vy_b2XHy04I (accessed April 24, 2014). 
1340 DŝĐŚĂĞů&ƌŽŵĂŶ ? “EĞǁZules of the Road for the Global MĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs 93, no. 6 (2014): 112. 
1341 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 7. 
1342 &ƌŽŵĂŶ ? “EĞǁZƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞZŽĂĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?112. 
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American-led TPP infers its high quality, universal applicability, and ultimate superiority to any other 
agreement. The often challenging aspects of neoliberal restructuring are regarded as natural, neutral and 
inevitable.1343  
 
In contrast, the ASEAN-OHG5&(3WKHUHJLRQ¶VRWKHUIRUPDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWKDVEHHQ discursively 
differentiated from the TPP as an inferior, low quality, run of the mill agreement that will not produce 
the economic ambition suitable for the twenty-first century.1344  This subliminally negative 
representation of the RCEP as competition to the TPP is at odds with the view emanating from the 
RCEP-negotiating countries; nor is it supported by Washington think tanks.  They interpret RCEP and 
TPP as potentially complementary rather than competing models for regional integration, albeit 
approaching regional integration differently.1345  Washington insists that the TPP is the only agreement 
that can pave the way for its vision of an FTAAP, pushing the idea that the RCEP and TPP offer 
competing ideologies on what constitutes a free trade agreement.1346  The juxtaposition of the two 
LPDJHVPDLQWDLQVWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHVXSHULRULW\RI:DVKLQJWRQ¶VYLVLRQLQGLDPHWULFRSSRVLWLRQ
to the junior position of Asia-Pacific states, consolidating their existing positioning within the regional 
hierarchy.  The implicit assertion is that ASEAN, with its consensual approach, is incapable of 
QHJRWLDWLQJDQDPELWLRXVKLJKTXDOLW\DJUHHPHQWZLWKRXW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQGGLUHFWLRQ 
 
The choice is clear: the TPP reflects U.S. interests and values with universal application, offering 
protections for labour, the environment and IPR.  In contrast, alternative state capitalist and mercantilist 
models RIIHUµIRUFHGWHFKQRORJ\WUDQVIHUORFDOLVDWLRQVWDWHFKDPSLRQVDQGJHQHUDOLVHGSURWHFWLRQ.¶1347  
Consequently, state capitalisPµKDVintroduced massive inefficiencies into global markets and injected 
                                                          
1343 ^ĞĞ,Ăůů ? “dŚĞŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚDŽĚĞů ? ? ? ? ? 
1344 Given the overlap in membership of RCEP and TPP, it is questionable whether these can be competing 
models.  Dual members are Singapore, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand and Vietnam.  Both India 
and China are RCEP members whereas neither is in the TPP.  However, the TPP is more comprehensive than 
RCEP in what it seeks to achieve. It is generally agreed that both will define the parameters of economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific, although a consequence of the differences in membership between the two might 
ƐƉůŝƚ ^E ?  ^ĞĞ ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?  “dWW ĂŶĚ ZW PŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ Žƌ ŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ DŽĚĞůƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞh^ŚĂƐŶŽƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞKKZŝŶŝƚ ĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞůǇ
bilateral nature. It has, however, voiced strong objections to the AIIB, formally part of the OBOR initiative. This 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
1345 ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? “dWWĂŶĚZW PŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŽƌŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇDŽĚĞůƐŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞ
competing vision model is not supported by the Singaporean government, for example, which views both TPP 
ĂŶĚZWĂƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂŶĚĂƐ ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůůǇƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƉĂƌĂůůĞůƚƌĂĐŬƐĨŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ĞĞ
Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry ?  “&ĂĐƚ ^ŚĞĞƚ ŽŶ ZW ? ? ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.fta.gov.sg/press_release%5CFACTSHEET%20ON%20RCEP_final.pdf (accessed September 3, 2014). 
1346 Fergusson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 7. 
1347 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,  “ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ďǇ ŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ DŝĐŚĂĞů &ƌŽŵĂŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ^/^ ƐŝĂŶ
ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/speechestranscripts/2015/september/remarks-ambassador-michael (accessed June 26. 2016). 
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populist politics into economic decision-making¶1348  While the U.S is characterised by its forward 
WKLQNLQJSURJUHVVLYHDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVUHJLRQDOWUDGHWKURXJKWKH733&KLQD¶VPRGHl is characterised 
DVXQVXVWDLQDEOHDQGLWVVWUDWHJ\DVµVHOI-GHIHDWLQJ¶1349  According to the USTR, Mike Froman, Beijing 
is described as being slow to advance necessary structural reforms, vulnerable on its current path and 
protracted in addressing the commitments set out in the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) Congress in November 2013.  At this Congress, the CCP established objectives, including 
improving the transfer of technology, its IPR, and in its application of anti-monopoly laws and in any 
meaningful reform of the SOE sector.1350  China is frequently represented in binary opposition to the 
United States in relation to economic strategies.  Choosing the China option means a preference for 
opacity, not openness, self-serving Chinese interests, not regional ones, and an unworkable economic 
model in the longer term.1351       
 
(iii) Creating an inclusive Asia-Pacific identity 
The third aspect of American productive power originates from the representation of the TPP as an 
agreement between twelve like-minded states on both sides of the Pacific, who are working towards the 
same ambitious, far-reaching trade goals without any degree of overt coercion from Washington.  Such 
language of inclusivity, represents the TPP members as having compatible high standards, climbing to 
the top, rather than a race to the bottom that is more typical of outmoded twentieth century FTAs.  Who 
would not want to be in such a club? 
µ,W¶V DERXW JHQHUDWLQJ JURZWK IRU RXU HFRQRPLHV DQG MREV IRU RXU SHRSOH E\
unleashing a ZDYHRIWUDGHLQYHVWPHQWDQGHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS,W¶VDERXWVWDQGLQJ
up for our workers, or protecting the environment and promoting innovation.  And 
LW¶VDERXWUHDFKLQJIRUKLJKVWDQGDUGV«¶1352 
%\GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJWKRVHµZLOOLQJ¶WRPDNHWKHnecessary structural adjustments, from those who remain 
on the periphery, who are unwilling or as yet unable, to reach the international rules of trade (including 
China), the binary oppositions of superiority and junior positions are reinforced.1353   
 
                                                          
1348 ƌĞŵŵĞƌ ? “^ƚĂƚĞĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵŽŵĞƐŽĨŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
1349 KĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?^ ? dƌĂĚĞ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?  “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the CSIS Asian 
ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
1350 KĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ dƌĂĚĞ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?  “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the CSIS Asian 
ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽ&ƌŽŵĂŶ ? “EĞǁZƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞZŽĂĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?
1351 KĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ dƌĂĚĞ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?  “Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the CSIS Asian 
ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?
1352 US State DĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ Ph ?^ ?sŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
1353 WƌĞƐƚŽǁŝƚǌ ? “dŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐWŝǀŽƚ ? ?
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The TPP discourse constitutes the identities of Asia-Pacific actors incorporating the U.S. (and other 
Pacific-IDFLQJVWDWHVLQWKH$PHULFDVLQFRQWUDVWWRDQH[FOXVLYHO\µ$VLDQ¶LGHQWLW\7KH733DFWVDV
channel through which the U.S. seeks to normatively legitimise American social and economic practices 
as synonymous with Asia-3DFLILFRQHVWRFUHDWHDVLQJOHVKDUHGLGHQWLW\EDVHGRQµVKDUHGHFRQRPLF
LQWHUHVWV¶ DQG SHUKDSV PRUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ µFRQVLVWHQW«ZLWKRXU VKDUHG YDOXHV¶1354  Secretary Kerry 
characteristically invoked the shared identity, appealing to a shared common understanding of the TPP 
as being: 
µEXLOWRQ LWVPHPEHUV¶VKDUHGFRPPLWPHQW WRKLJKVWDQGDUGVHOLPLQDWLQJPDUNHW
access barriers to good and services, addressing new, 21st century trade issues and 
respect for a rules-based economic framework.  We always envisioned the TPP as 
a growing platform for regional economic integration.  Now, we are realising that 
YLVLRQ«7KHJURZLQJ733LVDOUHDG\DPDMRUVWHSWRZDUG$3(&¶VYLVLRQRIDUHJLRQ-
wide Free Trade Area of the Asia-3DFLILF¶1355 
This is an Asia-Pacific vision for regional integration rather than an Asian-centric one.  The key words 
herHDUHµZHDOZD\VHQYLVLRQHG¶GHQRWLQJ WKDW$PHULFD¶VYLVLRQis a regionally shared vision, whilst 
also emphasising that AmeriFD¶V OHDGHUVKLS ZLOO EH WKH GULYLQJ IRUFH IRU WKH SODWIRUP RI UHJLRQDO
economic integration.  Maintaining regional consent for this shared vision is essential to the production 
of the normative foundations of U.S. hegemony.   
 
The tentative steps towards the development of an Asian-centric identity can also be linked back to the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  For the U.S., the goal is to work towards the shaping of the idea of what the 
Asia-Pacific region is, in geographic and regional identity terms, thereby ensuring its inclusion and 
reinstating its credibility as an Asia-Pacific state and regional leader.  The White House has turned the 
TPP into a gauge by which its leadership in the region is measured.1356  It is portrayed as the most 
important element of the rebDODQFHDQGRIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRVHWWKHUXOHVUDWKHU
than allowing this role to transfer to China.  However, the challenge for the U.S. is to create an American 
Asia-Pacific identity that is domestically acceptable and regionally viable.  By focusing on the 
geopolitical significance of the trade deal, the Obama administration has less successfully convinced 
Congress and the domestic audience of the tangible benefits of the TPP.  
                                                          
1354 h^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ Ph ?^ ?sŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
1355 U^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ PU.S. Vision for Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?See also dŚŽŵĂƐŽŶŝůŽŶ ? “dŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĂ WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ƚŽ ƐŝĂ ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? EĞǁ zŽƌŬ ? DĂƌĐŚ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-
president-united-states-an (accessed November 17, 2015).  
1356 Economist ? “dŚĞ ? ?-Year Itch: America Struggles to Maintain its Credibility as the Dominant Power in the 




This chapter has explored the ways in which the rebalance reflects the U.S. exercise of institutional, 
structural, and productive power to produce its hegemony.  The goals, simply put, are to maintain the 
American-led structure of regional economic governance, which facilitates American privileges and 
preserves the prevailing hierarchy, and allows the United States to shape the direction of an inclusive 
economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific.  The structure of regional economic governance should 
continue to fit in with the structure of global economic governance as expressed through the rules-based 
multilateral financial institutions, including the IMF, World Bank and WTO.1357  The existing financial 
and economic structures and institutions through which U.S. hegemony is expressed, are resilient and 
adept at deflecting opposition and redirecting challenges in ways that strengthen its legitimacy.1358  
Furthermore, the privileged position of the dollar as the currency of last resort, and the infusion of U.S. 
preferences in the international financial institutions enhance WKH PDLQWHQDQFH RI LWV :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
structural advantages in the global economy.1359 
 
However, there is more competition from other actors within the U.S. economic order in the Asia-
3DFLILFZKLFKKDVEHHQPDQLIHVWHGVLQFHWKHVLQUHJLRQDOFRQWHVWDWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VQHROLEHUDO
economic ideology, leading to a regional debate over whether the regional economic order should be 
exclusively Asian-centric or inclusively Asia-Pacific-centric.  This debate has been accentuated by the 
ULVHRI&KLQDDVWKHUHJLRQ¶VODUJHVWHFRQRPLFSRZHUZKLFKKDVFRPSHOOHGWKH86WRVWHSXSWRWKH
challenge.  The American-led regional free trade agreement, the TPP, reflects the Obama 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V ambition to further embed its rules and standards for global and regional trade and 
finance in the Asia-Pacific, with particular focus on Southeast Asia.  In addition to the TPP, the U.S.-
led E3 initiative, in partnership with ASEAN, aims to provide the economic building blocks for eventual 
membership to the TPP for those Southeast Asian states unable to currently qualify for the TPP.  E3 
provides the framework to draw these developing states into the liberal economic order, gaining their 
consent to the asymmetric economic bargain and leading to eventual internalisation of its dominant 
ideas in the process.   
 
                                                          
1357 ĞƐƉŝƚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůůǇƌŝƐŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ
disproportionately controlled by the advanced economies. The World Bank is led by an American, the IMF by a 
European and the ADB by a Japanese national. HannaŚtƵƌĨ ? “tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?/D&ĂŶĚ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ PdŚĞ>ŽŶŐ
tĂŝƚĨŽƌŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 31, 2016. 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/08/31/World-Bank-IMG-and-ADB-leadership-The-long-wait-for-
change.aspx (accessed September 1, 2016). 
1358 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 145. 
1359 Norrlof, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ, 6. 
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The TPP is positioned with two other visions for the eventual regional Free Trade Agreement for the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) ± the ASEAN-OHG5&(3DQG&KLQD¶VOne Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative.  
Each framework represents the different interests, economic norms and types of order visualised by the 
initiators.  The U.S.-led TPP promotes itself as a high standard, rules-based FTA that is more extensive 
in its desire to influence domestic labour and service standards than the other regional initiatives.  The 
ASEAN-led RCEP has a less ambitious remit than the TPP; has a bigger membership, including China, 
,QGLD DQG -DSDQ DQG ZKLFK UHSUHVHQWV $6($1¶V DWWHPSWV WR LQIOXHQFH WKH GLUHFWLRQ RI UHJLRQDO
economic order.  The RCEP deal is yet to be finalised, missing its initial December 2015 deadline and 
in all likelihood is KLQGHUHGE\DODFNRIVKDUHGYLVLRQRQZKDWDµFRPSUHKHQVLYHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VKRXOG
entail.1360   
 
The other framework for regional order is the China-led OBOR initiative which operates on a largely 
bilateral basis.  While Washington has not indicated any major concerns ZLWK&KLQD¶V OBOR initiative 
± despite its extension into Europe and potentially, into Latin America ± the Obama administration was 
WURXEOHGE\%HLMLQJ¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDn alternative regional infrastructure and investment bank, the 
AIIB.  Open to members in April 2015, the AIIB was viewed as a prospective competitor to the 
American-influenced Asian Development Bank.  Global interest in the AIIB came as a surprise to 
Washington (and to Beijing), which had tried, in vain, to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB.  U.S. 
concerns aside, Beijing has shown itself capable of establishing a development bank that is willing to 
work with, and not as a rival to, other MDBs within the existing structure of global economic 
governance.  While the alternative initiatives to regional economic order-building challenge aspects of 
$PHULFD¶VGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQLQUHJLRQDORUGHULWLVQRW\HWFOHDUZKHWKHU&KLQD¶VXOWLPDWHJRDOLVWR
FKDOOHQJH$PHULFD¶VRYHUDOODGYDQWDJH LQ WKHJOREDOHFRQRP\, or if the aim is to goal is to achieve 
greater decision-making roles for China and other rising powers, whilst maintaining the overall liberal 
economic structure.      
 
U.S. capacity to exert its institutional and structural power are compelling, yet there has been less 
success for the U.S. in dominating narratives supporting its neoliberal vision.  There continues to be 
significant contestation of the benefits of neoliberalism from within the U.S. and across the region.  
While the Obama administration has hinged $PHULFD¶V IXWXUHSURVSHULW\VHFXULW\DQG LWV Uole as an 
Asia-Pacific power on the ratification of the TPP, it has failed to convince domestic American audiences 
of the domestic benefits of TPP.  Hillary Clinton, the Democrat presidential nominee, distanced herself 
                                                          
1360 ,ĞWŝŶŐ ? “Three Relationships for RCEP MemďĞƌƐƚŽWŽŶĚĞƌ ? ?ĂƐƚƐŝĂ&ŽƌƵŵ ?August 2, 2016. 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/02/three-relationships-for-rcep-members-to-ponder/ (accessed 
September 3, 2016). 
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from this trade initiative that she had initially supported as Secretary of State.  This is despite the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRGHVFULEHWKH733DV$PHULFD¶VVLQJOHJUHDWHVWRSSRUWXQLW\WRGHWHUPLQHWKH
future of regional trade instead of China.   
 
Many Asia-Pacific states remain unconvinced of the advantages of embracing the American version of 
neoliberalism in its entirety.  Yet many have been willing to sign up to the TPP as a way to bind the 
U.S. into the regional economic order, whilst also accepting the extension of American influence into 
their domestic economies as part of this deal.  Nevertheless, many regional states continue to keep their 
options open through membership of the ASEAN-led RCEP.  There has been a degree of scepticism 
towards the longevity of the rebalance post-Obama across the Asia-Pacific.  As is argued here, the 
production of U.S. hegemony is dependent upon its social relations and consent-building activities.  
Consequently, the Obama administration has pursued multilateralism, not protectionism, as a way to 
challenge the regional perception that the U.S. is an unreliable trade partner.  Committing to a leadership 
UROH LQ UHJLRQDO WUDGHGHYHORSPHQWV WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VJRDOKDVEHHQ WR OLPLW WKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI
Chinese and ASEAN alternatives in realising the FTAAP.  Furthermore, as the main proponent of the 
UHJLRQ¶V $VLD-Pacific, rather than Asian-centric identity, the TPP is an example of :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
capacity to influence the normative foundations of regional orderLQOLJKWRI&KLQD¶VH[SDQGLQJUHJLRQDO








The role of rising powers in the rebalance strategy 
 
The Sino-U.S. relationship is the centre point that dictates the future of the Asia-Pacific regional order.  
India also plays a critical role in the rebalance. SSHFLILFDOO\LGHQWLILHGDVDµYDOXHGVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHU¶WR
the United States, India has the potential to hold a significant role in the organisation and mobilisation 
RI:DVKLQJWRQ¶V UHJLRQDOVHFXULW\HVSHFLDOO\PDULWLPHDJHQGDDVGHWHUrence against &KLQD¶Vrising 
naval power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.1361  The Obama administration has typically responded 
to expanding Chinese and Indian regional influence in contrasting ways, using American power 
differently to co-opt and socialise India and China into accepting the existing regional order.  The 
YDULDWLRQLQVWUDWHJ\LVLQODUJHSDUWGULYHQE\LGHQWLW\DQGQDUUDWLYHSURFHVVHVRIµRWKHULQJ,¶dominated 
by WKHZD\LQZKLFK µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶KDVRYHU WLPH acquired negative connotations, in contrast to the 
VHHPLQJO\PRUHEHQLJQµ,QGLD¶VULVH¶&RYHUDJHRIWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶IRUWKHVWDELOLW\RI
regional order is well-developed in IR literature.  This chapter draws attention first, to the way in which 
µ&KLQD¶VULVH¶has been negatively assimilated and narratively reproduced, and second, to the effects of 
this narrative RQ$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\DVSDUWRIWKHontological security-seeking processes 
that seek to understand and define the boundaries of this complex relationship between the U.S., as the 
incumbent hegemon, and China, as the rising regional power.               
   
This chapter considers the different ways in which the U.S. attempts to garner consent for its order by 
rising powers.  By focusing on various applications of American power, this chapter examines 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V attempts to dominate the shape and direction of these critical relationships, as the Obama 
administration engages in extremely complex bargaining processes with both rising powers to maintain 
$PHULFD¶V UHJLRQDO KHJHPRQLF VWDWXV  Highlighted here is the mixture of coercive and consensus-
building approaches used by the U.S. to reproduce its hegemony.  The discussion of compulsory power 
focuses on how the U.S. uses its military power to deter China from asserting its naval power in the 
East and South China Seas.  The U.S. also attempts to define WKHUHJLRQDOUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶VLVODQG-
building activities and territorial claims through regional institutions, exerting indirect influence over 
ASEAN.  Attention is then directed towards the American response to ChLQD¶VOne Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) initiative.  Developed and led by President Xi, this extensive regional development project, 
encompassing land and sea elements, and supported by the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure and 
,QYHVWPHQW%DQN$,,% LVFRQVLGHUHG WKHFHQWUHSLHFHRI&KLQHVHFODLPV WRUHVWUXFWXUH WKHUHJLRQ¶V
                                                          
1361 /ŶĚŝĂǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇŶĂƚŝŽŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ‘ǀĂůƵĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞWĞŶƚĂŐŽŶ ?Ɛ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?h^





and attempting to secure its own hegemonic identity as part of this process.  
 
U.S.-China relations during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations  
Since the normalisation of Sino-U.S. relations commenced in the 1970s, structuring and defining the 
relationship with Beijing has presented a recurring challenge to Washington bureaucrats.  American 
attitudes towards China have typically reflected a desire to see China develop into a liberal democratic 
state.  This goal was deemed possible once China started to open up to the international political 
economy from the 1980s, and gained membership of the WTO, World Bank and IMF in the early 2000s.  
Early post-Cold War administrations assumed that contact with the world, and the U.S. in particular, 
would facilitate China¶V socialisation and co-option into the American-led order.1362  This assumption 
has continued to shape U.S. China strategy.   
 
The vacillation in the China strategies of post-Cold War U.S. administrations demonstrates the enduring 
complexity of Sino-U.S. relations.  The violent crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in June 
KDGPDMRULPSOLFDWLRQVIRU$PHULFD¶V domestic political environment, between those supporting 
FRQWDLQPHQW DQG WKRVH DGYRFDWLQJ HQJDJHPHQW DQG DFFRPPRGDWLRQ WR VXSSRUW &KLQD¶V HYHQWXDO
transition to liberal democracy.1363  The Tiananmen Square incident accentuated the difficulty for post-
Cold War administrations concerning µLGHDWLRQDO WUDQVLWLRQV DQG LGHQWLW\ GLOHPPDV¶1364  creating 
GRPHVWLFµGLVFXUVLYHWHQVLRQV¶DQGLQFRKHUHQFHLQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶V&KLQDSROLF\1365  In 1992, the G.H.W. 
Bush administration granted China an extension to its existing most favoured nation (MFN) status, 
which Democrats criticised for its disregard for human rights.  However, the same MFN policy was 
lauded by the Democrat administration a few years later.1366  
 
                                                          
1362 ArthuƌtĂůĚƌŽŶ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂDĞƐƐ P,ŽǁdŚŝŶŐƐŝĚNot Turn Out as PůĂŶŶĞĚ ? ?Orbis 59 no. 2 (2015): 144. 
1363 ĨƚĞƌdŝĂŶĂŶŵĞŶ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐǁĂƐƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƉĂƌŝ ŚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
restructuring of the world order. By the time the Chinese Communist Party began to re-engage in international 
affairs, it was confronted with a post-Cold War western-dominated international hierarchy that promoted 
democracy and the market economy. Yong Deng, ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ƚƌƵŐŐůĞĨŽƌ^ƚĂƚƵƐ PdŚĞZĞĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 271. 
1364 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵŝŶh^ĂƐƚƐŝĂŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Pacific Review 17, no.1 (2004): 62. 
1365 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 20. 
1366 James Mann, About Face P,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƵƌŝŽƵƐZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŚŝŶĂĨƌŽŵEŝǆŽŶƚŽůŝŶƚŽŶ (New 
York: Random House, 2000), 263. 
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The incoming Clinton administration, riding the wave of the public mood towards China, accused the 
preceding G.H.W Bush administration of indulging the Chinese leadership, and initially adopted a hard 
line stance towards Beijing.  Applying DµFDUURWDQGVWLFN¶DSSURDFK WRXQGHUSLQ&KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQWR
liberal state and market economy, Clinton linked trade with pressure on China in relation to human 
rights, assuming that trade would be the appropriate leverage that would give the U.S. the advantage 
over China and allow it to embed U.S. values into all dealings with Beijing.1367  By 1994, when it 
EHFDPH HYLGHQW WKDW &OLQWRQ¶V OLQNDJH EHWZHHQ &KLQD¶V PRVW IDYRXUHG QDWLRQ 0)1 VWDWXV DQG LWV
human rights strategy was in disarray, the administration switched course.  The Clinton administration 
IRFXVHG RQ HQJDJHPHQW DQG EXLOGLQJ D µFRQVWUXFWLYH VWUDWHJLF SDUWQHUVKLS¶ ZLWK &KLQD, without 
achieving the anticipated concessions from Beijing.1368 
 
Given the divergent positions in Washington on how to interact with Beijing during its inevitable 
transition to global power status, neither the G.H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993) nor the 
succeeding Clinton administration (1993-2001) were able WRFRQVWUXFWµUHOLDEOHVWUDWHJLFH[SODQDWLRQV¶
for their policies.  Consequently, American China policy swung between rapprochement, and 
competition with sanctions, in response to the transforming strategic environment, events in China, and 
its growing power.1369  &RPSHWLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHµ&KLQDWKUHDW¶UH-emerged in the 1990s, uniting 
DURXQG µKXPDQ ULJKWV IUHH WUDGH SROLWLFDO UHIRUP HFRQRPLF WUDQVIRrmation and military 
PRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶1370  The challenge of developing a coherent policy or exercising leadership in a rapidly 
changing strategic environment in the 1990s gave significant voice to China sceptics, who, suspicious 
RI&KLQD¶VLQWHQWLRQVFLWHGWKe non-existent political reform and military modernisation as indication 
RI&KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJFRQWHVWDWLRQRI$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\1371  :LWKWKHQDUUDWLYHFRQFHUQLQJ&KLQD¶V
potential threat to U.S. hegemony broadly developing along security and economic lines, the 
XQIDPLOLDULW\ZLWK&KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJJUHDWSRZHULGHQWLW\ also cUHDWHGXQFHUWDLQW\IRU$PHULFD¶VUROHDV
global power and regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
 
                                                          
1367 zŝĚǁĂƌĚzĂŶŐ ? “>ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŚĂŶŐĞ PŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚe Bill Clinton and 
'ĞŽƌŐĞt ?ƵƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚŚŝŶĂ ? ?Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 3 (2010): 435. 
1368 Yang ? “>ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ?32-433. 
1369 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 20.   
1370 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 20.   
1371 Current voices of dissent continue to blame ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƵŶŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚĞĚ
rise. See Michael Pillsbury ?,ƵŶĚƌĞĚzĞĂƌDĂƌĂƚŚŽŶ PŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞƌŝĐĂĂƐƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂů
Superpower, (New York: Henry Holt, 2015); and for a study by former government officials, see Robert D. 
Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis,  “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, ? Council on Foreign Relations, Special 
Report No. 72, March 2015. 
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U.S.-China relations during the G.W. Bush administration (2001-2009) 
The incoming G.W. Bush administration set out to reinforce U.S. power, seeking to confront the 
challenges that regional powers could present to the United States.1372  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review identified WKH SRWHQWLDO IRU UHJLRQDO SRZHUV µWR GHYHORS VXIILFLHQW FDSDELOLties to threaten 
VWDELOLW\ LQUHJLRQVFULWLFDOWR86LQWHUHVWV¶1373  In the Asia-Pacific, the 2001 QDR highlighted the 
SRVVLELOLW\RI µDPLOLWDU\FRPSHWLWRUZLWKD IRUPLGDEOH UHVRXUFHEDVHZLOOHPHUJH LQ WKH UHJLRQ¶1374 
although China is not specifically mentioned.  The QDR also highlighted 86FRQFHUQVWKDWµWKHGHQVLW\
of U.S. basing and HQURXWHLQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶ZDVOHVVGHYHORSHGLQWKH$VLD-Pacific than it was in other 
areas of critical interest.1375  As a means to expand and entrench U.S. hegemony, the strategy sought to 
reorient U.S. Asia-Pacific policy and prioritise existing U.S. regional allies.  The attacks on September 
  GXO\ VKLIWHG WKH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SROLF\ SULRULWLHV DQG WKUHDW SHUFHSWLRQV1376  
Despite :DVKLQJWRQ¶V strategic mistrust of Beijing, especially concerning Taiwan, there was effective, 
if transactional, cooperation between the two during the two G.W. Bush terms, focusing on mutual 
interests relating to non-conventional threats such as terrorism, leading to the expansion of bilateral 
cooperation to prevent the proliferation of WMD.   
 
The relative stability of U.S.-China relations was achieved through the numerous economic and political 
dialogues that were established to create an institutional framework for developing communication and 
cooperation, and for managing disputes.1377  In December 2006, Treasury Secretary Paulson established 
a U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, at the time the most senior regular dialogue held between 
the two.  High level visits and exchanges of working level officials, and military-to-military relations 
were also resumed.1378  There was cooperation on anti-terror initiatives, and cooperation via the Six-
3DUW\7DONVWRPDQDJH1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUSUROLIHUDWLRQ7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDYRLGHGFRQIURntation 
                                                          
1372 dĂŽtĞŶǌĂŽ ? “Sino WAmeƌŝĐĂŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞŽƌŐĞt ?ƵƐŚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?American Foreign Policy 
Interests 26, no. 5 (2004): 409. 
1373 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: September 30, 2001), 4. 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1374 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 4. 
1375 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 4. 
1376 Yang,  “>ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1377 Philip Stephens,  “ƵƐŚ ?Ɛ ŚŝŶĂ WŽůŝĐǇ DĂǇ KƵƚůĂƐƚ ,ŝƐ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ? ?Financial Times, June 6, 2008. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f6d5306-4399-11dd-842e-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3giid9J8B (accessed August 
13, 2015). 
1378 The U.S. suspended mil-to-mil contacts and arms sales following the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989. 
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act (1990) enacted into law sanctions against China for arms sales and other 
cooperation. Mil-to-mil contact improved under Clinton, with high points noted in 1997-1998 and 2000 but 
relations were marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. Mil-to-mil contacts remained limited 
ƵŶƚŝů ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ' ?t ?ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ ?ŽŶĂůĚZƵŵƐĨĞůĚ ?ǀŝƐŝƚĞĚŚŝŶĂ ?ǁŝƚŚĨƵůů
mil-to-mil interactions resuming in 2006. Shirley A. Kan, US-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: October 27, 2014), 1-3.  
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with Beijing by avoiding the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and G.W. Bush formally indicated in 2003 
WKDWWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRSSRVHGµDQ\XQLODWHUDOGHFLVLRQE\HLWKHU&KLQDRU7DLZDQWRFKDQJHWKHVWDWXV
TXR¶1379  In addition, there was heavy investment by U.S. companies in China and increased Chinese 
investment in the United States.1380  However, the relative stability only concealed, rather than 
reconciled, the key issues and tensions in the bilateral relations that were reawakened by the global 
financial crisis in 2007-2008. 
 
 
Deteriorating U.S.-China relations: 2009-2011 
 
The strategy of the incoming Obama administration in November 2008 initially sought to maintain 
consistency in Sino-American relations, and to avoid the swings in approach that typically occurred 
between outgoing and incoming administrations.  The Obama administration believed that the 
pendulum approach had undermined cooperation with Beijing on critical global issues.1381  From the 
G.W. Bush administration, President Obama inherited several mechanisms for high-level engagement 
LQHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDODQGVWUDWHJLFDUHDV7KHQHZDGPLQLVWUDWLRQLQWHQGHGWRGHYHORSµEURDGHUDQG
GHHSHU¶ UHODWLRQV IRFXVLQJ RQ DUHDV RI FRPPRQ JURXQG DQG WR FRQWLQXH WR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH ELODWHUDO
relationship.  It hoped to secure greater cooperation from China on its agenda priorities including the 
global financial crisis, climate change, and the threat from Iranian and North Korean nuclear 
proliferation.  Nevertheless, the relationship had also grown signLILFDQWO\PRUHµFRPSOH[PXOWLIDFHWHG
and intertwined,¶ DV&KLQD¶Vposition in the global economy became more pronounced following the 
global financial crisis (GFC).1382  There was an expectation on the part of the incoming Obama 
administration that China should take on more responsibility in global affairs.   
 
The elevated position that China had assumed in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy during the G.W. Bush 
administration initially appeared to be sustained by the Obama administration, as it endeavoured to 
manage the global financial crisis in partnership with China.  7KHµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶SDUDGLJP
developed by the G.W. Bush administration was maintained, although absent from the terminology in 
                                                          
1379 Brian Knowlton,  “Bush warns Taiwan to keep Status Quo: China Welcomes U.S. SƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?New York Times, 
December 10, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/10/news/10iht-policy_ed3_.html  (accessed June 4, 
2016).  
1380 Kerry Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, updated March 17, 2008), 1. 
1381 Jeffrey A. Bader, KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ PŶ /ŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?Ɛ Account ŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐŝĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 21. 
1382 Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, 1. 
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official commentary.1383  This gave consistency to the DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vmessage that China should take 
on a larger role of responsibility in the international arena, in concert with the United States.  From the 
&KLQHVHSHUVSHFWLYHWKH*)&YDOLGDWHGLWVYLHZWKDW$PHULFD¶VRYHUZKHOPLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFH
was waning, and also demonstrated the end of the primacy of the Washington Consensus as the 
universal model of economic development.1384  2EDPD¶Vapproach was construed as an indication that 
U.S-China relations ZHUHWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSULRULW\DQGWKHUHZDV talk of a G2 condominium with 
China.1385  While Beijing also rejected the notion of a G2 condominium,1386 2EDPD¶V&KLQDSROLF\
implied DFFHSWDQFHRI&KLQD¶V DGYDQFLQJ VWDWXV LQJOREDO DIIDLUV, through shared responsibilities on 
matters of global significance.1387   
 
Their collective efforts to resolve the global financial crisis gave a false impression of the amicable 
condition of U.S.-China relations, and emphasised the growing tension in how each viewed the identity 
of the other.1388  During her visit to Beijing in February 2009, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, implied 
the bilateral relationship needed strengthening, while Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi spoke of 
µLPSRUWDQW FRPPRQ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV RQ PDMRU LVVXHV¶ ± in the Asia-Pacific and globally.  <DQJ¶V
suggestion concerning the global financial crisis was that the U.S. and China should collaborate and 
lead.1389  7KHH[SHFWDWLRQRQERWKVLGHVZDVWKHRWKHUZRXOGµPDNHWKHJUHDWHUFRQWULEXWLRQWRJOREDO
                                                          
1383 /Ŷ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶ ĚĞƉƵƚǇ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ŽĨ ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ZŽďĞƌƚ ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ? ĂůůĞĚ ĨŽƌ ŚŝŶĂ ƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă  ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ‘ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚĂŵĞŵďĞƌ W it would work with us to sustain 
the international system that has enabled ŝƚƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚ ?ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ? “Whither China: From Membership to 
ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm (accessed August 13, 2015). The significance of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶŵŽƌĞĚĞƉƚŚůĂƚĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? 
 
1384 tƵ yŝŶďŽ ?  “hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů /mplications of ƚŚĞ 'ůŽďĂů &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?The Washington 
Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 155. 
1385 ĂǀŝĚ ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ?  “dŚĞ ŚŝŶĂ ĂǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ KďĂŵĂ ? ? ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ ŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
2009. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/11/china-shambaugh (accessed August 13, 2015). 
Brzezinski suggested that the U.S. and China create an informal G2, paralleling U.S. relations with those of the 
EU and Japan to resolve the global financial crisis. See ďŝŐŶŝĞǁƌǌĞǌŝŶƐŬŝ ? “dŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨdǁŽƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĐŚĂŶŐĞ
ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?Financial Times, January 13, 2009. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d99369b8-e178-11dd-afa0-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3hNEVQjtI (accessed August 13, 2015); ^ĞĞZŝĐŚĂƌĚ ?ƵƐŚ ?  “The United States and 
China: A G-2 in the Making? ? ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ?1, 2011. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/10/11-china-us-g2-bush (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1386 Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao rejected the notion of a G2 on the ground that China does not align 
with any single country or bloc. Rather, agreements on global issues should be decided by all states. China Daily, 
 “tĞŶ PŚŝŶĂŝƐĂŐƌĞĞƐƚŽ^Ž-Called G2, ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?http://blog.chinadaily.com.cn/thread-653216-1-
1.html (accessed September 2, 2016). 
1387  zĂŶyƵĞƚŽŶŐ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝŶĂ-h^ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 
(2010): 279-280. 
1388 The complexity of discursively shaping the bilateral relationship, and producing identities is discussed further 
in the section on productive power. 
1389 US ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “Hillary Rodham Clinton: Toward a Deeper and Broader Relationship with China. 
ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ zĂŶŐ :ŝĞĐŚŝ ? ? ĞŝũŝŶŐ ? ŚŝŶĂ  ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119432.htm  (accessed August 13, 2015). 
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HFRQRPLFUHFRYHU\«DQGWR>JOREDO@ILQDQFLDOUHIRUPLQIDYRXURIWKHRWKHU¶VLQWHUHVWV¶1390  In an effort 
to downplay talk of a potential G2, at the first upgraded Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 
2009, Obama summed up the U.S. position by indicating that,  
µThe relationship between the U.S. and China will shape the 21st century, which 
makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world.... If we advance [our 
mutual] interests through cooperation, our people will benefit and the world will be 
better off²because our ability to partner with each other is a prerequisite for 
progress on many of the most pressing global challenges.¶1391   
Obama¶Vreference to the U.S.-China relationship as important as any bilateral relationship did not infer 
a G2.  The implication is that other relationship could be just as important.  President Obama distinctly 
avoided classifying it the most important bilateral relationship.  During the dialogue, Obama indicated 
that he and President Hu agreed to a commitment to build a framework for cooperation, and not that 
such a relationship already existed.  
 
&KLQD¶V DVSLUDWLRQV WR UHSRVLWLRQ LWVHOI LQ WKH FHQWUH RI WKH $VLD-Pacific regional order, and its 
FRQWHVWDWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VDVVXPHGULJKWWRUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\ZHUHPDGHFOHDUWR3UHVLGHQt Obama 
during his first visit to China in November 2009.  This visit to Beijing stood in contrast to the deference 
and respect Obama had received during his other overseas trips.1392  The customary bilateral 
negotiations, forming the framework for a presidential visit prior to the event, did not occur, suggesting 
that the White House had little leverage over its Chinese counterparts, in view of the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the U.S. economy.  7KH GHPHDQRXU WRZDUGV 2EDPD UHIOHFWHG %HLMLQJ¶V
perception that American financial mismanagement had caused the global financial crisis.  Moreover, 
it appeared that Washington UHIXVHGWRDFFHSW&KLQD¶VULVLQJVWDWXVRQ&KLQD¶VWHUPVDQGZDVDWWHPSWLQJ
WR VKDSH WKH WHUPV RI &KLQD¶V ULVH DQG JOREDO UHVSRQVLELlities.1393  %HLMLQJ¶V KLJKO\ HIIHFWLYH VWDJH
PDQDJHPHQWRI2EDPD¶VILUVWYLVLWWR&KLQDLQ1RYHPEHUZDVDQXQDQWLFLSDWHGVLJQDOIURP%HLMLQJ
that it could, and would, push back against international, especially American, pressure.  The limits of 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VOHYHUDJHZHUHHYLGHQW2EDPD¶V ability to advance his global agenda were hampered, 
                                                          
1390 zĂŶ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝŶĂ-US RĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1391 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “Remarks by the President at the U.S.-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ?
2009. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-uschina-strategic-and-economic-
dialogue (accessed June 5, 2016). 
1392 The WSJ refĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐƚƌŝƉĂƐĂ ‘ƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐbetween a weakened U.S. power and a China 
that senses its time has come. ?Obama was pressed on economic policy, largely ignored on human rights and 
restricted in his efforts to reach out to the Chinese populace.  Jonathan Weisman, Andrew Browne and Jason 
ĞĂŶ ?  “KďĂŵĂ ,ŝƚƐ Ă tĂůů ŽŶ ,ŝƐ sŝƐŝƚ ƚŽ ŚŝŶĂ ? ?Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2009. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125857743503654225 (accessed August 12, 2015). 
1393 zĂŶ ? “dŚĞ/nstability of China-h^ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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and Beijing successfully pushed Obama into endorsing Chinese positions on issues important to it.1394  
At home, the conciliatory tone towards Beijing was criticised by conservatives as over-accommodation, 
especially on issues with no consensus between the two.1395     
 
A second problem in U.S-China relations opened up early on in the Obama administration as a result 
of its approach to the rest of the Asia-Pacific.  The *:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vfocus on combatting 
terrorism in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, when coupled with the planned draw-down of 
U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, may have been viewed in Beijing as a sign of a reduction in 
U.S. interest in East Asia, tacitly conceding the region to Chinese influence.1396  The strategic space that 
opened up as a result, enabled China to concentrate on asserting its own regional influence in line with 
its economic development goals.1397  Anxious to reduce the trade imbalance with China by improving 
trade and diplomatic ties in the region, the Obama administration made its Asia-Pacific strategy a central 
priority, seeking to re-establish and salvage ties across the region that it viewed as damaged by the G.W. 
BusKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VIRFXVRQWKHJOREDOZDURQWHUURU7KHUH-assertion of U.S. hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific, reinforced by numerous visits to the region by key administration officials, received negative 
attention in Beijing.  Beijing had come to view the change in the balance of U.S.-China relations in its 
favour as indication that U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific was on the decline. 
 
A series of troublesome issues in 2010 and 2011 further upset U.S-China bilateral relations following 
3UHVLGHQW2EDPD¶V2009 visit to Beijing.  In their separate memoirs, administration insiders, Jeffrey 
Bader and Hillary Clinton, noted that Chinese officials attempted to derail the main talks at the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, by holding a closed session with Brazil, 
South Africa and India.1398  The Chinese goal was to dilute, or stop the kind of agreement the U.S. was 
seekingZKLOHDOVRGHOLEHUDWHO\DWWHPSWLQJWRXQGHUPLQHWKH86DQGVSHFLILFDOO\3UHVLGHQW2EDPD¶V
position in shaping the global climate agenda.1399  Bilateral relations worsened in 2010, deemed a low 
point in U.S-China relations under the Obama administration, and for Chinese diplomacy in general.1400  
                                                          
1394 Beijing also quashed discussions of contentious issues, including human rights.  Obama did not gain any 
move from Beijing on Iran, or currency issues during this meeting. HeůĞŶĞŽŽƉĞƌ ? “ŚŝŶĂ,ŽůĚƐ&ŝƌŵŽŶDĂũŽƌ
/ƐƐƵĞƐ ŝŶ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ sŝƐŝƚ ? ? New York Times, November 17, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/asia/18prexy.html (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1395 Bader, KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ, 79. Prior to the trip to Beijing, Obama had postponed his meeting with the 
ĂůĂŝ>ĂŵĂƐŽĂƐŶŽƚƚŽŽĨĨĞŶĚŚŝŶĞƐĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?ŽŽƉĞƌ ? “ŚŝŶĂŚŽůĚƐĨŝƌŵŽŶŵĂũŽƌŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶKďĂŵĂ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚ ? ? 
1396 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “The US WChina Relationship and Asia-Pacific Security ? ?Asian Security 1, no. 3 (2005): 223. 
1397 'ŽŚ ? “The US WChina Relationship and Asia-Pacific Security ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1398 dŽƚŚĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƵƌůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ?KďĂŵĂǁĂƐĂůĞƌƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƐĞĐƌĞƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ
attended whilst it was in session. Bader, KďĂŵĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ, 65-66 and Clinton, Hard Choices, 492. 
1399 Bader, Obama ĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZise, chapter 6. 
1400 In addition to worsening relations with the US, Chinese diplomatic relations with Australia, Japan, South 
<ŽƌĞĂ ?^EĂŶĚ/ŶĚŝĂĂůƐŽĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚĞĚ ?ůĂƌŐĞůǇĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞ
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Asserting a more muscular posture, President Obama approved $6.4 billion in defensive arms sales to 
Taiwan in January 2010, after which Beijing suspended bilateral military-to-military exchanges.1401  
President Obama also welcomed the Dalai Lama in February 2010, a meeting that had been postponed 
IURPWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUWRDYRLGWHQVLRQVZLWK%HLMLQJSUHFHGLQJ2EDPD¶VYLVLW$OEHLWDORZNH\
meeting in the White House Map Room rather than the OvaO2IILFH%HLMLQJ¶VUHVSRQVHZDVVZLIW1402  
Tensions boiled over into the international sphere in May 2010, with Beijing diluting UN sanctions 
against North Korea and Iran.1403   
 
In a series of other tit-for-WDWPDQ°XYUHVGXULQJDQGWashington criticised Beijing for the 
deterioration of human rights, the trade surplus with the U.S., &KLQD¶VFXUUHQF\PDQLSXODWLRQF\EHU-
attacks by the PLA, Chinese violations of intellectual property rights (IPR), PLA-N activities in the 
South and East China Seas, and %HLMLQJ¶VSURWHFWLRQRI1RUWK.RUHDDIWHU WKHVLQNLQJRI WKH6RXWK
Korean naval ship, Cheonan, in March 2010, and 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V shelling of the South Korean island 
Yeonpyeong in November 2010.  Beijing raised its own concerns about U.S. activities, including U.S. 
LQWHOOLJHQFHFROOHFWLRQDQGVXUYHLOODQFHLQ&KLQD¶V((=86DQG52.QDYDODQGDLUPLOLWDU\H[HUFLVHV
in the Yellow Sea following the Cheonan incident, and +LOODU\&OLQWRQ¶VVWDWHPHQWVRQWKHGLVSXWHVLQ
the South China Seas at the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum.1404  In August 2011, Beijing called for 
WKH86WRµFXUHLWVGHEWDGGLFWLRQ¶DQGOLYHZLWKLQLWVPHDQVDVDPRYHWRSXWSUHVVXUHRQWKHGROODU
as the global reserve currency.1405  As relations further deteriorated, in November 2011, Hillary Clinton 
and President Obama announced the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific, drawing attention to the military 
aspect of the strategy.1406 
 
                                                          
South and East China Seas. David ShĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “^ƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐhŶƐƚĂďůĞh^-China Relations? Prospects for the Hu 
Jintao ViƐŝƚ ? ? ƌŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? :ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? ?http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/01/us-
china-shambaugh (accessed June 4, 2016). 
1401 ,ĞůĞŶĞŽŽƉĞƌ ?  “h ?^ ?ƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨdĂŝǁĂŶƌŵƐ ^ĂůĞƐŶŐĞƌƐŚŝŶĂ ? ?New York Times, January 29, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html?_r=0  (accessed June 4, 2016). 
1402 Obama has met with the Dalai Lama twice  W in 2010 and 2016. ,ĞůĞŶĞŽŽƉĞƌ ? “Obama Meets Dalai Lama, 
ĂŶĚ ŚŝŶĂ /Ɛ YƵŝĐŬ ƚŽ WƌŽƚĞƐƚ ? ? New York Times, February 10, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/world/asia/19prexy.html?_r=0 (accessed June 4, 2010). 
1403 David E. Sanger and Mark Landler,  “DĂũŽƌWŽǁĞƌƐ,ĂǀĞĞĂůŽŶ^ĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ/ƌĂŶ ? ?New York Times, May 
18, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/19/world/19sanctions.html (accessed June 4, 2016). 
1404 ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “^ƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐhŶƐƚĂďůĞh^-China RĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
1405 ĂǀŝĚ ĂƌďŽǌĂ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ dĞůůƐ h^ /ƚ DƵƐƚ  ‘ƵƌĞ ŝƚƐ ĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽĞďƚ ? ? ?New York Times, August 6, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/business/global/china-a-big-creditor-says-us-has-only-itself-to-
blame.html?_r=0  (accessed June 26, 2016).  
1406 The response to the rebalance strategy received a mixed response in China. Hardliners perceived the strategy 
as the containment of China, while more moderate voices did not predict a significant worsening of U.S-China 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ^ĞĞ DŝĐŚĂĞů  ? ^ǁĂŝŶĞ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ůŝƚĞ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ?^ ? WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WŝǀŽƚ ? ?China 
Leadership Monitor 38, no. 1 (2012): 1-26. 
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The ambiguity in managing U.S-China relations is animated by the perpetual uncertainty in Washington 
concerning China¶VXse of its rising capabilities, and a lack of consensus on whether the U.S. should 
HQJDJHDQGFRRSHUDWHRUFRQWDLQ&KLQD¶VFKDOOHQJH1407  The dominating perception in Washington was 
that &KLQD¶V LQFUHDVLQJO\ DVVHUWLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ between 2009 and 2011 was brought about by 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V SROLF\ FKRLFHV  $FFRPPRGDWLRQ KDGQRW OHG WR &KLQD¶V FR-option but had increased 
%HLMLQJ¶VGLVVHQWRI$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\LQWKH$VLD-Pacific.1408  This acknowledgement pressed the 
:KLWH+RXVHLQWRUHDVVHVVLQJ&KLQD¶VLQWHQWLRQVLQthe Asia-Pacific.  As a result, tKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
VWUDWHJ\ EHFDPH PRUH DFWLYH LQ VWUHQJWKHQLQJ LWV UHVSRQVH WR &KLQD¶V open contestation of U.S. 
hegemony, revealed by its SHUFHLYHGDVVHUWLYHQHVVLQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW&KLQD6HDV&KLQD¶VODFNRI
cooperation on global issues including climate change, and the half-hearted condemnation of North 
.RUHD¶VPLVVLOHWHVWVLQ$SULO0D\1409  3HUFHLYLQJWKHRULJLQVRIUHJLRQDOWHQVLRQVWROD\DW&KLQD¶V
GRRUFRPSRXQGHGE\%HLMLQJ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRREVWUXFW the U.S. global agenda, Washington needed an 
HPSKDWLFUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶VUHYLVLRQLVP)XUWKHUPRUH&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVGHPDQGHG:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
reassurance of its regional allies and partners of U.S. intentions to remain committed to underpinning 
regional security, and that ultimately, it intended to remain the regional hegemon.1410   
 
The strategic rebalance and U.S.-China relations 
Holding the central position in the East Asian security complex, the U.S. is able to maintain order by 
deterring the use of force through the system of bilateral alliances and partnerships.  The U.S. also 
determines the parameters of the disputes in the East and South China Seas by defining and prioritising 
what it considers to be essential regional security public goods, such as freedom of navigation, 
maintaining the adherence to international rules and norms by regional actors, and mobilising support 
                                                          
1407 Dumbaugh, China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, 2. Khalilzad notes that the 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ŝƐ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ Ă ƉŽƐƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƐ Ă  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĂŶĚ
appropriately respond to negative behaviour in the short tĞƌŵ ? ? ,Ğ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ Ă ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŽĨ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƉůƵƐ
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƌĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?<ŚĂůŝůǌĂĚ ? “ŽŶŐĂŐĞŚŝŶĂ ? ? ?-2. 
1408 Beijing had supported the G.W. ƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛwar on terror and the war in Afghanistan, even though 
this would increase the American presence in Central and South Asia, creating a Chinese strategic disadvantage.  
The Chinese government had also been relatively quiet in its opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Beijing 
felt it had accommodated US activities, even when critical principles such as sovereignty were affected. Since 
China had adjusted to, and accommodated, the U.S., Beijing expected adjustment and accommodation in return.  
^ĞĞ : ? DŽŚĂŶ DĂůŝŬ ?  “ƌĂŐŽŶ ŽŶ dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ P ƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ dĂĐƚŝĐĂů 'ĂŝŶƐ ĂŶd Strategic Losses after 11 
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ?Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): 252 W ? ? ? ?ƌĞŶĚĂŶdĂǇůŽƌ ? “h^-China Relations after 
 ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ P>ŽŶŐŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƌDĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŽĨŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, 
no. 2 (2005): 179 W199. 
1409 See Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Michael E. O'Hanlon, ĞŶĚŝŶŐ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ PĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Policy (Washington: Brookings Focus Book, 2012),  ? ? ?DĂƌŬ>ĂŶĚůĞƌ ? “KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ:ŽƵƌŶĞǇƚŽdŽƵŐŚĞƌdĂĐŬŽŶĂ
ZŝƐŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ? ?New York Times, September 20, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/politics/obamas-
evolution-to-a-tougher-line-on-china.html (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1410 Indyk et al, Bending History, 43.  
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around them.1411  7KHDELOLW\WRQHJRWLDWHWKHWHUPVRILWVUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\UHVWVXSRQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
capacity to continue to provide public goods, through its security guarantees, to maintain a stable 
regional order.  An important element underpinning its regional hegemony is its capacity to manage 
(but not necessarily to resolve) regional conflicts.1412  Conflict in the South China Sea could have 
systemic impact on regional peace and stability, especially if it reduces access to sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) or militarises them.1413  This draws in the United States, whose authority as 
regional hegemon relies upon its capacity to manage these conflicts, to keep the sea lines open, and to 
deter major threats to regional security that may alter the status quo.   
 
&KLQD¶VDVVHUWLYHQHVVin the East and South China Seas threatened to unnerve friends and allies and to 
inhibit U.S. freedom of air and maritime navigation.  Its non-compliance with international norms might 
also FRQVWUDLQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDELOLW\WRSURMHFWSRZHULQWKHUHJLRQLIOHIWXQFKHFNHG1414  This would 
undermine American preponderance, and its continuing ability to provide for regional stability, both of 
which underpinned its regional hegemony.  The rebalance strategy announcement in November 2011 
VLJQDOOHGWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHDIILUPDWLRQRILWVUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\The emergent strategy 
also notified %HLMLQJRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶V determination to maintain its pre-eminent position in the Asia-
Pacific.  The rebalance was constructed as a necessary rebalancing of U.S. attention to deepen American 
credibility in the region, to advance U.S. interests, exploit opportunities, and reassure allies and friends 
of U.S. staying power and commitments.1415  :DVKLQJWRQ¶Vassurances to Beijing that the strategy was 
QRW DQ DWWHPSW WR µFRQWDLQ HQFLUFOH RU FRXQWHUEDODQFH¶ &KLQD placed the Sino-U.S. relationship in 
central position.1416  :DVKLQJWRQ¶VpushEDFNDJDLQVW&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJLQIOXHQFHDQGFRQWHVWDWLRQRI
its regional hegemony has involved the exercise of different modes of power in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
Compulsory Power: Deterring China in the East and South China Seas  
Due to the significance of maritime geography to East Asian states in trade and security terms, the East 
and South China Seas are an essential arena for political interaction but also increasingly an arena for 
conflict.  Regional states seek to assert their sovereign rights as a way to define national power and 
status, which has been combined with the lack of clear maritime boundaries and different interpretations 
                                                          
1411 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 24. 
1412 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 73. 
1413 The Korean Peninsula also has systemic impact on regional security. See Goh, The Struggle for Order, 24. 
1414 ^ǁĂŝŶĞ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚůŝƚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WĂĐŝĨŝĐWŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? 
1415 Manyin, Pivot to the Pacific? executive summary. 
1416 ŽŶŶŝĞ'ůĂƐĞƌĂŶĚƌŝƚƚĂŶǇŝůůŝŶŐƐůĞǇ ? “h ?^ ?-China Relations: U.S. Pivot to Asia Leaves China off ĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?




of the normative tools that determine them.1417  The potential to exploit oil and gas reserves in the East 
and South China Seas provides an additional motivation to assert territorial and maritime continental 
shelf claims through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1418  Territorial disputes 
focus on issues of sovereignty and on definitions of boundaries and overlapping exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ).  In the East and South China Seas, the application of UNCLOS is problematic, with 
disputes focusing on the ownership of inhabited and uninhabited islands and submerged rocks, EEZ, 
and undersea continental shelves, claimed by up to six countries in the South China Seas, and three in 
the East China Seas.1419   
 
In the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel island groups are claimed by China and Taiwan (similar 
claims), Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.  In the East China Sea, China, Japan and 
Taiwan all claim the Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  Figure 2 shows the positioning 
RIWKHGLVSXWHGLVODQGVLQWKH(DVWDQG6RXWK&KLQD6HDVLQUHODWLRQWRWKHFODLPDQWV¶WHUULWRULHV2WKHU
disputes exist between Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and between China and South Korea 
in the Yellow Sea.1420  U.S. involvement in the East and South &KLQD6HDV¶GLVSXWHVKDVEHFRPHPRUH
pronounced since 2010, as both Washington and Beijing assert their mutually contradictory interests in 
these strategically important arenas.  While the U.S. has no territorial claims, and does not have an 
official position on the sovereignty disputes, it does oppose the use of coercion and force in the 
promotion of sovereignty claims, it supports the use of international law to resolve or manage disputes 
and has a particular interest in maintaining freedom of navigation for military and commercial vessels.     
                                                          
1417 AleƐƐŝŽWĂƚĂůĂŶŽ ? “^ĞĂWŽǁĞƌ ?DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞŝƐƉƵƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐ^ ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƚĂŶĚ^ ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ ĞĂƐ ? ?
The RUSI Journal 158, no. 6 (2013): 48. UNCLOS does not differentiate between the types of vessels open to 
 ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨŶĂǀŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?China, and others, dispute that military vessels should enjoy the same rights 
as commercial ones under FON. This is open to interpretation. See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
December 10, 1982. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
(accessed June 26, 2016). 
1418 UNCLOS was open to ratification in 1982 and came into force in 1994. The US is a signatory but has never 
ratified the convention. China is an UNCLOS signatory but has an opt-out from the dispute resolution chapters. 
UNCLOS entitles littoral states to a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea, a continental shelf to a maximum 350 
nm through a natural prolongation of land territory and an EEZ of up to 300 nm, extending sovereign rights but 
allows for international freedom of navigation (FON) along sea lines of communication (SLOC). See UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982. 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1419 UNCLOS provisions do not extend to decisions on ownership of the landmasses. In addition, UNCLOS 
determines that only islands have an EEZ. Many features in the Spratly chain in the South China Sea do not 
qualify as islands since they are submerged at high tide and are not capable of sustaining human life and 
economic activity. Some claimants have resorted to island-building activities to bolster their territorial claims. 
^ĞĞ ?DŝĐŚĂĞůDĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĂŶĚh^WŽůŝĐǇKƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 
4 (2013): 183. 
1420 Ben Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, May 14, 2014), summary. 
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(i) The East China Sea disputes 
The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and similar territorial disputes occurring 
in the South China Sea are a product of historical claims, the spoils of war and a legacy of colonial 
RFFXSDWLRQ-DSDQ¶VFODLPWRWKHILYHXQLQKDELWHG6HQNDNX'LDR\XIHDWXUHVGDWHVEDFNWRLWVDQnexation 
of these islands in 1895,1421 with a lease granted to a Japanese businessman to establish a fish processing 
plant.1422  China and Taiwan claim the islands were not uninhabited when Japan annexed them and were 
used by the Chinese from the 16th century.1423  The PRC also claims that the islands should have been 
returned to Chinese control in 1945.1424  At the end of World War Two, the U.S. assumed military 
control of Okinawa, of which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were also part.  When the U.S. returned 
Okinawa to Japanese control in 1971, administrative control of these uninhabited islands was also 
handed back to Japan as part of the Okinawa Prefecture.  The competing claims to the islands have 
created political crises between Tokyo and Beijing since the 1970s, frequently linked to nationalist 
claims on both sides.1425   
 
In addition to the conflicting sovereignty claims over the islands, Japan and China also have overlapping 
claims to continental shelves in the East China Sea and, thus to the resources, including oil, gas and 
metals, which can be found there.  This aspect of the dispute involves their separate interpretations of 
the entitlement to continental shelves stemming from the different baselines.1426  Since the East China 
Sea is less than 400 nautical miles (nm) wide around the gas fields, Chinese and Japanese EEZs 
overlap.1427  The Chunxiao/Shirakaba and Tianwaitian/Kashi gas fields, located in the centre of the East 
China Sea, have become focal points for tension between the two,1428 despite the historical track record 
                                                          
1421 Since the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki did not make direct reference to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan 
was not legally required to return them to China after World War Two. China disputes this historical claim. 
1422 Michael DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ PdŚĞWůĂĐĞtŚĞƌĞ^ŝŶŽ-US Conflict Could OĐĐƵƌ ? ?American Foreign 
Policy Interests 36, no. 2 (2014): 101. 
1423 dŚĞWZ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽƚŚĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵdĂŝǁĂŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞWZ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĐůĂŝŵ ?'ŝǀĞŶdĂŝǁĂŶ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ WZ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌ-cut. Mark J. Valencia,  “ƐŝĂ ? ƚŚĞ >Ăǁ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĂ ĂŶĚ
International RĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 271.  
1424 Mark J. sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ P,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?^ƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚtĂǇƐ&ŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ?Asia Perspective 38, no. 
3 (2014): 195. 
1425 James Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea: Bridging Troubled Waters 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 42-43. 
1426 sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?:ĂƉĂŶƵƐĞƐƚŚĞ^ĞŶŬĂŬƵ ?ŝĂŽǇƵŝƐůĂŶĚƐĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐĞůŝŶĞĨŽƌŝƚƐ
continental shelf and EEZ claims in the East China Sea. China argues that the East China Sea continental shelf is 
ĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƐŚĞůĨĂŶĚĨĂůůƐƵŶĚĞƌŚŝŶĂ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ
^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1427 DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? ? ? ?
1428 China and Japan claim rights to exploration in the disputed fields. China argues the disputed area lies 
between the Japan-claimed median line and the Okinawa Trough  W the limit of the Chinese continental shelf 
ĐůĂŝŵ ?ǀĞŶĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůĞĚůŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐďƵƚ:ĂƉĂŶ
draws entitlement to the resources because the fields extend into the east side of the meridian line and into its 
EEZ. Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea
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of cooperation in areas including fisheries exploitation and conservation, and hydrocarbon resource 
exploitation, and limited cooperation regarding maritime surveys.1429  In April 2007, China announced 
it had started producing gas from the disputed Tianwaitian/Kashi field, and that it was ready to begin 
production from the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field.  Japanese protestation prompted a subsequent 
agreement between the two on joint exploration of oil and gas in the disputed areas, with the view to 
WUDQVIRUPLQJWKH(DVW&KLQD6HDLQWRDµ6HDRI3Hace, Cooperation and Friendship¶ in June 2008.1430  
&KLQD¶VDJUHHPHQWWRWKHFRQFHVVLRQRIµMRLQWGHYHORSPHQW¶RIWKH&KXQ[LDR6KLUDNDEDJDVILHOGZKLFK
falls within the Chinese side of the Japanese-claimed meridian line boundary, was in exchange for the 
inclusion of areas within the Japanese zone for joint development.1431   In January 2009, Japan claimed 
that China has violated the spirit of the East China Sea agreement by continuing development of the 
Tianwaitian/Kashi field and was siphoning off gas from the Japanese side of the line.  China responded 
WKDW WKH 7LDQZDLWLDQ.DVKL ILHOG IHOO ZLWKLQ &KLQD¶V XQGLVSXWHG MXULVGLFWLRQ  :KLOH ERWK DJUHHG WR
accelerate the implementation of the June 2008 agreement, there was no consensus on whether China 
could continue to drill in disputed areas, including the Tianwaitian/Kashi field.1432  No progress has 
been made on the interpretation and implementation of the joint development agreement. 
 
The current status of the dispute rests on two separate but interconnected issues: territorial ownership 
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and maritime sovereignty claims relating to the continental shelf and 
the EEZ and ownership of resources.1433  Tensions started to re-escalate around 2009 and the situation 
was exacerbated in September 2010, following the announcement by a Japanese conservative politician, 
Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the islands for the Tokyo municipality, primarily, it seems, to gain the attention 
of Japanese domestic voters.1434  The Japanese government claimed its intention to buy the islands was 
WRHQVXUHWKH\GLGQRWIDOOLQWRWKHKDQGVRI-DSDQHVHQDWLRQDOLVWV%HLMLQJ¶VUHVSRQVHZDVWKDW-DSDQ
had violated the agreement reached by Deng Xiaoping and the Japanese foreign minister in 1978 to 
GHIHUWKHLVODQGV¶VRYHUHLJQW\LVVXHXQWLODGDWHLQWKHIXWXUH1435   Under the premise that Japan had 
disrupted the status quo with the island purchase, Beijing filed a claim with UNCLOS concerning the 
extended continental shelf, deployed China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels to waters near the 
                                                          
1429 Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, 4. 
1430 Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, 20.  
1431 sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1432 sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1433 Taiwan (Republic of China) also claims territorial ownership, an EEZ and continental shelf in the East China 
^ĞĂ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽƚŚĞ^ĞŶŬĂŬƵ ?ŝĂŽǇƵŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞƐŝŶ ŝƚƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽǀĞƌdĂŝǁĂŶ ?dŚĞ ? ? ? ?:ĂƉĂŶ-
Taiwan fisheries agreement means TaiwaŶŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ
agreement stipulates that Taiwanese fishing boats cannot enter the 12nm territorial waters around the islands. 
sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “The East China Sea Disputes ? ?199-200. 
1434 WĂƚĂůĂŶŽ ? “^ĞĂWower, Maritime Disputes and the Evolving Security ŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƚĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƐ ? ?52. 
1435 DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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disputed islands and increased its Coast Guard presence in the East China Sea.1436  Japan has also 
increased its Coast Guard presence in the disputed waters.  Both view the exercise of their maritime 
jurisdiction in the disputed areas of the East China Sea as of vital strategic interest.  The near-continuous 
SUHVHQFHRI&KLQHVHQDYDOYHVVHOVDQGPDULWLPHSUHVHQFHLQDGGLWLRQWR-DSDQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWWRUHVLst 
this presence, has increased the prospect of confrontation between the Chinese and Japanese vessels.1437  
 
In March 2009, the harassment of the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed ocean surveillance ship, by five 
Chinese vessels in the South China Sea pressed the U.S. into taking a tougher position on Chinese 
activities in both the South and East China Seas.  Intensified Chinese air and naval activity in the East 
and South China Seas thus coincided with the diplomatic signals emanating from Washington during 
the summer of 2010.  Washington promised a greater U.S. regional military presence to protect freedom 
RI QDYLJDWLRQ RSHUDWLRQV )2123 LJQRULQJ %HLMLQJ¶V GHVLJQDWLRQ RI 86 )21 DFWLYLWLHV DV
illegitimate.1438  The intention was to remind the region, especially China, that the U.S. is a serious 
strategic regional player.  Consistent with its policy in the South China Sea, the U.S. asserts no territorial 
claims, nor holds a position on the sovereignty issues in the East China Sea.1439  However it has inserted 
itself directly into the sovereignty issues of the East China Sea, through its support of Japan, in its 
repeated declaration that protection of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands falls within the remit of the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Defence Treaty since 2012.1440  During 2012, to assert its role as regional stabiliser and 
preponderant naval power, the U.S. Navy sent two naval battle groups and a Marine Corps task force 
through the East China Sea.1441  While contradicting its own position that China and Japan should 
resolve their issues diplomatically, rather than resorting to coercion or the use of force, the decision to 
deploy American naval power was an assertion of U.S. hegemony.  Affirming its conflict management 
and regional stabiliser role, a U.S. naval presence was deemed to miWLJDWH -DSDQ¶V FRPSXOVLRQ WR
increase its naval/air deployment to the area and deter China from taking any further action.1442   
 
                                                          
1436 &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ/d>K^ƌƵůŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚŝŶĂŽŶ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞŝƐŶŽǁĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐƉĂƚƌŽůƐŽǀĞƌ
the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands in what it says will become regular practice as a means to defend its claims in the 
East China Sea. <ĂŶĂ /ŶĂŐĂŬŝ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ sĞƐƐĞůƐ ZĂŝƐĞ dĞŶƐŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ :ĂƉĂŶ ? ?Financial Times, August 8, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6458f1e6-5d2a-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT (accessed August 
27, 2016). 
1437 Manicom, China, Japan and Maritime Order in the East China Sea, 166.  
1438 The U.S. and China have fundamentally opposing positions on what military, especially naval, activities are 
ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌhE>K^ ?DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? ? ? ?
1439 Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, 3. 
1440 h^ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ ?  “>ĞŽŶWĂŶĞƚta: Joint Press Conference with Secretary Panetta and Japanese 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ DŽƌŝŵŽƚŽ ? ? dŽŬǇŽ ? :ĂƉĂŶ ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5114 (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1441 sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1442 sĂůĞŶĐŝĂ ? “dŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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%HLMLQJ¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ 1RYHPEHU  WR XQLODWHUDOO\ DQQRXQFH DQ (DVW &KLQD 6HD $LU 'HIHQFH
Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping -DSDQ¶VZLWKWKHµYDJXHWKUHDWRIDFWLRQVE\WKH3/$LQWKH
event of non-FRPSOLDQFH¶ZDVVHHQDVDQDJJUHVVLYHDFW1443  While the establishment of the ADIZ is 
not an illegal move, it significantly increases the risk of military accidents, which has a destabilising 
effect on regional relations.1444  &KLQD¶V DFWLRQV DUH DOVR REVHUYHG IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI LWV
GHYHORSPHQW DV D UHJLRQDO SRZHU DQG UHVSRQVLEOH JOREDO DFWRU  )URP :DVKLQJWRQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH
therefore, the ADIZ was a clear sign that Beijing was attempting to unilaterally change the status quo 
in the East China Sea.1445  Disregard for international law and resorting to intimidation and coercion in 
relation to the islands in both China Seas, is considered as evidence that China is not prepared to play 
by the rules.  In 2013, both Obama administration secretaries of state, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, 
had attempted to exert pressure on Beijing, publically warning China against taking any further 
XQLODWHUDO DFWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG XQGHUPLQH -DSDQ¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRn of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, or 
escalate tension and inadvertently lead to a political miscalculation.1446   
 
In a further attempt to de-escalate the tensions, and in response to pressure from Tokyo, presumably 
using the TPP negotiations as leverage, in April 2014, President Obama publically announced that the 
protection of the islands falls within article 5 of the U.S-Japanese Mutual Defence Treaty and that the 
U.S. would assist Japan in their defence of the features.1447  This move, directly aimed at China, was to 
signal that U.S. credibility as a responsible treaty partner and as the regional hegemon are now 
implicated in the disputes.  Nevertheless, midway into 2016, tensions continue to escalate, with the 
Chinese Navy, under the auspices of the Chinese Coast Guard, increasing the size and number of its 
ships located in the East China Sea, coupled with increased Chinese air force activity in addition to a 
record number of Japanese air sorties taking place.1448  In June 2016, Japanese officials reported spotting 
a Chinese warship for the first time near disputed islands in the East China Sea, with reports of Russian 
                                                          
1443 ŽůǀĞŶ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞdĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝƐƉƵƚĞƐŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ P/ƐƐƵĞƐĨŽƌŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
1444 DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞEast China Sea ? ? ? ? ?-104. 
1445 US ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ PWƌĞƐƐ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝƌĞĨĞŶĐĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĞ ? ?
Washington, DC, November 23, 2013. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm 
(accessed June 26, 2016). 
1446 US ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶ PRemarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida after their 
ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? :ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203050.htm 
(accessed June 6, 2016); US ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇ PRemarks with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 
Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and JapĂŶĞƐĞĞĨĞŶƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ/ƚƐƵŶŽƌŝKŶŽĚĞƌĂ ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/10/215073.htm (accessed June 6, 2016). 
1447 dŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “:ŽŝŶƚWƌĞƐƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂĂŶĚWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌďĞŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ? ?Ɖƌŝů
24, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-
and-prime-minister-abe-japan (accessed June 6, 2016).  
1448 ĂŶĚĞ>ƵĐĞĂŶĚ<ĞŝƚŚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? “/ŶƚŚĞĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?ƐŝŐ^ŚŝƉƐƉƵƐŚƚŚĞŶǀĞůŽƉĞ ? ?Foreign Policy, 
May 22, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/22/in-the-east-china-sea-beijings-big-ships-push-the-
envelope/  (accessed June 6, 2016). 
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warships in the area also under investigation.1449  In August 2016, Japan accused China of installing a 
military-grade radar system on a gas platform in the disputed areas of the East China Sea.1450  Despite 
%HLMLQJ¶VDQG:DVKLQJWRQ¶Vagreement on the rules of behaviour governing air encounters in September 
2015, the limits of U.S. naval deterrence have also been demonstrated.1451  The number of incidents and 
µXQVDIH LQWHUFHSWV¶ RFFXUULQJ EHWZHHQ &KLQHVH ILJKWHU SODQHV DQG 86 UHFRQQDLVVDQFH SODnes in 
May/June 2016 intensified the militarisation of the East China Sea, further increasing the likelihood of 
an accident that could spark an over-reaction.   
 
 
(ii) The South China Sea disputes 
)RU DOO QDWLRQV FRQFHUQHG WKH µKLJKO\ HPRWLRQDO¶ WHUULWRULDO FODLPV JLYH VXVWHQDQFH WR WKH ULVLQJ
nationalism across the region.1452  China has serious concerns over its maritime border security and 
access to energy resources: it lacks control over the sea on which it borders, and fears its access to 
FULWLFDOHQHUJ\UHVRXUFHVFRXOGEHDWULVNIURP$PHULFD¶VFRQWURORIWKHKLJKVHDV1453  Internal stability 
KDVDµPDMRUPDULWLPHVWUDQG¶VLQFHWKHHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWQHHGHGLVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHLPSRUWRI
raw materials via constricted trade routes.1454  The South China Sea is also militarily sensitive, providing 
China with critical sea-based access to the submarine base on Hainan Island.1455  &KLQD¶V historic claims 
WRFRQWUROOLQJWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDLWVµQHDUVHD¶DUHLQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKLQWKHµQLQH-GDVKHGOLQH¶1'/
marking on its maps which covers approximately 80 per cent of the South China Sea, including the 
                                                          
1449 Wall Street Journal ? “JĂƉĂŶWƌŽƚĞƐƚƐƚŽŚŝŶĂĨƚĞƌ^ƉŽƚƚŝŶŐŚŝŶĞƐĞtĂƌƐŚŝƉKĨĨŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ/ƐůĂŶĚƐ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ?
2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-protests-to-china-after-spotting-chinese-warship-off-disputed-
islands-1465458144 (accessed June 10, 2016). 
1450 /ƐĂďĞůZĞǇŶŽůĚƐ ? “:ĂƉĂŶ-ŚŝŶĂdĞŶƐŝŽŶƐZŝƐĞĂƌŽƵŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ/ƐůĞƐ ? ?ůŽŽŵďĞƌŐ ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ?
2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-08/china-japan-tensions-rise-around-disputed-east-
china-sea-isles (accessed August 28, 2016). 
1451 Gordon Lubold,  “New U.S.-China Military Rules Vague on Dealing with Conflicts, ? Wall Street Journal, 
September 25, 2015 http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-u-s-china-military-rules-vague-on-dealing-with-
conflicts-1443220819 (accessed June 11, 2016); Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold,  “Chinese Jets Intercept U.S. 
Spy Plane over East China Sea, ? Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-jets-
intercept-u-s-spy-plane-over-east-china-sea-1465360954 (accessed June 11, 2016). 
1452 Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt,  “<ĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?dŚĞ
Foreign Policy Brief, Brookings Institution, August 2014, 3. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/08/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-
lieberthal-mcdevitt/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1453 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation (New York: Double Day, 2013), 229. In order to escape the  ‘Malacca Straits 
dilemma, ?ĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨǇŝƚƐƚƌĂĚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐ ?China is pursuing alternative paths, over land via Central Asia, and via 
Myanmar in South East Asia, as part of the One Belt, One Road strategy, discussed later in the chapter. For more 
ŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĞŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚƚƌĂĚĞƌŽƵƚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ƐĞĞWĂŬ< ?>ĞĞ ? “China's Quest for Oil Security: Oil (Wars) 
in the PŝƉĞůŝŶĞ ? ?The Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2005): 265-301.  
1454 Kun-ŚŝŶ>ŝŶĂŶĚŶĚƌĞƐsŝůůĂƌ'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific: China and the Emerging Order 
ŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƚĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƐ ? ?Chatham House, (July 2015), 14. 
1455 Bader et al,  “<ĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? 4. 
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Spratly and Paracel Islands, also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.1456 
&KLQD¶Vhistorical claims within the NDL remain contentious, and its unclarified and vaguely defined 
claims to the land features are not based on UNCLOS provisions.1457  Nevertheless, the assertion of 
claims under the NDL UHIOHFW WKH VHQVHRI&KLQHVHQDWLRQKRRG LWVJUHDWSRZHUVWDWXVDQGµULJKWLQJ
wrongs done to China over time.¶1458  Ambiguity over the NDL allows Beijing to undertake a wide 
range of activities, including the harassment of other littoral states in their own EEZ without having to 
PDNHµOHJDOO\GXELRXVDVVHUWLRQV¶1459  )LJXUHVKRZV&KLQD¶VFODLPVWRWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDZLWKLQLWV
nine-dash line, as per its submission to the UN in May 2009. 
 
The Obama administration has placed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands directly into the broader context of 
U.S-China strategic relations and managing the South China Sea (SCS) disputes have also come to 
signify a critical element of the rebalance.  For decades, the U.S. has avoided entanglement in any 
competing sovereignty claims, yet, as with the East China Sea, U.S. hegemonic interests require the 
exertion of rules-based stability in the South China Sea.  The rebalance strategy has inevitably drawn 
Washington LQWRWDNLQJRQPRUHLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHµGD\-to-day security dynamic between China and 
WKH6&6OLWWRUDOVWDWHV¶1460  U.S. strategic interests are related to its hegemonic position in the region, 
primarily as regional stabiliser.  As regional hegemon, the U.S. holds responsibility for determining the 
rules of the game, including managing regional conflict peacefully through international arbitration 
where necessary, and acceptance of, and adherence to, international agreed-upon norms on freedom of 
navigation for military purposes and the upholding of UNCLOS.  In December 2014, the U.S. officially 
conveyed an official posLWLRQWKDWFKDOOHQJHGWKHXVHRIWKH1'/DVDZD\WRLQGLFDWH&KLQD¶VFODLPVWR
                                                          
1456 ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƉƌĂƚůǇƐ ?EĂŶƐŚĂŝƐůĂŶĚƐ )ƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽŝƐůĂŶĚƐŝŶĂŶĐŝĞŶƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
and maps, but provides no information about which islands, and little proof of conquest, cession, or occupation. 
See Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: A Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 
97-98.  
1457 Ben Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2015), 7. UNCLOS only recognises historic waters in very limited 
circumstances and cannot apply to open ocean, as is the case with the submerged rocks of the South China Sea. 
DŝĐŚĂĞůDĐĞǀŝƚƚ ?  “dŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĂŶĚh^WŽůŝĐǇKƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 4 
(2013): 179. 
1458 To date, Chinese officials have not clarified the rights China claims within the NDL. China expert, Mohan 
DĂůŝŬ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂƵƐĞƐ ‘ĨŽůŬlore, myths and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater 
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĂŶĚŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞŶĞǁƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƐƉŚĞƌĞƐĂŶĚŽŶ ůĂŶĚ ?^ĞĞDŽŚĂŶDĂůŝŬ ?
 “,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů &ŝĐƚŝŽŶ P ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ůĂŝŵƐ ? ?World Affairs Journal (May/June 2013). 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/historical-fiction-china%E2%80%99s-south-china-sea-claims 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1459 For a comprehensive overview of the legal ambiguities, see ZŽďĞƌƚ ĞĐŬŵĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime DŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ? ?American Journal of 
International Law 107, no. 1 (2013): 155-158. 
1460 McDevitt,  “dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĂŶĚh ?^ ?WŽůŝĐǇKƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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the land features in the South China Sea.1461  In addition, U.S. neutrality with regard to the claims does 
QRW KRZHYHU H[WHQG WR ZKDW LW FRQVLGHUV WR EH &KLQD¶V DVVHUWLYH RU FRHrcive behaviour in settling 
claims.1462   
 
Defending international rules and norms 
(i) Coercion 
For China, the East and South China Seas represent arenas for contesting any intensification and 
consolidation of American military preponderance in the Western Pacific.  Since 2009, China has been 
increasingly more willing to use its disproportionate size and military capacity to threaten and coerce 
the smaller littoral states in the South China Sea.1463  7KLVLQFUHPHQWDOO\FRHUFLYHDSSURDFKµVWD\VEHORZ
the threshold of DGLUHFWXVHRIYLROHQFH¶1464  Nevertheless, China has actively intimidated fishermen 
from the Philippines1465 and Vietnam1466, the most vocal littoral states in their criticism of Chinese 
activities in the South China Sea.  Between September 2013 and June 2015, China additionally 
embarked upon an ambitious land reclamation scheme, creating new land features out of previously 
submerged reefs to reinforce its claims to the Spratly Islands, which are located more than 500 miles 
from the Chinese mainland.  None of the Spratly features are naturally inhabitable.  The scale of the 
                                                          
1461 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Daniel Russel, stated in his February 5, 2014 congressional 
testimony that  “ĂŶǇƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŝŶĞ-dash-ůŝŶĞ ?ďǇŚŝŶĂƚŽĐůĂŝŵŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŶŽƚďĂƐĞĚŽŶůand features 
would be inconsistent with international law. ? h^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “ĂŶŝĞůZƵƐƐĞů PMaritime Disputes in East 
ƐŝĂ ? ?dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ^ƵďĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶĂƐƚƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?February 
5, 2014. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm (accessed November 17, 2015). 
1462  “tĞ ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ǁŽƌŬ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ ƌĞƐŽůǀĞ ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
coercion, withŽƵƚ ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ? ? h^ ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ P ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ ǁŝƚŚ
/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ZĂĚĞŶ DŽŚĂŵŵĂĚ DĂƌƚǇ DƵůŝĂŶĂ EĂƚĂůĞŐĂǁĂ ? ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197279.htm (accessed June 6, 2016). 
1463 In 2010, the year that Vietnam held ASEAN chairmanship, Vietnam was effective in bringing maritime 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽŶƚŽ^E ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŶĚƵƌŐĞĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ&KE
in the South China Sea. Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 15. 
1464 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ PIsland Building and Evolving US PŽůŝĐǇ ? ?American Foreign Policy 
Interests 37, no. 5/6 (2015): 257. 
1465 Beijing rejected the Philippines offer to take their dispute over the Scarborough Shoal to a number of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in 2012. In January 2013, the Philippines formally requested international arbitration 
ďǇƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůdƌŝďƵŶĂůŽŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĂ ?/d>K^ )ŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝƚƐE>
comply with UNCLOS. Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 14.   
1466 A number of Vietnamese fishermen have been detained by the Chinese military since 2009. In 2014 and 
 ? ? ? ? ?ŚŝŶĂĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŶŽŝůƌŝŐŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚǁĂƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌĂĐĞů/ƐůĂŶĚƐ ?DŝŬĞ/ǀĞƐ ? “Vietnam Objects to 
ŚŝŶĞƐĞ Kŝů ZŝŐ ŝŶ ŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ tĂƚĞƌƐ ? ? New York Times, January 20, 2016. 




reclamation work undertaken by China is unprecedented and has no parallel with the activities of other 
claimants, who in the past have also carried out smaller scale land reclamation.1467   
 
/DQGUHFODPDWLRQRQWKLVVFDOHLVYLHZHGDVDVLJQRI&KLQD¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRFRQWHVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ
its assertion of de facto rather than de jure sovereignty, and the strengthening of its capacity to project 
power into the South China Sea.1468  In April 2015, Beijing presented its own public goods spin, by 
DVVHUWLQJ WKDW DFFHVV WR WKH LVODQGV H[SDQGV &KLQD¶V FDSDFLW\ WR HQJDJH LQ UHJLRQDO KXPDQLWDULDQ
assistance and disaster response (HADR) activities, which it hopes will enhance its moral legitimacy.1469   
Its current problem of projecting a substantial force presence for sustained periods far from mainland 
bases, will also be alleviated with island access, consequently there is little doubt that the Chinese Navy 
and Air Force will be able to use the islands to project military power further into the South China 
Sea.1470   
 
6LQFHWKH86KDVWUHDWHGWKHVHPHDVXUHVDV&KLQD¶VDWWHPSWVWRIXUWKHUGHVWDELOLVHWKHPDULWLPH
security environment in the SCS, resorting to threats and coercion to strengthen its claims.1471  Speaking 
at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2015, Secretary of Defence Carter emphasised that,  
                                                          
1467 All claimants have ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ůĂŶĚ ƌĞĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐĂůĞ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ?-15 
reclamation is more extensive. After China laid claim to the entire South China Sea in 1992, it occupied and built 
structures on reefs claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŚŝŶĂ ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ P ƚŚĞ h ?^ ? ŝŶ ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚ ƐŝĂŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ? ĂƐƚ-West Center, Policy Studies 
Monograph 16 (2005): 8-9. 
1468 <ŽŚ ^ǁĞĞ >ĞĂŶ ŽůůŝŶ ?  “ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ &Ăŝƚ ĐĐŽŵƉůŝ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ? ?The Diplomat, May 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/beijings-fait-accompli-in-the-south-china-sea/  (accessed August 15, 2015). 
Some analysts argue that China is systematically developing a phased strategy of domination over the next 25 
years that would end American primacy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  See Kun-Chin Lin and Andres Villar 
'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ PŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐKƌĚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƚĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƐ ? ?
Chatham House (July 2015), 13-14; ^ƚĂĐǇ ?WĞĚƌŽǌŽ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐActive Defense Strategy and its Regional IŵƉĂĐƚ ? ?
Testimony, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, US House of Representatives, (January 27, 
2011), 2. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-active-defense-strategy-its-regional-impact/p23963 (accessed June 
28, 2016). 
1469 CharůĞƐůŽǀĞƌ ? “h^ ‘tĞůĐŽŵĞ ?ƚŽƵƐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐDĂŶ-Made Islands for Civilian PƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?Financial Times, May 
1, 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27dcd7ee-efd2-11e4-ab73-00144feab7de.html#axzz4C2nKDJrA  
(accessed August 13, 2015); <ŽŚ ? “ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ĂŝƚĐĐŽŵƉůŝŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? 
1470 ƚĂũŽŝŶƚƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚyŝĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚŝŶĂĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
ŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶƚŚĞ^ƉƌĂƚůǇƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝƐǇĞƚƚŽďĞƚĞƐƚĞĚ ?The White House, 
 “Remarks by President Obama and PresidenƚyŝŽĨƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨŚŝŶĂŝŶ:ŽŝŶƚWƌĞƐƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?
September 25, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint  (accessed June 11, 2016). 
1471 Daniel Russel pointed to Chinese actions including more extensive patrols by Chinese maritime authorities 
and other Chinese vessels, the blockading of some disputed features by Chinese maritime authorities, the 
announcement of fishing bans, energy exploration in disputed waters, and now the reclamation and 




µ«ZLWK LWV DFWLRQV LQ WKH 6RXWK &KLQD 6HD &KLQD LV RXW RI VWHS ZLWK ERWK WKH
international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-PaciILF¶V VHFXULW\
architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes 
coercion.¶1472 
&KLQD¶VODQGUHFODPDWLRQLQWKH6SUDWO\VUDLVHVDQXPEHURILVVXHVIRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQFOXGLQJWKH
OHJDOLW\RI&KLQD¶VUHFODPDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKis currently indeterminable, since the sovereignty of 
these features has not been settled.1473  The reclamation includes areas under consideration in the 
UNCLOS arbitration case, in which the Philippines sought a ruling on the legality of Chinese claims 
and behaviour in the South China Sea.1474  In its July 12th ruling, the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
KHOGWKDWGHVSLWHWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHµIHDWXUHV¶LQWRPDQ-made islands, this does not entitle the 
owners to an EEZ and that through its reconstruction activities, China had illegally prevented the 
Philippines from developing fisheries and potential energy reserves in its own EEZ.1475   Furthermore, 
WKHWULEXQDOUXOHGWKDWWKHUHZDVQRKLVWRULFDORUOHJDOEDVLVIRU&KLQD¶VFODLPVWRWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD
incorporated within its nine-dash line.1476 
   
(ii) Freedom of Navigation  
&KLQD¶VH[WHQVLYHODQGUHFODPDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHGLVSXWHG6SUDWO\V implicates the United States in 
upholding existing interpretations of international law by directly challenging any claim of expanded 
rights for the artificial islands.1477  Adding another layer of complexity, China offers different 
interpretations to American-derived international rules and norms pertaining to the conduct of Freedom 
of Navigation (FON) operations in EEZs, as determined under the UN Convention on the Law of the 
                                                          
1472 Ashton Carter ?  “ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞtŚĞƌĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞZŝƐĞƐ ? ?Speech at Shangri-La Dialogue. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, May 30, 2015. 
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1945 (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1473 The construction of an artificial island raises legal questions if it occurs within the EEZ of another state. In 
contrast, land reclamation related to features located in the high seas appears to be permissible under UNCLOS. 
ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ůĂŶĚ ƌĞĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǌŽŶĞs 
among the surrounding states. Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 6. 
1474 Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea, 4. 
1475 dŽŵDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂƚŽŚŽůĚ:ŽŝŶƚǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?Financial Times, July 28, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/75502fc4-550e-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT (accessed August 
27, 2016).  
1476 ŵŝůǇZĂƵŚĂůĂ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚEĞǁZƵůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂdĂůŬƐ PŽŶ ?ƚdĂůŬďŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?
Washington Post, July 25, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/amid-growing-asian-
storm-us-seeks-quieter-touch-with-china-over-sea-dispute/2016/07/25/10cffc90-5226-11e6-994c-
4e3140414f34_story.html (accessed August 27, 2016).  
1477 Between 2013 and 2015, Beijing created 4 square kilometres of artificial landmass on reefs, prompting U.S. 
WĂĐŝĨŝĐ&ůĞĞƚŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ?ĚŵŝƌĂů,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?ƚŽǁĂƌŶƚŚĂƚĞŝũŝŶŐǁĂƐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂ “ŐƌĞĂƚǁĂůůŽĨƐĂŶĚ ? ? Admiral Harry 
B. Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia, 
31 March 2015. http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/harry-harris/speeches/2015/03/ASPI-Australia.pdf (accessed 
June 26, 2016). 
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Sea (UNCLOS).1478  Freedom of navigation is critical for commercial vessels, consequently the free 
movement of these vessels along the regional sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and minimising 
disruption to trade is of interest to all regional littoral states, in addition to China and the United 
States.1479  The situation is different for military vessels.  U.S. maritime hegemony is underpinned by 
its preponderant sea power, which gives the U.S. Navy the freedom of action to collect intelligence and 
engage in effective naval diplomacy through its unlimited access to the global high seas.1480  Free 
navigation of warships and submarines through, and under, the straits and sea lanes of Southeast Asia 
is critical to the nuclear strategy of the United States and its access to the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea.1481  The norm of FON underpins the exercise of American sea power and 
consequently the U.S. has been the most prominent defender of FON.1482   
 
However, as a non-ratifier of UNCLOS, the U.S. is reliant on its relations with littoral states, who can 
GHFLGHZKHWKHUWRµJUDQWWUHDWy-VDQFWLRQHGSDVVDJH¶WR86PLOLWDU\YHVVHOV1483  In practice, the majority 
of littoral states view U.S. assertions of FON as acquiescence to U.S. hegemony.  Military activities in 
the EEZ can be a source of dispute, with some states, including China, India, Malaysia and Vietnam, 
adopting domestic legislation to prohibit military activities of other states in their EEZ.1484  &KLQD¶V
contestation of American naval hegemony starts with the dispute over its interpretation of freedom of 
navigation.  Beijing contesWV :DVKLQJWRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ULJKWV RI PLOLWDU\ YHVVHOV WR WUDQVLW
through the resource zones of coastal states.1485  $VWKHSULPDU\VHFXULW\JXDUDQWRURIWKHZRUOG¶VRFHDQV
the U.S. continues to exert influence over rules relating to the laws of the sea. Despite its refusal to 
ratify UNCLOS, the U.S. asserts that UNCLOS navigational provisions are part of customary 
international law and are therefore binding.  As far back as 1995, the U.S. has emphasised its strategic 
interest in maintaining the SLOCs in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean and would 
                                                          
1478 Part II of UNCLOS agreement sets out these particular provisions, see UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
 “ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ZĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ /ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ WĂƌƚ y/ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1479 Mark J. Valencia,  “ƐŝĂ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ^ ĞĂĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 
274-5. 
1480 JameƐ DĂŶŝĐŽŵ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ^ĞĂ WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ P /ƐĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ WŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?Journal of 
Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 352. 
1481 Valencia,  “ƐŝĂ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĂĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
1482 In 1982, Republicans in the Senate rejected UNCLOS on the basis that it was inimical to US sovereignty and 
national security interests. In 2012, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 4 hearings on UNCLOS, 
considering the options of the Obama administration, but no vote was held. Dolven, Maritime Territorial 
Disputes in East Asia, 7. 
1483 Valencia,  “ƐŝĂ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĂĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
1484 DĂŶŝĐŽŵ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ĞĂWŽǁĞƌŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1485 dŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŶĚĂǀĂƐƚŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ?ƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌŝĞƐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŚŝŶĂ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
ĚŽŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ “ĐŽĂƐƚĂů-ƐƚĂƚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌhE>K^ ?:ĞĨĨD ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? “>Ğƚ ?ƐĞZĞĂů: The South China Sea Is a US-
ŚŝŶĂ/ƐƐƵĞ ? ?The Diplomat, June 24, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/lets-be-real-the-south-china-sea-
is-a-us-china-issue/ (accessed August 13, 2015). 
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µUHVLVWDQ\PDULWLPHFODLPVEH\RQGWKRVHSHUPLWWHGE\WKH/DZRIWKH6HD&RQYHQWLRQ¶1486 It is this 
customary law concerning FON and protecting passage through territorial seas that the U.S. is likely to 
use force to protect.  
 
As a non-VLJQDWRU\WR81&/26:DVKLQJWRQ¶VOHJDOEDVLVWRLQYRNHinternational rules may be reduced 
in the longer term.  Its non-VLJQDWRU\VWDWXVDOVRGUDVWLFDOO\OLPLWV:DVKLQJWRQ¶VOHYHUDJHRYHU%HLMLQJ
regarding ChiQD¶V ODQG UHFODPDWLRQ DFWLYLW\ WKH 1'/ RU WKH WHUULWRULDO FODLPV1487  Any change to 
H[LVWLQJGHILQLWLRQVRIIUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQFRXOGGLUHFWO\OLPLWWKH861DY\¶VXQSDUDOOHOHGDFFHVV
to international waters, but as a non-signatory, the U.S. could remain outside the process by which this 
ZLOORFFXU7KHUHIRUH&KLQD¶VDWWHPSWVWRFODULI\WKHULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVRIOLWWRUDOVWDWHVDQGRWKHU
states within EEZ, with the view to limiting military activities there, are directly aimed at constraining 
U.S. naval primacy.  For the U.S., any changes to the existing customary law, giving littoral states the 
rights to regulate navigation through their EEZ would set a precedent on curtailing U.S. naval freedom 
which is a vital aspect of American regional hegemony.   
 
The rising number of air and naval confrontations between the Chinese military/coast guard and the 
U.S. military LQ&KLQD¶V((=Ls DQDWWHPSWWRDVVHUW%HLMLQJ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIIUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQ
although most Chinese activity continues to be directed against fishing boats and naval vessels from the 
littoral states.  In an assertion of U.S. naval primacy and in defence of freedom of navigation, since May 
2015, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy continue to conduct surveillance sorties over and around the 
UHFODLPHGLVODQGVGLUHFWO\FRQWUDYHQLQJ%HLMLQJ¶VGLUHFWLYHV1488  On completion of its land reclamation 
activities in June 2015, it was expected that Beijing would declare an Air Defence Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in the area.1489  This would be WKHQH[WVWHSWRZDUGVLQFUHDVLQJ%HLMLQJ¶VDXWKRULW\RYHUWHUULWRU\
                                                          
1486 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 1995. 
http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html (accessed August 13, 
2015). 
1487 ZĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĂŶŝĞů ZƵƐƐĞů ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ hE>K^ ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ ĐĂƐĞ ŝŶ :ƵůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? Ă
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson retorted ƚŚĂƚ ? “Ăttempting to push forward the arbitration unilaterally 
initiated by the Philippines, the US ƐŝĚĞũƵƐƚĂĐƚƐůŝŬĞĂŶ ‘arbitrator outside the tribunal ? ? designating the direction 
for the arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines. This is inconsistent with the position the 
US side claims to uphold on issues concerning the South China Sea disputes. Being not a party concerned to the 
South China Sea issue, the US side should live up to its pledge of not taking sides and refrain from actions that 
go against regional peace and stability. ?ŚŝŶĞƐĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?  “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's 
Remarks on the US Statement about Issues Relating to the Arbitration Unilaterally Initiated by the WŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ ?
July 24, 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1283808.shtml (accessed 
June 12, 2016). 
1488 ^ŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞh ?^ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐĂŶŶƵĂů&KEKWƐ ?ƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǁŚĂƚŝƚ sees as excessive or unlawful 
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐůĂŝŵƐ ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? “>Ğƚ ?ƐĞZĞĂů PdŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂIs a US-ŚŝŶĂ/ƐƐƵĞ ? ? 
1489 A senior Chinese foreign ministry official first spoke of the possibility of implementing an ADIZ over the South 
ŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƐŝŐŶĂůĨƌŽŵĞŝũŝŶŐ ? “/ŶĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůĂǇŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞ
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in the South China Sea, and a provocative and direct move to limit American naval access and reduce 
its capacity to stand by its security guarantees.  As at September 2016, there has been no declaration of 
an ADIZ in the South China Sea, as occurred in the East China Sea in November 2013, despite warnings 
by Chinese officials.1490   
 
While China is unlikely to DFFHSW86SUHSRQGHUDQFHLQWKHZHVWHUQ3DFLILFµLQSHUSHWXLW\¶ or its own 
subordinate position along its maritime periphery, Beijing is still likely to avoid direct military 
confrontation with the United States for some time to come, although it will continue to contest its 
unrestricted hegemony in the South China Sea through naval activity and its opposition to UNCLOS 
jurisdiction.1491  Beijing will also continue to reject U.S. intervention into the South China Sea 
disputes.1492  &KLQD¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHUXOLQJRQ-XO\KDVEHHQWRLQFUHDVHLWVPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFH
in the South China Sea.  During the summer of 2016, Chinese and Russian navies have held joint 
exercises in the South China SeaGHVFULEHGDVµURXWLQH¶E\&KLQHVHRIficials, and in addition to the 
exercises held by the Chinese navy, in a show of force prior to the July ruling and likelihood of the 
Chinese air force also conducting regular patrols across the region.1493  There are unsubstantiated claims 
emanating from Southeast Asia that Vietnam has deployed mobile rocket launchers to the Spratlys as a 
means to counter further Chinese expansionZKLFKSHUSHWXDWHVWKHFRQWLQXDOµDFWLRQ-UHDFWLRQF\FOH¶LQ
relation to the disputes.1494 
 
Both Washington and the government of the Philippines have been restrained in their responses to the 
tribunal ruling.  The Philippines new president, Rodrigo Duterte, also vowed to use the ruling as part of 
                                                          
diplomatic groundwork for sucŚĂŵŽǀĞŝĨŚŝŶĂŝƐŶŽƚŚĂƉƉǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĂǇƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐƉůĂǇŽƵƚ ? ?ůŽǀĞƌ ? “ŚŝŶĂ
Raises Prospect of South China Sea Air Defence ZŽŶĞ ? ?
1490According to a report in the South China Morning Post in June 2016, Beijing was ready to impose an ADIZ in 
the South China Sea. Citing sources close to the PLA, a declaration was dependent on the US military presence 
and diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries. This warning came as China prepares for the ITLOS ruling on 
ƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐĐĂƐĞ ?DŝŶŶŝĞŚĂŶ ? “ĞŝũŝŶŐZĞĂĚǇƚŽ Impose Air Defence Identification Zone in South China Sea 
Pending US MŽǀĞƐ ? ? South China Morning Post, June 1, 2016. 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1960954/beijing-ready-impose-air-defence-identification-zone-
south-china-sea (accessed June 6, 2016). 
1491 DŝĐŚĂĞů ?^ǁĂŝŶĞ ? “dŚĞZĞĂůŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞWĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3, (May/June 2015). 
1492 In May 2016, Washington urged Beijing to recognise the ITLOS decision on the Philippines case but China 
rejected the US stance, pointing out that the US is a non-signatory of UNCLOS. ŚĂƌůĞƐůŽǀĞƌ ?  “ŚŝŶĂWŽƵƌƐ
^ĐŽƌŶŽŶ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ>ĞŐĂůĂƐĞ ? ?Financial Times, May 12, 2016. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/87fa596e-
1810-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.html (accessed June 26, 2016).  
1493 DŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂƚŽŚŽůĚ:ŽŝŶƚǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?
1494 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĞĞů ? “^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞ&ĂůůŽƵƚ^ƚŽŬĞƐdĞŶƐŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚŝŶĂĂŶĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ? ?Financial Times, August 
10, 2016. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3aa404f2-5ee8-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT 
(accessed August 27, 2016). 
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µRQJRLQJHIIRUWV WRSXUVXHDSHDFHIXO UHVROXWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIRXUGLVSXWHV¶1495  Duterte also 
GURSSHGWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶SUHYLRXVUHTXHVWWRKDYHWKHUXOLQJPHQWLRQHGLQWKH$6($1MRLQWVWDWHPHQW 
at the ASEAN summit in Laos, July/August 2016.1496  In an effort to calm down the tensions following 
the ruling, when National Security Advisor Susan Rice met with President Xi and State Councillor Jang 
in Beijing at the end of July 2016 to discuss the South China Sea, there was no public statement from 
Rice on the issue.1497  At the ARF in Laos, Secretary Kerry also urged that the rule of law must be 
XSKHOG DGGLQJ WKDW µQR FODLPDQW LQ WKH 6RXWK &KLQD Sea should take steps that wind up raising 
tensions.1498  Kerry also suggested that the U.S. would support renewed bilateral talks between the 
Philippines and China, but not on the basis of disregarding the legally binding international ruling.1499  
The U.S. should also continue to push for the COC, while also following up with Beijing on President 
;L¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDW&KLQDGRHVQRWLQWHQGWRPLOLWDULVHWKH6SUDWO\V.1500  Non-compliance with the 
UXOLQJDQGWKHLQFUHDVHGQDYDOSUHVHQFHPD\DGYDQFH&KLQD¶V6RXWK&KLQD6HDFODLPVLQWKHVKRUWWHUP
but LWZLOOLQWKHORQJHUWHUPXQGHUPLQH%HLMLQJ¶VJRDORIEHLQJseen as a responsible and legitimate 
great power that abides by international law.1501  
 
Another FRQVHTXHQFHRI&KLQD¶Vactivities in the South China Sea has been the shift towards the United 
States by many countries around the Asia-Pacific.  This situation has not changed as a result of the 
tribunal ruling, particularly as China has responded with a show of strength in the affected areas.  
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VHQHUJLVHGVHFXULW\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH3KLOLSSLQHVKDVIDFLOLWDWHGWKHUHWXUQRIWKH86
military to its former bases there.  Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have all established comprehensive 
strategic partnerships with the United States during the Obama administration.  The situation in the 
South China Sea has also drawn two major U.S. regional allies, Japan and Australia, into protecting 
)21LQ WKH UHJLRQ¶VZDWHUZDys, in addition to improving the maritime security of the SCS littoral 
states.1502      
                                                          
1495 ZĂƵŚĂůĂ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚEĞǁZƵůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂdĂůŬƐ PŽŶ ?ƚdĂůŬďŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? 
1496 :ŽƐĞƉŚZŽǆĂƐ ? “Duterte: PHL to use South China Sea Ruling In Efforts to RĞƐŽůǀĞ^ĞĂŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ?'DEĞǁƐ ?
July 25, 2016. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/575005/news/nation/duterte-phl-to-use-south-china-
sea-ruling-in-efforts-to-resolve-sea-dispute#sthash.n1Ed8Er2.dpuf (accessed August 27, 2016). 
1497 ZĂƵŚĂůĂ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚEĞǁZƵůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂdĂůŬƐ PŽŶ ?ƚdĂůŬďŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ? 
1498 US State ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ <ĞƌƌǇ P WƌĞƐƐ ǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶ sŝĞŶƚĂĞ ? >ĂŽƐ ? ? :ƵůǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260475.htm (accessed August 27, 2016). 
1499 Ben Otto,  “h ?^ ? ƚŽ ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ dĂůŬƐ ŝŶ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ?Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2016. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-asks-u-s-to-back-china-philippine-talks-1469511072 (accessed August 27, 
2016). 
1500 :ĞĨĨƌĞǇ ?ĂĚĞƌ ? “tŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚŚŝŶĂShould DŽŝŶƚŚĞtĂŬĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂZƵůŝŶŐ ? ?
Brookings Institution, July 13, 2016. 
1501 Lynn Kuok,  “ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ĞĨŝĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ? ?Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2016. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-defiance-in-the-south-china-sea-1468169189 (accessed August 27, 
2016).  
1502 DĐĞǀŝƚƚ ? “dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ P/ƐůĂŶĚƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚǀŽůǀŝŶŐh ?^ ?WŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Compulsory and Productive Power in Tandem: The Indo-Asia-Pacific 
As the U.S. has found it progressively more difficult to deter &KLQD¶VEHKDYLRXULQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HD
Washington has drawn on the support of Southeast Asian allies and non-allied states, and more 
significantly, gained the consent of other partners outside Southeast Asia, including Japan, India and 
Australia, into actively supporting its framework for managing this particular conflict and the regional 
SHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQZLWKLQLQ.  The U.S. has also responded to pressure from its regional 
allies to exert more diplomatic influence, and to intensify its naval presence, as part of its hegemonic 
bargain in conflict management.  
 
(i) 6RFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHµ,QGR-Asia-3DFLILF¶ 
In her November 2011 DUWLFOH ³$PHULFD¶V 3DFLILF &HQWXU\,´ Secretary Clinton emphasised the 
criticality of the three sub-regions to the rebalance, with her rhetorical symbiosis of the Indian and 
3DFLILF2FHDQVWKURXJKWKHµ,QGR-Asia-3DFLILF¶FRQVWUXFWLRQ1503  The linkage of Northeast, Southeast 
and South Asia via their interconnecting oceans is an essential optic of American power through which 
the U.S. is building a strategic environment in which like-minded democratic states can be indirectly 
drawn together into the process of supporting American hegemony.  Using the QDUUDWLYHRI&KLQD¶V
assertiveness, and its quest to change the regional status quo, further justification for the rebalance 
VWUDWHJ\DQG WKHFRPIRUWRI$PHULFD¶V VHFXULW\XPEUHOOD LQGLUHFWO\QXGJHV µWKUHDWHQHG¶FRXQWULHVRI
strategic value into assenting to American security hegemony.1504  As part of the hegemonic bargain, 
the threat is not only to American national interests, but also to those of its regional allies and its 
partners, which creates a wide network of potential supporters for American interests and for the 
defence of the U.S. provision of public goods.   
 
Stretching the sphere of operation to the Indo-Asia-Pacific enables the U.S., with its regional allies, to 
µQDWXUDOO\¶VWUHQJWKHQDQGH[SDQGWKHLUUHJLRQDl alliance networks to create webs within the hub-and-
                                                          
1503 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘/ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚŐĂŝŶĞĚ
prominence in 2011, being ƵƐĞĚŝŶƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐďǇ,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶĂŶĚƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?s Minister for Defence, Stephen 
^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ>ŽǁǇ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŚĂƐĂůƐŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?^ĞĞZŽƌǇDĞĚĐĂůĨ ? “/ŶĚŽ-Pacific: 
tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶ Ă EĂŵĞ ? ? The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 16, 2012. 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/08/16/Indo-Pacific-Whate28099s-in-a-
name.aspx?COLLCC=2894431929&  (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1504 ĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂ ‘ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ƐƚĂƚĞǀĂƌy, tending to centre on the satisfaction of a state towards the current 
international order.  ŚŝŶĂŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ
identity in the Asia-Pacific. See Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in World Politics: Western 
ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ZŝƐĞ (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), especially Chapter 2. For the 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐǀŝĞǁŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞůĂƐƚĂŝƌ/ĂŝŶ:ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “/ƐŚŝŶĂĂ^ƚĂƚƵƐYƵŽWŽǁĞƌ ? ?International 
Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5 W56. 
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spokes system as a means to future-SURRIWKHH[LVWLQJVHFXULW\DUFKLWHFWXUHDQGOLPLWV&KLQD¶VRSWLRQV
to create a China-centric regional order in the Asia-Pacific.1505  The emerging Asian maritime strategic 
system, encompassing the Pacific and Indian Oceans, is defined in large part by the geographically 
expanding interests and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the 
United States in both.1506  By encompassing the South Asian sub-continent, India features prominently 
as a key partner in regional architecture building activities.1507  Key allies of the United States, 
particularly Australia and Japan, view India as the lynchpin drawing the two oceans together and as a 
strategically significant partner in the South China Seas.1508  The Indian government has classified the 
South China Sea as part of LWVµH[WHQGHGQHLJKERXUKRRG¶IRURYHUDGHFDGH1509   
 
One of the practical security aims of the Indo-Asia-Pacific regional construct is to shift the centre of 
gravity of Indian security concerns towards the South China Sea as a part of a burden-sharing strategy 
with the United States.  It is a simultaneous attempt by the United States to engage India (and other 
allies), whilst also being a mechanism for maintaining its hegemonic position.1510  The new imperative 
of shifting from the exclusively Indian Ocean, to an Indo-Asia-Pacific, regional security construct is in 
some measure driven by concerns over possible Chinese naval expansionism, and use of Chinese naval 
power in the Indian Ocean and in the South China Sea.  From an American perspective, effectively 
managing these concerns requires the cooperation not only of India, but also of Australia, Indonesia, 
                                                          
1505 ƐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƉĂƌĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?ƐĞůĨ-imagination.  U.S. security 
and survival is often predicated on various spatial practices of geopolitics with ever expanding frontiers seen as 
crucial for its self-renewal as the exceptional and indispensable nation. See Campbell, Writing Security, 91; 
ŚĞŶŐǆŝŶWĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ  ‘/ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ'ĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐĂďŽƵƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐŝĂŶZĞŐŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌ ? ?
Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): 454-6.  
1506 Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs and Justin Jones, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security 
in Indo-Pacific Asia, (Sydney: Lowy, 2011): 56; http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/crisis-and-confidence-
major-powers-and-maritime-security-indo-pacific-asia (accessed June 26, 2016); DĞĚĐĂůĨ ? “/ndo-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ PtŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
in a NaŵĞ ? ? 
1507 The U.S. Unified Command Structure divides the Indian Ocean Region between USAFRICACOM and 
USPACOM ?dŚŝƐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŚĂƐƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂ “ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞh^ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
to the IOR is concerned. See Dennis Rumley, Timothy Doyle and Sanjay Chaturvedi,  “^ĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶKĐĞĂŶ ?
ŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, Policy Brief, Issue 3 
(2012): 3.http://www.adelaide.edu.au/indo-pacific-governance/policy/Timothy_Doyle.pdf (accessed August 
13, 2015). 
1508 DĐĞǀŝƚƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞĂƐĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨh ?^ ?-India 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ůĞĚh ?^ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƚŽďĞŐŝŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ /ŶĚŝĂŶ KĐĞĂŶƐ ? ?Michael MĐĞǀŝƚƚ ?  “dŚĞ >ŽŶŐ >ŝƚƚŽƌĂů WƌŽũĞĐƚ P ^ƵŵŵĂƌǇ ZĞƉŽƌƚ P  DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
Perspective on Indo-Pacific SĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Project Report, CNA Strategic Studies, June 2013, 8. 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRP-2013-U-004654-Final.pdf (accessed June 16, 2016). 
1509 DĞĚĐĂůĨ ?  “Indo-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ P tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶ Ă EĂŵĞ ? ? ^ĞĞalso David Scott,  “/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ  “xtĞŶĚĞĚ EĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?
Concept: Power Projection for a Rising PŽǁĞƌ ? ?India Review 8, no. 2 (2009): 107-143. 
1510 Dennis Rumley, Timothy Doyle & Sanjay Chaturvedi,  “^ĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂŶ KĐĞĂŶ ? ŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů
Security Constructions ? ?Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, Policy Brief, Issue 3, 2012, 4 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/indo-pacific-governance/policy/Timothy_Doyle.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016). 
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Japan and other states that possess similar concerns.1511  From a regional geopolitical perspective, a 
loose partnership will affect a closer monitoring, and potential control over, the eastern exits and 
entrances of Indian Ocean access routes.  The end result is clearly of global, not just regional, 
geopolitical significance.1512  The emergent Indo-Asia-Pacific reflects new geopolitical realities, 
particularly the energy and trade reliance on Indian Ocean sea lanes.  Stability in the Indian Ocean 
5HJLRQ,25DOVRRSHQXSVWUDWHJLFRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUWKH86WRHQOLVW,QGLDDVDµGesirable partner.¶1513  
  
(ii) Expanding the regional strategic framework to include India 
The Indo-Asia-3DFLILFFRQVWUXFWHQWHUHG,QGLD¶VRIILFLDO OH[LFRQDVDFRPSOHPHQWWRH[LVWLQJIRUHLJQ
policy concepts and ideas about regional engagement and is used by Indian pragmatists to promote the 
building of regional architecture that aligns India more closely with democratic states in the region, 
such as the U.S., Japan and Australia.1514  Yet, New Delhi viewed the 2011 rebalance announcement as 
an attempt by Washington tRFRQWDLQ&KLQDDQGWRLQDGYHUWHQWO\SXVK,QGLDLQWRDFFHSWLQJ$PHULFD¶V
position on China.1515  While privately some senior Indian officials said they would welcome a stronger 
American presence in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi did not publically support the American agenda.1516  
Consistent with its traditional non-alignment policy, India remains averse to becoming ensnared in any 
RI$VLD¶VFRPSHWLQJSRZHUFHQWUHVWKDWFRXOGGDPDJHLWVRZQHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW1517  ,Iµ&KLQD
                                                          
1511 /ŶĚŝĂŚĂƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ‘ƐƚƌŝŶŐŽĨƉĞĂƌůƐ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŚat attempts to link bases across the Indian Ocean, 
with the view to containing India in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China explains the strategy as a means to 
security energy routes from Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait. There is suggestion that the US-India 
cooperation seeks to counter potential Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the IOR. See EŝƚŝŶ'ŽŬŚĂůĞ ? “/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐYƵŝĞƚ
Counter-ŚŝŶĂ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Diplomat, March 16, 2011. http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/indias-quiet-
counter-china-strategy-2/ (accessed August 13, 2015); ,ĂŶŬǁŽŶ<ŝŵ ? “dŚĞ/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞ “^ƚƌŝŶŐ
ŽĨWĞĂƌůƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞh ?^ ?ZĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƐŝĂWŽůŝĐǇ PƚŚĞh ?^ ? ?ŚŝŶĂ ĂŶĚ/ŶĚŝĂŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶKĐĞĂŶ ? ?Journal of Global 
Policy and Governance 2, no. 2 (2013): 193-204. 
1512 Rumley et al,  “ ?^ĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂŶKĐĞĂŶ ?ŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐZĞŐŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?5 
1513 ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶůĂŶŬ ? “dŚĞ'ĞŽƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶĚŽ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?India Review 6, 
no. 1 (2007): 1. 
1514 Deepa KůůĂƉĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ ZĂũĞƐŚ ZĂũĂŐŽƉŽůĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ WƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŽ/ŶĚŝĂŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?The 
Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 145-162. /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐƐĞĞŬĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇǁŝƚŚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐŽůĚtĂƌ
foreign policy in prioritising non-alignment, and an opposition to dependence on external powers. Priya Chacko, 
 “dŚĞ ZŝƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ŶĚŽ-Pacific: Understanding Ideational Change and Continuity in /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?
Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): 434. 
1515 In 2008, the perception of a possible Washington-Beijing rapprochement made New Delhi feel  ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
ĂŶĚŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ?tith the announcement of the rebalance, there were doubts as to its credibility and sustainability. 
,ĂƌƐŚs ?WĂŶƚĂŶĚzŽŐĞƐŚ:ŽƐŚŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WŝǀŽƚ ? ?dŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵƌĞĂƵŽĨƐŝĂŶ
Research, Asia Policy 19 (January 2015): 91. 
1516 ^ŝŵŽŶĞŶǇĞƌĂŶĚZĂŵĂ>ĂŬƐŚŵŝ ?  “/ŶĚŝĂƉpears Ambivalent about Roles as U.S. Strategy Pivots toward 
ƐŝĂ ? ?Washington Post, October 13, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/india-
appears-ambivalent-as-us-strategy-pivots-toward-asia/2012/10/13/254b05d0-0e18-11e2-bb5e-
492c0d30bff6_story.html (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1517 Like Southeast Asian nations, India pursues a complex engagement of China at political, economic and 
strategic levels; India also attempts to enmesh a number of regional powers including Japan and Australia into 
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perceives India as irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up adopting 
RYHUWO\KRVWLOHDQGQHJDWLYHSROLFLHV WRZDUGV,QGLD¶1518  Consequently, New Delhi has attempted to 
avoid direct actions that could unnecessarily provoke China.  Instead it has pursued multiple foreign 
policy options, including building stronger ties with the United States1519; attempting to normalise its 
often strained relationship with Beijing, on the basis of their shared post-colonial identities;1520 and 
increasing its defence partnerships with other regional powers.1521   
 
%DVHG RQ VKDUHG FRQFHUQV RYHU &KLQD¶V EHKDYLRXU New Delhi has, however, opted for increasing 
strategic convergence with Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Vietnam and 
Indonesia, as well as the United States.1522  Since the 1990s, India has expanded its joint naval exercises 
with all Southeast Asian countries and extended its military presence in the Western Pacific through 
multilateral exercises with the U.S., Japanese, Australian and Singaporean navies.1523  Security 
cooperation between India and Japan is likely to increase because of their shared apprehensions about 
&KLQD¶VLQWHQWLRQV1524  In December 2015, Prime Ministers Abe and Modi issued a joint statement on 
their µ6SHFLDO 6WUDWHJLF DQG *OREDO 3DUWQHUVKLS¶ ZLWK VSHFLILF IRFXV RQ VWUHQJWKHQLQJ UHJLRQDO
institutions such as the EAS, their support for UNCLOS and maintaining open SLOCs across the Indo-
Asia-Pacific.1525  %RWK,QGLDDQG-DSDQDUHZHOODZDUHRI%HLMLQJ¶VOHss than subtle attempts at preventing 
their rise, reflected in its opposition to the expansion of the UN Security Council to include India and 
                                                          
the Indian Ocean, as well as supporting them in the South China Sea. For more on regional hedging strategies, 
see 'ŽŚ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŚŝŶĂŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ?viii.  
1518 ^ƵŶŝů<ŚŝůŶĂŶŝĞƚĂů ? “EŽŶůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? P&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐWŽůŝĐǇĨŽƌ/ŶĚŝĂŝŶƚŚĞdǁĞŶƚǇ-&ŝƌƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?
Centre for Policy Research, 2012, 14. http://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/nonalignment-20-foreign-and-
strategic-policy-india-twenty-first-century (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1519 Since 2005, Washington has increasingly accommodated New Delhi. From a country prohibited from 
defence procurement of crucial high-technology transfers, India has become a recipient of major defence 
platforms and technology. The Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal (2006) necessitated amendments to US domestic law 
for legislative approval. S. Rajasimman,  “/ŶĚŝĂŝŶh^^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?Indian Defense Review, 
January 30, 2015. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/india-in-us-strategic-rebalance-in-asia-pacific/ 
(accessed August 13, 2015). New Delhi has refused to sign two key defence agreements usually demanded of 
U.S. allies on communications and logistical support. See ĞŶǇĞƌĂŶĚ>ĂŬƐŚŵŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂƉƉĞĂƌƐmbivalent about 
ZŽůĞƐĂƐh ?^ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇWŝǀŽƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝĂ ? ? 
1520 Pak K. Lee and Lai-,ĂŚĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂŶĚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐWĞƌƐƉĞĐtive on Military Intervention: Why Africa but not 
^ǇƌŝĂ ? ?Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 2 (2016): 179-214. 
1521 WĂŶƚĂŶĚ:ŽƐŚŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇZĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ?
1522 WĂŶƚĂŶĚ:ŽƐŚŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂn Foreign Policy RĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1523 WĂŶ ? “dŚĞ ‘/ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ'ĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐĂďŽƵƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐZŝƐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂŶZĞŐŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1524 ZĂũĂŶ DĞŶŽŶ ?  “dŚĞ /ŶĚŝĂ DǇƚŚ ? ?The National Interest (November/December 2014): 54-55. 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-india-myth-11517 (accessed September 9, 2016).   
1525 Indian Ministry ŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and 
Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ZĞŐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ? ?
December 12, 2015.  
http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global
_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_IndoPacific_R (accessed June 12, 2016). 
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Japan as permanent members.1526  ,QGLD¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH(DVW$VLD6XPPLWZDVIDFLOLWDWHGE\-DSDQ
and while China resisted the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Japan strongly backed their entry.1527   
 
The U.S. LV LQVWUXPHQWDOLQ,QGLD¶VGHHSHQLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWK LWVRZQVWUDWHJLFDOOLHV LQWKH$VLD-
Pacific.1528  Equally, the GHHSHQLQJ RI UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ $PHULFD¶V NH\ UHJLRQDO DOOLHV is 
advantageous to the United States.  The cultivation of greater cooperation between the states of the 
various sub-UHJLRQV VXJJHVWV D µSURFHVV RI RSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJ ,QGR-Pacific cooperation as a seamless 
FRQVWUXFW¶LVRFFXUULQJLQYLWDODUHDVLQFOXGLQJPDULWLPHVHFXULW\FRXQWHr-terrorism, disaster relief and 
counter-piracy.1529  The integration of the Indo-Asia-Pacific concept into Indian foreign policy circles 
strengthens the linkage to converging interests with the United States, and American allies, particularly 
in the case of the upholding of global public goods.  India has made common cause with the U.S. on 
the issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and has joined in 
trilateral defence dialogues with the U.S. and Japan, in addition to strengthening strategic ties with 
Australia.1530 
 
In 2014, India and Japan began regular national security consultations following the initiation of annual 
trilateral meetings between India, Japan and the U.S. in 2011, with Japanese SDF participation in three 
of the annual U.S.-Indian Malabar naval exercises.1531  Growing security cooperation between India 
and Japan suggests an emergent regional balance of power that is potentially less threatening to Beijing 
than a possible alliance between India and the United States.1532  Moreover, it suits India to maintain 
strategic autonomy by not becoming a spoke in the hub-and-spokes alliance system.1533  <HW,QGLD¶V
                                                          
1526 ,ĂƌƐŚs ?WĂŶƚ ? “ŚŝŶĂŽŶƚŚĞ,ŽƌŝǌŽŶ P/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ‘>ŽŽŬĂƐƚ ?WŽůŝĐǇ'ĂƚŚĞƌƐDŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ? ?Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer 
2013): 459. 
1527 WĂŶƚ ? “ŚŝŶĂŽŶƚŚĞ,ŽƌŝǌŽŶ P/ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ ‘>ŽŽŬĂƐƚ ?WŽůŝĐǇ'ĂƚŚĞƌƐDŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1528 WĂŶƚĂŶĚ:ŽƐŚŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1529 ŚĂĐŬŽ ?  “dŚĞZŝƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ /ĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
WŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1530 According to one Australian analyst, Australia is of strategic interest to New Delhi as a result of the U.S.-
Australia strategic alliance. India seeks greater bilateral defence cooperation with Canberra in relation to the 
/ŶĚŝĂŶKĐĞĂŶ ?'ƌĂĞŵĞŽďĞůů ? “ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?/ŶĚŝĂĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?The Strategist, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, July 6, 2015. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-india-and-strategic-convergence/  
(accessed June 12, 2016). 
1531 Japan participated in the Malabar exercises in 2007, 2009 and 2014. The 2015 Malabar exercise was 
ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂǇŽĨĞŶŐĂůŝŶKĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŶĐĞŚŝŶĂƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
Bay of Bengal Malabar exercise, the 2015 Malabar exercise was restricted to the U.S. and India, without Japanese 
participation. DĞŶŽŶ ? “dŚĞ/ŶĚŝĂDǇƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? 
1532 WĂŶƚĂŶĚ:ŽƐŚŝ ? “/ŶĚŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞh ?^ ?WŝǀŽƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1533 India rejects quadrilateral defence collaboration with the U.S., Japan and Australia. The first attempt at an 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĚ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƉƌŽƚĞƐƚƐďǇŚŝŶĂ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ desire for such a 
grouping was reiterated by Chief of PACOM, Adm. Harry B. Harris in March 2016. Despite its reluctance,  ‘ŝƚƐ
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developing strategic partnership with the U.S. will remain critical, given that it cannot currently carry 
WKHEXUGHQRILWVUHJLRQDOSDUWQHUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVLQEDODQFLQJ&KLQD,QGLDLVLQFUHDVLQJO\LVVXLQJMRLQW
communiqués with America, Japan and Australia, emphasising democracy and the rule of law.1534  
During 3ULPH0LQLVWHU1DUHQGUD0RGL¶V visit to Washington in September 2014, DQG2EDPD¶VUHWXUQ
visit to New Delhi in January 2015, Modi all but aligned India openly with America.1535  In a rare but 
unambiguous move, Obama and Modi issued a 430-ZRUGµMRLQWVWUDWHJLFYLVLRQIRUWKH$VLD-Pacific and 
Indian Ocean region,¶ SURPRWLQJ VWDELOLW\ FHOHEUDWLQJ KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG LPSRUWDQWO\ FDOOLQJ IRU
µVDIHJXDUGLQJPDULWLPHVHFXULW\DQGHQVXULQJIUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQ«HVSHFLDOO\ LQWKH6RXWK&KLQD
Sea¶1536  It has become customary for other U.S. allies, including Australia and New Zealand to offer 
similar joint communiqués urging restraint by China in the South China Sea.1537   
 
Building on the work of the G.W. Bush administration in recognising ,QGLD¶VVWDtus as a regional power 
and emerging global player,1538 WKHSROLF\RIZRUNLQJ WRZDUGV,QGLD¶VJOREDOHFRQRPLFDQGVHFXULW\
integration has been strengthened under the Obama administration.   While U.S.-India relations are not 
unproblematic,1539 ,QGLD¶Vsupport for the promotion of democracy and international rule of law has 
EROVWHUHG,QGLD¶VGLSORPDWLFSRVLWLRQand international status.  The Indo-Asia-Pacific concept brings 
India indirectly into the American sphere, which strengthens American security hegemony via strategic 
partnerships and alliances.  India, too, openly plays up the China threat, citing border tensions and 
                                                          
intĞƌĞƐƚƐŵĂǇĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĚƌŝǀĞŝƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŶĚƐŝĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? ?Lisa Curtis, Walter Lohman, Rory Medcalf, 
>ǇĚŝĂWŽǁĞůů ?ZĂũĞƐǁĂƌŝZĂũĂŐŽƉĂůĂŶĂŶĚŶĚƌĞǁ^ŚĞĂƌĞƌ ? “^ŚĂƌĞĚ'ŽĂůƐ ?ŽŶǀĞƌŐŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ PWůĂŶĨŽƌh ?^ ?-
Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 2011, 14. 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/shared-goals-converging-interests-a-plan-for-u-s-
australia-india-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific (accessed August 13, 2015) 
1534 Economist ? “/ŶĚŝĂŝŶƐŝĂ Pŝƚ-DŽƌĞWůĂǇĞƌ ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1535 The South China Sea was first mentioned in a joint statement where India iterated its position that maritime 
disputes should be resolved in accordance with UNCLOS. This indicated a break from the usual past caution. The 
tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “h ?^ ?-India Joint StatĞŵĞŶƚ ? WƌĞƐƐ ZĞůĞĂƐĞ ? ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement (accessed August 13, 
2015); The White ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “U.S.-/ŶĚŝĂ :ŽŝŶƚ ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ P ^ŚĂƌĞĚ ĨĨŽƌƚ ? WƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ĨŽƌ ůů ? ? :ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1536 Economist ? “/ŶĚŝĂŝŶƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
1537 Following an Australian-New Zealand summit in February 2016, both nations noted that the increased 
tensions in the South China Seas are creating difficulties for regional nations. :ĂŵŝĞ^ŵǇƚŚ ? “ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ and New 
Zealand warn China on Maritime TĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ? ? Financial Times, February 19, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1286e904-d6ca-11e5-969e-9d801cf5e15b.html#axzz4Cu7RN7yS (accessed June 
26, 2016).   
1538 >ůŽǇĚ / ? ZƵĚŽůƉŚ ĂŶĚ ^ƵƐĂŶŶĞ ,ŽĞďĞƌ ZƵĚŽůƉŚ ?  “DĂŬŝŶŐ h ?^ ? &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ĨŽƌ ^ŽƵƚŚ ƐŝĂ P KĨĨ-Shore 
Balancing in Historical Perspective, ?Economic and Political Weekly (February 25, 2006): 703-709. 
1539 India is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); on the economic front, the US is concerned 
that India is not making sufficient reform on areas such as IPR and protected markets/foreign investment 
restrictions. K. Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations and the Visit of Prime Minister Modi (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service Insight, June 6, 2016). https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10500.pdf (accessed 
June 26, 2016). 
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&KLQD¶V HVFDODWLQJ QDYDO DFWLYLW\ LQ WKH ,QGLDQ 2FHDQ  $V &KLQD¶V SHUFHLYHG DVVHUWLYH EHKDYLRXU
increases, the more regional states move towards the American security umbrella, remaining as bilateral 
spokes, or moving towards pluri-lateral webs, which renews and reinvents the bargain of American 
hegemony.1540   
 
(iii) Securing American naval preponderance 
The rebalance strategy has focused AmerLFDQDWWHQWLRQRQ&KLQD¶V militarisation and its intentions in 
the Asia-Pacific.  Conversely, the rebalance has given Chinese officials, academics and PLA leaders 
µDPSOH UKHWRULFDO DPPXQLWLRQ¶ WR SXVK WKURXJK ZLWK PLOLWDU\ PRGHUQLVDWLRQ HVSHFLDOO\ DFFHOHUated 
naval modernisation and technical knowledge.1541  There is intense Chinese contestation with regard to 
$PHULFD¶Vprioritisation of public security goods, including adherence to freedom of navigation, and, 
and modes of conflict management, including UNCLOS, as the primary conflict management tool in 
the South and East China Sea disputes.  If the U.S. cannot protect its allies, or provide a sustainable 
security umbrella, the U.S. would be breaching one of the critical terms upon which its regional 
hegemony rests.  Consequently, &KLQD¶V DWWHPSWV WRFKDOOHQJH$PHULFDQPLOLtary dominance in the 
South China Sea are being met with strong resistance from the United States.1542  From the American 
perspective, all trading countries using the Pacific and Indian Oceans have a common interest in 
maintaining order and should cooperate their efforts.  With American direction, a more robust coalition 
incorporating pluri-lateral groupings of other regional actors, including India, Japan and Australia is 
vital for U.S. interests.  Another important mechanism through which the U.S. seeks to influence 
UHJLRQDO UHVSRQVHV WR WKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDGLVSXWHV LV YLD WKH UHJLRQ¶VPDLQPXOWLODWHUDO LQVWLWXWLRQ
ASEAN.   
 
,QVWLWXWLRQDO3RZHU6WUHQJWKHQLQJ$6($1¶VUROHLQFRQIOLFWPDQDJHPHQW 
Since USNS Impeccable incident in 2009, U.S. officials have maintained a level of pressure on Beijing 
by constructing the South China Sea issue as one that extends further than disputed territory, to one of 
maritime security affecting regional stability in traditional and non-traditional security matters, 
                                                          
1540 dŝŵ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?Chatham House (June 2014), 11. 
1541 Kun-ŚŝŶ>ŝŶĂŶĚŶĚƌĞƐsŝůůĂƌ'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-Pacific: China and the Emerging Order 
ŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƚĂŶĚ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƐ ? ?Chatham House, July 2015, 13. The PLA is developing an A2/AD strategy that 
ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ Ăŝƌ ?ƐĞĂ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ. ,ĂƌƌǇ <ĂǌŝĂŶŝƐ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
hŶĚĞƌǁĂƚĞƌ  ? ? ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Diplomat, May 6, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-
underwater-a2ad-strategy/  (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1542 The rebalance is a multifaceted approach to the China threat. In addition to strengthening of the alliance 
system and expanding pluri-lateral groupings, Chapter 4 discussed the reorientation of U.S. military capacity to 
project American power, including the JOAC and ASB concepts, and THAAD that would target an adversarǇ ?Ɛ
A2/AD capabilities.  
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including transport, resource extraction and fishing.1543  The U.S. government has issued a series of 
SXEOLF VWDWHPHQWV FULWLFDO RI YDULRXV &KLQHVH DFWLRQV FDOOLQJ WKHP µSURYRFDWLYH¶ µDJJUHVVLYH¶ DQG
µGHVWDELOLVLQJ¶SRLQWLQJWRDSDWWHUQRIEXOO\LQg and intimidation in Chinese behaviour.1544  U.S. officials 
have used every international venue as a forum for highlighting the situation in the South China Sea 
and using these mechanisms as a way to prioritise the issue and determine the direction of dispute 
management.1545   
 
)ROORZLQJ2EDPD¶VOHVVWKDQVXFFHVVIXOWULSWR%HLMLQJLQ1RYHPEHULt was Hillary Clinton who 
publically voiced U.S. concerns over the situation in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional 
Forum in Hanoi, July 2010.  In an interview with The Australian in November 2010, Clinton admitted 
that several Chinese officials, including Dai Bingguo, a senior foreign policy official in the Chinese 
government, had declared the South China Sea to be a core strategic interest at the May 2010 U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.1546  By raising it to the level of Tibet and Taiwan, China was, 
in effect, declaring it would go to war over the South China Sea.  Given the concerns of Southeast states 
over the Chinese declaration that the South China Sea was a core strategic interest, Clinton was reacting 
to what Washington deemed as a series of Chinese regional provocations.  It was essential for the U.S. 
to initiate the conflict management mechanism for the South China Sea as part of WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
focus on renewing its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  Consequently, Clinton set out the refined and 
expanded U.S. policy on managing the conflict at the Hanoi regional forum, making it clear that the 
conflict must be resolved in accordance with the rule of law.1547  Clinton outlined D µFROODERUDWLYH¶
diplomatic process among claimants and strongly encouraged the negotiation of a legally binding Code 
of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN and China to manage the disputes.1548  She also asserted that the 
                                                          
1543 >ŝŶĂŶĚ'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?25. 
1544 Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt,  “<ĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?dŚĞ
Foreign Policy Brief, Brookings Institution, August 2014, 7. 
1545 Since 2010, the South China Sea disputes have increasingly come to dominate the Shangri La Dialogue  W the 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ? ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ ďǇ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ? h^ ĂŶĚ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
officials. The June 2016 conference was no exception  W ǁŝƚŚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ
South China Sea, island-building, ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƌƵůŝŶŐďǇdŚĞ,ĂŐƵĞŽŶ ƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
South China Sea claims and the potential for China to declare an ADIZ.  WendeůůDŝŶŶŝĐŬ ? “Shangri-La Dialogue 
KƉĞŶƐ ŝŶ ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ? ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ >ĂƌŐĞůǇ ŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ?Defense News, June 3, 2016. 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2016/06/03/shangri-la-dialogue-
opens-singapore-south-china-sea-largely-dominating-summit/85361430/ (accessed June 26, 2016).  
1546 Greg SheƌŝĚĂŶ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ĐƚŝŽŶƐ DĞĂŶƚ ĂƐ dĞƐƚ ? ,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ ƐĂǇƐ ? ?The Australian, November 9, 2010. 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/china-actions-meant-as-test-hillary-clinton-says/story-
fn59niix-1225949666285 (accessed June 26, 2016). High level Chinese leaders have neither denied nor 
confirmed that the South China Sea is a core strategic interest. By 2011, they were happy to let the matter drop, 
however, as a means to smoothing over relations with the Obama administration. ĚǁĂƌĚtŽŶŐ ? ?ŚŝŶĂ,ĞĚŐĞƐ
KǀĞƌ tŚĞƚŚĞƌ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ /Ɛ Ă  ‘ŽƌĞ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? tŽƌƚŚ tĂƌ ? ? Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html?_r=0 (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1547 ^ŚĞƌŝĚĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐDĞĂŶƚĂƐdĞƐƚ ?,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶƐĂǇƐ ? ? 




WKH WHUULWRULDO GLVSXWHV ZHUH D UHJLRQDO FRQFHUQ  %HLMLQJ LQWHUSUHWHG µFROODERUDWLYH¶ WR PHDQ
µPXOWLODWHUDO¶ DQG LQYROYLQJ WKH PHGLDWLRQ RI WKH 8QLWed States in what it saw as bilateral matters 
between the parties involved in the territorial disputes.1549   
 
Prior to the Hanoi ARF in 2010, Beijing had succeeded in keeping the disputes off the agenda at the 
ARF and other regional meetings.  Beijing had also expressed interest in promoting separate spheres of 
influence and requested that the State Department not raise the South China Sea issue during the 2010 
ARF.1550  Beijing was therefore shocked by the U.S. intervention at the Hanoi summit.1551  Hillary 
Clinton not only raised the sovereignty issue, but she also rallied ASEAN claimants by stressing the 
pursuit of claims in accordance with UNCLOS.  In this move, the Obama administration challenged 
&KLQD¶V FODLPV EDVHG RQ KLVWRULFDO ULJKWV UDWKHU WKDQ OHJDO RQHV DQG &OLQWRQ¶V SURSRVDO IRU D
collaborative process additionally undermined CKLQD¶VSUHIHUHQFH IRUELODWHUDOQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK WKH
ASEAN claimants.1552  The South China Sea disputes bring into focus the contrasting views between 
the U.S. and China on regional conflict management, which is an important aspect of hegemonic 
legitimacy.1553   
 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRPXOWLODWHUDOLVHDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHWKHWHUULWRULDOGLVSXWHVLQWKH6RXWK
China Sea has allowed for other regional players, especially India, Japan and Australia to become 
involved.  India has supported the American agenda FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LWV RZQ FRQFHUQV RI &KLQD¶V
assertiveness, by starting to raise the South China Sea issue at various regional settings including 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit.1554  Japan is pursuing a number of 
strategies to mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea.  Japanese officials raise the problem at 
                                                          
1549 Indyk et al, ĞŶĚŝŶŐ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ PĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ, 48-9.  
1550 :ŽŚŶWŽŵĨƌĞƚ ? “ĞŝũŝŶŐůĂŝŵƐ ‘/ŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĂďůĞ^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ŽǀĞƌ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?Washington Post, July 31, 
2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html 
(accessed June 26, 2016). 
1551 ^ŚĞƌŝĚĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐDĞĂŶƚĂƐdĞƐƚ ?,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶƐĂǇƐ ? ? 
1552 Leszek Buszynski ?  “dŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ P Kŝů ? DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ ůĂŝŵƐ ĂŶĚ h ?^ ?-ŚŝŶĂ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ZŝǀĂůƌǇ ? ?The 
Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 149. 
1553 WƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ) ?ŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ŬĞǇďĂƐŝƐ
of great ƉŽǁĞƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĂŵĂƌŬĞƌŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?'ŽŚ ?The Struggle for Order, 73.   
1554 India continues to raise its concerns over the South China Sea disputes at the India-ASEAN Delhi Dialogue, 
ƚŚĞZ&ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐGreat Wall of Sand also attracted criticism from New Delhi, along with 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhE>K^ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ŝƉĂŶũĂŶŚĂƵĚŚƵƌǇ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐĞƐŝŶ^ ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ
^ĞĂ tŽƌƌŝĞƐ /ŶĚŝĂ ? ?Economic Times (Mumbai), March 26, 2015. 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-26/news/60516212_1_south-china-sea-bilateral-
cooperation-artificial-islands (accessed AuŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂƚŚĞƌŝŶĞsĂůĞŶƚĞ ? “/ŶĚŝĂďĂĐŬƐW,ŝŶŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂƌŽǁ ? ?
Manila Times, March 11, 2015. http://www.manilatimes.net/india-backs-ph-in-china-sea-row/168539/ 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
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regional security forums, Tokyo seeks to enhance cooperation with ASEAN on maritime security, 
discusses the matter bilaterally with ASEAN nations and has embarked upon capacity-building to the 
Philippines.1555  $XVWUDOLD¶V  'HIHQFH :KLWH 3DSHU DOVR RXWOLQHV WKH VWUDWHJLF VLJQLILFDQFH RI
Southeast Asia and the SLOCs to Australian trade and to Australian security.  Since 2014, Australia has 
focused on deepening its ties with U.S. allies and strategic partners across East Asia.1556  With its focus 
on land reclamation, support for UNCLOS and a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, and its 
UHFRJQLWLRQRI WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI$6($1DQG WKH($6 WKH$XVWUDOLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶V'HIHQFH
White Paper reflects the U.S. position and echoes its concerns. 
 
(i) Promoting a regional institutional response to conflict management through ASEAN 
7KHSURFHVVRIFRQIOLFWPDQDJHPHQWLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDKDVRFFXUUHGPDLQO\WKURXJK$6($1¶V
regional mechanisPVZKRVHDSSURDFKHPSKDVLVHVFRRSHUDWLRQDQGµSUHYHQWDWLYHGLSORPDF\WKURXJK
UHJXODURIILFLDOGLDORJXH¶1557  In the case of the South China Sea, the U.S. has sought to share some 
authority in conflict management with ASEAN.  ASEAN has taken on the mantle of conflict 
management through the negotiation of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with U.S. 
support.1558  The U.S. encourages ASEAN-led conflict avoidance frameworks as the key mode of 
regional conflict management, supported by international legal frameworks.1559  The U.S. also uses the 
U.S-ASEAN annual summit to press for a consistent approach by ASEAN members over matters 
relating to the South China Sea.1560  The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC) that came into effect in November 2002 was the first multilateral, although non-binding 
                                                          
1555 /ĂŶ^ƚŽƌĞǇ ? “:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐDĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ/nterests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea DŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ?Political 
Science 65, no. 2 (2013): 135. 
1556 Australia has strengthened security ties with Indonesia, through the 2012 Defence Cooperation Arrangement 
and 2014 Joint Understanding on Intelligence cooperation. There is also a comprehensive strategic partnership 
(2015) with Singapore and relationships with Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Japan. See 
Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra, February 25, 2016), 
chapter 5, especially 56-58. http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1557 The 2002 Declaration committed ASEAN and China to peaceful dispute resolution; to self-restraint, including 
no further occupation of uninhabited features; and to enhancing exchanges and cooperation, especially search 
and rescue, humanitarian assistance and transnational crime.  In October 2012, the parties recommitted to the 
ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ^ĞĞ ^E ?  “ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĚƵĐƚ ŽĨWĂƌƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ? ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2 (accessed June 
26, 2016). 
1558 A Code of Conduct would establish mutually agreeable mechanisms to manage the South China Sea, and 
may also include a dispute settlement mechanism and legally binding adherence to international law via 
UNCLOS.   
1559 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 111. 
1560 At the February 2016 US-ASEAN summit, the US encouraged all ASEAN members as a unit to put diplomatic 
pressure on Beijing to accept the ITLOS ruling regarding the Philippines. GĞŽĨĨǇĞƌ ? “h^ƚŽĐŽƌƌĂů^E^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ
in South China Sea SƉĂƚ ? ?Financial Times, February 12, 2016. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8f9607c-d155-11e5-
831d-09f7778e7377.html (accessed June 26, 2016). 
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statement of its kind on conflict management.  This provided ASEAN with a role for regional conflict 
management within a U.S.-friendly framework, but one not directly influenced by the United States.1561   
 
Beyond the 2002 declaration, only modest progress has been made towards a binding Code of Conduct.  
Since formal negotiations recommenced in 2013, there has been scant agreement on what should be 
included and whether the Code should contain a binding dispute settlement mechanism.1562  China 
resists draft proposals that would limit its movements, thereby ending its military exercises in disputed 
waters, or that would reaffirm total freedom of navigation.1563  &KLQD¶VODQG reclamation in the Spratly 
islands also arguably violates the spirit of the 2002 DOC and makes discussions over a potential Code 
of Conduct more difficult.1564  Any statement from Washington encouraging cooperation between 
ASEAN countries to bolster their position with China in negotiating a Code of Conduct has been 
dismissed by Beijing as American interference in a regional (or, more importantly, bilateral) matter.1565  
It has been suggested that China continues to make only small concessions to the ASEAN Code of 
Conduct negotiations, while it continues to consolidate control over the South China Sea.1566   
 
$6($1KDVEHHQNHHQWRDYRLGPXOWLODWHUDOLVLQJWKHGLVSXWHVSDUWO\LQUHVSRQVHWR%HLMLQJ¶VZDUQLQJV
DQGDOVRRXWRIIHDURIWHVWLQJPHPEHUV¶FROOHFWLYHFRPPLWPHQWVWRH[LVWLQJDJUHHPHQWV and overlapping 
claims in the South China Sea.1567  A low point for ASEAN came in 2012, when members failed to 
issue a joint communiqué at its annual foreign ministers meeting.  It was reported that the chair, 
Cambodia, blocked reference to South China Sea disSXWHV DW %HLMLQJ¶V ELGGLQJ1568  Consequently, 
                                                          
1561 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 105. 
1562 Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, 30. 
1563 ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶdŝĞǌǌŝ ? “tŚǇŚŝŶĂ/ƐŶ ?ƚ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŽĚĞŽĨŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?The Diplomat, February 
26, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/why-china-isnt-interested-in-a-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/ 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1564 Dolven, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, 4. 
1565 China has repeatedly lobbied ASEAN members to prevent consensus on the matter and accused the US of 
attempting to damage the relationship between China and ASEAN. DĂƚƚŚĞǁ>ĞĞ ? “^E^Ƶŵŵŝƚ P<ĞƌƌǇƉƌĞƐƐĞƐ
ŚŝŶĂ ĂŶĚ EĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ ŽŶ DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ /ƐƐƵĞƐ Ăƚ ƌƵŶĞŝ ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ? The Independent, May 21, 2013. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/asean-summit-john-kerry-presses-china-and-neighbours-
on-maritime-issues-at-brunei-summit-8868155.html (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1566 Prior to the 2015 ASEAN conferenĐĞ ?ŝŶĂŵŽǀĞƚŚĂƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƐŵĂůůĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŽƌǇŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƉĂƌƚ ?
ĞŝũŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽĂŚŽƚůŝŶĞĨŽƌŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐ^^ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ŶŬŝƚWĂŶĚĂ ? “For the ASEAN-China South China Sea 
ŽĚĞ ŽĨ ŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? EŝŶƚŚ dŝŵĞ /ƐŶ ?ƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĂƌŵ ? ?The Diplomat, August 1, 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/for-the-asean-china-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-ninth-time-isnt-the-
charm/ (accessed August 14, 2015); Dolven, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 30. 
1567 ASEAN cannot formally act as a third party mediator unless ascribed/asked to do so by a member. However, 
since it views its role primarily as confidence-building and contributing to the non-escalation of disputes, it can 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?>ŝŶĂŶĚ'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ?“DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?24. 
1568 /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌŝƐŝƐ 'ƌŽƵƉ ?  “^ƚŝƌƌŝŶŐ ƵƉ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ  ?/// ) P  &ůĞĞƚŝŶŐ KƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ Ăůŵ ? ? Asia 





UROH LQ UHJLRQDO FRQIOLFW PDQDJHPHQW DQG KLJKOLJKW$6($1¶V LQWHUQDO OLPLWDWLRQV LQ IRUPXODWLQJ D
united policy on &KLQDDQGWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDGLVSXWHV$6($1¶VForeign Minister Meeting 2015 
statement, criticising land reclamation activities and reaffirming the 2014 statement of µPDLQWDLQLQJ
peace, stability, security and freedom of navigation in and over-flight over the South China Sea,¶
indicates the importance of ASEAN to the regional conflict management mechanism.1569  With the 2016 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting following shortly after the tribunal ruling, the joint communiqué 
GLGQRWH[SOLFLWO\GHQRXQFH&KLQD¶Vassertive actions in the South China Sea, instead preferring a soft 
response, implying the ongoing struggle within ASEAN to produce a strong and coherent approach to 
the South China Sea stems from conflicting interests and rivalries.1570    
 
As a rising power undergoing international status anxiety and requiring positive domestic outcomes, 
Beijing fears losing of control over the multilateral agenda and is wary of the µSRWHQWLDOLQIOXHQFHRI
non-FODLPDQWLQWHUHVWVDOOLHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶1571  Instead, Beijing advocates bilateral negotiations 
RYHUµERUGHULVVXHV¶ZLWKWKHSDUWLHVFRQFHUQHG1572  )URP&KLQD¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKH86QDYDOSUHVHQFH
in the western Pacific has emboldened the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea to oppose Chinese 
claims.1573  %HLMLQJ¶V holds Washington responsible for the escalation of tensions, through its 
encouragement of weaker states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, to assert their claims vis-à-vis 
China.  Beijing is concerned that the other claimants, and ASEAN, will unite against China, while 
6RXWKHDVW$VLD¶VLQFUHDVHGGHSHQGHQFHRQ$PHULFDQVHFXULW\SURYLVLRQVLVEHLQJDFWLYHO\HQFRXUDJHG
by Washington.1574  China refuses to acknowledge the outcome of the ITLOS process initiated by the 
                                                          
(accessed March 25, 2016). &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ^E ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĞĞĂƌůǇůĞ. dŚĂǇĞƌ ? “^E ?Ɛ
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building? ?The Asia-Pacific Journal 10, 
issue 34, no. 4, (August, 20, 2012): 1-23.  ‘ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ^E ?Ɛ ? ?-year endeavor to 
ďŽůƐƚĞƌ ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ĨƌŽŵ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐ  “ĨĂĐƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ďǇ
ĂŶŶĞǆŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ ĞĂĂŶĚƉůĂĐŝŶŐŝƚƵŶĚĞƌŚŝŶĞƐĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?ĂƌůǇůĞ ?dŚĂǇĞƌ ?
 “Indirect Cost Imposition Strategies in the South China Sea: h ?^ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚ^EĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? CNAS, April 
2015, 7. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Maritime%208%20Thayer.pdf 
(accessed June 16, 2016). 
1569 ASEAN,  “ASEAN Foreign MinistĞƌƐ ?^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞƵƌƌĞŶƚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?Nay Pyi 
Taw, Burma, May 10, 2014. http://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-current-developments-
in-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1570 ĚĂŵ >ĞŽŶŐ <ŽŬ tĞǇ ?  “/Ɛ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ĨƌĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ^E ? ? ĂƐƚ ƐŝĂ &ŽƌƵŵ ? ƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/25/is-the-south-china-sea-fracturing-asean/ (accessed August 27, 
2016). 
1571 ŚŝŶĞƐĞƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶǀŝĞǁƐĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞǁŝƚŚ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŶ ‘ƐŵĂůůĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƐĂƐŝŐŶŽĨǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ ?
WithŽƵƚĂŚĂƌĚƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŵĂǇďĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?>ŝŶĂŶĚ'ĞƌƚŶĞƌ ? “DĂƌŝƚŝŵĞ
Security in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1572 yƵĞ >ŝ ?  “,Žǁ ŚŝŶĂ sŝĞǁƐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐĞ ? ?The Diplomat, July 14, 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/how-china-views-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-case/ (accessed August 13, 
2015). 
1573 Buszynski ? “dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ PKŝů ?DĂƌŝtime Claims, and US-ŚŝŶĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƌŝǀĂůƌǇ ? ?147. 
1574 Bader et al,  “<ĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂŝŶWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?3. 
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Philippines because it considers the matter a bilateral dispute that Manila has internationalised with 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VHQFRXUDJHPHQW 
 
Beijing has appeared to soften LWVUHVLVWDQFHWRPXOWLODWHUDODSSURDFKHVHQGRUVLQJ$6($1¶VOHDGUROH
in managing and maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea along with China.  Beijing has 
SURSRVHG D µGXDO WUDFN¶ DSSroach, whereby under a multilateral framework, ASEAN could play a 
suitable role, but mediation, or interference, from powers outside the region has been firmly opposed.  
The intention is to block U.S. involvement in the dispute settlement process.1575  7KH µGXDO WUDFN¶
approach, however, continues to push for negotiation and consultations with affected parties only.1576  
By favouring a regional mechanism, Beijing has consented to a relatively controllable regional 
multilateral mechanism which it hopes will exclude the participation of the United States.1577  Beijing 
courted Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, with well-coordinated visits in April 2016, to reach agreement on 
a four-point consensus with these ASEAN nations on the South China Sea issue that affirms its dual 
track approach.1578  This was an attempt to secure regional diplomatic support before The Hague ruling 
on the arbitration case in July $WWKHVDPHWLPHWKLVPRYHGHPRQVWUDWHV%HLMLQJ¶VZillingness to 
exacerbate the existing divisions amongst ASEAN nations to secure its own interests.1579 
 
U.S. twin track support of the UNCLOS, and establishing ASEAN as the primary forum for regional 
dispute settlement, has garnered support from the other ASEAN members.  The Obama DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
HIIRUWVWRSURYLGHOHDGHUVKLSZKLOVWUHFRJQLVLQJWKHYLWDOUROHRI$6($1¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOSURFHVVHVDQG
international legal frameworks, have been essential for gaining regional support.1580  There is, however, 
a limit to Southeast Asian complicity with American regional hegemonic authority.  While the region 
supports American deterrence in pressuring China into negotiating and abiding by a code of conduct on 
the South China Sea with ASEAN, there is no will to support American activities if this intends to either 
                                                          
1575 International Crisis Group,  “Stirring up the South ŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ?/// ) ? ? ? ? ? 
1576 tĂŶŐzŝ ? “ƵĂůdƌĂĐŬƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐƚŚĞDŽƐƚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ&ĞĂƐŝďůĞ tĂǇƚŽZĞƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ/ƐƐƵĞ ? ?
Chinese Foreign Ministry, Brunei, April 21, 2016. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358167.shtml (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1577 Xue ? “How China Views the SouƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĞ ? ?
1578 The four-point consensus affirms that the Spratly island disputes are not an ASEAN-China issue and should 
not have implications for ASEAN-China relations; that sovereignty is paramount and that no unilateral decision 
can be imposed; that the DOC is the best way to solve the disputes; that China and ASEAN can main effective 
peace and security without external interference. ^ĂŵƉĂ<ƵŶĚƵ ? “ŚŝŶĂĚŝǀŝĚĞƐ^EŝŶƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂĞ^Ă ? ?
East Asia Forum, May 21, 2016. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/21/china-divides-asean-in-the-south-
china-sea/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1579 PƌĂƐŚĂŶƚŚ WĂƌĂŵĞƐǁĂƌĂŶ ?  “tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ehind China ?Ɛ EĞǁ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ǁŝƚŚ dŚƌĞĞ E^AN 
SƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?The Diplomat, April 25, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/whats-behind-chinas-new-south-
china-sea-consensus-with-three-asean-states/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1580 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 111. 
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contain China, or lose their own autonomy.1581  However, out of necessity, a China that continues to 
OLPLW$6($1¶VDttempts to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct, and asserts unilateral sovereignty over 
the South ChLQD6HDZRUNV LQ$PHULFD¶V IDYRXU 0DQ\6RXWKHDVW$VLDQVWDWHVDUHLQFUHDVLQJ WKHLU
GHSHQGHQFHRQ$PHULFD¶VUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\JXDUDQWHHVWRYDU\LQJGHJUHHVWKXVVXVWDLQLQJ$PHULFD¶V
leadership role in regional conflict management, and enhancing its hegemonic authority in the South 
China Sea.   
 
$VWKHUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQWKH86KDVFUHGLEO\GHPRQVWUDWHGµVXVWDLQHGEHQLJQLW\¶LQDVVXULQJRWKHUV
of its lack of territorial ambitions, its willingness to encourage multilateral institutional processes in 
conflict management, and its responsiveness to Southeast Asian security concerns from allies and non-
allies.1582  The U.S. position stands in contrast to China, which has demonstrated a reluctance to commit 
to regional conflict management efforts or to international regimes of conflict resolution.  There are two 
crucial consequences: first, China may not be able to ignore regional preferences over the longer term, 
which means it will have to negotiate terms of the position it seeks in the regional hierarchy with other 
UHJLRQDO DFWRUV  6HFRQG WKLV FDVH UHLQIRUFHV WKH 86 UROH DV µXOWLPDWH GHWHUUHQW DQG JXDUDQWRU¶ RI
regional security which also serves to strengthen American preponderance.1583  
 
Structural Power: Accommodating competing regional trade and financial initiatives  
FURP %HLMLQJ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH WKH Jlobal financial crisis highlighted the structural weaknesses in the 
American economic model and signified a change in the international economic landscape.  China and 
other BRICS nations ± Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa ± had sustained their economic 
performance during the crisis better than many developed economies, particularly that of the United 
States and Europe.  The financial crisis also drew Chinese attention to the potential weakness of the 
U.S. dROODUDQGUHGXFHGWKHLUFRQILGHQFHLQLWVVWDWXVDVWKHZRUOG¶VUHVHUYHFXUUHQF\1584  Prior to the 
2009 G20 summit in London, Beijing used this opportunity to strengthen its position in global economic 
governance by pushing for reform of the international monetary system, suggesting a global reserve 
system to replace the dollar as the single reserve currency and proposing to expand the use of Special 
Drawing Rights to include the yuan.1585   
                                                          
1581 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 113. 
1582 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 213. 
1583 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 204-5. 
1584 tƵ yŝŶďŽ ?  “hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů /ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨƚŚĞ 'ůŽďĂů &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?The Washington 
Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 157. 
1585 ŚŽƵ yŝĂŽĐŚƵĂŶ ?  “ZĞĨŽƌŵ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů DŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? DĂƌĐŚ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf (accessed June 26, 2016).  
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:KLOH&KLQD¶VVWDWXVLQJOREDOHFRQRPLFgovernance was advanced by the global financial crisis, for 
WKH86 WKH FULVLV DFFHOHUDWHG WKHSHUFHSWLRQRI LWVGHFOLQH DJDLQVW DEDFNGURSRI&KLQD¶V ULVH  ,Q
Washington, this perception reinforced the need to reorient U.S. economic interests towards the Asia-
Pacific ± the hub of global economic growth ± as part of the rebalance strategy.  Moreover, it was critical 
for the U.S. to be integral to the direction of Asia-Pacific economic growth and cooperation by shaping 
the structure, norms and standards for regulating trade and finance.1586  This was the acknowledgement 
WKDWµHFRQRPLFVDUHVKDSLQJWKHVWUDWHJLFODQGVFDSH (PHUJLQJSRZHUVDUHSXWWLQJHFRQRPLFVDWWKH
FHQWUH RI WKHLU IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV¶1587 To maintain U.S. strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacific, U.S. 
leadership of global and Asia-Pacific economic governance has required strengthening.  The shift 
towards defining U.S. foreign policy priorities in economic terms was outlined through a number of 
broad projects and initiatives encompassing Eurasia, through a New Silk Route, the Asia-Pacific, 
through the TPP,1588 and China, through bilateral opportunities, including the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) and the negotiation of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).  The goal is to facilitate 
political and economic reforms through these American-led initiatives and raise standards in trade and 
investment within a U.S.-sanctioned framework in view of competing Chinese regional projects.  
Through the exercise of American structural power over the global economy, including its control over 
international institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, the system can DFFRPPRGDWH&KLQD¶VULVH
making necessary compromises that binds China more firmly within the existing structure.  Given the 
more open contestation of U.S. hegemony in the economic sphere, Washington has to be both proactive 
in its own initiatives, and reactive to those of other regional players.  
 
(i) Competing New Silk Road initiatives 
In July 2011, Hillary Clinton DQQRXQFHGDQDPELWLRXV1HZ6LON5RDGSURMHFWWKDWZRXOGEHDµZHERI
WUDGHDQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQOLQNVUHDFKLQJIURPWKHVWHSVRI&HQWUDO$VLDWRWKHVRXWKHUQWLSRI,QGLD¶1589  
While the strategic aim was to bring some economic stability to Afghanistan, the move into Central 
Asia was a means to weaken Russian, and potentially, Chinese influence, and, by uniting Central and 
                                                          
1586 'ƵŝůůĂƵŵĞ ĚĞ ZŽƵŐĠ ?  “dŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ ZĞďĂůŶĐĞ ? ? ŝŶOrigins and Evolution of the US 
Rebalance towards Asia: Diplomatic, Military and Economic Dimensions, eds. H. Mejier and Hugo Meijer 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 108. 
1587 ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ P ĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ WƌŽŵŝƐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ^ƚĂƚĞĐƌĂĨƚ ? ? ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ
Management University, Singapore, November 17, 2012. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1588 The TPP was discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
1589 US ^ƚĂƚĞ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?  “,ŝůůĂƌǇ ůŝŶƚŽŶ Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st 
Century ? ? ŚĞŶŶĂŝ ? /ŶĚŝĂ ? :ƵůǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168840.htm (accessed June 26, 2016). 
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South Asia, to reshape the regional geopolitical configurations.1590 Moreover, although some projects 
were underway, such as a free trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or planned, such as 
the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline (TAPI), first proposed in the 1990s, 
the potential challenges as a result of the instability in many of these countries would require vast 
funding resources that the U.S. government was not prepared to allocate to this region.1591  By 2014, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), scheduled to finance 40% of the project, withdrew, citing security 
concerns in Afghanistan following the U.S. drawdown.1592  The U.S. has continued to improve its trade 
relations with Central Asia, and established a U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment, with 
the additional aim of potentially drawing Afghanistan into this grouping.  The U.S. Silk Road project, 
however, remains an unrealised vision.1593    
 
$FFRUGLQJWRRQHVRXUFH&KLQHVHRIILFLDOVZHUHSHUSOH[HGE\&OLQWRQ¶VXVHRIWKHWHUPSilk Road to 
describe a U.S. policy.1594  *LYHQ&KLQD¶VVHQVHRIKLVWRULFDORZQHUVKLSRIWKHVHWUDGHURXWHV± not just 
one road ± stretching from China to the Mediterranean, during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 
3UHVLGHQW;L-LQSLQJDQQRXQFHG&KLQD¶VYLVLRQWRLPSURYHFRQQHFWLYLW\IUom China to Europe as 
DQ µHFRQRPLFEHOW¶ VRDV WRGLIIHUHQWLDWH LW IURP&OLQWRQ¶V New Silk Road.1595  $VSDUW RI WKH µ1HZ
1HLJKERXUKRRG 'LSORPDF\¶ VWUDWHJ\ ;L -LQSLQJ¶V One Belt, One Road (OBOR), or Silk Road 
Economic Belt (SREB), combined with the establishment of the Chinese-dominated AIIB, 
demonstrates the most sophisticated foreign policy shift in Beijing since 1989.1596  It is also a move by 
President Xi to fill the gap in trade and economic opportunities in Central Asia that the U.S., with its 
budgetary constraints, had not been able to exploit with its New Silk Road vision.1597  
 
                                                          
1590 :ŽƐŚƵĂ<ƵĐĞƌĂ ? “ůŝŶƚŽŶ ?ƐƵďŝŽƵƐWůĂŶƚŽ^ĂǀĞĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶǁŝƚŚĂ ‘EĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ? ? ?Atlantic, November 2, 
2011. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/clintons-dubious-plan-to-save-afghanistan-
with-a-new-silk-road/247760/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1591 :ŽƐŚƵĂ <ƵĐĞƌĂ ?  “dŚĞ EĞǁ ^ŝůŬ ZŽĂĚ ? ?The Diplomat, November 11, 2011. 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-new-silk-road/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1592 ZĞŝĚ ^ƚĂŶĚŝƐŚ ?  “dŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ^ŝůŬ ZŽĂĚ ƚŽ EŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?Foreign Policy, September 29, 2014. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/29/the-united-states-silk-road-to-nowhere-2/ (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1593 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2014), 45-47. 
1594 Theresa Fallon,  “dŚĞEĞǁ^ ŝůŬZŽĂĚ Pyŝ:ŝŶƉŝŶŐ ?Ɛ'ƌĂŶĚ^ ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌƵƌĂƐŝĂ ? ?American Foreign Policy Interests 
37, no. 3 (2015): 141. 
1595 Fallon,  “dŚĞEĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1596 ŚĞŶŐ tĂŶŐ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ ? ?The Diplomat, April 1, 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-alternative-diplomacy/ (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1597 Simon Denyer,  “ŚŝŶĂypasses ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘EĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ?ǁŝƚŚdǁŽŽĨŝƚƐKǁŶ ? ?Washington Post, October 
13, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-bypasses-american-new-silk-road-with-
two-if-its-own/2013/10/14/49f9f60c-3284-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html (accessed June 26, 2016). 
 280 
 
7KH LQLWLDWLYH UHSUHVHQWV&KLQD¶VHIIRUWV WRSOD\D OHDGHUVKLSUROH LQUHJLRQDODIIDLUVE\FRQWULEXWLQJ
µ&KLQHVH ZLVGRP¶ zhongguo zhihui E\ LQVLVWLQJ RQ µZLQ-ZLQ¶ FRRSHUDWLRQ throughout Asia.1598  
Chinese leaders see the creation of links such as the Silk Road fund and the AIIB, and the trade they 
generate, as essential to building good relations with neighbouring countries.1599  OBOR is an exercise 
in public diplomacy, setting out CKLQD¶VSULRULW\IRUSXEOLFJRRGVWKDWEHQHILWDOODQGH[FOXGHQRQHRQ
the basis of a sWDWH¶VSROLWLFDOLQFOLQDWLRQV1600  As a confidence-building measure, it is a move to produce 
the winning idea for future regional development and establish its own regional hegemony.  Beijing 
seeks to convince countries in Southeast Asia and beyond that China is a legitimate regional power.1601  
At the same time, however, &KLQD¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKOLWWRUDOQHLJKERXULQJFRXQWULHVcontinue to be 
tested by %HLMLQJ¶VFRQIURQWDWLRQal and coercive approach to the maritime security environment in the 
East and South China Seas.  The concept of a µFRPPXQLW\ZLWKFRPPRQGHVWLQ\¶LVLQWHQGHGWRDGGUHVV
the security and development challenges facing Asian states and to improve bilateral relations.1602   
 
The strategy is reinforced with significant financial investment, through which Beijing hopes to 
convince Southeast Asian states in particular that its intentions are benign.1603  The OBOR strategy 
DWWDFKHVµQRVWULQJV¶DQGLQWLPDWHVWKDWFROODERUDWLYHpartners will be treated as equals.1604  This is an 
DWWHPSWWRFHPHQWDQGOHJLWLPLVH%HLMLQJ¶VLQIOXHQFHDQGSRVLWLRQLQWKHregion by mobilising consent 
to its own hegemonic claims through financial incentives.  Money in exchange for influence, however, 
has not proven an entirely successful endeavour.1605  Mobilising its financial resources to finance the 
                                                          
1598 :ŝĂŶŚĂŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐEĞǁ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽlicy under Xi Jinping: TŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘WĞĂĐĞĨƵůZŝƐĞ ? ? ? ? ?Global Change, Peace 
and Security (2015): 11. yŝĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƵƐĞƐ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĞŽƵƐ ? ? ‘ĨĂŝƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ũƵƐƚ ?ŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
order, drawing on classical Chinese concepts, rather than simply translating Western ones.  
1599 Economist,  “dŚĞEĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ?^ƚƌĞƚĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞdŚƌĞĂĚƐ ? ? ?ƉƌŝŶƚĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ) ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-63. 
1600 dŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽƚŚĞh ?< ? ?>ŝƵyŝĂŽŵŝŶŐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞĂƐ “ĂŶŽĨĨĞƌŽĨĂƌŝĚĞŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
economic ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚƌĂŝŶ ?/ƚŝƐĂƉƵďůŝĐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽŽĚŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?Liu Xiaoming,  “EĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚŝƐ
an Opportunity not a TŚƌĞĂƚ ? ?Financial Times, May 24, 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8f58a7c-ffd6-11e4-
bc30-00144feabdc0.html (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1601 /ƚƐ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŵĂŶƚƌĂon its land borders contrasts with the threatening behaviour in the South 
China Sea. Economist ? “dŚĞEĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ ? ? ? ?-63. 
1602 At the May 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi outlined his 
ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ  ‘ƐŝĂŶ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ? ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ  “ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?  “ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ
 “ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨƵůůǇĞǆĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?yŝ:ŝŶƉŝŶŐ ? “EĞǁƐŝĂŶ
Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation: Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference 
ŽŶ/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞƵŝůĚŝŶŐDĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐof the WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨ
China (May, 21, 2014). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml (accessed June 26, 
2016). 
1603 ĂǀŝĚ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌWƵƐŚ PdŚĞ^ĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌZĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2015): 
100.  
1604 ^ŚĞŶŝŶŐůŝ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ‘KŶĞĞůƚ ?KŶĞZŽĂĚ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞgy Is Not aŶŽƚŚĞƌDĂƌƐŚĂůůWůĂŶ ? ?China-US Focus, May 16, 
2015.http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/china-advances-its-one-belt-one-road-strategy/ 
(accessed May 22, 2015).  
1605^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞǇŝĞůĚŝŶŐĂǀĞƌǇůŽǁƌĞƚƵƌŶ ?ĐŚŝĞĨůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝƚƐďĞŶŝŐŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?^ĞĞĂǀŝĚ^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ŽĨƚWŽǁĞƌWƵƐŚ PdŚĞ^ĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌ
ZĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2015), 100.  
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schemes, is a means of extending &KLQD¶VLQIOXHQFHDFURVVWKH$VLD-Pacific (in addition to Central Asia 
and Europe), thereby shaping and managing regional production centred on the needs of the Chinese 
economy.1606  &KLQD¶V HIIRUWV WR H[HUFLVH VWUXFWXUDO SRZHU E\ UH-organising regional production 
networks through the OBOR strategy in its favour has been contested.1607  Furthermore, there is a great 
deal of political instability within the countries along the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 
which is already beginning to affect the short term gains of the initiative.1608  
 
(ii) The Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank  
Integral to the OBOR strategy is the AIIB, a new regional financial institution launched by President 
Xi at the October 2012 APEC conference in Bali, to address the widening infrastructure gaps in the 
Asia-Pacific.1609  The AIIB will concentrate on the infrastructure and investment requirements of the 
UHJLRQ¶V HPHUJLQJ HFRQRPLHV SURYLGLQJ WKH ILQDQFLDO VXSSRUW IRU PXFK QHHGHG LQYHVWPHQW LQ
connectivity among Asia-3DFLILFHFRQRPLHVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK$3(&¶VH[LVWLQJFRPPLWPHQW1610  The 
creaWLRQRI WKH$,,%DQG WKH1HZ'HYHORSPHQW%DQN %5,&6%DQN UHIOHFW&KLQD¶VFRQILGHQFH LQ
asserting economic power, and its demand for greater input into the creation of rules governing global 
finance and investment.1611  China, along with many developing countries, has voiced its frustrations 
                                                          
1606 'ĂďƌŝĞůtŝůĚĂƵ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂĐŬƐhƉ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚŵďŝtions with $62bn Capital IŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Financial Times, April 20, 
2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e73c028-e754-11e4-8e3f-00144feab7de.html (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1607 Many Southeast Asian countries want to diversify their economic options not proliferate economic 
dependence on China.  They are concerned that Chinese goods may flood markets and overwhelm nascent 
industries ?dŚĞǇǀŝĞǁŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĂs on building infrastructure, rather than sharing technical knowhow, 
using Chinese workers rather than local citizens. A deeper fear is that China has bigger plans than improving 
infrastructure, connectivity, and boosting trade: it is trying to expand its sphere of influence along with its 
markets. Economist ? “dŚĞEĞǁ^ŝůŬZŽĂĚ P^ƚƌĞƚĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞdŚƌĞĂĚƐ ? ? ? ?-63. 
1608 The SREB project has faced setbacks: In September 2011, Myanmar suspended Chinese construction of the 
Myitsone dam following domestic opposition; In July 2014, Thailand approved a $23 billion deal for two high-
speed rail links with China but questions remain over the durability of an agreement made with the military 
junta. A change from the pro-Beijing to a pro-Indian government, following presidential elections in Sri Lanka, 
January 2015, has affected the degree of influence Beijing can exert in the Indian Ocean.  
1609 It is estimated that developing Asian economies will need to invest US$8 trillion from 2010 to 2020, just to 
keep pace with expected infrastructure needs. ŝƐǁĂE ?ŚĂƚƚĂĐŚĂƌǇĂǇ ? “ƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌ/ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
in Energy, Transport, Telecommunications, Water and Sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 2010- ? ? ? ? ? ?Asian 
Development Bank Institute, September 9, 2010. http://www.adbi.org/working-
paper/2010/09/09/4062.infrastructure.demand.asia.pacific/ (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1610 W ?  “ŶŶĞǆ PAPEC Multi Year Plan on /ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ /ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?Ăůŝ ? /ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ?
October 8, 2013. http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/2013/2013_aelm/2013_aelm_annexB.aspx (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1611 Founder members of the New Development Bank are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.  See Ding 
ŝŶŐ ŚĞŶ ?  “ ? ZĞĂƐŽŶƐ ƚŚĞ Z/^ ? EĞǁ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶŬ DĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?The Diplomat, July 23, 2014. 




with existing global institutions in their slowness to provide a greater voice to emerging powers.1612  
These parallel regional and global financial institutions, which give developing countries greater 
influence, have the potential in the longer term to µHQWUHQFK6LQR-centric patterns of trade, investment 
and infrastructure.¶1613   
 
The creation of the AIIB is a statement of intent from China that it desires to play a leading role in 
defining new rules of the game for investment and development aid in the Asia-Pacific.1614  While China 
recognises it has benefitted from membership of multilateral institutions including the WTO and the 
World Bank, which has helped improve the competitiveness of Chinese businesses, it also supports 
reform of a system which currently limits its capacity to lead.1615  The AIIB operating guidelines differ 
in two areas from the IMF and World Bank.  First, it will give more equal coverage of voting rights to 
Asian nations, and second, the AIIB will not implement the conditionality attached to IMF loans that 
enforce conditions of economic reform.1616  In the short term, tKLVVWUDWHJ\ZLOOLPSURYH&KLQD¶VFDSDFLW\
to shape the rules of lending in its neighbourhood by building collateral and improving its legitimacy 
among neighbours.1617   
 
On balance, the AIIB is also one of approximately twenty-eight international organisations specialising 
in aid and development.  Financial development aid is a highly competitive business, and potential 
recipients can receive funds from a number of sources.  Developing countries have become adept at 
picking and choosing from the range of µmultilateral, bilateral, and private financing sources¶1618   If 
                                                          
1612 The 2010 IMF reform package was finally signed off by h^ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?/D& ? “IMF Managing 
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŚƌŝƐƚŝŶĞ>ĂŐĂƌĚĞtĞůĐŽŵĞƐh ?^ ?ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?YƵŽƚĂĂŶĚ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞZĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ?
December 18, 2015. https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15573.htm (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1613 Scott Kennedy and David A. Parker,  “ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ  “KŶĞ Ğůƚ ? KŶĞ ZŽĂĚ ?Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, April 3, 2015. http://csis.org/publication/building-chinas-one-belt-one-road (accessed 
August 13, 2015). 
1614 ZŽďĞƌƚ<ĂŚŶ ? “ĂŶŬdŽŽ&Ăƌ ? ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?http://www.cfr.org/global-
governance/bank-too-far/p36290?cid=nlc-gec_public-this_month_in_geoeconomics-
from_the_maurice_r_greenberg_center_for_geoeconomic_studies-link10-
20150319&sp_mid=48297166&sp_rid=cC5rLmxlZUBrZW50LmFjLnVrS0 (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1615 /ĂŶdĂůůĞǇ ? “h ?^ ?>ooks to Work with China->ĞĚ/ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶŬ ? ?Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-seek-collaboration-with-china-led-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-
1427057486 (accessed June 26, 2016).  China has also sought to tightly integrate Central Asia into its economic 
orbit by allying with Iran and Russia through its involvement in the establishment of the SCO (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation) as a rival to American power and to limit its presence in the region, wrapped as a 
counterweight to NATO and the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). Central Asia is a major source of energy for 
China.  See Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, 236.  
1616 ZĞďĞĐĐĂ >ŝĂŽ ?  “Out of the Bretton Woods: ,Žǁ ƚŚĞ // ŝƐ ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2015. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-07-27/out-bretton-woods (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1617 For more information on institutional bargains, see Goh, The Struggle for Order, 66.  
1618 Phillip Y. Lipscy ?  “tŚŽ ?Ɛ ĨƌĂŝĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ // ? ?Foreign Affairs, May 7, 2015. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib (accessed August 13, 2015). 
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the AIIB is seen as being overly dominated by China, other members may turn their attention elsewhere, 
µdepriving the organisation of resources, attention, and skilled staff.¶1619  Beijing has also taken 
advantage of the knowledge and experience of several Europeans on the board of directors.1620  While 
WKH$,,%LVLQGLFDWLYHRI&KLQD¶VJOREDODPELWLRQVLWVHVWDEOLVKPHQWDQGPHPEHUVKLSDOVRGraw China 
closer into existing structures of global economic governance, since the international backers will 
expect China to contribute to regional development in a more transparent and accountable way.  The 
$,,%LVDWWHPSWLQJWREHDµPRGHORIWUDQVSDUHQF\¶LQFRQWUDVWWRWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQW-owned China 
Development Bank, whose funding is often connected to natural resources.1621  Channelling its 
investments through international institutions, suggests self-imposed constraint, and not at the expense 
of U.S. structural power. 
 
The failure of :DVKLQJWRQ¶VSXEOLFHIIRUWVWRGLVVXDGHDOOLHVIURPMRLQLQJWKH$,,%RQWKHEDVLVRIWKH
economic and political implications of a lending agency led by China highlighted the reduced influence 
it has among its allies in financial matters.  7KLVVLWXDWLRQDOVRHPSKDVLVHGWKDW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VIHDURI
%HLMLQJ¶VJURZLQJVWDQGLQJLQHFRQRPLFJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHLVQRWUHSOLFDWHGDFURVV(XURSHRUWKH$VLD-
Pacific.1622  Washington¶V initial opposition to the AIIB centred on the establishment of a new regional 
institution that could compete with existing development institutions such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank; concern over the potential for weak environmental standards and social safeguards 
within the AIIB; and the opportunity for China to use AIIB-financed infrastructure for greater leverage 
in the region.1623  Washington also argued that China would have an effective veto on decision-
making.1624  While China does have a voting share of 26 per cent, giving it veto power, as a super-
majority of 75 per cent is required for important decisions, China only has minority status, since 15 per 
cent of voting rights are allocated equally to founding members.1625  U.S. arguments may have been 
                                                          
1619 Lipscy ? “tŚŽ ?ƐĨƌĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞ// ? ? 
1620 dŽŵ DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?  “// 'ĂƚŚĞƌƐ ĨŽƌ /ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂů ŶŶƵĂů Deeting. ? Financial Times, June 24, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/828ff06c-39e7-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f.html#axzz4Cu7RN7yS (accessed June 
26, 2016). 
1621 DŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “//'ĂƚŚĞƌƐĨŽƌ/ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂůŶŶƵĂůDĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ?
1622 Kim Jong Kim, president of the World Bank, declared the AIIB to be an important new partner, adding that 
ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵent needs are too large for one institution. Cited in Gabriel Wildau 
ĂŶĚ ŚĂƌůĞƐ ůŽǀĞƌ ?  “// >ĂƵŶĐŚ ^ŝŐŶĂůƐ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ EĞǁ ŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?Financial Times, June 29, 2015. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ea61666-1e24-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz4IXvcpOlT (accessed June 26, 
2016). 
1623 ůŝǌĂďĞƚŚ ?ĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? “dŚĞ//ĞďĂĐůĞ PtŚĂƚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ^ŚŽƵůĚŽEŽǁ ? ?ŽƵŶĐŝůŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
March 17, 2015. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/03/16/the-aiib-debacle-what-washington-should-do-
now/?cid=nlc-gec_public-this_month_in_geoeconomics-
from_the_maurice_r_greenberg_center_for_geoeconomic_studies-link12-
20150319&sp_mid=48297166&sp_rid=cC5rLmxlZUBrZW50LmFjLnVrS0 (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1624 Financial Times,  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?s &ůĂǁĞĚ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ // ? ? May 20, 2015. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eef600b8-fee0-11e4-84b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4Cu7RN7yS (accessed June 
26, 2016). 
1625 tŝůĚĂƵĂŶĚůŽǀĞƌ ? “//>ĂƵŶĐŚ^ŝŐŶĂůƐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐEĞǁŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?
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more cRQYLQFLQJLIWKH,0)KDGQRWEHHQSHUFHLYHGDVµWKHDUPRIFRHUFLYH(XUR-Atlantic discipline for 
WKH6RXWK¶E\PDQ\LQ(DVW$VLDDQG/DWLQ$PHULFDZLWKUHJDUGWR,0)PDQDJHPHQWRIILQDQFLDOFULVHV
during the 1980s and 1990s.1626  Moreover, while the U.S. has less than 20 per cent of the votes in the 
IMF and World Bank, the U.S. retains a final say over matters of importance, including the head of 
each organisation.1627 
 
Beijing now has the opportunity to create rules and norms for regional investment and infrastructure 
projects and to set the regional agenda.1628  Washington opposes the establishment of a parallel financial 
institution led by Beijing, which would legitimise &KLQD¶V JOREDO HFRQRPLF LPSRUWDQFe and 
corresponding influence, thereby reducing its own privileged position in matters relating to international 
economic governance.  :DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH$,,%LPSOLHVWKDWWKHJRDOLVWRJHW&KLQDWRplay 
by the rules; China PXVWQRWµJDLQVLJQLILFDQWVKDUHRIWKHSRZHUWRmake WKHUXOHV¶1629  While the U.S. 
UHFRJQLVHV&KLQD¶VJURZLQJLQIOXHQFHWKHUHLVQRZLOOWRVKDUHSRZHUZLWK&KLQDZLWKLQWKHH[LVWLQJ
institutions.   
 
In September 2015, Washington conceded to the establishment of the AIIB and sought to resume U.S-
China economic relations.  To allay U.S. fears, Beijing committed to increase its financial commitments 
to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, while the U.S. reiterated its pledge to EDFN&KLQD¶s 
bid for the inclusion of the yuan in the IMF basket of reserve currencies, as long as Beijing is declared 
credible by the IMF.1630  Washington had drawn concessions from Beijing with regard to its ongoing 
funding promises to the World Bank and ADB but has not altered the course for Chinese influence over 
the structure of the regional economy.1631  In December 2015, the yuan achieved special drawing rights 
(SDR), joining other major currencies in the basket of currencies used by the IMF.  Before making its 
decision, the IMF asked China to make changes to its currency regime.1632  Inclusion in the SDR also 
deepens international expectations that China will increasingly DOORZPDUNHWIRUFHVWRGHFLGHWKH\XDQ¶V
                                                          
1626 WŚŝůŝƉ^ ?'ŽůƵď ? “ŚŝŶĂZĞǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůZƵůĞƐ ? ?Le Monde Diplomatique (English print version), February 
4, 2016. 
1627 Financial Times,  “America ?Ɛ&ůĂǁĞĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ// ? ? 
1628 Ɛ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ĂŶĚ /D& ? ƚŚĞ // ǁŝůů  ‘actively promote the national interests and political 
ǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŽƐƚ ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ? ZĞďĞĐĐĂ >ŝĂŽ ?  “Out of the Bretton Woods: How the AIIB is 
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-07-27/out-
bretton-woods (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1629 ŵŝƚĂŝƚǌŝŽŶŝ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂ/ŶĨƌĂƐƚructure and Investment Bank: A Case Study of Multi-Faceted CŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?
Asian Perspective 40, no. 3 (2016): 184. 
1630 ŽŶŶĂŶ ? “White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB. ? 
1631 ŽŶŶĂŶ ? “White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB. ? 
1632 Economist ? “DĂŝĚĞŶsoyage: Reserve-Currency Status Might MĂŬĞĨŽƌĂtĞĂŬĞƌzƵĂŶ ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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exchange rate.1633  Therefore, this move is more than symbolic; the hope is to embed the yuan in the 
international monetary system, thereby committing China to financial reform in the longer term.1634  




In addition to the structural power the U.S. asserts through global financial institutions, Washington 
also attempts to exert structural influence over China through the bilateral relationship.  It hopes that 
since China typically views the bilateral relationship as one which establishes its status legitimately on 
the international stage, China is more likely to be co-opted, if not completely socialised into the existing 
structures of the regional economy.  For the U.S., bilateral forums do not dilute its bargaining power in 
the way of a multilateral setting.1636  The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) has provided the 
critical annual forum for developing bilateral relations with China.1637  This forum, and its numerous 
sub-groups, cover every issue on which the U.S. and China cooperates, including piracy, counter-
terrorism and climate change, and those on which they do not, including the contentious issues of cyber 
security and the South China Sea.1638   
 
Through the S&ED frameworks, there has been gradual movement towards a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT), with China agreeing to some SOE reform and the liberalisation of FDI restrictions during 
the 2014 S&ED.1639  During the 2015 S&ED, the South China Sea disputes were indirectly covered 
                                                          
1633 Economist ? “DĂŝĚĞŶsŽǇĂŐĞ PZĞƐĞƌǀĞ-ƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ^ƚĂƚƵƐŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŬĞĨŽƌĂtĞĂŬĞƌzƵĂŶ ? ?
1634 :ĞŶŶŝĨĞƌ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ/ŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŝŶ/D&ƵƌƌĞŶĐǇĂƐŬĞƚŶŽƚũƵƐƚ^ǇŵďŽůŝĐ ? ?Financial Times, November 19, 
2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02bd4fe4-8cf2-11e5-8be4-3506bf20cc2b.html (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1635 ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ KůŝǀĞƌ ?  “US Warns Europe over Granting Market Economy SƚĂƚƵƐ ƚŽ ŚŝŶĂ ? ?Financial Times, 
December 28, 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7d12aea-a715-11e5-955c-
1e1d6de94879.html#axzz4BSKbLAeY (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1636 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵŝŶh^ĂƐƚƐŝĂŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Pacific Review 17, no.1 (2004): 63. 
1637 ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶdŝĞǌǌŝ ? “h^-China Strategic and ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝĂůŽŐƵĞ PWƵƚƚŝŶŐŽŶĂƌĂǀĞ&ĂĐĞ ? ?The Diplomat, June 
26, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-putting-on-a-brave-
face/ (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1638 /Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ‘ŶĂŵĞĚĂŶĚƐŚĂŵĞĚ ?ĨŝǀĞŚŝŶĞƐĞW>ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŽĨĐǇďĞƌĞƐƉŝŽŶĂŐĞ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐƉƵůůĞĚ
out of cooperation with the US via the joint Cyber Working Group, ĐŝƚŝŶŐĂ “ůĂĐŬŽĨƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ
h ?^ ? ƚŽ ƐŽůǀĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĐǇďĞƌ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶ dŝĞǌǌŝ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h^ ǇďĞƌ ƐƉŝŽŶĂŐĞ ŚĂƌŐĞƐ ? ? The Diplomat, May 21, 2014. 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-response-to-the-us-cyber-espionage-charges/ (accessed August 13, 
2015). 
1639 Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 17, 
2015), 49. See C. Fred Bergsten et al,  “dŽǁĂƌĚĂh ?^ ?-ŚŝŶĂ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚdƌĞĂƚǇ ? ?W//ƌŝĞĨŝŶŐZĞƉŽƌƚ ?Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, February 2015. https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/toward-us-
china-investment-treaty (accessed August 13,  ? ? ? ? ) ?'ĞŽĨĨǇĞƌ ? “^ŝŶŽ-U.S. Investment Deal SŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?Financial 
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WKURXJKDQHZµRFHDQVPHHWLQJ¶DVSDUWRIWKHVWUDWHJLFWUDFN1640  These bilateral talks may prove to be 
a conducive environment through which each can engage the other in order to diffuse tensions. The 
86KDVJDLQHG&KLQD¶VFRRSHUDWLRQRQLVVXHVRIJOREDOLPSRUWDQFHLQFOXGLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQG,UDQ
agenda issues over numerous S&EDs that have proven invaluable for creating Sino-American 
consensus in the key issue areas of trade, security, finance and the environment for the Obama 
administration.1641  Nevertheless, the 2016 S&ED failed to extract concrete results concerning &KLQD¶V
DFWLYLWLHVWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDRU&KLQD¶VRYHUSURGXFWLRQRIVWHHO1642  Consequently, many observers 
remain sceptical of the overall success of these dialogues from the American perspective.   
 
Productive Power: The challenges in sKDSLQJ&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\ 
Washington habitually treats Beijing as a challenger to the existing American hegemonic order, 
justifying extreme responses in the protection of the U.S. position in the order, and the order itself.  This 
QDUUDWLYHQHJOHFWVWRDFFRPPRGDWH&KLQD¶VLGHQWLW\DVDULVLQJSRZHUDQGLWVFRUHLQWHUHVWVDQGSUHVHQWV
American hegemony as non-negotiable.  Presenting China as DµSRZHUFKDOOHQJHU¶VDWLVILHVWKH&KLQD 
threat lobby and justifies the strengthening of the bilateral alliances and regional partnerships to boost 
American preponderance in the Asia-Pacific by through its negative perception of &KLQD¶VULVH1643  For 
China, WKHUHJLPHFDQQRWDOZD\VFRQWUROKRZLWVµSHUVRQDOLW\¶LVSHUFHLYHGRUFRQVWUXFWHGRXWVLGHRI
China.1644  &KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFLQIOXHQFHPD\KDYHLQFUHDVHGVXEVWDQWLDOO\EXWWKLVKDVQRWQHFHVVDULO\
                                                          
Times, July 12, 2013 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83094a3e-ea76-11e2-913c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz4C2nKDJrA (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1640 US ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? “:ŽŚŶ<ĞƌƌǇĂŶĚYang Jiechi: Closing Remarks at the Strategic Track Oceans Meeting 
of the Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-WĞŽƉůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?DC, June 24, 
2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/244181.htm (accessed August 13, 2015). 
1641 DŝĐŚĂĞů ^ŝŶŐŚ ?  “dŚĞ ^ŝŶŽ-/ƌĂŶŝĂŶ dĂŶŐŽ ? ? Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango (accessed August 13, 2015); 
^ŚĂŶŶŽŶdŝĞǌǌŝ ?  “The 2015 US-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝĂůŽŐƵĞ PtŚĂƚ  ?ĂŶĚtŚĂƚEŽƚ )ŽǆƉĞĐƚ ? ?The 
Diplomat, June 23, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-2015-us-china-strategic-and-economic-
dialogue-what-and-what-not-to-expect/ (accessed August 13, 2015); ^ŚĂŶŶŽŶdŝĞǌǌŝ ?  “US-China Strategic and 
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŝĂůŽŐƵĞ P WƵƚƚŝŶŐ ŽŶ Ă ƌĂǀĞ &ĂĐĞ ? ?The Diplomat, June 26, 2015. 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-putting-on-a-brave-face/ 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1642 WĞƚĞƌŝƚƚŶĞƌ ? “US-ŚŝŶĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝĂůŽŐƵĞ P<ĞǇdĂŬĞĂǁĂǇƐ ? ?The Diplomat, June 10, 2016. 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-key-takeaways/ (accessed June 
26, 2016). At the 2016 S&ED, China did concede a 250 billion yuan (S$52 billion) quota to the US, under its 
Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investment (RQFII). The RQFII scheme, launched in 2011, allows 
financial institutions to buy securities such as stocks and bonds in mainland China and is part of Beijing's efforts 
to internationalise the yuan. The US is now the second largest holder of Yuan after Hong Kong. Straits Times 
(Singapore),  “&Ğǁ ƌŝŐŚƚ ^ƉŽƚƐ ŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ-US Dialogue, ? June 8, 2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-
asia/few-bright-spots-in-china-us-dialogue (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1643 'ŽŚ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŚŝŶĂŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƐĞideas stem from realist convictions, cultural perceptions, and 
an ideological opposition to authoritarian regimes.  See Goh,  “The US WChina Relationship and Asia-Pacific 
Security, ? 232. 
1644 ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
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been matched yet by diplomatic, cultural and soft power, or military influence outside it existing 
µSDUWQHUV.¶1645  &KLQDUHPDLQVDµSDUWLDOSRZHU,¶ 1646 ZKRVHULVHLVµVSUHDG¶DFURVVWKHJOREHEXWZLWKRXW
WKHGHSWKRI$PHULFD¶VFRPPHUFLDOVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFH 
 
No post-Cold War administration has yet been able to firmly assign a new identity for China¶VULVLQJ
power status, nor set out a framework for managing the bilateral relationship.  There have been 
SHUVLVWHQWO\ YDJXH KRSHV WKDW &KLQD¶V SHUFHSWLRQV DQG SULRULWLHV ZRXOG EH DOWHUHG E\ GHYHORSPHQW
liberalisation, and socialisation.1647  )RUSURSRQHQWVRIHQJDJHPHQW&KLQD¶VLQWHJUDWLRQLQWRWKHJOREDO
HFRQRPLFLQVWLWXWLRQVSHUSHWXDWHG:DVKLQJWRQ¶VµURPDQWLFYLHZ¶RI&KLQDWKDWLWKDGEHFRPHDµso-
called Communist country.¶1648  Based on the mistaken assumption that &KLQD¶Vmembership of these 
international institutions indicated the inevitable internalisation of the rules and norms associated with 
the U.S.-OHG RUGHU LQ WKH XOWLPDWH DFW RI µVHOI-GHFHSWLRQ¶ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV KDV FUHDWHG D µKLJKO\
RSWLPLVWLFVFULSW¶Rn how developments with China would unfold, without indication from Beijing that 
the U.S. vision was accurate.1649 
 
Many of the issues addressed in this chapter relating to U.S.-China relations ± the territorial and 
maritime boundary disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the concerns over the AIIB ± 
emphasise the increasing difficulty for both Beijing and Washington in shaping the identity of the other.  
Ontological security-seeking behaviour is reflected in these potentially highly explosive regional 
disputes.  These disputes, with long historical backgrounds, and interspersed with equally long periods 
of calm, have become a physical manifestation of ontological security-seeking behaviour by the U.S. 
and China, and an arena for each to test the other.  In their efforts to preserve a secure national identity, 
Washington and Beijing are setting expectations for their own actions, and conversely, how each 
H[SHFWV WKH RWKHU WR DFW WRZDUGV WKHP  $IWHU  WKHUH LV D WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LQ &KLQD¶V EHKDYLRXU
towards its claims in the East and South China Sea, and in its engagement with its neighbours.  As 
&KLQD¶VVHHNVWRHVWDEOLVKDUHJLRQDOSRZHULGHQWLW\IRULWVHOIWKLVSURFHVVSURYLGHVDOHQVWKURXJKZKLFK
WRFRQVLGHU&KLQD¶VFKDQJLQJDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKHGisputes.1650  The escalation in tension after 2009 can 
be best explained through a broader pattern of identity formation processes, as the U.S. seeks to 
                                                          
1645 ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
1646 Shambaugh, The Partial Power, 15.   
1647 ǀĞůǇŶ'ŽŚ ? “^EZĞŐŝŽŶĂů&ŽƌƵŵŝŶh^ĂƐƚƐŝĂŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 62. 
1648 James Mann, About Face, 147. 
1649 tĂůĚƌŽŶ ? “dŚĞƐŝĂDĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1650 &ŽƌĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽŶŝƚƐŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ƐĞĞzŽŶŐĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-Responsible 
WŽǁĞƌ ? ?The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 117-132. 
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reproduce its hegemonic identity in the Asia-Pacific in view of a perceived challenges by China, and 
China VHDUFKHVIRUDFFHSWDQFHRILWVµULVLQJSRZHU¶LGHQWLW\E\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV 
 
Despite the acknowledgement that the U.S. must work with a rising China, the difficulties in defining 
the relationship and the place of each within it, has produced extreme policy shifts between, and within, 
successive U.S. post-Cold War administrations ± swinging between reprimand and coercion on one 
hand, and accommodation, engagement and consensus-building on the other.  The first term G.W Bush 
administration disassociated LWVHOI IURP ZKDW LW VDZ DV WKH &OLQWRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V H[FHVVLYH
accommodation of China, rejecting &OLQWRQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ELODWHUDO UHODWLRQV DV PRYLQJ µWRZDUG
strategic partnership, and instead designating Beijing as a µstrategic competitor¶1651   Condoleezza Rice 
summarised,  
µ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRSURPRWH&KLQD¶VLQWHUQDOWUDQVLWLRQWKURXJKHFRQRPLFLQWHUDFWLRQ
while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be 
pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests 
collide.¶1652 
,QUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJPLOLWDU\SRZHUSURMHFWLRQFDSDELOLWLHVDQGJURZLQJHFRQRPLFSRZHU
WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQWHQGHG WR SLYRW $PHULFD¶V UHODWLRQV EDFN WR WKH $VLD-Pacific, by strengthening 
alliances with Japan and Australia, and expanding cooperation with friendly states, including 
Singapore.1653  ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKHGRPHVWLF&KLQDFULWLFV$PHULFD¶VSULPDF\LQWKH$VLD-Pacific was to 
be strengthened.  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review inferred that China was a potential threat to 
86LQWHUHVWVDQGPRVWOLNHO\PLOLWDU\FRPSHWLWRUWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV(DVW$VLDDQDUHDRIµHQGXULQJ
LQWHUHVW¶ RYHU ZKLFK QR RWKHU VWDWH ZDV DOORZHG WR GRPLQDWH ZDV SULPH IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI
additional access and infrastructure agreements.1654  
 
(i) 7KHµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶SDUDGLJP 
7KH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V UHVROYH WR GHILQH 86-&KLQD UHODWLRQV ZDV GULYHQ E\ $PHULFD¶V
strategic focus after September 2001, which led to a reprioritisation of the principal security threats to 
U.S. national interests.  Mirroring the shift, the 2002 National Security Strategy HPSKDVLVHG µJUHDW
SRZHUFRRSHUDWLRQ¶ZLWKJUHDWSRZHUVµLQFUHDVLQJO\XQLWHGE\FRPPRQYDOXHV¶DQGµLQFUHDVLQJO\RQ
                                                          
1651 Tao ? “Sino WŵĞƌŝĐĂŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞŽƌŐĞt ?ƵƐŚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂ ŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1652 ŽŶĚŽůĞĞǌǌĂZŝĐĞ ? “WƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 57. 
1653 'ŽŚ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?-China Relationship and Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ PEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1654 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (September 30, 2001).  
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed August 13, 2015). 
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the same side ± united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos¶1655  Second, was the 
intensifying realisation that the focus on the GWOT had left a vacuum in the Asia-Pacific for China to 
ILOO8QFHUWDLQW\ZDVJURZLQJLQ:DVKLQJWRQRYHU&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVLWVXVHRISRZHUWKHRSDFLW\RILWV
political system and its rapid militarisation.1656  In June 2005, in a speech to the National Committee on 
U.S.-&KLQDUHODWLRQV'HSXW\6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH5REHUW=RHOOLFNRXWOLQHGKLVµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶
IUDPHZRUNIRUPDQDJLQJµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶ and the bilateral relationship.1657  His speech offered a clear 
statement regarding the complexity of U.S.-China relations; it outlined U.S. hopes and concerns over 
WKHQDWXUHRI&KLQD¶VULVHDQGWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKH86-led global order.1658   
 
7KHµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶QDUUDWLYHVHWRXt a framework for what the G.W. Bush administration 
deemed to be the sort of behaviour characteristic of one who belongs to, and who appreciates belonging 
WRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPWKDWKDGIDFLOLWDWHG&KLQD¶VULVHDQGZHDOWKLQFUHDVH1659  This marked the 
first official U.S. recognition that China should be encouraged to give more to the international system, 
ZKLOVWDOVRDVVXPLQJWKDW&KLQDZRXOGDFFHSW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VJOREDOSULRULWLHVDQGLWVKHJHPRQ\PRUH
generally.  China, Zoellick declared, should not simply act in its own national interests but as a 
UHVSRQVLEOH VWDNHKROGHU UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW DV WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP VXVWDLQV &KLQD¶V µSHDFHIXO
SURVSHULW\¶VR&KLQDVKRXOGZRUNWRVXVWDLQWKDWRUGHU1660  The U.S. sought to define the behaviour 
associated wLWKµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶VWDWXVGLFWDWLQJZKDWPDNHV&KLQDDµJRRG¶RUµEDG¶JOREDO
player based on American normative assumptions.1661  7KH FRQFHSW RXWOLQHG D µVHW RI EHKDYLRXUDO
EHQFKPDUNV¶DJDLQVWZKLFK WKH86FRXOGJDXJH&KLQHVHSROLFLHVDQGSUDFWices in the international 
V\VWHP LQFOXGLQJ IRU H[DPSOH RYHU :0' ,UDQ 1RUWK .RUHD KXPDQLWDULDQ FULVHV DQG %HLMLQJ¶V
involvement in UN peace-keeping missions.1662  7KHµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶ IUDPHZRUNSURYLGHG
and continues to provide, a blueprint for what the U.S. considers U.S.-China mutual interests should be, 
and especially on the global stage.1663  7KH*:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDJHQGDZDV5RVVQRWHVDPHDQV
                                                          
1655 The White House, The National Security Strategy (September 2002): 2. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/  (accessed November 18, 2015). 
1656 Robert Zoellick,  “tŚŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ P&ƌŽŵDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 5-14.  
Speech, as prepared for delivery on September 21, 2005. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm  
1657 ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ? “tŚŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ P&ƌŽŵDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝů ƚǇ ? ? ?. 
1658 ZŝĐŚĂƌĚĂƵŵ ? “ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ?ƐZŽĂĚŵĂƉĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨh^-ŚŝŶĂZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 18. 
1659 :ĂŵĞƐ ?<ĞůůǇ ? “hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐWŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚŝŶĂ PdŝŵĞůǇZĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 
30. 
1660 ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ? “tŚŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ P&ƌŽŵDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝů ƚǇ ? ? 10. 
1661 Amitai Etzioni,  “/ƐŚŝŶĂĂZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011): 550. 
1662 Bates Gill,  “ŚŝŶĂĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?WĂƉĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽZĞĨƌĂŵŝŶŐŚŝŶĂWŽůŝĐǇ PdŚĞ
Carnegie Debates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 11, 2007), 1. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/10/china-as-responsible-stakeholder-event-998 (accessed June 16, 
2016). 
1663 Dan BlumenthĂů ? “/ƐŚŝŶĂĂƚWƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŽƌtŝůůŚŝŶĂĞĐŽŵĞ )ĂZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? Paper presented to Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates, Carnegie Endowment for 
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WRVHFXUH&KLQD¶VFRRSHUDWLRQLQDUHDVWKDWVXSSRUWWKHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVRIWKH86DVmuch as it was 
an attempt to preserve the existing global order.1664   
 
=RHOOLFN¶V VSHHFK ZLWK LWV IRFXV RQ WKH µUHVSRQVLEOH VWDNHKROGHU¶ QDUUDWLYH HQFRXUDJLQJ JUHDWHU
responsibility from China, was intended for the U.S. domestic audience, as much as it was aimed at 
%HLMLQJ  7KHUH ZHUH GHHS DQ[LHWLHV LQ :DVKLQJWRQ UHJDUGLQJ &KLQD¶V PLOLWDU\ JURZWK DQG JOREDO
aspirations.  The speech was presented just before the publication of the 2005 QDR, which, in its 
coverage of the Asia-Pacific, outlined the growing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, in what 
&DPSEHOOWHUPVWKH4'5¶Vµ&KLQDWKUHDW¶VHFWLRQV1665  7KHµUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU¶IUDPHZRUN
it was hoped, would appeal to the supporters of pro-engagement, and deliver a counter-attack against 
the bureaucratic in-ILJKWLQJLQ:DVKLQJWRQRYHUWKHIXWXUHRI$PHULFD¶V&KLQDSROLF\1666  By deeming 




with the rules-based order.1669 
 
+RZHYHU WKH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ GLG QRW VSHFLI\ WKH REOLJDWLRQV HQWDLOHG ZLWK µUHVSRQVLEOH
VWDNHKROGHU¶VWDWXVDOWKRXJKLWZDVDVVXPHGLQWHUQDOUHIRUPZDVLQWHJUDOWRWKHSRVLWLRQRQWKHEDVLV
WKDWµFORVHGSROLWLFVFDQQRWEHDSHUPDQHQWIHDWXUHRI&KLQHVHVRFLHW\¶1670  The Chinese Communist 
Party has always set out two red lines: external interference in its domestic human rights practices, and 
moves to destabilise the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, are unacceptable.1671  =RHOOLFN¶s 
speech also placed the onus on China to increase its international contribution, which, at a time when 
WKH86ZDVHQOLVWLQJ&KLQD¶VKHOSLQFRPEDWWLQJWHUURULVPWKHUHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHUUROHZDVVHHQ
as a U.S. attempt to draw China into a number two role in the U.S-led order.1672  Chinese commentators 
                                                          
International Peace (June 11, 2007), 1. http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/10/china-as-responsible-
stakeholder-event-998 (accessed June 16, 2016). 
1664 ZŽďĞƌƚ^ ?ZŽƐƐ ? “dŽǁĂƌĚĂ^ƚĂďůĞĂŶĚŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞŚŝŶĂWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 35; Deng, 
 “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?-23. 
1665 <ƵƌƚĂŵƉďĞůů ? “ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ?ƐŚŝŶĂ ? ?NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 24. 
1666 ĂŵƉďĞůů ? “ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ?ƐŚŝŶĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
1667 Zoellick,  “tŚŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ P&ƌŽŵDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 8.  
1668 ĂŵƉďĞůů ? “ŽĞůůŝĐŬ ?ƐŚŝŶĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
1669 :ƵůŝĂ ŽǁŝĞ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ P  ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?National Interest, May 10, 2016. 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-responsible-stakeholder-16131?page=show (accessed June 16, 
2016). 
1670 Zoellick,  “tŚŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂ P&ƌŽŵDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 12. 
1671 ĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?-23. 
1672 ĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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EHFDPH VXVSLFLRXV RI D µZHVWHUQ WUDS¶ WR EXUGHQ &KLQD ZLWK µXQIDLUO\ LPSRVHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶ DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ &KLQHVH DQDO\VWV FLWHG &KLQD¶V µGHYHORSLQJ FRXQWU\ VWDWXV¶ DV D
reaction to western demands of increased responsibility.1673  From the Chinese perspective, the framing 
RI WKH µUHVSRQVLEOH VWDNHKROGHU¶ QDUUDWLYH E\ WKH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ PHDQW WKDW E\ RZQLQJ
American-LPSRVHG µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ &KLQD ZDV DOVR DGPLWWLQJ JXLOW RYHU for instance, claims that 
&KLQD¶VFXUUHQF\PDQLSXODWLRQ and under-valued yuan were a cause of the global financial crisis.1674   
 
Following the global financial crisis and the success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China appeared 
to undergo a significant transformation in its self-identity, with implications for its role in the Asia-
Pacific region, how it expected to be treated by other states in the region, and how it perceived its 
relationship with the United States.  Many China experts in the West detected an assertive shift in 
%HLMLQJ¶V SXEOLF VWDWHPHQWV DFWLRQV DQG GHPDQGV FRQFHUQLQJ LWV FRUH LQWHUHVWV DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
status.1675  At the same time, U.S. uncertainty in its hegemonic identity and talk of decline following 
the global financial crisis required action to limit this uncertainty, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.  
:KLOHWKHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\ZDVPHDQW WRVLJQLI\$PHULFD¶VUHWXUQ WRWKH$VLD-Pacific, from 2010, 
%HLMLQJYLHZHGWKHUHEDODQFHDV86RSSRVLWLRQWR&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHUVWDtus, especially resenting 
86 PLOLWDU\ VXUYHLOODQFH DFWLYLW\ LQ &KLQD¶V ((= DQG 86 µPHGGOLQJ¶ LQ WKH 6RXWK &KLQD 6HD
disputes.1676   Although Beijing and Washington offer statements on the importance of cooperative 
China-U.S. relations, neither President Obama, nor Chinese Presidents Hu Jintao and Xi, have devised 
a mutually agreeable narrative to manage this most critical bilateral relationship.1677 
 
(iii) Rejecting WKHELODWHUDOµQHZW\SHRIJUHDWSRZHUUHODWLRQVKLS¶ 
During his meeting with President Obama at Sunnylands in 2013, President Xi advanced the concept 
RIDµQHZW\SHRIJUHDWSRZHUUHODWLRQVKLS¶WKURXJKZKLFKChina seeks to define its own identity, and 
that of the United States, and assert its international status, through a framework for equal partnership.  
The concept was predominantly, although not exclusively, designed to manage complex Sino-U.S. 
                                                          
1673 ĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?See, for example, ŚŝŶĂĂŝůǇ ? “Chinese experts lash out at 
 ?ŚŝŶĂ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ? ? August 24, 2010. http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/aboutchina/t726655.htm (accessed June 16, 2016). 
1674 ĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ P The Post-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1675 &ŽƌĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨǁĞƐƚĞƌŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞ ?ƐĞĞŝƐůĞǇ ? “ŝĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ,ŝĚŝŶŐEŽ>ŽŶŐĞƌ PDŽƌĞƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞ
ŚŝŶĂZĂƚƚůĞƐƚŚĞZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?^ŚĂŵďĂƵŐŚ ? “ŽƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŽŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚŚŝŶĂ ? ?^ĐŚǁĞůůĞƌĂŶĚWƵ ? “ĨƚĞƌhŶŝƉŽůĂƌŝƚǇ P 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐsŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌĚĞƌŝŶĂŶƌĂŽĨh ?^ ?ĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ? 
1676 tĂŶŐ:ŝƐŝ ? “hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐt^rategic Distrust: the Chinese SŝĚĞ ? ?ŝŶAddressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, 
eds. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012), 7-19. 
1677 ZŽŐĞƌ/ƌǀŝŶĞ ? “'ĞƚƚŝŶŐĂĐŬŽŶdƌĂĐŬ PŚŝŶĂ ?ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƐŝĂ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?American Foreign 
Policy Interests 35, no. 3 (2013): 144. 
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relations.  At its core is the understanding that a stable and cooperative relationship with the U.S. is 
FHQWUDOWR&KLQD¶VSHDFHIXOULVH7KHUHDUHWKUHHIHDWXUHVRIWKHµQHZW\SHRIJUHDWSRZHUUHODWLRQVKLS: 
no conflict/non-confrontation; win-win cooperation through the advance of areas of mutual interest; 
and PXWXDOUHVSHFWRIHDFKRWKHU¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHPVDQGloosely defined µFRUHLQWHUHVWV,¶ especially over 
the inclusion of the South China Sea as a core interest.1678   
 
By taking the initiative to define the future framework for Sino-U.S. relations, through the re-
FODVVLILFDWLRQRIHTXDOµJUHDWSRZHUV¶WKHKRSHLVWRFUHDWHDOHYHOSOD\LQJILHOd that establishes a new 
FRGHRI FRQGXFW FRPPHQVXUDWHZLWK&KLQD¶V FRUH LQWHUHVWV 2EWDLQLQJ86 VXSSRUWRI WKHFRQFHSW
ZRXOG LPSO\ :DVKLQJWRQ¶V UHFRJQLWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V VWUHQJWK DQG SRZHU UHFRJQLWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V core 
interests, including the South China Sea, and acknowledgement of China as an equal, with its own 
sphere of influence in East Asia.1679  This is a narrative about the Chinese quest to gain international 
legitimacy and status versus the American quest to maintain the regional status quo.  It naturalises 
&KLQD¶VJUHDWSRZHULGHQWLW\DV$PHULFD¶VHTXDODFFHSWHGDVµIDFW.¶1680     
 
7KHUHDUHVRPHLQ%HLMLQJZKRYLHZHYHQWDFLWDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHµQHZW\SHRIJUHDWSRZHUUHODWLRQV¶DV
FRUURERUDWLRQ RI $PHULFDQ ZHDNQHVV DQG &KLQD¶V LQHYLWDEOH ULVH1681  This narrative of a declining 
United States is promulgated by the Chinese leadership, although Xi takes care to emphasise that he 
                                                          
1678 zĂŶŐ :ŝĞĐŚŝ ?  “/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ƌĞĂŵ ? ?National Interest, September 10, 2013. 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/implementing-the-chinese-dream-9026 (accessed August 13, 2015); 
ŚĞŶŐ>ŝĂŶĚ>ƵĐǇyƵ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǇŶŝĐŝƐŵ PdŚĞ “EĞǁdǇƉĞŽĨ'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?
China-U.S. Focus, December 4, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-enthusiasm-and-
american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/#sthash.zdvEdHak.dpuf (accessed August 13, 
2015). 
1679 Chinese media interest in a joint endorsement of the concept by Obama and Xi suggests that gaining 
American recognition for the initiative has Chinese domestic motivations.  Only the United States has the 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞ ?ǇƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐĂƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂŶĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚƉŽǁĞƌ ? Xi 
Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate 
his power base at home. See Ding Ding Chen ? “ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂ ‘EĞǁdǇƉĞŽĨDĂũŽƌWŽǁĞƌZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?The Diplomat, 
November 8, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/ 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1680  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŝŶƚĞůůŝŐŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŚĞƌĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ “ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĐĂŶďĞŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚĂĐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶ ? ?
See Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 6.   
1681 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?&ƵzŝŶŐ ? “dŚĞh^tŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌŝƐĂ^ƵŝƚƚŚĂƚEŽ>ŽŶŐĞƌ&ŝƚƐ ? ?&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůdŝŵĞƐ ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ?
2016. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c09cbcb6-b3cb-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz4JCPuckJ (accessed 
July 15, 2016. For a range of Chinese discussions on AmericaŶŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? see Liu Mingfu, The 
China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era (New York: CN Times Books, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?tĂŶŐ:ŝƐŝ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ^ĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌ^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 39-48. 
 293 
 
believes there is room in Asia for two great powers to coexist and cooperate - as equals.1682  In other 
words, the United States must aFFRPPRGDWH DQG DFFHSW &KLQD¶V ULVH RQ &KLQD¶V WHUPV  :KLOH
Washington acknowledges that the scope of the bilateral relationship requires clarification, there has 
EHHQQRPRYHWRDFFHSW;L-LQSLQJ¶VLQLWLDWLYHDVDZD\WRGHILQHDQGPDQDJHWKHUHODWLRQVKLp.  The 
features of the concept grant China great power status without placing any conditions on its behaviour.  
Such acceptance could indirectly commit Washington to concessions that are objectionable to vital U.S. 
foreign policy values, principles, and interests.1683  Chinese plans to obtain foreign, and especially 
$PHULFDQUHFRJQLWLRQRILWVµFRUHLQWHUHVWV¶FRXOGOHDGWRDEDFNGRRUDFFHSWDQFHRI&KLQD¶VWHUULWRULDO
demands, including official American recognition of its disputed territorial claims in the East and South 
China Seas.1684   
 
American policy-makers have no interest in embracing a new framework offered by another country 
that would in any way undermine their regional status.1685  $FFHSWDQFHRI&KLQD¶VQDUUDWLYHFRXOGDOVR
QHJDWLYHO\LPSDFW$PHULFD¶VUelations with its allies in the region.  There are unspoken concerns that 
American recognition of the Chinese concept would not only imply that Obama is taking a backseat 
role in the bilateral relationship, but would also suggest that the United States recognises itself as the 
declining regional hegemon.1686  Washington does not accept the representations of the U.S. and China 
LQ;L¶VQDUUDWLYHWKDWXQGHUPLQHWKHVWUDWHJLFXQGHUVWDQGLQJVFKDUDFWHULVLQJWKHH[LVWLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDO
system and American hegemony.  Nor has the Obama administration developed a narrative to replace 
WKH µUHVSRQVLEOH VWDNHKROGHU¶ VWDWXV  8QWLO WKH\ ILQG D ZD\ WR GHDO ZLWK WKHLU PXWXDOO\ H[FOXVLYH




The inability to make sense of, and re-LQVFULEH&KLQD¶VQHZLGHQWLW\LQWKHWUDQVIRUPLQJSRVW-Cold War 
strategic situation, has had longer term implications for American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.1687  
                                                          
1682 :ĂŶĞ WĞƌůĞǌ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ  ‘EĞǁ dǇƉĞ ? ŽĨ dŝĞƐ &ĂŝůƐ ƚŽ ^ǁĂǇ KďĂŵĂ ? ?New York Times, November 9, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/world/asia/chinas-new-type-of-ties-fails-to-sway-obama.html?_r=0 
(accessed August 13, 2015). 
1683 Erickson and Liff,  “EŽƚ-So-ŵƉƚǇdĂůŬ PdŚĞĂŶŐĞƌŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ “EĞǁdǇƉĞŽĨ'ƌĞĂƚ-Power RelatioŶƐ ?^ůŽŐĂŶ. ? 
1684 ŚĞŶŐ >ŝ ĂŶĚ >ƵĐǇ yƵ ?  “ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ǇŶŝĐŝƐŵ P dŚĞ  “EĞǁ dype of Great Power 
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? 
1685 President Obama and Secretary Kerry insist that any new model of U.S-China relations cannot be defined by 
ĐĂƌǀŝŶŐ ƵƉ ŵƵƚƵĂů ƐƉŚĞƌĞƐ ŽĨ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ZĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ƚŝĞƐŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ďǇ Ă  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂů ĞŵďƌĂĐĞ ŽĨ
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĨŐůŽďĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ‘ŶŽƌŵƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?tŝůůŝĂŵdŽǁ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŶĚƐŝĂ
ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Asian Survey 55, no. 1 (2015): 17-18.     
1686 ŚĞŶŐ>ŝĂŶĚ>ƵĐǇyƵ ? “ŚŝŶĞƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǇŶŝĐŝƐŵ ? ? 
1687 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 20. 
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Washington has not been able WRJDLQGRPHVWLFFRQVHQVXVRQ&KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJLGHQWLW\or present a 
clear diVFRXUVHFRQFHUQLQJ&KLQD¶VULVH1688  While Beijing does want a constructive relationship with 
Washington, the bottom line is that China does not want to contribute more to sustaining the U.S.-led 
order.1689  Nor does China identify itself as a responsible power, as defined by the U.S., which it views 
DVWKHPRVWUHFHQWµLQFDUQDWLRQ¶RI$PHULFDQDWWHPSWVWRKDUP&KLQD1690  China has actively embraced 
existing international norms and mechanisms for cooperation but at the same time, it seeks to produce 
DGLVWLQFWO\µ$VLDQ¶LGHQWLW\IRULWVHOI1691 
 
For &KLQD ZKRVH ULVLQJ SRZHU LGHQWLW\ GUDZV KHDYLO\ RQ &KLQD¶V KLVWRU\ SULRU WR WKH FHQWXU\ RI
humiliation, this is time to construct a Chinese identity that places it as the centre and natural leader of 
Asia, with values distinct from those of western norms and ideas.1692  This vision conflicts with the 
existing Asia-Pacific-centred order, created by the incumbent regional hegemon, the United States, and 
defined in terms of its own exceptionalism and its universally applicable value system, which, Ikenberry 
assHUWVLVµKDUGWRRYHUWXUQDQGHDV\WRMRLQ¶1693  The U.S. is experiencing instability in its hegemonic 
identity vis-à-vis the rising power identity of China because its sense of self is not being affirmed within 
this critical relationship.  The U.S. is also in a state of flux concerning its global role, which has, in part, 
EHHQXQGHUPLQHGE\2EDPD¶VDWWHPSWWRGHFRXSOHH[FHSWLRQDOLVPIURPSULPDF\leading to criticisms 
that Obama lacks belief in U.S. exceptionalism.  Consequently, both Chinese and American identities 
are in a process of change.  
  
The demonstration of power and assertion of positions in the interactions between the U.S. and China 
emphasise that their actions are motivated by a need to reproduce their own autobiographical identity, 
in addition to defining the boundaries of self-versus-other.  At the level of self and other, the close 
interconnectivity between the two identities, both enhances and simultaneously constrains, the power 
of each.1694  In addition, in every aspect of their relations ± political, economic, security and cultural ± 
                                                          
1688 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 20-21. 
1689 From this perspective, Yan Xuetong argues that taking on more responsibility for global problems is viewed 
ĂƐĂ  ‘ƚƌĂƉ ? ƚŽĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ? zĂŶyƵĞƚŽŶŐ ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶĂǀŝĚWŝůůŝŶŐ ?  “<ĞĞƉŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?
Financial Times, February 11, 2010. https://www.ft.com/content/77a928a0-1511-11df-ad58-00144feab49a 
(accessed September 1, 2016). 
1690 ĞŶŐ ? “ŚŝŶĂ PdŚĞWŽƐƚ-ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞWŽǁĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1691 ^ŚĂƵŶƌĞƐůŝŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ůŽďĂůKƌĚĞƌ P^ŝŐŶĂůůŝŶŐdŚƌĞĂƚŽƌ&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? ?International Affairs 89, no. 3 
(2013): 621. 
1692 ,ĞŶƌǇ ƵƌƚŝƐ ?  “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ P ŚŝŶĞƐĞ KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ^ĞĞŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ^ĞĂ
ŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ? Journal of Borderland Studies (online) (2015): 7. 
http://dx.doi.org.chain.kent.ac.uk/10.1080/08865655.2015.1066698 (accessed September 9, 2016). 
1693 ' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “dŚĞZŝƐĞŽĨŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs, 87, no. 1 (2008): 28. 
1694 ŚĞŶŐǆŝŶWĂŶ ? “ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚŝŶĞƐĞWŽǁĞƌ PŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘WŽǁĞƌ^ŚŝĨƚ ?EĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?Asian 
Perspective 38, no. 3 (2014): 403. 
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WKHLU LQWHUHVWV FDQ EH µFRPPRQ FRPSOHPHQWDU\ FRQIOLFWLQJ DQG FRQIURQWDWLRQDO¶ UHQGHULQJ WKLV
relationship extremely complicated.1695  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine the rising powers element of the rebalance strategy, focusing on the 
divergent relationships with China and India.  The discussion alluded to the complex negotiations 
occurring between the U.S. and China over the future of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, with global 
implications.  TheUHKDVDOZD\VEHHQDGHJUHHRIH[SHFWDWLRQRQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSDUWWKDW%HLMLQJwould 
be sufficiently socialised into the existing order and by extension, would consent to American 
hegemony.  The Obama administration has not actively undertaken a process of renegotiating the 
FXUUHQWVWUDWHJLFEDUJDLQZLWK&KLQD)RULWVSDUW&KLQDKDVEHHQµUHODWLYHO\XQZLOOLQJ¶WRHQJDJHLQ
VXEVWDQWLYHHOHPHQWVRIWKHVWUDWHJLFQHJRWLDWLRQRQ$PHULFD¶VWHUPV1696  The rebalance strategy has 
been used by both the U.S. and China as a means to assert their regional positions.  China views the 
UHEDODQFHDVD86DWWHPSWWRUHLQYLJRUDWHLWVZDQLQJKHJHPRQ\DQGWKXVDVDZD\WRFRQVWUDLQ&KLQD¶V
rise, which feeds into domestic nationalist sentiment concerning its century of humiliation.  As the 
KHJHPRQWKH86LVDSSO\LQJGRZQZDUGVUHVLVWDQFHWRGHIXVH&KLQD¶VFKDOOHQJHE\ exerting different 
facets of its power DQGDOVRE\DFFRPPRGDWLQJVRPHRI&KLQD¶VUHTXHVWVLQJOREDOHFRQRPLFJRYHUQDQFH
as a means to extract buy-in for its hegemonic order.1697   
 
U.S.-China policy veers regularly EHWZHHQFRHUFLYHPHDVXUHVWROLPLW&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJLQIOXHQFHDQG
attempts to build consensus as a means to DFFRPPRGDWH&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHUVWDWXV%RWKVWUDWHJLHV
XOWLPDWHO\ UHTXLUH &KLQD¶V DFFHSWDQce of U.S. hegemony and the U.S. hegemonic order.  %HLMLQJ¶V
contestation of American hegemony is occurring at the level of order and is also creating insecurity 
ZLWKLQ$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\OYHUWLPH:DVKLQJWRQ¶VIUXVWUDWLRQZLWK%HLMLQJ has developed 
LQWR D QHJDWLYH LPDJH RI µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ in relation to its own identity, thereby highlighting the 
significance of narrative and identity formation processes, threat construction and foreign policy 
outcomes.  The integration of narrative and identity processes in the practice of foreign policy result in 
the formulation of strategies that connect identity and physical security-seeking.  The fluidity of the 
                                                          
1695 Yan XuĞƚŽŶŐ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝŶĂ-h ?^ ?ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 
(2010): 292. 
1696 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 217. 
1697 Goh observes that in IR, more attention is given to upwards resistance in regional hierarchy  W from the 
ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐƵŵďĞŶƚ ?  ‘^ƵƉĞƌŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ? ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĂůƐŽ ĂƉƉůǇ  ‘ĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚ ? ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƌĞƉĞů
challenges from subordinate states. This could take the form of political-military containment but also 
 ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ŽƌĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞƐƚrategies to circumscribe, isolate, limit or end attempts to compete with 
ŽƌƌĞƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞŝƌŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?'ŽŚ ?The Struggle for Order, Chapter 6, especially 216-219. 
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µ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHDOVRGHPRQVWUDWHVthe way in which officials politically mobilise and manipulate 
ontological security concerns into concerns about survival.   
   
Taking on degrees of otherness, ,QGLD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\LVVHWDJDLQVWWKDWRI&KLQD¶VE\GLQWRILWV
suitability to the United States, underpinned by shared values, including democracy, and converging 
interests in the Asia-Pacific.1698  There is important congruence on issues from strengthening regional 
institutions such as ASEAN, freedom of navigation and maritime security and peaceful resolution of 
conflicts consistent with international law.1699  By developing the construction of the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
maritime region, the Obama administration has been gradually able to draw India into its strategic 
sphere of influence ZKLOVW DOVR IDFLOLWDWLQJ ,QGLD¶V VWUDWHJLF UHODWLRQV with other regional American 
allies.  The South China Sea, for example, featured in the 2015 U.S.-India defence discussions, at which 
further bilateral defence agreements were signed.1700  Highlighting the complexity of delineating 
relationships in the current international system, India does not seem to be challenging U.S. hegemony, 
but it does contest aspects of the U.S. hegemonic order that diverge from its own national interests.  For 
instance, New Delhi will cooperate with China with regard to restructuring international financial 
institutions, the historical development of which also excluded India.  India and China, in this regard, 
are united by a shared history of colonial control and their inability in the post-war period to have any 
say in the development of the post-war order.  Nevertheless, New Delhi continues to work with 
Washington and its allies in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.  
 
This assessment of the exercise of American power as a means to sustain its regional hegemony 
underlines the unequal distribution of &KLQD¶VFRQWHVWDWLRQRI$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\.  It is still unclear 
whether China seeks to overturn U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific in its entirety, or whether it seeks 
a renegotiation of some aspects of it, especially in the economic sphere.   However, this chapter has 
demonstrated that China does not (or cannot yet) challenge all aspects of American hegemony since it 
does not have the full gambit of power assets at its disposal.  6LJQLILFDQWO\ &KLQD¶V DVVHUWLYH DQG
coercive behaviour in the South and East China Seas has been met with resistance, not only from the 
U.S., but also from other regional actors.  China has been unable to convince regional actors of the 
                                                          
1698 Hansen observes that constructions of identity take on varying degrees of otherness, indicating that there is 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŽƉĞŶƐƵƉƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ?ĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ-based.  
Hansen, Security as Practice, 40. 
1699 ,ĞŵĂŶƚ<ƌŝƐŚĂŶ^ŝŶŐŚ ? “/ŶĚŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŽ-WĂĐŝĨŝĐZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶRajiv K. Bhatia and Vijay Sakhuja, Indo Pacific 
Region: Political and Strategic Prospects (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2014), 112. 
1700 ŝƉĂŶũĂŶŚĂƵĚŚƵƌǇ ? “/ŶĚŝĂ ?h^ŝƐĐƵƐƐDĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĨŽƌ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŵŝĚŚŝŶĞƐĞŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?
Economic Times (Mumbai), June 4, 2015. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-
discuss-measures-for-south-china-sea-stability-amid-chinese-aggression/articleshow/47535256.cms (accessed 
August 13, 2015). 
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peaceful nature of its rise, and thus remains unable to garner support for its vision of a Sino-centric 
regional order.  By remaining wedded to coercive practices that induce fear and insecurity, China does 
not yet have the capacity to garner consent for its aspiring regional hegemonic order.  Consequently, 
for the time being, the foundations of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific remains strong.  With 








to announce the rebalance strategy in November 2011, when the recalibration of U.S. foreign policy to 
the Asia-Pacific had been specified from the start of the administration in 2009.  Second, the 
announcement coincided with a military rebalance to the region, which seemed to undermine the initial 
focus on rebalancing American power away from the military/security focus of the preceding G.W. 
Bush administration.  In addition, the obvious multi-dimensional approach to the rebalance warranted 
closer inspection of the way in which the U.S. distributes its power capabilities beyond the narrow 
application of its military capabilities to sustain its regional hegemony.   
 
After the global financial crisis, media and academic focus centred on global concerns of a declining 
U.S., a waning hegemon with neither the capacity, nor the will to lead in global affairs.1701  Since the 
strategy was initially pronounced to be a µSLYRW¶ HPSKDVLV ZDV TXLFNO\ SODFHG RQ WKH VWUDWHJ\ DV
evidence that the U.S. would also pivot away from its global commitments.1702  µ&RPPRQ VHQVH¶
GLFWDWHGWKDWWKLVVWUDWHJ\ZDV:DVKLQJWRQ¶VODVWHIIRUWVWRVXVWDLQLWVUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\LQWKH$VLD-
PacifiFLQWKHIDFHRI&KLQD¶VLQHYLWDEOHULVH1703  Yet, by 2011, the U.S. economy was showing signs of 
improvement,1704  and as closure on the events of 9/11, Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy Seals 
in Pakistan in May 2011.  In the Asia-Pacific, beyond the narrow focus on the military rebalance, by 
2011, the rebalance strategy was turning into a multidimensional strategy, combining different elements 
of U.S. power, and engaging multiple partners across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.  Contrary to the 
reports and analysis about U.S. decline, the rebalance strategy did not seem to indicate declining U.S. 
power; rather it demonstrated the reach of American power, emphasising the strength of American 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  Furthermore, the narrow focus on ChiQD¶VPLOLWDU\DQGHFRQRPLFULVH
as evidence of U.S. decline belied the nature of American hegemony beyond its material base.   
 
                                                          
1701 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƵǌĂŶ ? “>ĞĂĚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ&ŽůůŽǁĞƌƐ ? ? 
1702 NŝĐŽůĂƐ ^ŝĞŐĞů ?  “Ɛ ƚŚĞ h^ WŝǀŽƚƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ƐŝĂ ? ƵƌŽƉĞ ^ƚƵŵďůĞƐ ? ?The European, November 18, 2011. 
http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/nicholas-siegel--3/6203-a-shift-in-us-foreign-policy (accessed July 14, 
2015). 
1703 Douglas A. Macgregor,  “ĨĨŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘WĂĐŝĨŝĐ WŝǀŽƚ ? ? ?Time, October 26, 2012. 
http://nation.time.com/2012/10/26/affording-the-pacific-pivot/ (accessed July 14, 2015).  
1704 BBC,  “US Economy is Moderately Improving, SĂǇƐ &ĞĚĞƌĂů ZĞƐĞƌǀĞ ? ? May 19, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13449747  (accessed August 29, 2016). 
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Two research questions have provided the structure to this thesis.  The first question focused on 
uncovering the motivations for rebalancing U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific.  This question 
LQHYLWDEO\GUHZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHLVVXHRI&KLQD¶VULVHDQGLWVDOOHJHGHIIHFWVRQ$PHULFDQhegemony.  To 
understand the rebalance as critical to the reproduction of U.S. hegemony, in Chapter 2 I conceptualised 
hegemony as WKHVWUXFWXUHRIµRUGHU¶E\PHDQVRI*UDPVFLDQWKRXJKWHegemony is derived from the 
OHDGHU¶V SRVVHVVLRQ RI DQ DPDOJDP RI SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF DQG FXOWXUDO FRQGLWLRQV WKDW HQDEOH LWV
emergence as the leader.  Hegemon\LVXQGHUSLQQHGE\DUDQJHRISRZHUDVVHWVDWWKHOHDGHU¶VGLVSRVDO, 
sustained over time, and include its capacity to dominate the organisations and institutions of ideology 
and politics on a global scale.  Rather than an extension of U.S. military primacy, hegemony 
incorporates a set of social relationships between the leader and subordinate states that relies on gaining 
consent from subordinate states for its ongoing production.   
 
Developing hegemony further, in Chapter 3 I examined and assessed the inter-related processes of 
identity, narrative and security formation that shape U.S. foreign policy-making and underpin U.S. 
hegemonic identity.  The style of hegemonic order is built on the character, identity and normative 
preferences of the leading state within it.  Moreover, hegemony is fused into APHULFD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of itself ± shaped by ideas of American exceptionalism and its manifest destiny to lead in international 
affairs.  American hegemony is also formed by its perception of the other ± of China ± that is dependent 
XSRQWKHLQFUHDVLQJO\QHJDWLYHµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYH6LQFHLWLVLPEXHGZLWKLGHQWLW\KHJHPRQ\LV
in constant need of reproduction because American ontological security depends upon it.  The decision 
to rebalance is being driven by American insecurity in its own hegemonic identity and exacerbated by 
&KLQD¶VULVLQJSRZHULGHQWLW\)RUHLJQSROLF\RXWFRPHVGRQRWVLPSO\µKDSSHQ¶$FRPSOH[VHULHVRI
background processes are occurring, which contribute to foreign policy decision-making processes at 
the level of identity and narrative.    
 
The second question focused on how the Obama administration has exercised American power to 
implement the rebalance strategy as a means to sustain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  In the 
empirical chapters, the aim was to show how U.S. hegemony is continually generated through an 
analysis of different forms and interactions of power.  %DUQHWW DQG 'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\ of power 
facilitates this study of hegemony by opening up the concept of power along the dimensions of 
interaction and social constitution.  In so doing, power can be derived from the preponderant material 
resources of the hegemon, and SRZHUFDQEHGHULYHGIURPWKHKHJHPRQ¶VDELOLW\WRFUHDWHVRFLDODFWRUV
± their self-understanding, interests and capacities ± prior to their interactions with others.  Since Barnett 
DQG 'XYDOO¶V WD[RQRP\ DOVR FRQVLGHUV KRZ UHODWLRQV RI SRZHU FDQ ZRUN GLUHFWO\ DQG GLIIXVHO\ D
broader, relational picture of power emerges.  The hegemon exercises power through a complex set of 
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ongoing relationships and social bargains.  Consequently, consent for both the hegemonic order and 
hegemonic identity is continually required from the subordinate states in the order. 
 
By looking at the multi-dimensional exercise of American power as a means to reproduce and 
consolidate U.S. regional hegemony, this thesis has shown that the American hegemony is itself deeply 
embedded in the Asia-Pacific and is broadly supported by other states in the Asia-Pacific.  Since 
hegemony is treated here as a social relationship, American regional hegemony undergoes a continual 
process of negotiation between the U.S. and the other states.  Moreover, the social nature of American 
hegemony means it is both fluid and adaptable and capable of absorbing resistance.  Aspects of 
American hegemony are frequently questioned and challenged by allies and competitors alike.  
However, no peer competitor yet exists with the complete mix of material and non-material capabilities 
to either counter U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, or to create its own regional order.   
 
The conclusions drawn from this thesis are theoretical and empirical.  This thesis recognises the growing 
relevance of the concept of ontological security to the field of IR.  Understanding the self-constitutive 
process of identification, incorporating the constitution of self and other, is an essential pre-condition 
IRUDQDJHQW¶VDFWLRQZKLFKFDQWKXVH[SODLQDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXULQERWKURXWLnised practices and in 
managing change.  Furthermore, uncoupling ontological and physical security has allowed for an 
exploration of how the state securitise issues, not only through the conventional lens of physical 
VHFXULW\RUµVHFXULW\-as-VXUYLYDO¶EXt also in its endeavours to secure a stable self-identity.  These self-
constitutive processes are just as important in the desire for ontological security as the relationship with 
the other.  In theoretical terms, ontological security is often conflated with physical security, which 
overlooks the ways in which states not only seek both ontological and physical security but also how 
their ontological security concerns are politically mobilised into fears of survival.1705  I have drawn 
attention to how the theoretical distinction between physical and ontological security concerns expands 
RQWKH,5GLVFLSOLQH¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIVHFXULW\DQGWRWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQLGHQWLW\VHFXULW\DQG
foreign policy practice.                 
 
Second, in developing an analytiFDOIUDPHZRUNIRUKHJHPRQ\XVLQJ%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\RI
power, several aspects of power are used to sustain U.S. hegemony.  The empirical analysis of the 
rebalance strategy points to several conclusions.  While the process of renegotiating U.S. hegemony is 
coupled with varying degrees of contestation by subordinate states, with the exception of China and 
                                                          
1705 ^ĞĞ&ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
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North Korea, the regional inclination is to maintain the American-led regional security order.  In the 
economic sphere, where contestation of the neoliberal project has been more widespread and 
pronounced, resistance is constrained by the structure of global capitalist production.  The majority of 
subordinate states have either internalised or pragmatically accept the structure of U.S. hegemony.  
Moreover, this is not a passive activity, rather, this is an active process of negotiation and consent by 
leaders of subordinate states to sustain U.S. hegemony.  The success of the rebalance, therefore, depends 
DVPXFKRQWKHUHJLRQ¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH$PHrican-led regional order, and the sustainability of the 
$PHULFDQSUHVHQFHDVLWGRHVRQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRUHDVVXUHLWVSDUWQHUVDQGSUHVHUYHLWVUHJLRQDO
hegemony.   
 
In this concluding chapter, I start by revisiting the puzzle, followed by a brief summary of the two main 
research questions.  The first covers the motivations for the rebalance, including an assessment of the 
theoretical approach used in chapters 2 and 3.  I then move on to review the practice of American 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, drawing on the empirical material appraised in Chapters 4-6. Towards 
the end of this chapter, I also discuss the extent to which the rebalance forms the basis of an Obama 
IRUHLJQSROLF\GRFWULQHDQGXQGHUSLQV2EDPD¶VOHJDF\LQWKH$VLD-Pacific.  This chapter concludes with 




The announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 presented a noticeable contradiction 
between the public statements and a strategy that was already two years into implementation.  The 
announcement of the rebalance strategy in November 2011 coincided with the strengthening of the U.S. 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific, while the thUXVWRIWKHSUHYLRXVWZR\HDUV¶ZRUNZDVHFRQRPLF
and diplomatic.  Moreover, with the rebranding of the strategy, attention shifted from a regional focus 
that had sought to rebuild relations and reconnect the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific, to one which had a hard 
SRZHUHGJH:LWKWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VUHJLRQDOVWUDWHJ\DSSHDUHGWRVKLIW
DWWHQWLRQWRZDUGV%HLMLQJPRWLYDWHGE\&KLQD¶VH[SDQGLQJDVVHUWLRQVLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDGXULQJ
2009 and 2010.  While the tensions in the South China Sea have a long history, the U.S. had historically 
UHPDLQHGRQWKHSHULSKHU\<HWEHWZHHQDQGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VRIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHVWDUWHG
to draw attention to the South China Sea as indicative of the looming threat that China represented to 




This narrative was not borne out by specifics.  The United States was clearly the preponderant military 
hegemon in the Asia-Pacific, the biggest military spender, and the underwriter of regional security 
WKURXJKDV\VWHPRIIRUPDODOOLDQFHVDQGRWKHUVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLSV %HLMLQJ¶VDGRSWLRQRIDPRUH
assertive stance in its regional strategy during the course of 2010 appeared to be the catalyst for 
Washington¶V reassertion of its hegemony over the Asia-Pacific, reaffirming the importance of the 
United States to the strategic interests of its regional allies and to the ongoing stability of the existing 
regional order.1706  Why were events between 2009 and 2011 interpreted by the U.S. to be evidence of 
&KLQD¶VULVLQJWKUHDWWR86LQWHUHVWVLQWKH$VLD-Pacific?  The decision to announce the rebalance in 
November 2011 reveals significant information about the condition of American hegemony in the 
American psyche and the importance of threat construction in driving U.S. foreign policy.     
 
Although China has more frequently pushed against what it sees as U.S. interference in regional matters 
through the assertion of Chinese core interests since 2010, Beijing has not yet directly threatened U.S. 
military preponderance in the Asia-Pacific.  It is, however, asserting its rights over maritime areas 
perceived as Chinese-owned.  Despite its military modernisation, it is not clear whether China possesses 
the ability, or the will, to overturn the existing regional order, even if it is acting more assertively in its 
near neighbourhood.1707  Nevertheless, the timing of the American announcement and the focus on the 
mLOLWDU\ UHEDODQFH LQ 1RYHPEHU  FRLQFLGHG ZLWK DQ HVFDODWLRQ LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V QHJDWLYH 
QDUUDWLYH FRQFHUQLQJ µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ DQG VLJQLILFDQW XQFHUWDLQW\ LQ $PHULFD¶V VHQVH RI VHOI  The 
combination of story-telling, the timing of the announcement DQG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI
%HLMLQJ¶VEHKDYLRXU have created the conditions for this common-sense foreign policy outcome in the 
shape of the rebalance strategy.   
 
Motivations for the strategic rebalance 
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the notion of U.S. decline was rekindled.1708  Rationalist 
studies focus on the decline of American material power, drawing attention to the redistribution of 
                                                          
1706 ŝƐůĞǇ ? “ŝĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ,ŝĚŝŶŐEŽ>ŽŶŐĞƌ PDŽƌĞƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞŚŝŶĂZĂƚƚůĞƐƚŚĞZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
1707 /Ŷ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?tĂŶŐzŝ ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ‘ǁŝůůĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞ
international syƐƚĞŵ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐŽŶĚ tŽƌůĚ tĂƌ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?tĂŶŐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚŝŶĂŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚ ?ŽƵƌ ?ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚŽƵƌůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ
national interests, be it in addressing the Korean Peninsula or ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂ ? ?^ĞĞ ?tĂŶŐzŝ ?
 “^ƚĂƚĞƐŵĞŶ ?Ɛ&ŽƌƵŵ PtĂŶŐzŝ ?DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?WZ ? ?ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?
February 25, 2016. http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-wang-yi-minister-foreign-affairs-prc (accessed 
March 4, 2016). 
1708 American decline is a cyclical discussion that has come to the fore at critical points since the 1950s. Samuel 
Huntington observed that between the 1950s and 1980s, there were five cycles of declinism in the United States. 
^ĂŵƵĞůW ?,ƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? “dŚĞh ?^ ? PĞĐůŝŶĞŽƌZĞŶĞǁĂů ? ?Foreign Affairs 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988/89): 94.  
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wealth to the Asia-3DFLILFDQG&KLQD¶V LQFUHDVLQJHFRQRPLFSRZHU as proof of U.S. decline.  Time 
magazine declared that the decade up to 2010 hDGEHHQµWKHGHFDGHIURPKHOO¶IRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV 1709 
6WDUWLQJ ZLWK  DQG WKH *: %XVK DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V VWUDWHJLFDOO\ KHDY\-handed response, the 
VHWEDFNV ZRUVHQHG ZLWK µthe gradual erosion of economic certainty¶1710 culminating in the global 
financial crisis with its roots in the U.S. financial system, which brought about the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and exposed the dubious practices of American banks with regard to sub-prime mortgages.1711    
 
The financial crisis that had so badly affected western countries was not replicated amongst many 
developing countries, including Brazil, India and China, and this appeared to present a massive 
challenge to the west.1712  Wealth and power were shifting to the East and the South,1713  and with the 
86WKHZRUOG¶VµKyper-SRZHU¶ZDQLQJ 1714 the question now was µZKDWNLQGRIJOREDOSROLWLFDORUGHU¶
would emerge as a consequence.1715  Overnight, it was argued that the imminent shift towards China 
and the Asia-Pacific was now occurring;1716 although regarded as a correction of ChiQD¶VFHQWXU\RI
humiliation,1717 &KLQD¶VULVHQRQHWKHOHVVFUHDWHGDQ[LHWLHVDERXW&KLQD¶Vimpact on the existing global 
economic and political order.1718  The impact continues to be felt most keenly in the United States, 
                                                          
1709 Time magazine ǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƚŚŝƐĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ  QdŚĞǇǁŝůůǀĞƌǇůŝŬĞůǇŐŽĚŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
dispiriting and disillusioning decade Americans have lived through in the post-World War II era ? ? Andy Serwer, 
 “dŚĞ ŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ P 'ŽŽĚďǇĞ  ?ƚ >ĂƐƚ ) ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞĐĂĚĞ ĨƌŽŵ ,Ğůů ? ?Time, December 9, 2009. 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1942973,00.html (accessed July 16, 2015). 
1710 DŝĐŚĂĞůŽǆ ? “WŽǁĞƌ^ŚŝĨƚƐ ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ? ?International Relations 26, no. 
4 (2012): 370. 
1711 Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐǇŽĨ >ĞŚŵĂŶƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĞƐŚĂŵ ǀĞƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ
ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “'ƌĞĂƚ DŽĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶƐŝŐŶĞĚ ĨŽƌĞǀĞƌ ƚŽ ŽďůŝǀŝŽŶ ? ? ^ĞĞ ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ ƵƌŐĞƌ ?  “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? EŝĂůů &ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ^ĂǇƐ zĞƐ ? ? The Peking Duck, January 1, 2010. 
http://www.pekingduck.org/2010/01/chinas-century-niall-ferguson-says-yes/ (accessed July 14, 2015). 
1712 ZŽŐĞƌ  ? ůƚŵĂŶ ?  “The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West ? ?Foreign Affairs 
(January/February 2009). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/great-crash-2008 
(accessed July 14, 2015)  
1713 :ĂŵĞƐ,ŽŐĞ ?  “A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready ? ? Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 
(2004): 2-7. 
1714 For discussion of the US decline debate, see Michael CŽǆ ?  “Is the United States in Decline - Again? ? 
International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007): 643-653.  
1715 ' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America ? ?Foreign Affairs 
 ?DĂǇ ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ) P ? ? ?,ŽŐĞ ? “A GlŽďĂůWŽǁĞƌ^ŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞDĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?
1716 Wendy Dobson, 'ƌĂǀŝƚǇ^ŚŝĨƚ P,ŽǁƐŝĂ ?ƐEĞǁĐŽŶŽŵŝĐWŽǁĞƌŚŽƵƐĞƐtŝůů^ŚĂƉĞƚŚĞ ? ?ƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ (Toronto, 
Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
1717 ŽŵŝŶŝĐtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚZŽŽƉĂWƵƌƵƐŚŽƚŚĂŵĂŶ ? “ƌĞĂŵŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZ/Ɛ PdŚĞWĂƚŚƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?'ůŽďĂůĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ?
Goldman Sachs, Paper No. 99 (October 1, 2003). http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-
pdfs/brics-dream.pdf (accessed July 14, 2015). 
1718 :ŽŚŶWůĞŶĚĞƌ ? “Great Dangers Attend the Rise and Fall of Great Powers ? ?Financial Times, August 20, 2010. 




where many Americans continue to believe that the U.S. is a declining power.1719  7KHµFommon sense¶ 
argument says that U.S. hegemony is in decline and that the imminent power transition, created by 
&KLQD¶VULVH1720 will lead to intensified global conflict.1721  A global power shift towards China rests on 
the assumption that the U.S. is facing inevitable decline µWKDWZLOOLILWFRQWLQXHVHLWKHUDOORZRWKHUVWR
take advantage of its weakness or reduce its ability to lead.¶1722  I have argued in this thesis that the U.S. 
is not a declining power, and nor is its hegemony waning.    
 
*UDPVFL VLWXDWHGKHJHPRQ\ LQ WKH OHDGHU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR SRVVHVV WKH HFRQRPLF SROLWLFDO DQG FXOWXUDO
conditions that enable its emergence as the leading force.1723  The dominant state must be at the heart 
of economic activity through control of the base ± the principal mode of production ± and through its 
capacity to sustain the political and ideological superstructure, through the organisations and institutions 
of politics and ideology through which it can universalise its ideas over a sustained period of time.1724  
U.S. economic and financial hegemony continues, in part due to its embedded position in the world 
economic system and its long-standing regulation of capitalism through international financial 
institutions.  Carla Norrlof observes that despite a gradual economic decline since the end of the World 
War II, the U.S. VWLOOSRVVHVVHVFULWLFDOIHDWXUHVWKDWJLYHLWZKDWVKHFDOOVµSRVLWLRQDODGYDQWDJHV¶RYHU
all other states.  Norrlof challenges the view that $PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLc burdens outweigh the benefits, 
suggesting instead that Washington actually acquires more than it spends in the provision of public 
goods.1725  As Doug Stokes has compellingly argued, the privileged status of the dollar affords special 
advantages to the United States.  This particular form of financial power is a side-HIIHFW µof others 
willingness to purchase, hold and use the dollar¶1726  Stokes concludes that the financial crisis has not 
weakened the position of the United States as much some have assumed.  Moreover, despite the 
                                                          
1719 See, for instance, Gideon Rachman,  “dŚŝŶŬŐĂŝŶ PŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ?Foreign Policy (January/February 2011) 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/think-again-american-decline/ (accessed July 14, 2015). China, with a 
population of around 20 per cent of the world ?ƐƚŽƚĂů ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇŽŶĞ-seventh and one-
ƚĞŶƚŚŽĨŐůŽďĂů'W ?dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ?
per cent. Žǆ ? “WŽǁĞƌ^ŚŝĨƚƐ ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1720 By 2010, China held 11.5 per cent of US Treasury securities, valued at US$895 billion. It had become the key 
economic player in the Asia-Pacific and was extending its influence in Australia, Latin America and Africa. Robert 
: ?ƌƚ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞZŝƐĞŽĨŚŝŶĂ P/ŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ>ŽŶŐ,ĂƵů ? ?Political Science Quarterly 125, 
no. 3 (2011): 364 (359-392). 
1721 &ŽƌKƌŐĂŶƐŬŝ ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǁŚǇpower transitions lead to greater competition, 
insecurity and potentially war, see Abramo F. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958). 
1722 Žǆ ? “WŽǁĞƌ^ŚŝĨƚƐ ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1723 Joseph, Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent, 49. 
1724 Cox,  “Social Forces, ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚtŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?167-169. 
1725 Norrlof, ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ. 
1726 ^ƚŽŬĞƐ ? “chilles Heel, ? 1076; Eswar S. Prasad, Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened its Grip on Global 
Finance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).  
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financial crisis, the U.S. is still regarded as a safe haven.   Contrary to expectations, therefore, the 
financial crisis confirmed U.S. financial power, not weakened it.   
 
In military preponderance terms, the U.S. has the capacity to mobilise its armed forces to project power 
globally, spends about 45 per cent RI WKHZRUOG¶VWRWDORQGHIHQFHDQGLVVWLOO WKHPDLQSURYLGHURI
security in the Asia-Pacific and Europe.  It also retains more military personnel now than it did before 
9/11.1727 The extraordinary military capabilities of the U.S. suggests that it is not a declining power.  
When compared with the military capabilities of &KLQD¶V armed forces, even with its huge standing 
army,1728 its growing naval capacity that now includes one aircraft carrier,1729 and the modernisation 
programme,   &KLQD¶VRQHDLUFUDIWFDUULHULVPLQLVFXOHZKHQFRQWUDVWHGZLWK$PHULFD¶VHOHYHQFDUULHU
JURXSVDQGQRUGRHV LWVFXUUHQWPLOLWDU\PRGHUQLVDWLRQEULQJ&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVDQ\QHDU
those of the United States.  Even countries in Europe and the Asia-3DFLILFZLWKGRXEWVDERXW$PHULFD¶V
current leadership abilities continue to ally themselves with the United States.  No other country has the 
mix of capabilities that can guarantee their security like the United States.  In the Asia-3DFLILF&KLQD¶V
rise has led many states, including Vietnam and potentially Burma, to request more of a U.S. presence 
DQGQRWOHVV&KLQD¶VKHDY\-handed behaviour in the South China Sea, coupled with its implicit support 
for North Korea has strengthened $PHULFD¶VSRVLWLRn in the region, not weakened it.1730 
 
American military power is not waning.  However, the combination of the war in Iraq, the use of torture 
in the war on terror, and the global financial crisis in 2008 did prompt questions about $PHULFD¶V
capacity to lead, and its willingness to garner support for its policies abroad ± which are also integral to 
the maintenance of its hegemony.  Consequently, while its capacity to wield coercive, hard power was 
evident, social consent for U.S. leadership, prompted by its willingness to unilaterally undermine 
international norms, was gradually being withdrawn.  Consensus was replaced by inducement and self-
interest among the subordinate states and coercion on the part of Washington.  On this basis, the 
legitimacy of the U.S. hegemonic order was tarnished in international society, and consequently, 
                                                          
1727 ĚǁĂƌĚ >ƵĐĞ ?  “dŚĞ DŝƌĂŐĞ ŽĨ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ ĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƵƚƐ ? ?Financial Times, January 30, 2012. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed684ca2-4830-11e1-b1b4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4J5rW47eG (accessed July 
14, 2015).  
1728 The PLA has not fought a war since the invasion of Vietnam in 1979. On the internal problems of the PLA, 
see John Garnaut,  “ZŽƚƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ tithin ? ? Foreign Policy, April 12, 2012. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/16/rotting-from-within/ (accessed July 14, 2015). 
1729 The Chinese were keen to remind neighbours that, in spite of having acquired its first aircraft carrier, China 
ĚŝĚ ‘ŶŽƚƉŽƐĞĂŶǇƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ. ?e^e Zhao Lai aŶĚŚĂŶŐyŝĂŽŵŝŶ ? “Maiden Run for Aircraft Carrier ? ?
China Daily Europe, August 8, 2011. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-
08/12/content_13100751.htm (accessed July 14, 2015). 
1730 ^ĞĞ “Rising Power: Anxious State ? ?Economist (Special Report on China), June 25, 2011.  
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$PHULFD¶Vglobal position was becRPLQJPRUHµIUDJLOH¶1731  Furthermore, &KLQD¶VULVHhas inevitably 
put pressure on the existing regional hierarchical order, especially in the Asia-Pacific.1732  Since the 
WKUHDW WKDW µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ SUHVHQWV WR 86 KHJHPRQ\ LV ORFDWHG LQ PRUH WKDQ &KLQHVH SK\VLFDO
capabilities, U.S. hegemony rests on more than primacy.   
 
Rationalist accounts versus a non-material approach to the rebalance strategy 
(i) Hegemony 
The conventional treatment of American hegemony is to connect, and conflate it with American 
primacy.  Put simply, the U.S. must maintain its primacy if it is to remain regional hegemon.  American 
SULPDF\LVURRWHGLQPDWHULDOSUHSRQGHUDQFHDQGWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRI$PHULFD¶VDGYDQWDJHRXVSRZHU
position is in the American interest.1733  Moreover, this view determines that American primacy has 
facilitated the creation and maintenance of the existing broadly liberal global order that reflects 
$PHULFD¶V YDOXHV DQG LQWHUHVWV  3UHVHUYLQJ $PHULFDQ SULPDF\ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH µXVXDO DQG FUXGH
measures of power,¶LPSOLHVWKDWWKH86KDVVXSHULRUDELOLW\WRH[HUWLWVDXWKRULW\RYHUDEURDGUDQJH
RI LVVXHV DQG VWDWHV HVWDEOLVKLQJ RU DW WKH YHU\ OHDVW LQIOXHQFLQJ WKH µUXOHV RI WKH JDPH¶ LQ WKH
international arena.1734  Advocates of primacy understand it in terms of relative versus absolute gains 
and are thus preoccupied with the material manifestations of power as exhibited by territory and 
resources.1735  These paradigms seem to assume WKDWKHJHPRQ\HTXDWHVWRµRPQLSRWHQFH,¶ZKLFKVNHZV
the relationship between power, leadership and hegemony.1736  This thesis, conversely, has viewed 
hegemony DQG SULPDF\ LQ GLIIHUHQW WHUPV REVHUYLQJ WKDW µVXSerior military capabilities do not 
QHFHVVDULO\ EULQJ VXSHULRU VWDWXV DFFHSWDQFH RU UHVSHFW¶1737  Primacy, Dueck observes, is a 
circumstance and an interest, not a strategy.1738   
 
                                                          
1731 ƵǌĂŶ ? “A Leader without Followers ? ? 
1732 White, The China Choice, 4. 
1733 Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
204. 
1734 ZŽďĞƌƚ :ĞƌǀŝƐ ?  “/ŶƚĞrnational Primacy: Is the Game WŽƌƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĚůĞ ? ? International Security 17, No. 4, 
(Spring 1993): 52-3. 
1735 The greatest proponent of this position is John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New 
York: Norton, 2001). 
1736 Dirk Nabers, for instance, enquires into the relationship between power, hegemony and leadership, whereby 
the relationship between hegemony and leadership is co-constituted, with power being discursively translated 
into ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞŵĞĂŶƐ ?ŝƌŬEĂďĞƌƐ ?  “WŽǁĞƌ ?>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ PdŚĞĂƐĞŽĨĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 931.  
1737 Deborah Welch LarƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůĞǆĞŝ ^ŚĞǀĐŚĞŶŬŽ ?  “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. 
Primacy ? ?International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 69. 
1738 Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today, 202. 
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In seeking to rebalance the insufficiency of realist and liberal paradigms in theorising the relational and 
normative aspects of hegemony,1739 this thesis has sought to capture the broader bounds of hegemony, 
FRQVLGHULQJ QRW RQO\ WKH FRQYHQWLRQDO H[SUHVVLRQV RI SRZHU WKDW IL[DWH µRQ WKH PRVW YLVLEOH DQG
GHVWUXFWLYHGLPHQVLRQVRISRZHU¶EXWDOVRRQ WKHµQRUPDWLYHVWUXFWXUHVDQGGLVFRXUVHV WKDWJHQHUDWH
differential social capacities for actors to dHILQHDQGSXUVXHWKHLULQWHUHVWV¶1740  I have treated primacy 
and hegemony as conceptually distinct.  Instead of a limited focus on primacy, hegemonic leadership 
is a distinctly social phenomenon.  In a transforming and increasingly globalised world, American 
primacy of the 1950s cannot be restored, and the numerous issues facing the world of the twenty-first 
century ± including terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and climate change ± do not respect 
American primacy.   
 
Since the production of power creates the consequences that shape the capacities of actors to determine 
their own circumstances and fate, in and through social relations, hegemony, therefore, when conceived 
of as leadership, rests on the capacity of the incumbent to be open to renegotiate the terms of its 
hegemony.1741  The reproduction of hegemony is contingent on the agency of hegemonic actors and 
dependent on subordinate states for acceptance or contestation.  While Gramsci assumes that legitimacy 
is inherent within the process of garnering consent, there is, in practice, a continuum of consent that can 
EHORFDWHGEHWZHHQLQWHUQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHGRPLQDQWVWDWH¶VLGHDVQRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHVDWRQHHQGDQG
pragmatic acceptance at the other.  The need to maintain hegemonic legitimacy is an essential part of 
this process, emphasising the social and asymmetric relationships that exist between the hegemon and 
subordinate states.  The processes of deriving and bestowing legitimacy requires greater analytical 
focus.  An essential part of legitimacy is FUHGLELOLW\ZKLFKUHVWVILUVWRQDQDFWRU¶VVXIILFLHQWPDWHULDO
resources to carry out threats, to deter others and to assist allies from attack; and second, rests on 
whether other states believe that the United States will live up to its pledges.1742  Hegemony, therefore, 
is a social process, that is neither fixed by, nor condensed to, capabilities.  Leadership in the current 
context thus requires the support and consent of others, including countries such as China, Russia and 
Iran, with whom the U.S. does not share similar values or world views.  These regional powers are 
themselves constrained within the structure of the existing American-dominated order, into which they 
have no, or little, input.1743    
                                                          
1739 Ikenberry, for instance, treats hegemony as relational but limits his understanding to mutual interest. See G. 
John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
1740 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?<ƵƉĐŚĂŶ ? “dŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?
1741 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 5. 
1742 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 55. 
1743 LarƐŽŶĂŶĚ^ŚĞǀĐŚĞŶŬŽ ? “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy ? ? ? ?-95. Kupchan 
similarly observes that the modernisation of the rest will not follow the western path to modernity. 
Consequently, in the future, there are likely to be multiple models of modernity. The American model will need 
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In Chapter 2, I determined that the production of U.S. hegemony is not merely derived from American 
preponderance of material power; rather, U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific requires negotiation, 
consensus and legitimacy.  That is, American hegemony rests on the perception of other states 
FRQFHUQLQJ$PHULFD¶V right, willingness and capability to lead.  In the twenty-first century, primacy, 
with its preoccupation with military power, cannot alone sustain American leadership, or its credibility.  
American leadership requires buy-in from other global actors.  U.S. regional hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific is sustained and reproduced through the ongoing (re)negotiation of the existing social compact 
by the U.S. with regional states.1744   ,WLVWKLVVRFLDOFRPSDFWFRPSULVLQJµLGHDVFROOHFWLYHEHOLHIVDQG
bargains about SRZHUDXWKRULW\VHFXULW\DQGFRPPXQLW\¶WKDWSURGXFHVDQGPDLQWDLQVWKH86-centred 
hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific.1745  An American-led order, thus, rests on normative foundations, 
infused with an American understanding of its identity, its values and its belief system.  Any perceived 
threat to this order is also a threat to the hegemonic identity of the United States and to what the U.S. 
represents.  Consequently, wKLOH&KLQD¶VULVHGRHVQRWSRVHDQH[LVWHQWLDO WKUHDWWRWKH86 LWGRHV
present some kind of threat to the United States.  The imminent threat is not derived in material decline 
but concerned with non-material ontological security threat ± WKH WKUHDW IURP &KLQD¶V ULVLQJ SRZHU
identity to U.S. hegemonic identity and the challenge to the U.S. of producing a rising power identity 
for China.   
 
(ii) Identity, security and narrative 
In addition to a social practice, hegemony is therefore also a defining characteristic of American 
identity.  The co-constituted processes reproducing American hegemony as both an identity and a 
practice are inherently social.  Similar to the production of hegemonic order, American hegemonic 
identity requires consistent reproduction through narratives and the practice of foreign policy.   
 
Being the regional hegemon is integral to American self-perception, driven by long-standing beliefs in 
American exceptionalism.  There has been considerable disagreement over the extent to which 
exceptionalism influences foreign policy.  However, the character and meaning of American society 
HQFRPSDVVHGZLWKLQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPDW WKHYHU\ OHDVW µSURYLGHV WKHIUDPHZRUN IRUGLVFRXUVH LQ86
foreign policy-PDNLQJHYHQLILWLVUDUHO\WKHPDLQGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRURISROLF\LWVHOI¶1746  In Chapter 3, 
I examined the American exceptionalist ideology underpinning American identity and perceptions of 
                                                          
 ‘ďƵǇ-ŝŶ ?ĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌs if it is to remain viable. See Charles A. Kupchan, No OŶĞ ?ƐtŽƌůĚ PdŚĞtĞƐƚ ?dŚĞZŝƐŝŶŐZĞƐƚ ?
and the Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 86-89. 
1744 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 4-5. 
1745 Goh, The Struggle for Order, 5-6. 
1746 Trevor McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy since 1974 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 185. 
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national security.  The aim ZDVWRXQFRYHUKRZWKHH[FHSWLRQDOLVWEHOLHIV\VWHPKHOSVVKDSH$PHULFD¶V
world vision and its hegemonic identity.  The story concerning the unique formation of the United States 
(as either a crusader state or the promised land) is made possible by its exceptionalist beliefs ± in its 
capacity to be unique, in the distinctiveness of its values, and in its capacity to universalise those values 
± that continue to inform American political life today.1747  As a result of the symbiosis of American 
H[FHSWLRQDOLVP DQG $PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ ERWK PXVW EH SURWHFWHG EHFDXVH VR PXFK RI
$PHULFD¶VVHOI-perception and the cohesiveness of its national identity formation rest on its uniqueness 
and on its manifest destiny.1748   
 
The vacillations in the production of $PHULFD¶VLGHQWLW\ are being projected outward onto China through 
the processes of threat construction and story-WHOOLQJ  7KH VWRU\ RI µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ KDV FRPH WR EH
FRPPXQLFDWHGDVDWKUHDWWR$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFSRVLWLRQLQWKH$VLD-Pacific and to the American-led 
regional orGHUPDGHµUHDO¶WKURXJKHYHQWV&KLQD¶VDVVHUWLYHQHVVLQWKH6RXWK&KLQD6HDLWVWKUHDWWR
86IUHHGRPRIQDYLJDWLRQ&KLQHVHDWWDFNVRQ$PHULFDQF\EHUVHFXULW\DQG&KLQD¶VXQIDLUHFRQRPLF
practices are some such events or occurrences.  The outcome in foreign policy terms is the strategic 
rebalance, through which the U.S. intends to maintain its leadership position as the regional hegemon 
in the Asia-Pacific by maintaining the existing regional hegemonic order, and reproduce hegemony as 
an integral part of American self-identity.   
 
State identities need securing just as a state seeks physical security.  To this end, ontological security 
and story-telling processes provide the conceptual focus of Chapter 3.  Ontological security ± the 
process of securing RQH¶VRZQLGHQWLW\± is also a function of the state, requiring the constant production 
DQGUHSURGXFWLRQRIQDUUDWLYHVWKDWUHIOHFWWKHQDWLRQ¶VSHUFHSWLRQRILWVKLVWRU\FXOWXUHDQGLGHQWLW\
Furthermore, the state also determines the threats that undermine the security of a particular identity.  
Since threats to identity are often couched in terms of physical security needs, political officials, 
authorised to act on behalf of the state apparatus, construct narratives that activate foreign policies to 
counter any threat to identity, often encompassed (and therefore conflated) within the remit of physical 
security. 
 
                                                          
1747 &ŽƌŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐƚŽǀŝĞǁŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůƌŽůĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŝƚƐǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐ
either the Crusader State or the Promised Land, see Christopher Hemmer, American Pendulum: Recurring 
Debates in US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), especially chapter 1. 
1748 Tomes asserts, for example, that the extent of exceptionalist thinking is likely influenced by both the reality 
ĂŶĚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŐƌĞĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?^ĞĞZŽďĞƌƚZ ?dŽŵĞƐ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ
in the Twenty-&ŝƌƐƚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 1 (2014): 46-47. 
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Identity plays an important role in shaping what is constructed as a security threat, and asserted that a 
state lives in several conditions of (in)security at the same time.  The American state seeks to secure 
self ± its ontological security ± as well as its traditional physical security-seeking behaviour.  Securing 
$PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF LGHQWLW\ LV PDGH SRVVLEOH WKURXJK WKH UHSURGXFWLRQ RI WKH national security 
narrative that ultimately determines the shape of U.S. foreign policy.  Therefore, I have contended that 
identity and interest formation are endogenously essential to the making of foreign policy, rather than 
exogenously given.1749  Since narratives are critical to identity formation, and narratives also rely upon 
the sequencing of events for the elucidation of foreign policy activities, the timing of the decision to 
announce the rebalance strategy is more significant than is often depicted.   
 
The rebalance strategy has been interpreted from the U.S. perspective, since the purpose of this thesis 
has been to examine how the hegemon perceives security threats, and how it uses various forms of 
power at its disposal to maintain order, or at the very least, how it adapts circumstances to maintain the 
hierarchical status quo.  Priority is given to the U.S. within the Asia-3DFLILF¶VUHJLRQDORUGHUsince it is 
the processes that determine threat perceptions, the choices which determine who represents a threat, 
and finally, how the U.S. acts upon them, that will shape the future direction of regional order.  
Furthermore, the state is regarded as the principal actor in U.S. foreign policy-making, on the 
understanding that identity and state practices are mutually constitutive, and produce real material 
effects.   
 
Through the U.S. national security narrative, political officials determine the nature of threats and 
present them as common sense.  They are also able to marginalise, or exclude, alternatives, and justify 
foreign policy activities on this basis.  It is the state apparatus, acting on behalf of the state and nation, 
which establishes the constitution of national security, and defines the µstrategic perimeter¶ that 
prioritises specific regions and issues.1750  ,QIXVHGDVWKH\DUHE\$PHULFD¶VPRUDOEHKDYLRXUDOFRGH
U.S. political officials DFWZLWKDXWKRULW\LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK$PHULFD¶VDXWRELRJUDSKLFDOEHOLHIV\VWHPV
$FWLQJ RWKHUZLVH ZRXOG SURGXFH ZKDW *LGGHQV UHIHUV WR DV µVKDPH¶ which would undermine the 
reproduction of American identity as a benign hegemon.1751  Consequently, I argued that foreign policy-
making is not separate from the articulation of identity, rather, that national security subliminally draws 
upon identity.  Particular representations give specific policies a stable foundation upon which identity 
can then also be reproduced.1752  µ1DWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶LVWKXVUHTXLUHGWRUHSURGXFHRQWRORJLFDODVZHOODV
                                                          
1749 tĞŶĚƚ ? “ŶĂƌĐŚǇŝƐtŚĂƚ^ƚĂƚĞƐDĂŬĞŽĨŝƚ ? ? ? ? ?-8. 
1750 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 14. 
1751 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 64-68. 
1752 >ĞŶĞ ,ĂŶƐĞŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-structuralist work on the discursive production of the Bosnian war provided useful 
insight into the formulation of my theoretical framework. Hansen, Security as Practice.  
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physical security.  Since these normative processes are social by nature, it is the intended audience who 
PXVWLQWHUSUHW&KLQD¶VULVHDVDWKUHDW, for a state of (in)security to exist.  It is through political interaction 
that a collective understanding of the security threat can be fashioned, simultaneously creating a shared 
identity that binds a society together.   
 
Domestic identities also play an essential role in shaping national security narratives.1753  The 
construction of identity and foreign policy are connected through national security narratives that are 
produced by authorised speakers, namely political and military officials.  TKHµPHDQLQJVWKDWVWDWHVDQG
other political actors attach to power and security help XVH[SODLQWKHLUEHKDYLRXU¶1754  By taking this 
approach, this research claims that the treatment of the domestic socio-political context is essential to 
our understanding of the international security environment, and uncovers how material objective facts 
DERXWVHFXULW\DUHLQVHUWHGLQWRWKHGLVFXUVLYHUHDOP+DQVHQDVVHUWVWKDWLWLVµXVHIXOWRH[DPLQHKRZ 
IDFWVDUHEURXJKW WRJHWKHU WRFRQVWLWXWHHYHQWV¶ LQDQ\DQDO\VLVRI IRUHLJQSROLF\GHEDWHV1755  These 
µIDFWV¶DUHWKHQDVVLPLODWHGLQWREURDGHUTXHVWLRQVRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\ZLWKLQSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVHZKHUH
they take on political saliency through the story-telling activities of authorised political actors.1756  
Looking beyond conventional security narratives, this research illuminates the co-constitutive process 
of policy-making and identity construction of the American state, drawing attention to the processes 
that traditional IR approaches treat as pre-determined.  The socio-political context, in which security is 
constructed, determines what the state treats as threat or opportunity; it is the social framework within 
ZKLFK&KLQD¶VULVHLVLQWHUSUHWHGDQGZhich determines China to be positioned as a security threat to 
the United States.1757   
 
The theoretical approach 
This thesis has adhered to a post-positivist, interpretivist epistemology, concerned as it has been with 
interpreting American foreign policy behaviour, rather than predicting or explaining in the positivist 
VHQVH  µ)DFWV¶ DUH QRW GLYRUFHG IURP WKHRUHWLFDO FRQWH[WV µDV EDVLV RI OHJLWLPDWH FODLPV WR
knowledge.¶1758 They are established with a certain context which is determined by agents with inherited 
traditions of thought that drives their way of seeing the world.  Consequently, this interpretation of the 
                                                          
1753 Classical conceptualisations of security, for instance, separate the domestic and international domains. 
Hansen, Security as Practice, 34.  
1754 Peter Katzenstein,  “ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? in The Culture of National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1. 
1755 Hansen, Security as Practice, 32.  
1756 Hansen, Security as Practice, 33-34. 
1757 Hayes, Constructing National Security, 2-3. 
1758 Alan &ŝŶůĂǇƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ PĂ^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ? ?British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 6, no. 2 (2004): 129-164. 
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empirical material used in this thesis is shaped by my world views and thus interpretivism is an 
unavoidable mode of analysis.1759  Interpretivists also contend that people act as they do because of their 
EHOLHIVDQGNQRZOHGJHDERXWKRZWKHZRUOGZRUNVDQGWKHLUSODFHZLWKLQWKDWZRUOG$JHQWV¶EHKaviour 
can only be understood through their beliefs and theories that underpin their interpretations of the 
meanings of their actions, and the actions of others, in their social world, which also shapes their 
behaviour.  Consequently, interpretivists are concerned with meaning and with explaining what political 
agents do by interpreting their interpretations of their social world.1760  Interpretivists are not just 
concerning with understanding what agents think, but also with how and why they act.  They are thus 
concerned with describing and explaining political practices and behaviour, which is what this thesis 
has set out to do.1761 
 
Supporting the interpretivist understanding of knowledge, in the introductory chapter, I outlined reasons 
for choosing a critical constructivist and post-structuralist ontological approach.  This mixed approach 
allows for a theoretical focus on the social sources of hegemony and leadership, and the articulation of 
identity, with identity simultaneously (re)produced through the formulation and legitimisation of policy 
through narratives.  The premise, therefore, is that social cognitive structures are important, with 
identity being one of the most important.1762  Since the narrative processes that generate social meaning 
are often controlled by political officialsWKHWKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNUHYHDOHGKRZµGHHSO\SROLWLFDODQG
power-ODGHQ¶WKHVHSURFHVVHVFDQEH1763  Situations require interpretation and require weaving into an 
effective story that justifies particular foreign policies; consequently, political officials compete to 
produce dominant narratives.  Moreover, identity structures are the basis for ordering and designing 
social life, leading to practices as well as giving meaning to action.  Opening up hegemony to include 
identity focuses on the social nature of hegemonic relationships that cannot exist entirely on material 
SULPDF\+HJHPRQ\LVJLYHQPHDQLQJDQGµEHLQJ¶WKURXJKDVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
by the states in the Asia-Pacific.  While the American goal is to maintain the long-standing asymmetry 
in U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations and regional geopolitics through the existing structure of hierarchy in 
regional order$PHULFD¶VSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHVWKHFRQVHQWRIRWKHUVIRULWVOHJLWLPDF\DVPXFKDVLWUHVWV
on American material capabilities.  
 
                                                          
1759 Ian Hall,  “The Promise and Perils of Interpretivism in Australian International Relations ? ?Australian Journal 
of Public Administration 73, no. 3 (2014): 308. 
1760 Colin Hay,  “Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of Public 
Administration ? ?Public Administration 89, no. 1 (2011): 168 (167 W182). 
1761 ,Ăůů ? “The Promise and Perils of Interpretivism in Australian International Relations ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1762 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 
1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 23. 
1763 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 281. 
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Rationalist IR literature tends to frame regional questions such as that of the South China Sea disputes 
as a matter of international security, typically explained in terms of the distribution of military and 
economic capabilities.  Rationalist approaches tend to explain WKH UHEDODQFH DV WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V
UHDFWLRQWRHYHQWVQDPHO\&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJO\DVVHUWLYHEHKDYLRXULQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW&KLQD6HDV
7KHVH HYHQWV KDYH SURSHOOHG WKH DVVHUWLRQ RI $PHULFD¶V KHJHPRQLF SRVLWLRQ in the Asia-Pacific.  
µ&KLQD¶VULVH,¶ and all that this entails, LVGHHPHGWR WKUHDWHQ$PHULFD¶V top position in the regional 
order.  Yet, on balance, China does not currently pose a direct, existential threat to the United States or 
its allies in the Asia-Pacific.1764  7KHµ&KLQD¶VULVH¶QDUUDWLYHFRQQHFWVHYHQWVDQGZHDYHVWKHPLQWRD
believable story, linking specific events into a convincing themed narrative.  Realist and liberalist 
approaches say little about national security narratives; they are overlooked because the established 
assumption is that only material factors produce security threats.1765  Consequently, rationalist accounts 
ignore the underlying narratives of national security that determine which facts are relevant, or how 
threats and opportunities are initially constructed.1766   
 
Isolating capabilities from the social and political contexts in which such capabilities are found, restricts 
their explanatory potential.  Constructivism offers the opportunity to look beyond rational explanations 
by illuminating how events ± for instance, &KLQD¶VLVODQG-building activities in the South China Sea in 
GLVSXWHG ZDWHUV RU WKH WLPLQJ RI $PHULFD¶V GHFLVLRQ WR UHEDODQFH ± are interpreted by actors and 
incorporated into foreign policy-making and outcomes.  By taking a constructivist approach, which is 
µVHQVLWLYHWRERWKVWUXFWXUHVRIPHDQLQJZLWKDQDSSUHFLDWLRQIRUDJHQF\¶1767 this research presents an 
opportunity to add to the existing coverage of the rebalance strategy.  The idea that identity shapes 
security processes rests on the claim that security is a social construction and is thus the product of 
social and political processes, rather than being an objective state of nature.1768        
 
,QYRNLQJ SRVWVWUXFWXUDOLVP¶V UHODWLRQDO FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI LGHQWity allows for an understanding of 
LGHQWLW\WKDWLVµDOZD\VJLYHQWKURXJKUHIHUHQFHWRVRPHWKLQJLWLVQRW¶1769  Perceptions of what it means 
to be American sets out the boundaries for what is understood to be non-American.  In other words, 
                                                          
1764 Countries throughout the Asia-Pacific are competing to modernise their militaries but the arms build-up is 
ŶŽƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?dŚŝƐůŽŶŐĞƌƚƌĞŶĚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
rapid economic growth and increased wealth, and a range of longstanding external and internal security 
concerns that are not in every case specifically related to China. Economist ? “dĂŬŝŶŐƌŵƐ ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
54. 
1765 Jarrod Hayes, Constructing National Security: U.S. Relations with India and China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 2. 
1766 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 297. 
1767 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 281. 
1768 Hayes, Constructing National Security, 2. 
1769 Hansen, Security as Practice, 6-7. 
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SHUFHSWLRQVRIµVHOI¶DUHDOZD\VUHODWHGWRSHUFHSWLRQVRIµRWKHUV¶  Identity is also social in the sense 
that a particular identity is established through collective understandings of what it means to be 
American.  Identity is politically mobilised and constructed within political national security narratives; 
identities are simultaneously a product of, and the justification for, foreign policy.1770  Consequently, 
identities are constantly produced and reproduced through foreign policy discourse.1771  Looking 
beyond the Sino-U.S. rivalry as an outcome of power capabilities, a discursive epistemology focuses 
on a relational construction of identity.1772  The use of discourse analysis underlies a commitment to 
XQFRYHULQJ WKH µVWUXFWXUHV RI VLJQLILFDWLRQ¶ WKDW FRQVWUXFW WKHVH VRFLDO Uealities, by defining who is 
DXWKRULVHGWRVSHDNDQGDFWKRZWKH\HQGRUVHDFHUWDLQµFRPPRQ-VHQVH¶WKURXJKQDUUDWLYHDQGKRZ
their structuring of meaning connects to the practice of foreign policy in ways that are both intelligible 
and legitimate.1773  Discourse analysis thus supports a constructivist understanding of meaning in which 
µSHRSOH FRQVWUXFW WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKLQJV¶ SUHGRPLQDQWO\ WKURXJK OLQJXLVWLF VLJQ V\VWHPV1774  The 
growing rivalry between the U.S. and China is driven by competing statuses and identities, playing out 
ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHUHJLRQDOKLHUDUFK\&KLQD¶VVHOI-perception is one of achieving great power 
status that befits its non-Western, Sino-centric exceptional identity, and the U.S. self-perception is one 
of a benign, liberal hegemon with a manifest destiny and a universally applicable value system.1775  
 
 
The power in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific  
To study how the Obama administration attempts to DQLPDWH$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\%DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶V
taxonomy of power provides the analytical framework for the three empirical chapters.  Three elements 
of the rebalance strategy ± the security rebalance, the economic rebalance and U.S. relations with two 
regional powers, China and India ± provide the case studies, illustrating the American use of power to 
reproduce and FRQVROLGDWHLWVUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ\3RZHUDVZHNQRZUHPDLQVDQHVVHQWLDOO\µFRQWHVWHG
concept¶ yet using a comprehensive framework to analyse power in four forms ± compulsory, 
institutional, structural and productive ± provides depth to this analysis.1776   Moving the focus away 
from the economic and military aspects of the rebalance strategy enables the exploration of the depth 
of American hegemony, and uncovers how America uses elements of its power interactively and 
relationally.  Power is as much a social activity as it is drawn from military and economic 
                                                          
1770 Hansen, Security as Practice, 26. 
1771 Hansen, Security as Practice, 26. 
1772 Hansen, Security as Practice, 17. 
1773 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?-230. 
1774 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1775 White, The China Choice, 3. 
1776 Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ďǇ t ? ? 'ĂůůŝĞ ?  “ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚ ŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 
(1955-1956): 167-198. See also ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ?. 
 315 
 
capabilities.1777  It is expressed through social constitution as well as interaction.  The reproduction of 
American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is just as dependeQWRQ$PHULFD¶VDELOLW\WRLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVH and 
maintain the legitimacy of an American-centred order, which invites discussion of how the U.S. uses 
various forms of power to get what it wants.1778    
 
Power, like hegemony, remains conceptually problematic.  However, operationalising power in 
GLIIHUHQWZD\VZKLFK%DUQHWW DQG'XYDOO¶V DQDO\WLFDO IUDPHZRUN VXSSRUWV RIIHUV DPRUH LQVLJKWIXO
analysis into the workings of American hegemony.  Not only do Barnett and Duvall allow for multiple 
forms of power to co-exist, the contributors in their edited volume, Power in Global Governance, 
demonstrate how these various forms of power interact and relate, rather than compete.1779  In their 
varied applications of the taxonomy, perhaps on account of their different theoretical commitments, one 
RUWZRIRUPVRISRZHUUHFHLYHPRUHDWWHQWLRQWKDQWKHRWKHUV1HYHUWKHOHVVVXFKµFURVV-IHUWLOLVDWLRQ¶
is healthy since it promotes dialogues across theoretical perspectives.1780  The use of the four forms of 
power in this thesis is not meant to detract from the ontological and epistemological differences that 
exist in the field of IR over power.1781  $QLQWHJUDWHGDSSURDFKKRZHYHUVXSSRUWVDµEHWWHUULFKHUDQG
IXOOHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ RI KRZ SRZHU ZRUNV LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV1782  A willingness to look for 
FRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHYDULRXVIRUPVRISRZHUDUWLFXODWHGLQWKLVWD[RQRP\µHQKDQFHVDQGGHHSHQV¶
our understanding of international relations.1783   
 
Inherent in any analysis of power, and central to this discussion of hegemony, is the recognition that 
expressions of power invite contestation and resistance from subordinate states.  The social nature of 
SRZHUSURYRNHVFKDOOHQJHDQGUHVLVWDQFHIURPWKRVHRQWKHµUHFHLYLQJHQG¶ZKRVHHNJUHDWHUFDSDFLW\
WR µLQIOXHQFH WKH VRFLDO IRUFHV WKDW GHILQH WKHP DQG WKHLU SDUDPHWHUV IRU DFWLRQ¶1784  Power and 
FRQWHVWDWLRQDUHWKXVµPXWXDOO\LPSOLFDWHG.¶1785  Resistance to, or contestation of, American hegemony 
is present in each form of power within the taxonomy.  Through the empirical case studies, I 
                                                          
1777 Barnett and Duvall note that ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞƚŽ ‘ŵŽĚŝĨǇ ?ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƐƚ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? ?Barnett and Duvall,  “WŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ 'ůŽďĂů
'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?
1778 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƐƚĂŶĚƵŶŽ ? “/ŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇKƌĚĞr in the Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?ŝŶAmerica Unrivalled: 
The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 181-187. 
1779 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
1780 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
1781 /ŶƚŚĞŝƌĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůůƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŽƌĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŽƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŶĞĞĚĞǆĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚ
ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?46. 
1782 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
1783 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
1784 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
1785 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
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demonstrated that the American exercise of power generates varying degrees of contestation.  
Contestation of aspects of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific from time to time can be located not 
only in Beijing or Pyongyang, but also in the capitals of allies and partners across the region.  
Furthermore, pushback against the United States can be issue-specific, such as the matter of American 
bases on Okinawa, or, can WDNHWKHVKDSHRIEURDGHUFRQFHUQVIRULQVWDQFHRYHU$PHULFD¶VHFRQRPLF
liberalisation agenda.  However, while there are certainly incidences of contestation, requiring the U.S. 
to renegotiate the terms of its regional hegemony, this does not point to the overall demise of American 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  Rather, most subordinate states accept the asymmetry of relations in the 
regional order and the nature of U.S. hegemony ± channelled through institutions that encourage 
collective images and produce ideological legitimacy ± is relatively good at absorbing resistance.  The 
exercise of contestation in international relations, in all its forms, therefore, seems as complex as the 
exercise of power.1786     
 
The U.S. can exercise a range of power assets to maintain its ideological, economic, security and 
political hegemony, and does so consensually and coercively.  %DUQHWWDQG'XYDOO¶VWD[RQRP\SLQSRLQWV
two dimensions upon which power is expressed.  The first dimension concerns the expression of power 
through interaction and constitution and the second dimension defines the specificity of social relations 
as being direct and immediate, or indirect, temporally and socially diffuse.  Interactive expressions of 
power ± compulsory and institutional ± are the more conventional starting points for analyses of power, 
WUHDWLQJ µVRFLDO UHODWLRQV DV FRPSRVed of the actions of pre-constituted social actors towards one 
DQRWKHU¶1787  The constitutive expressions of power ± structural and productive ± are broadly concerned 
with how the social capacities of actors are socially produced through the perception of self and other, 
shaping interests and preferences, with the former working through direct structural relations and the 
latter entailing more diffuse social processes.1788  Social structures are co-constituted through the actions 
of agents, and structures such as discourses find expression in the rhetorical practices of actors, as they 
formulate preferred action.  There is a place for agency in the structural and productive elements in this 
project that focuses its energies on the American exercise of American power.  
 
Like the contributors to Power in Global Governance, this thesis looked for the connections between 
the different forms of power in each element of the rebalance strategy ± the security rebalance, the 
economic rebalance and U.S. relations with two crucial regional rising powers, India and China.  In 
                                                          
1786 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
1787 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
1788 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚŚĞǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
cannot be reduced to the attributes, actions, or interactions of pre-given actors. Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞr in 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
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each case, the forms of power that animate American hegemony drew attention to the range of tools the 
U.S. has at its disposal to preserve the asymmetric relations with subordinate states in the region.  Each 
case study attempted to capture the various forms of power expressed, with some more prevalent than 
others.  In addition, each case study also made reference to the varying forms of resistance to aspects 
of American hegemony.  This section addresses each form of power ± compulsory, institutional, 
structural and productive, assessing how each case study reflects U.S. hegemony. 
 
&RPSXOVRU\3RZHU$PHULFD¶VFRHUFLYHHGJH 
Compulsory power rests on the hard, material power resources possessed by a state that directly controls 
another.  Dahl notes that coercive power can be present, even without a physical presence.  The starting 
point of the discussion on the American exercise of compulsory power is the U.S. military presence in 
the Asia-Pacific that is shaping the behaviour of other states in the region without physical force being 
applied.  The military element of the UHEDODQFHVXVWDLQV$PHULFD¶VJRDO WR UHPDLQ WKHSUHSRQGHUDQW
military power in the Asia-Pacific, by augmenting its existing presence, and repositioning a tranche of 
its military resources towards Australia and Southeast Asia by 2020.  The goal is not only to rebalance 
to, but also to rebalance military hardware within, the Asia-Pacific.  American hegemony is 
underpinned by the capacity of the U.S. military to maintain regional stability and its willingness and 
capacity to use those preponderant resources to directly shape the actions of others.  
 
The manner in which the U.S. exercises its military power as a means to sustain its hegemony can be 
both coercive and consensual.  In Chapter 4, I considered the exertion of U.S. compulsory power 
through the rebalance by bilaterally engaging with other regional partners, including India and Vietnam, 
working towards upgrading these strategic relationships, and enhancing the sphere of American 
influence across the Indo-Asia-Pacific.  The broadening of the alliance structure to incorporate 
burgeoning pluri-lateral arrangements between like-minded American allies also perpetuates and 
strengthens the existing regional security order.  Cooperation between existing American allies expands 
the coverage of American-sponsored rules and norms concerning regional security behaviour across the 
Asia-Pacific, in ways that the U.S. could not do alone.  The U.S.-Japan-India trilateral grouping extends 
U.S. influence and its capacity to extend interoperability with partners from Northeast Asia into the 
Indian Ocean.  In Chapter 6, in contrast, I focused on the escalating tensions in the East and South China 
Seas as demonstration of U.S. willingness to use its preponderant military power as means of deterrence 
against potential resistance to the regional hegemonic order by China.  The inclusion of the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands within the U.S-Japan security alliance meant to deter China in the East China 
Sea after %HLMLQJ¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIthe East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013.   
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The exertion of U.S. compulsory power is not stand-alone.  These disputes point to the strength of the 
American-led order that structures the conditions within which China and other regional players, can 
act and determine their own preferences.  Since U.S. hegemony rests on the consent of others, coercion 
is not the best approach to sustain hegemony.  In general, the U.S. does not resort to coercion to maintain 
the regional security order ± rather the opposite.  U.S. hegemony has proliferated through the myriad 
post-war global and regional institutions that could further American interests and spread U.S. values 
more comprehensively and in which its core regional allies are also heavily invested. The U.S. capacity 
to influence the direction of regional institutions, and to dominate the ideas that become universally 
accepted within the order, further sustain its hegemony. 
  
Institutional power: securing American interests through regional multilateral mechanisms 
Institutions, therefore, are an essential mechanism through which hegemonic order is sustained.  As the 
more diffuse form of interactive power, institutional power involves the U.S. working through regional 
institutions to secure favourable outcomes.  Institutions with a degree of autonomy from the U.S., and 
with partial control given to other (usually U.S.-friendly) states, denotes that these institutions are not 
possessed by the U.S, even though they reflect American views.  Global and regional institutions reflect 
and maintain existing relations of power, producing rules and ideological legitimacy and co-opting 
officials from subordinate states to absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.  Embedding the U.S. presence in 
regional institutions, including ASEAN, EAS and APEC, and nudging them towards the American way 
of thinking has been a strategic goal of the Obama administration.   
 
In Chapters 4 and 6, I considered how the U.S. uses regional institutions to create a favourable response 
to U.S. interests.  Despite being a non-member, increasing U.S. involvement with the main regional 
forum, ASEAN, has been instrumental in U.S. attempts to create common interests and a unified 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDQUHVSRQVHWR&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH6RXWKDQG(DVW&KLQD6HDV The way in which the 
U.S. has influenced the regional agenda to make this a regional problem from 2010, requiring a regional 
response, highlights the combined use of American compulsory and institutional power.  Since ASEAN 
is keen to maintain its independence from either U.S. or Chinese control, the Obama administration has 
ZRUNHGZLWK$6($1DQGDFFHSWHG$6($1¶VUROHDVWKHFULWLFDOUHJLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQRI6RXWKHDVW$VLD
The U.S. has supported ASEAN in the creation of a Code of Conduct for safe navigation in the South 
China Sea, advocating a legal framework consistent with the U.S.-favoured approach.  Through the 
application of pressure, the escalated presence and freedom of navigation exercises in the South China 
Sea, the U.S. is viewed as discharging a regional stabiliser role, and as protector of UNCLOS, for the 
common good.  This presents the benign face of U.S. hegemony, recognising the role of ASEAN as a 
critical regional institution, and empowering the regional states via ASEAN to manage the South China 
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Sea disputes.  The empowerment of subordinate states and institutions is an important aspect of U.S. 
hegemonic maintenance.  
 
In Chapter 5, I considered the role of the U.S. in shaping the regional economic order.  The U.S. 
preference to promote institutions for global economic governance through the IMF, World Bank and 
WTO highlights a significant disjoint between developed and developing nations, especially in the Asia-
Pacific.  ,QVWLWXWLRQDOSRZHUµH[SRVHVWKHJRYHUQLQJELDVHVRILQVWLWXWLRQV¶JHQHUDWLQJµXQequal leverage 
RULQIOXHQFHLQGHWHUPLQLQJFROOHFWLYHRXWFRPHV¶1789 Also consistent with the biases of institutions is 
WKHDELOLW\RIJUHDWSRZHUVWRSUHVHUYHRUIXUWKHUµWKHLULQWHUHVWVDQGSRVLWLRQVRIDGYDQWDJH¶ZLWKRXW
direct or full control over them.1790  These institutions of global or regional governance reflect the 
underlying global class structure, thus helping to reproduce that structure by fostering a world view that 
there is either no alternative, or that the current social order is the most appealing.1791    
 
American hegemony in the economic sphere is more contested, with numerous regional economic 
actors ± states and multilateral institutions ± contributing to the dynamism of the regional economy.  
American influence on the IMF during the Asian Financial Crisis highlighted both the extent of 
American power and also the limits.  The long term consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis 
produced regional institutions such as the ASEAN +3 mechanism that eschewed American influence.  
The choice of the U.S. course of action that emphasised coercion, especially working through an 
institution of global economic governance, the IMF, led to changing institutional terrain and greater 
contestation of the Washington Consensus.  Moreover, the rise of new economic powers, including the 
BRICS nations has put increasing pressure on the U.S. dominant position in the global and Asia-Pacific 
economic order, and limited U.S. capacity to unrestrictedly exercise its structural power.  These rising 
economic powers may not ultimately want to destroy the liberal economic order, they do challenge 
$PHULFD¶V XQIHWWHUHG GRPLQDQFH RYHU WKH UXOHV RI WKH JDPH DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV  The 
American model of neoliberalism continues to be contested across the region, yet, at present there is no 
viable alternative to this model, which may provide some explanation as to why many regional states 
have further locked themselves into this model through the TPP.   
 
   
                                                          
1789 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
1790 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?58. 
1791 Barnett and ƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?60. 
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Structural power: The U.S. trade agenda 
Structures assign agents the capacity to act in the social world.1792  This constitutive element of structural 
power is, by definition, direct, as agents are enabled and constrained through the internal relations of 
pre-existing structures.  However, states have a role to play in the co-constitution (and reconstitution) 
of the structures that condition their existence through, for example, economic policy.  As chronicled 
in Chapter 5, the U.S. uses free trade agreements (FTAs) to facilitate the neoliberalisation of the Asia-
Pacific political economy, thus buttressing U.S. structural power in the region.  The negotiation of FTAs 
has resulted in greater mobility for transnational capital, safer opportunities for U.S. investors and a 
general opening of markets through privatisation and deregulation. 
 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations point to the direct power American retains over the structure 
of the global capitalist economy, as it is manifested in the Asia-Pacific region.  The TPP reflects the 
ideological adherence to neoliberalism, as it supports the U.S. goal of opening markets, deregulation, 
limiting the number of state-owned enterprises and generally promoting transparency and good 
governance that will enable American companies to operate on a level playing field in the region.  The 
TPP aims to place the United States at the centre of future regional economic development, shaping its 
future direction from the inside.1793  6LQFHWKHLQWHQGHGRXWFRPHRIWKH733LVWRµORFNLQ¶$VLD-Pacific 
states to a process of economic restructuring compatible with American economic neoliberalism, this 
process is indicative of a defined connection between the exercise of American structural and productive 
power.  The discourses and institutions of international and regionDO JRYHUQDQFH µFRQWLQJHQWO\
reproduce particular kinds of actors with associated social powers, self-understandings, and 
SHUIRUPDWLYHSUDFWLFHV¶1794   
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, tKHSULQFLSDOIRUXPIRU&KLQD¶VFRQWHVWDWLRQRI$PHULFDQ-dominated regional 
economic governance ± American structural power ± has come in the form of the formal establishment 
of the China-led regional development bank, the AIIB, in April 2015.  While this development does not 
necessarily imply a direct challenge to American hegemony, :DVKLQJWRQ¶VLQLWLDOUHVSRQVHLQGLFDWHG
WKDWWKLVZDVDQRWKHUVWHSWRZDUGV%HLMLQJ¶VDVSLUDWLRQWRGLVSODFHWKH86DVWKHUHJLRQDOKHJHPRQ and 
WRHURGH$PHULFD¶VFDSDFLW\WRH[HUWVWUXFWXUDOSRZHURYHUWKHJOREDOHFRQRP\.  Beijing has asserted 
                                                          
1792 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
1793 US economic influence over Southeast Asia, for instance, will remain limited, since from Southeast Asia, only 
Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are current signatories of TPP. Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, for 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ Žƌďŝƚ ? ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ igh bar for TPP entry. RCEP, despite being less 
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐƚŚĂŶdWW ?ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂůů^EƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?/ŶĚŝĂĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?'ƌĂŚĂŵ ? “^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŝŶƚŚĞh^ZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ P
WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĂŝǀŝĚĞĚZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?
1794 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?60. 
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that the AIIB will act in concert with existing regional and international financial institutions. The first 
AIIB projects are set to be joint efforts: one with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development in Central Asia and another with the Asian Development Bank in Pakistan.1795  At the 
spring 2016 meetings of the IMF and World Bank, prominent leaders of both the AIIB and the BRICS 
EDQN DWWHQGHG VHVVLRQV RQ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH ZLWK DOO WKH ZRUOG¶V PXOWLODWHUDO GHYHORSPHQW EDQNV
(MDBs).1796   One year on, cooperation, rather than confrontation, defines the relationship between the 
$,,%DQGWKHZRUOG¶VPXOWLODWHUDOGHYHORSPHQWEDQNVThis suggests that the U.S. retains considerable 
dominance over the structure of the global economy, and cultural domination of international 
institutions through its enduring capacity to universalise American interests, and heading up the still 
prevailing group of subordinate states.     
 
Productive Power: Constructing regional narratives 
Productive power worNV WKURXJK GLIIXVH DQG FRQVWLWXWLYH VRFLDO SURFHVVHV µWKDW DUH HIIHFWHG RQO\
through the meaningful practices of actors¶1797  ,WLQYROYHVµWKHGLVFXUVLYHSURGXFWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWV
WKHIL[LQJRIPHDQLQJVDQGWKHWHUPVRIDFWLRQRIZRUOGSROLWLFV¶1798 Productive power runs through 
the discursive phenomena that produce identities, ideas and knowledge.  It encompasses the 
contingency of subjects, who can (re)ascribe meaning to themselves and the world around them through 
language practices and knowledge production. Insofar as they legitimise the actions of more powerful 
actors, discursive representations are ideological DQG LGHRORJLFDO VXERUGLQDWLRQ IDFLOLWDWHV µUXOH E\
FRQVHQW¶1799 
 
The obvious asymmetry of American compulsory power has conditioned the interests, preferences and 
even the identity of regional actors (especially the post-war pacifist Japan), as well as shaping the 
UHJLRQDOVHFXULW\GLVFRXUVHSDUWLFXODUO\DURXQGWKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHUHSUHVHQWVERWKWR$PHULFDQ
hegemony and regional security.  In Chapter 4, I considered how &KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\DVVHUWLYHQHVVLQWKH
East and South China Seas is increasingly represented as a collective regional security problem, in 
DGGLWLRQWRWKHWKUHDWWKDW&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVSUHVHQWWRUHJLRQDOFRPPRQV:hile benefitting from the 
American provision of regional public goods, including freedom of navigation, and generally 
                                                          
1795 dŽŵƵĞƌŬůĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ//ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚDƐ ? ?Institutional Investor, April 
28, 2016. http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/3549574/chinas-aiib-stresses-cooperation-not-
competition-with-mdbs/banking-and-capital-markets-banking.html#.V8RTc4-cFYc  (accessed August 28, 2016); 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “//ŐĂƚŚĞƌƐĨŽƌ/ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂůDĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ?
1796 ƵĞƌŬůĞ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ//ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚDƐ ? ?
1797 DŝĐŚĂĞůĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚZĂǇŵŽŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
1798 DŝĐŚĂĞůĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚZĂǇŵŽŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?-21. 
1799 ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞŶƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐŽĨ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? ? ? ?-27. 
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acquiescing to the American military presence around the Asia-Pacific, many regional actors have 
resisted the security rebalance narrative that appears to support a quasi-containment of China strategy.  
Initial regional responses to the military balance were low-key.  While an increased U.S. military 
presence is broadly accepted, ASEAN countries have not acquiesced to, or publically supported, the 
justification of the military rebalance that situates the China threat as the reasoning.1800  
 
The U.S. also has a long history of exercising productive power in relation to the process of economic 
development of the Asia-Pacific.  As assessed in Chapter 5, in the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement, the U.S. represents the TPP as the gold standard of free trade agreements.  At the same time, 
the objective is to create a regional Asia-Pacific identity around the TPP.  The successful completion of 
the TPP negotiations became an administration priority in April 2015, in view of the difficult 
progression of TPA through Congress, and with the establishment of the AIIB by China.  The 
negotiations became increasingly securitised by Obama administration officials, who emphasised the 
733¶VVLJQLILFDQFHWR$PHULFDQKHJHPRQ\LQWKH$VLD-Pacific.1801  Despite professing to be primarily a 
tool of American economic power, such actions have security implications.  The linking of security and 
economic realms may potentially shift this free trade agreement into the compulsory power sphere in 
the future, especially as it makes specific reference to TPP members working collectively on cyber 
security issues, implicitly focusing on the increasing instances of Chinese cyber espionage against 
American corporations.1802      
   
Washington has also consistently discursively delegitimised state capitalist practices that are 
inconsistent with its neoliberal vision.  Conversely, regional contestation of the American-led neoliberal 
project, the Washington Consensus, has been more prevalent in the economic than in the security 
sphere.  This regional contestation persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the form of the Asian 
development models for economic growth.  Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the effects of 
the harshness of the IMF bailout, ostensibly drawn up by the IMF, but entirely backed by the United 
States, are still being felt today, manifested by regional attempts to create Asian-only institutions to 
                                                          
1800 From a regional perspective, the rebalance initially reawakened the over-militarisation critique of U.S. Asia-
Pacific policy, with its upfront focus on the realignment of the US regional presence and on the tensions in the 
^ŽƵƚŚĂŶĚĂƐƚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂƐ ?'ƌĂŚĂŵ ? “^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŝŶƚŚĞh^ZĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1801 In April 2015, Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, highlighted that American military power rests on the 
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǀŝďƌĂŶƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞdWW  ‘ŵĂŬĞƐ ƐƚƌŽŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ?  Ashton Carter, 
 “Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific ? ?McCain Institute, Arizona State University, 
April 6, 2015. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606660/remarks-on-the-next-
phase-of-the-us-rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific-mccain-instit (accessed March 3, 2016). 
1802 ^ŚĂǁŶ ŽŶŶĂŶ ?  “WĂĐŝĨŝĐ dƌĂĚĞ ĞĂů dĂŬĞƐ ŝŵ Ăƚ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ,ĂĐŬŝŶŐ ? ?Financial Times, November 4, 2015. 




buffer the American-dominated APEC.  The intra-Asian ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping grew from 
WKH QHHG IRU GLYHUVLI\ WKH UHJLRQ¶V GHSHQGHQFLHV DQG WR LQFUHDVH LWV FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ OHYHUDJH
against the United States.   
 
Chapter 6 focused on America¶V  application of productive power through the discursive trends that 
SURGXFHLGHQWLWLHVLGHDVDQGµIDFWV¶DERXWZKDW&KLQDLVLQUHODWLRQWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV1803   As I make 
the case in the discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the processes that link identity and the national 
security narrative, China is consistently represented as the threatening other.  India, in contrast, is 
represented in a more favourable light, because it is a democracy, and despite the challenges of the 
Indo-U.S. relationship.1804  Both India and China contest aspects of American hegemony, even as the 
U.S. builds ever closer strategic and economic ties with India, and endeavours to create a formal 
IUDPHZRUNIRUFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK&KLQD7KH\LQGLYLGXDOO\FRQWHVW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRVKDSHWKHLU
rising power identity, conveyed through their individual, but similar, historical memory narratives 
concerning their colonisation by western powers.1805  For each, there is an unconcealed aversion to 
being involuntarily co-opted into the sphere of American preferences and action.  In InGLD¶VFDVHLWKDV
challenged U.S. interests in the WTO and over climate change.1806  China has asserted its rights in the 
western Pacific. 
 
The use of this taxonomy has illuminated both the different ways in which U.S. power operates and the 




The Global Financial Crisis and the Global War on Terror, and military overspend of the previous 
decade drew attention to the unsustainability of U.S. defence spending.1807  Obama has no choice but to 
temper spending and rebalance the financially unsustainable foreign policy excesses of previous 
                                                          
1803 ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? “WŽǁĞƌŝŶ'ůŽďĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?-21. 
1804 For further discussion on the divergent trajectories of US-China and US-India relations, based on US 
perceptions of their value systems and attitudes towards democracy, see Hayes, Constructing National Security.  
1805 &ŽƌĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝes in the international 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐĞĞ>ĞĞĂŶĚŚĂŶ ? “ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂŶĚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ/ntervention ? ?179-214. 
1806 EĂǀŝŶ ^ŝŶŐŚ <ŚĂĚŬĂ ?  “No US-India Deal on Climate ChĂŶŐĞ ? ?BBC, January 27, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-31008165 (accessed December 15, 2015). 
1807 The Budget Control Act (2011) commits the Obama administration to cutting the defence budget by USD500 
bilůŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĚĞĐĂĚĞ ?^ĞĞƌĂĚWůƵŵĞƌ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ^ƚĂŐŐĞƌŝŶŐĞĨĞŶƐĞƵĚŐĞƚ ?/ŶŚĂƌƚƐ ? ?Washington 
Post, January 7, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-hagel-
needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/ (accessed March 4, 2016). 
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presidencies.  Obama¶VDSSURDFKhas prioritised domestic economic issues as a means to strengthen 
U.S. global leadership overall*LGHRQ5RVHIRULQVWDQFHXQGHUVWDQGV2EDPDWREHµDQLGHRORJLFDO
liberal with a conservative temperament ± someone who felt that after a period of reckless 
RYHUH[SDQVLRQDQGEHOOLJHUHQWXQLODWHUDOLVPWKHFRXQWU\¶VORQJ-term foreign policy goals could best be 
IXUWKHUHG E\ VKRUW WHUP UHWUHQFKPHQW¶1808  Obama recognises that the perpetuation of the liberal 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUGHUUHVWVRQUHWUDFWLQJIURPµPLVJXLGHGDGYHQWXUHVDQGIHXGVLQWKHJOREDOSHULSKHU\¶1809  
Critics claim a trend towards isolationism under Obama and condemn his approach to restrained U.S. 
global leadership as accelerating U.S. decline.1810  Some conservatives have accused Obama of 
misunderstanding power and the leadership role of the United States in the international system.1811   
 
:KLOH WKH LGHD RI D µJUDQG VWUDWHJ\¶ KDV RIWHQ FHQWUHG RQ PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ LW UHTXLUHV D EURDGHU
designation that includes economic priorities as well as military and diplomatic considerations within 
WKH QDWLRQ¶V VWUDWHJLF WKLQNLQJ1812  ,Q HVVHQFH JUDQG VWUDWHJ\ LPSOLHV µDQ LQWHJUDWHG DQG LQFOXVLYH
DSSURDFKWRWKHSROLFLHVWKDWWKHVWDWHSXUVXHVLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHLWVGHVLUHGHQGV¶1813  The purpose of 
grand strategy is to define the U.S. role in the international system, and goals that policy-makers want 
the U.S. to achieve in line with interests and capacity.  In this way, it is a framework for outlining the 
kind of world that the U.S. seeks to build.1814  Academics offer several competing and often overlapping 
frameworks which define what is included in U.S. grand strategy.1815  In this thesis, a grand strategy is 
perceived to offer a constant set of principles that underpins foreign policy behaviour.  Implicit within 
                                                          
1808 'ŝĚĞŽŶZŽƐĞ ? “tŚĂƚKďĂŵĂ'ĞƚƐZŝŐŚƚ ? ?Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015): 2. 
1809 ZŽƐĞ ? “tŚĂƚKďĂŵĂ'ĞƚƐZŝŐŚƚ ? ? ? ? 
1810 ^ĞĞ ? ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?sĂůŝEĂƐƌ ?  “dŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇKďĂŵĂ EĞĞĚƐ ? ?New York Times, September 10, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/opinion/vali-nasr-the-grand-strategy-obama-needs.html?_r=0 
(accessed February 29, 2016). Krauthammer delivered an early ĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉolicy; 
arguing that the Obama administration made the decision to bring about American decline,  “&ŽƌŵĞƌŝĐĂƚŽĚĂǇ ?
ĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝƐŶŽƚĂĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĞĐůŝŶĞŝƐĂĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ? ŚĂƌůĞƐ<ƌĂƵƚŚĂŵŵĞƌ ? “ĞĐůŝŶĞŝƐĂŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?Weekly Standard, 
October 19, 2009. http://www.weeklystandard.com/decline-is-a-choice/article/270813 (accessed June 26, 
2016). 
1811 tĂůƚĞƌ>ŽŚŵĂŶ ? “tŚǇKďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ:ĂďĂƚtĂůŬĞƌ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞDŝƐƐĞƐƚŚĞWŽŝŶƚ ? ?The Daily Signal, 
April 7, 2015. http://dailysignal.com/2015/04/07/why-obamas-jab-at-walkers-foreign-policy-knowledge-
misses-the-point/ (accessed February 29, 2016); see also Alfred McCoy,  “The Quiet Strategy of Barack Obama, ?
The American Conservative, September 15, 2015. http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-quiet-
grand-strategy-of-barack-obama/ (accessed February 29, 2016). 
1812 William C. Martell, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
340. 
1813 Martell, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, 340. 
1814 Martell, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, 340. 
1815 Miller sets out five goals: liberalism, defending the American homeland from attack, maintaining a 
favourable balance of power among the great powers, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance 
ĂŶĚĂůůŝĞƐ ? capabilities abroad. WĂƵů ?DŝůůĞƌ ? “&ŝǀĞWŝůůĂƌƐŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy 54, no. 5 (2012): 7-44. Martell sets out a three-point roadmap for American grand strategy: 
restoring the domestic foundations of American national power, reinforcing American leadership to restrain 




grand strategy are notions of identity, and as a collective endeavour, grand strategic thinking undergoes 
a constant process of articulation and re-articulation, of defining and redefining threats and interests, 
and for creating stories to support foreign policy endeavours.   
 
Obama eschews the pursuit of a grand design in favour of small, incremental changes, making case-by-
case judgements.1816  However, the lack of an overtly verbalised doctrine does not signify that there has 
been no grand strategic thinking over the course of the presidency.  From his inaugural address in 
January 2009, Obama framed his strategic approach in terms of managing domestic financial problems 
WRµOD\DQHZIRXQGDWLRQIRUJURZWK¶1817  It was clear that American economic prosperity and security, 
and predominant international status continue to underpin U.S. foreign policy concerns, as they always 
have.1818  His first National Security Strategy in 2010 outlined his grand strategic objective ± to rebuild 
liberal hegemony ± µWKHIRXQGDWLRQRI$PHULFDQVWUHQJWKDQG[global] OHDGHUVKLS¶± that could best be 
DFKLHYHGWKURXJK$PHULFD¶Vdomestic renewal.1819  In acknowledging difficult fiscal realities, it was in 
WKHEHVW LQWHUHVWVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWRLQYHVWµZLVHO\>LQDUHDVWKDW] will yield the biggest returns, 
which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st FHQWXU\RSSRUWXQLW\IRUXV¶1820   
 
$FUXFLDOWKHPHRI2EDPD¶VVWUDWHJLFWKLQNLQJKDVEHHQWKHQHHGWRUHEDODQFHORQJHUWHUPU.S. foreign 
policy priorities by moving focus away from the dominance of the U.S. military as the key tool for 
delivering U.S. foreign policy.  Ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, drawing down U.S. troop 
involvement, and keeping the U.S. military out of new operations in Syria and Libya ± the µQRboots on 
the ground¶ VWUDWHJ\ ± has highlighted the depth of bipartisan disagreement in the United States 
concerning how the U.S. should lead in the international order.1821  The administration¶VYLHZLVthat 
                                                          
1816 Vox,  “/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ǁŝƚŚ ĂrĂĐŬ KďĂŵĂ ŽŶ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ƚranscript, January 23, 2015. 
http://www.vox.com/a/barack-obama-interview-vox-conversation/obama-foreign-policy-transcript (accessed 
February 29, 2016). See also Hemmer, American Pendulum, 158. 
1817 dŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ĂƌĂĐŬ KďĂŵĂ ?Ɛ /ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂů ĚĚƌĞƐƐ ? ? :ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address (accessed March 
10, 2016). 
1818 EŝĐŚŽůĂƐŽƵĐŚĞƚ ? “dŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇdƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶh^&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞKďĂŵĂWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ? ?International 
Affairs 89, no. 1 (2013): 43. 
1819 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ KƉĞŶŝŶŐ ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed March 
10, 2016). 
1820 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ. ? 
1821 Anne-DĂƌŝĞ^ůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ? “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy for his Second Term? If Not, He Could Try One 
ŽĨdŚĞƐĞ ? ?Washington Post, January 18, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-obama-have-
a-grand-strategy-for-his-second-term-if-not-he-could-try-one-of-these/2013/01/18/ec78cede-5f27-11e2-a389-
ee565c81c565_story.html (accessed February 29, 2016). 
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the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan would allow the 86WRµDFFHOHUDWHHIIRUWVWRSLYRWWRQHZJOREDO
realities,¶ZKLOVWDOVRµSUHVV>LQJ@IRUZDUGDQGUHQHZ>LQJ@RXUOHDGHUVKLS¶1822   
 
However, leading does not mean acting alone.  Without international support for interventions in Libya 
and Syria, the Obama administration has not been prepared to act.  7KLVµOHDGLQJIURPEHKLQG¶VWUDWHJ\
has not only compounded the perception that the U.S. is a declining power, it has been unsuccessful in 
diffusing escalating violence in Iraq, or civil war in Syria, and has potentially created the conditions for 
the advance of ISIS.1823  To avoid repetition of the mire of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama 
administration has rejected strategic RSWLRQVWKDWRQO\VHUYHWRµNHHSDOLGRQWKLQJV.¶As Robert Kagan, 
writing in the Wall Street Journal observes, preserving the liberal world order has always involved 
µNHHSLQJDOLG¶RQUHJLRQVLQWXUPRLO1824  Consequently, 2EDPD¶VDSSURDFKKDVQRWEHHQLQWHUSUHWHGDV
leadership.  The proposed reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe and the Middle East has 
generated concern and prompted claims that the administration was pursuing an offshore-balancing 
grand strategy.1825   
 
Proponents of offshore-balancing argue that the U.S. should strive to maintain its dominance in the 
western hemisphere, while simultaneously preventing another state from achieving hegemonic status.  
The only region where competition to U.S. hegemony is likely is in the Asia-Pacific.1826  The unlikely 
offshore-balancing strategy in Europe and the Middle East, where the U.S. has shown little will from 
:DVKLQJWRQWRWDNHWKHOHDGKDVSURYHQLQHIIHFWLYH2EDPD¶Vcaution in involving the U.S. military in 
any major interventions meant only the minimum military effort necessary to achieve limited goals was 
authorised in Syria and Libya.  The limited and delayed U.S. response has allowed Russia to shape the 
geopolitical situation on the ground.  Hemmer also notes that offshore balancing offers little guidance 
about threats such as nuclear proliferation, climate change or transnational diseases which require 
                                                          
1822 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐWĂĐŝĨŝĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ. ? 
1823 Jeffrey Goldberg,  “dŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ? ? Atlantic, April 2016. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed March 14, 
2016). 
1824 ZŽďĞƌƚ <ĂŐĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ ƌŝƐŝƐ ŽĨ tŽƌůĚ KƌĚĞƌ ? ?Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-crisis-of-world-order-1448052095 (accessed November 21, 2015).   
1825 Since the 1990s, Layne has been arguing for the U.S. to pursue an offshore balancing strategy. Christopher 
>ĂǇŶĞ ?  “&ƌŽŵWƌĞƉŽŶĚĞƌĂŶĐĞƚŽKĨĨƐŚŽƌĞĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ PŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ&ƵƚƵƌĞ'ƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?International Security 
22, no. 1 (1997): 86-124. 
1826 Mearsheimer and Walt suggest that even in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S should be an offshore-balancer, relying 
on regional powers to balance China. However, they concede that the distance between these regional powers 
makes it difficult to form a balancing coalition. On this basis, ƚŚĞh ?^ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ďǇĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?:ŽŚŶDĞĂƌƐŚĞŝŵĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶtĂůƚ ? “dŚĞĂƐĞĨŽƌKĨĨƐŚŽƌĞĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ ? ?Foreign 
Affairs (July/August 2016): 81  
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multilateral solutions.1827  2EDPD¶V HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKHVH LVVXHV VXJJHVWV D recalibration of U.S. 
foreign policy commitments, not towards a military-focused offshore-balancing strategy, but rather in 
the way in which the U.S. leads and determines global priorities.  
 
For much of the post-Cold War period, the effects of globalisation have radically altered the synergy 
between American national security policy and the international security environment.1828  If there is an 
µObama Doctrine¶ LW UHVWV RQ 2EDPD¶V JOREDO ZRUOG YLHZ WKDW UHFRJQLVHV WKH OLPLWV RI $PHULFD¶V
capacity to meet twenty-first century threats alone.  As a presidential candidate, Obama defined the U.S. 
security perimeter in global terms:  
µ,QWRGD\¶VJOREDOLVHGZRUOG«>Z@KHWKHULW¶VJOREDOWHUURULVPRUSDQGHPLFGLVHDVH
dramatic climate change or the proliferation of weapons of mass annihilation, the 
threats we face at the dawn of the 21st century can no longer be contained by borders 
and boundaries.¶1829 
Obama acknowledges that U.S. leadership is not synonymous with bearing the financial and military 
burdens.1830  µ/HDGHUVKLS¶LQYROYHVPRELOLVLQJthe international community, creating coalitions of the 
willing and working with partners to pay their share.1831  3UHVLGHQW2EDPDKDVUHGHILQHG$PHULFD¶V
QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LQWHUHVWVE\GLVFDUGLQJWKHµZDURQWHUURU,¶ZLWKGUDZLQJIURP,UDTDQG$IJKDQLVWDQ
and pushing WKHGHVLUH WR UHGXFH$PHULFD¶VJOREDOPLOLWDU\ IRRWSULQW 5DWKHU WKDQ VXVSHQGLQJ86
global leadership, or shunning military options, Obama has escalated the fight against Islamic terrorism 
by intensifying the use of drone warfare against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
2EDPD UHWDLQV D EHOLHI LQ $PHULFDQ H[FHSWLRQDOLVP DQG LQ $PHULFD¶V JOREDO OHDGHUVKLS EXW KLV
XQGHUVWDQGLQJUHVWVRQ$PHULFD¶VµDELOLW\WRZRUNZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGXSKROGWKHUXOHRI
ODZ¶DQd its capacity to lead by example, rather than on what he terms the outmoded belief in military 
primacy as the single pillar of American hegemony.1832   
                                                          
1827 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 181. 
1828 Robert Patman and Laura SouthgĂƚĞ ? “'ůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞKďĂŵĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ŶŐŽĨh^
ǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?International Politics 53, no. 2 (2016): 226. 
1829 ĂƌĂĐŬKďĂŵĂ ? “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
https://my.barackobama.com/page/content/fpccga/ (accessed March 4, 2016). 
1830 In his 2007 Foreign Affairs article, Obama set out his vision for a post-G.W. Bush foreign policy. In this piece, 
ŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? ‘dŚƌĞĂƚƐĚĞŵĂŶĚĂŶĞǁǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŶƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚǇ-first century  W a vision that draws from 
ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ďƵƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ďŽƵŶĚ ďǇ ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ? ĂƌĂĐŬ KďĂŵĂ ?  “ZĞŶĞǁŝŶŐ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?Foreign 
Affairs (July/August 2007): 2-16. 
1831 The tŚŝƚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?  “ĂƌĂĐŬ KďĂŵĂ P ĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ >ŝďǇĂ ? ? EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞĨĞŶƐĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?
Washington, DC, March 28 March, 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-
president-address-nation-libya (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1832 WĂƚŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ^ŽƵƚŚŐĂƚĞ ?  “'ůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ KďĂŵĂ ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ Ănd the Refashioning of US 




The Obama administration has prioritised the Asia-Pacific within its global security perimeter.1833  This 
is not the same as offshore-balancing.  Nor is this universal or long-term retrenchment.  Rather, partial 
UHWUHQFKPHQWVXJJHVWVWKDW2EDPDLVDWWHPSWLQJWRµVDYHWKHFRUHRIWKHOLEHUDORUGHU¶E\shifting to the 
region where its hegemony is most challenged.1834  The designation of the Asia-Pacific region as 
critically important to core American interests is indicative of partial and short-term retrenchment ± a 
recalibration of U.S. priorities to sustain U.S. global leadership into the future ± rather than a long-term 
offshore-balancing strategy,QYLHZRIWKHSRWHQWLDOFKDOOHQJHWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHSUHVHQWVWR86JOREDO
leadership, the preservation of U.S. power and influence is the strategic priority.  As the U.S. 
Department of Defense document, Sustaining U.S. Global LeadershipIRUHZDUQVµ&KLQD¶VHPHUJHQFH
KDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRDIIHFWWKH86HFRQRPLFDQGRXUVHFXULW\LQDYDULHW\RIZD\V¶1835  In addition to 
rebalancing of U.S. military commitments and spending, the main political and strategic priority for 
future decades will be occupied by determining which great power ± the U.S. or China ± will structure 
the Asia-3DFLILF¶VUHJLRQDORUGHULWVLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNDQGWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHUHJLRQ¶Vfuture.   
 
The rebalance is as much an attempt by the U.S. to structure the Asia-3DFLILF¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV
integrating the region more fully into the U.S.-led order, and securing U.S. hegemony, as it is concerned 
ZLWKPDQDJLQJ&KLQD¶VULVH7KHUHEDODQFHLVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWUDWHJ\WKDWDLPVWRµIXWXUH-SURRI¶WKH
U.S. position as the resident Asia-Pacific power in military, economic and strategic spheres.  The 
rebalance is the realisation oIWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VVWUDWHJLFWKLQNLQJWKDWXVHVDEURDGUDQJHRI
American power.  These strategic themes include a preference for engagement, designed to reaffirm the 
U.S. commitment to an international order based on rights and responsibilities; improving bilateral 
relations; pursuing multilateralism where appropriate; and promoting burden-sharing.  The rebalance 
strategy has been developed in keeping with the American liberal international order that is underpinned 
by the American approach to security and trade, including the extension of openness, rules, a transparent 
legal framework, institutions and multilateral norms and the support of international laws to resolve 
disputes.1836   
 
                                                          
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ /ĚĞĂ ? ? New York Times, December 10, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/opinion/10cohen.html?_r=0  (accessed March 9, 2016).   
1833 Hemmer, American Pendulum, 160. 
1834 ZŽƐĞ ? “tŚĂƚKďĂŵĂ'ĞƚƐZŝŐŚƚ ? ? ? ? 
1835 h^ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞĨĞŶƐĞ ?  “^ƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ h^ 'ůŽďĂů >ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ P WƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ  ? ?st Century DefenƐĞ ? ?
(Washington, DC, 2012): 2. 
1836 Ikenberry questions whether the liberal world order still exists in the face of competition from newly rising 
states with different views, ŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶĚĂƐĨŽƌŐůŽďĂůŽƌĚĞƌ ?' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂů
tŽƌůĚKƌĚĞƌ P/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂĨƚĞƌŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?Foreign Affairs, 56, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 56.   
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While the goal remains to preserve American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, the challenge is to adapt 
WKHUHJLRQDORUGHUWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKHULVHRI&KLQDDQGWKHµQRUPDOLVDWLRQ¶RI-DSDQas a political and 
military power, EXWµWRGRVRLQZD\VWKDWUHWDLQWKHYLUWXHRIWKHROGRUGHU¶1837  0DQDJLQJ&KLQD¶VULVH
LQFOXGHV VKDSLQJ &KLQD¶V ULVLQJ SRZHU LGHQWLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH H[LVWLQJ RUGHU  7KH SUHYDLOLQJ ZLVGRP
FRQWLQXHVWRVXSSRUWHQJDJHPHQWRQWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKH86FDQVKDSH&KLQD¶VFKRLFHVDQGWKDW
China¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPZLOOSUHYHQWLWVUHYLVLRQLVPDQGUHGXFHWKHOLNHOLKRRG
of Sino-86 FRQIOLFW  6WHLQEHUJ DQG 2¶+DQORQ DUJXH WKDW VKDSLQJ µ&KLQD¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI 86
VWUDWHJ\¶ DQG LWV µOHDGHUV DVVHVVPHQWV RI 86 LQWHQWLRQV¶ ZLOO SURGXFH UHFLSURFDO SRVLWLYH &KLQHVH
responses.1838  7KLV DSSURDFKKLJKOLJKWV :DVKLQJWRQ¶V WHQGHQF\ WR VXSHULPSRVH LWV RZQ YDOXHV DQG
world view bias onto its interactions with Beijing, leaving Washington disappointed with the result.  
Consequently, Obama has continued to pursue engagement, while at the same time, gradually 
broadening its own military and economic options in the Asia-Pacific and often striking an adversarial 
posture as he seeks to reassert American regional hegemony.1839   
 
(i) Prospects for the Rebalance Strategy  
The future of the rebalance falls WR 2EDPD¶V VXFFHVVRU WR FRQWLQXH following the November 2016 
presidential election.  The trade element of the rebalance strategy is hugely contentious.  Both parties 
in Congress ± either on political or ideological grounds ± could potentially hold up legislative approval 
of TPP, a vote that Obama hoped to hold in June 2016, is unlikely to occur before Obama leaves the 
White House.1840  This is despite the admLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V KDUG-won securing of the Trade Promotion 
Authority that fast-tracks the legislative process for free trade agreements through Congress.  Both 
Donald Trump, Republican presidential nominee, and Hillary Clinton, Democrat presidential nominee, 
have spoken out against the TPP deal in its current form, although Clinton may shift towards centre-
ground once in the White House. 1841   There is also the matter of growing autocracy in the Southeast 
Asian region, most notably in Malaysia and the Philippines, which complicates the rebalance strategy, 
                                                          
1837 ' ?:ŽŚŶ/ŬĞŶďĞƌƌǇ ? “EĞǁKƌĚĞƌŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ? in East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, 
eds. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 222. 
1838 :ĂŵĞƐ ^ƚĞŝŶďĞƌŐ ĂŶĚ DŝĐŚĂĞů K ?,ĂŶůŽŶ ?Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the 
Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 47. 
1839 AndƌĞǁ ƌŽǁŶĞ ?  “ĂŶ ŚŝŶĂ Ğ ŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534 (accessed June 26, 2016). 
1840 In December 2015, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) signalled that the TPP would be defeated 
if it were sent to Capitol Hill in the spring or summer of 2016, as the administration had planned. Paul Kane and 
ĂǀŝĚEĂŬĂŵƵƌĂ ? “DĐŽŶŶĞůůtĂƌŶƐƚŚĂƚdƌĂĚĞĞĂůĂŶ ?ƚWass Congress before 2016 EůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Washington 
Post, December 10, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mcconnell-warns-that-trade-deal-cant-
pass-congress-before-2016-elections/2015/12/10/b8151f26-9f66-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html 
(accessed March 9, 2016). 
1841 EŝĐŬŽƌĂƐĂŶŝƚŝ ? “ŽŶĂůĚdƌƵŵƉsŽǁƐƚŽZŝƉhƉdƌĂĚĞĞĂůƐĂŶĚŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŚŝŶĂ ? ?New York Times, June 28, 





U.S. sphere of influence.  Deepening autocracy and the erosion of the rule of law in many Southeast 
Asian statHVDOVRPDNHVGLIILFXOW:DVKLQJWRQ¶VHIIRUWVWRFRPSHO&KLQDWREHERXQGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDO
regulations on, for example, the South China Sea disputes.1842  
 
As the campaign for the White House intensifies, Clinton and Trump inevitably offer competing visions 
for U.S. leadership for the next decade.  Clinton has positioned herself as a guardian of the post-Second 
:RUOG:DUJHRSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFRUGHUZKLOH7UXPSDSRSXOLVWRIIHUVDQµ$PHULFDILUVW¶YLVLRQ
that chimes with voters who have grown wary of the effects of globalisation.1843  A Democratic 
presidency under Hillary Clinton would most likely continue and further deepen the rebalance strategy, 
ZKLFKVKHIHUYHQWO\VXSSRUWHGDQGH[HFXWHGDV2EDPD¶VILUVW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH3UHOLPLQDU\LQGLFDWLRQV
suggest that Hillary Clinton is more hawkish than Obama on foreign policy,1844 and especially on 
China.1845  A Hillary Clinton presidency is also likely to continue with the existing security 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific.   Trump, in contrast, has indicated that he would insist on more 
burden-sharing from what he calls free-riding allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.1846  Sino-U.S. 
relations will remain an essential element of Asia-Pacific strategy but not the only consideration for the 
incoming President.  Establishing a workable framework for Sino-U.S. relations will be critical for 
regional stability.   
  
                                                          
1842 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĞĞů ? “'ƌŽǁŝŶŐƵƚŽĐƌĂĐǇŝŶƐŝĂŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐh^ ‘WŝǀŽƚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞZĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?Financial Times, September 
8, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b62523e-75cd-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.html#axzz4JlKkU2bP (accessed 
September 9, 2016).   
1843 The outcome of the UK referendum in favour of Brexit - h< ?ƐŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĞǆŝƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ Whas 
highlighted a global nationalist trend, driven by concerns over domestic economies. Trump, aligned with the US 
ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚ>ĞĂǀĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐĂƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůhS FTAs, including the TPP on the 
ŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh^ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŽĨŝƚƐďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŽƵƌƚŶĞǇtĞĂǀĞƌĂŶĚ
ĞŵĞƚƌŝ^ĞǀĂƐƚŽƉƵůŽ ? “tŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞZŝǀĂůƐDŝůĞƐƉĂƌƚŽŶsŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌh^sŽƚĞƌƐ ? ?Financial Times, June 29, 2016. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e8ff178-3e12-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0.html#axzz4D4B9sS60 (accessed June 
30, 2016).  
1844 Clinton appeared more hawkish in supporting military intervention in Syria than Obama.  John Hudson, 
 “ůŝŶƚŽŶWƌŽŵŝƐĞƐĂDŽƌĞ,ĂǁŬŝƐŚƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ/ƐůĂŵic State tŚĂŶKďĂŵĂ ? ?Foreign Policy, November 19, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/19/clinton-promises-a-more-hawkish-approach-to-islamic-state-than-
obama/ (accessed March 9, 2016). 
1845 ůŝŶƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚŝŶĂ^ĞĂĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐŝŶ,ĂŶŽŝ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƐŚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚŚŝŶĂƚo retreat from 
its assertive attempts to control the South China Sea, suggests that she will push back more strongly than Obama 
ŽŶďŽƚŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?'ĞŽĨĨǇĞƌĂŶĚdŽŵDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶ PdŚĞ
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b372cdb1043a.html#axzz4JlKkU2bP (accessed September 9, 2016). 
1846 Michael 'ŽůĚĨĂƌď ? “Donald Trump and Barack Obama Agree: America Cannot Police the World AŶǇŵŽƌĞ ? ?
Telegraph, March 30, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/30/donald-trump-and-barack-obama-




Current literature concentrates on the broader geopolitical implications, and treats the rebalance as a 
consequence of the competition between the U.S and China as the hegemon versus a rising power.  
While that may indeed be the case, this research contributes to the growing body of work on the Obama 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\E\GUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKHQRQ-material processes behind the intention 
and determination to maintain American hegemony and American power in the Asia-Pacific.  The 
background processes that form the basis of this thesis concern the formation of identity, and thus 
interests, narrative and how these processes combine to produce and justify foreign policy outcomes.  
To date, these non-material processes are under-theorised in the existing literature on the rebalance 
strategy.   
 
Since hegemony and primacy are often conflated within mainstream rationalist approaches, hegemony 
is treated as an extension of American material economic and military power.  Critical, especially neo-
Gramscian, approaches to hegemony, in contrast, focus on the social nature of hegemony.  Hegemony 
is a social relationship of dominance that is built upon hierarchical order and relies on the consent of 
others for reproduction and legitimation.  My contribution to the critical study of hegemony is through 
my interpretation of identity.  I view hegemony as essential to the production and reproduction of 
American identity.  How the U.S. acts to maintain its leading position in the regional order is driven by 
American interpretations of hegemony, which are essential to its understanding of self, as much as it is 
driven by the need to maintain LWVSUHSRQGHUDQWSRVLWLRQLQUHJLRQDORUGHU$PHULFD¶VLGHQWLW\DVWKH
Asia-Pacific regional hegemon is central to its decision to rebalance.1847   
 
$PHULFD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILWVKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\DQGWKHZD\LWSUDFWLVHVIRUHLJQSROLF\LVLQterlinked 
with, and reproduced through, discursive processes, especially narratives/story-telling.  The way the 
American state apparatus discursively constructs security and threats to that security feeds into 
American foreign policy behaviour, shaping the regional order commensurate with those constructions.  
7KHVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVFRQVWUDLQWKH86UHVSRQVHWRHYHQWVDQGKRZLWLQWHUSUHWVµ&KLQD¶VULVH.¶7KH
UHEDODQFHKDVEHHQMXVWLILHGRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH86LVREOLJHGWRUHVSRQGWR&KLQD¶VJURZLQJregional 
influence and justified in terms of the imminent threat that China now presents to the U.S. and its 
regional allies.  To understand how the U.S. responds to regional trends and especially the rise of China, 
the internal identity and narrative processes shaping American foreign policy cannot simply be 
                                                          
1847 &ŽƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĂůŝƚǇĂƚĂŶǇƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞŝƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞ
product of human aĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂůĞ ?ŽƉĞůĂŶĚ ? “dŚĞŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽ
^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůZĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŝŶConstructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics, eds. Stefano 
Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 3. 
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assumed; they must be explicitly acknowledged.  How identity shapes world view and how identity 
interacts with real world contexts has implications for the practice of foreign policy.   
 
There is a tendency in discourse analysis to explain how dominant discourses articulated by officials 
SURGXFH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SUDFWLFHV  +RZHYHU DV 0LOOLNHQ REVHUYHV WKH ZHDNQHVV LV WR RPLW µZKDW
happens after a policy is promulgated among high-OHYHORIILFLDOV¶1848  To go some way to rectify this 
RPLVVLRQ WKLV WKHVLV DSSOLHV%DUQHWW DQG'XYDOO¶V IUDPHZRUNRISRZHU WR examine how power and 
hegemony intersect and reinforce each other over time.  The durability of the hegemonic order relies on 
WKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\DUWLFXODWHDQGXVH$PHULFDQSRZHUDVVHWVOHJLWLPDWHO\
Power, like hegemony, is not reducible to material power advantages.  Hegemony is dependent on the 
hegHPRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR JDUQHU FRQVHQW IRU LWV RUGHU WKURXJK WKH DSSURSULDWH XVH RI LWV FRPSXOVRU\
institutional, structural and productive power.  This comprehensive framework enables a study of how 
the Obama administration uses its power resources to implement and promote the benefits of the 
rebalance strategy across the region, and to assess the effects of the American use of power on the 
subordinate states.  The focus on the rebalance strategy also provides analysis of how this specific policy 
has been enacted in a particular circumstance, driven by the µ&KLQD¶VULVH¶ narrative.  Since hegemony 
involves states of being and doing, this research illuminates processes such as identity formation and 
narrative construction, linking them with foreign policy practices.   
 
The timing of the rebalance strategy ± RIWHQWUHDWHGZLWKLQWKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHDVOLQNHGZLWK&KLQD¶V
increasingly assertive behaviour between 2008 and 2010 ± is considered in this thesis to be a critical act 
of decision-making.  Others, in contrast, view the timing of the rebalance announcement with the 
military aspect of the strategy as coincidental.1849  This assumption creates the impression that the 
DQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKHUHEDODQFHVWUDWHJ\LQ1RYHPEHUZDV$PHULFD¶VUHDFWLRQWR&KLQD¶VDFWLYities 
± a position also endorsed by the administration¶V official statements and speeches.  However, this 
position cannot deepen our understanding of why key elements of the rebalance strategy were already 
being implemented from 2009.   
 
The discursive practice of narrative, or story-telling, allows consideration of the timing of the rebalance 
strategy in historical perspective; the U.S. perception of events, its hegemonic identity and the 
(re)production of a dominant (or hegemonic) narrative that justifies action.  The sequencing of events, 
                                                          
1848 DŝůůŝŬĞŶ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1849 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 
200. See also Clinton, Hard Choices, especially chapter 3. 
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linking the past and the present, is essential to narrative formation and thus the timing of the rebalance 
VWUDWHJ\LVDFULWLFDOPRPHQWLQ86LGHQWLW\7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRDQQRXQFHWKHUHEDODQFH
in November 2011 was as much propelled by the need to reproduce its hegemonic identity, at the 
moment its hegemonic identity was being undermined, DVLWZDVVHWLQPRWLRQE\&KLQD¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQ
the South China Sea, which, until 2010, were on the periphery of U.S. regional interests.  The U.S. 
reaction was driven by ontological insecurity concerns, manifested in the need to secure physical 
security. 
 
The discursive practice of narratives illuminates KRZWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VGRPLQDQWQDUUDWLYH
on national security has legitimised the rebalance strategy as a positive move towards the Asia-Pacific 
± silencing alternative narratives on national security that could have defined the rebalance in strategic 
WHUPV DV DQ\WKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ D PHDQV WR FRQWDLQ WKH µ&KLQD Whreat.¶  7ZR VHSDUDWH EXW interlinked 




but one which relies on intersubjective understanding for its meaning.  U.S. political officials constantly 
realign the two processes of identity and narrative construction as they react to events and policy 
practices.  U.S. leaders attempt to sustain American ontological security, systematically buttressing its 
hegemony to feel less ontologically insecure and does this through threat narratives.  
 
This thesis also engages with the developing literature on ontological security in International Relations.  
Prioritising ontological security instead of a myopic focus on physical security allows for the combining 
of identity and security processes.  This conceptualisation of ontological security also incorporates the 
link to physical security.  American ontological security-seeking behaviours have a direct consequence 
on physical security, with the U.S. interpreting &KLQD¶V DFWLYLWLHV DV D WKUHDW WR $PHULFDQ SK\VLFDO
security and that of LWVDOOLHV$V5XPHOLOLREVHUYHVµFRQFHUQVDERXWLQVWDELOLW\DQGXQFHUWDLQW\RIEHLQJ
FDQ HDVLO\ EH SROLWLFDOO\ PDQLSXODWHG LQWR FRQFHUQV DERXW VXUYLYDO¶1850  Furthermore, the 
conceptualisation of ontological security developed in this thesis disaggregates ontological security into 
states RIµEHLQJ¶DQGµGRLQJ¶WKDWDOORZVIRUWKHH[DPLQDWLRQRISDUWLFXODUIRUHLJQSROLF\VWUDWHJLHVOLNH
the rebalance, as a means to sustain and reproduce American hegemonic identity.1851  As both Mitzen 
                                                          
1850 ZƵŵĞůŝůŝ ? “/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?60. 
1851 See Browning anĚ :ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ?  “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? &ůŽĐŬŚĂƌƚ ?  “dŚĞ WƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ ŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀist 
Theory ? ? 
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and Steele independently observe, empirical phenomena are actually identity threats.1852  By 
disaggregating ontological and physical security, this thesis is able to look at the constituting effects 
that these two conditions of security have on each other ± neither privileging one over the other, thus 
broadening the position of existing literature on µsecurity.¶ 
 
One criticism levelled at an ontological security approach concerns the extrapolation from individual 
ontological security to state level. After all, states are not human beings and their behaviour might be 
subject to different logics.1853  Critics argue that collectives ± states and nations ± do not have the same 
psychological needs as people and consequently, caution must be exercised towards any approach 
which seeks to treat them equally.1854  Since we assume states seek physical security, why not also 
ontological security?  Both are theoretically productive.1855  Fundamental to the role of the state and its 
legitimacy is its ability to mediate anxieties by providing for basic individual and social needs, not only 
by providing order and physical and economic security, but also by providing reassurance about the 
QDWXUHRIWKHZRUOGDQGWKHFRQWLQXLW\RIRQH¶VVHOILGHQWLW\DVVHHQWKURXJKWKHFROOHFWLYH1856  
 
Focus on ontological security in IR deepens existing understanding of state identity and the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUIRUHLJQSROLF\$VRFLHW\PXVWEHµFRJQLWLYHO\VWDEOH¶LQRUGHUWRVHFXUHWKHLGHQWLWLHV
of the individuals they seek to protect, and individuals become attached to these stable identities.  States 
also exhibit behaviours that strengthen the ontological security-seeking position.  States seek 
similarities with, or distinctiveness from, other groups, and seek routinised relations with other groups.  
The state also projects self-images that are either accepted or rejected by other states.  Mitzen observes 
that the irrational reactions states exhibit towards another suggests that states, like humans, also 
reproduce mistrust, even without a physical threat being present.1857  While collective actors like states 
do not have psychologies, they are constituted by, and seek to promote, certain values.1858  Simply put, 
collectives, like nations and states, do have biographies, which are emotive and contested, and which 
policy leaders acting in their name, are both aware of, and seek to uphold.1859  Self-narratives are not 
                                                          
1852 See DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?^ƚĞĞůĞ ?Ontological Security in International Relations. 
1853 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1854 ƌŽǁŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?13; ZŽĞ ? “dŚĞ  ‘sĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨWŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?785. 
1855 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1856 Browning and JoennŝĞŵŝ ?  “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?13; Alanna Krolikowski,  “State Personhood in Ontological 
Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View ? ?The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008): 109-33; ZŽĞ ? “dŚĞ  ‘sĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨWŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?785. 
1857 DŝƚǌĞŶ ? “KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtŽƌůĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1858 ZŽĞ ? “dŚĞ ‘sĂůƵĞ ? of Positive Security ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1859 Browning and JŽĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ? “ƐĐĂƉŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?13. 
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only important in connecting identities to interests but also entail significant emotional content ± an 
element largely ignored in much constructivist analysis.1860   
 
Limitations and future research opportunities 
Rather than framing this research through the success of the rebalance strategy as a means to measure 
the strength of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, priority has been given to discerning how the 
American exercise of power through the rebalance strategy, which underpins the reproduction of U.S. 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  American identity, preferences, interests and foreign policy choices have 
therefore provided the main foci.  The administration has also consistently maintained that a crucial 
goal of the rebalance strategy is to reassure allies of the sustainability and willingness of the United 
States to lead the regional order.  The degree to which individual Asia-Pacific nations feel reassured is 
vital for measuring the success of the rebalance strategy.  Such a project would require extensive field 
work throughout the Asia-Pacific to ascertain individual state perspectives on whether they feel more 
or less secure with the rebalance.  This would necessitate evaluation of the extent to which Asia-Pacific 
states are being drawn to the rebalance strategy, as a means of measuring its success, rather than their 
being drawn to the U.S. because of their greater concern over China.  Although the Obama 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VHFRQRPLFGLSORPDWLFDQGPLOLWDU\FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHUHJLRQDUHPDQ\PHDVXULQJLWV
tangible success is outside the scope of this project.  The effectiveness of the rebalance strategy is not 
evaluated in this thesis since this is not the focus of this particular project.  Such a project may also 
consider resistance to American hegemony from the perspective of the subordinate regional states ± and 
not just China.1861   
 
Finally, the constructivist approach of this thesis does not support any predictions concerning the 
trajectory of U.S-China relations.  Nor does this thesis intend to offer any prescriptive plans that could 
improve American chances of maintaining its regional hegemony.  China and the U.S. have different 
value structures and preferences, they also have fundamentally different identities, through which they 
have distinct visions for regional order in the Asia-Pacific and potentially for global order.  The 
discourse of security, in addition to threat construction, facilitates the construction of self and other, 
presenting as natural what is essential contingent and culturally/historically-specific definitions of inter-
state relations. As Hansen observes, constructions of identity can take on varying degrees of 
                                                          
1860 Catarina <ŝŶŶǀĂůů ?  “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological 
security ? ?Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004):748.   
1861 'ŽŚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-Cold War period. This position could be developed to include 
the rebalance. See Goh, The Struggle for Order. 
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otherness.1862  Campbell additionally opens up the possibility that identity need not be constructed 
through radical otherness.  Identity is never fixed or final; it is always in the process of becoming.1863  
There are still a range of options that can influence the direction of U.S.-ChLQDUHODWLRQV$PHULFD¶V
µSXVKEDFN¶ DJDLQVW WKH XQNQRZQ TXDQWLW\ WKDW LV &KLQD¶V ULVLQJ SRZHU LGHQWLW\ LV D µQDWXUDO DQG
LQVWLQFWLYHUHVSRQVH¶EXWLWLVQRWWKHRQO\SRVVLEOH response.1864   
 
Judging the strength and U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific will inevitably depend XSRQ$PHULFD¶V
capacity and willingness to manage relations with China.  If the rebalance strategy continues to form 
the framework of U.S-Asia-Pacific strategy, the U.S. will need to engage with regional allies, both 
multilaterally and bilaterally, to improve their economic and military capacities, to project American 
power, and to secure regional public goods, such as freedom of navigation, in addition to working with 
China bilaterally and multilaterally on matters of regional and global importance.  One of the key 
challenges of the Obama administration, which will continue in the new administration, is the building 
of a political consensus at home and abroad that accepts some fundamental changes occurring in the 
international system and the constrainWVWKLVSODFHVRQ$PHULFD¶V unilateral use of force.  The challenge 
LVDOVRWRDGDSWWUDGLWLRQDOWKLQNLQJRQ$PHULFD¶VKHJHPRQLFLGHQWLW\ZKLFKLVSULPDULO\IRFXVHG on 
preserving primacy and maintaining the status quo.  Instead, prolonging American hegemony requires 
re-negotiating the terms of its regional leadership by acknowledging the legitimacy of regimes that do 
not necessarily adhere to the American model.   
 
  
                                                          
1862 Hansen, Security as Practice, 40. 
1863 Campbell, Writing Security. 
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